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Abstract 
 
This thesis provides an analysis of policy change in the Conservative Party on the question of 
European integration between 1997 and 2016. The thesis answers two principal research 
questions. Firstly, in what ways did European policy change in the Conservative Party 
between May 1997 and February 2016? Secondly, what caused these changes in European 
policy and how can they be understood in relation to exogenous and endogenous factors? It 
answers these questions through a qualitative analysis of 36 original interviews with party 
elites, 119 speeches, 267 parliamentary statements, 290 newspaper articles, and nine 
manifestoes. Additionally, it has drawn on secondary quantitative survey data from Ipsos 
Mori, YouGov, and the British Social Attitudes Survey. It concludes that policy has moved 
incrementally over the period from a minimalist-Soft Eurosceptic position to a more 
revisionist-Soft Eurosceptic position with Hard Eurosceptic elements. Policy experienced 
periods of both stability and volatility depending on the internal and external political 
context. Theoretically, it advances an approach centred upon new institutionalist theories. It 
argues this better accounts for the underlying processes and mechanisms behind policy 
change in political parties. In doing so it provides an integrated approach which can be 
applied to the future study of policy change in other political parties. This thesis makes an 
original contribution to both the literature on the Conservative Party and European 
integration, and policy change in political parties more widely. It does so by providing an 
empirically systematic and theoretically informed analysis of the development of European 
policy, an approach lacking in previous research, covering a period in which changes in 
policy over Europe in the Conservative Party would contribute directly to the June 2016 EU 
Referendum. As such, it also makes an important contribution to our understanding of the 
UK’s historical path towards Brexit. 
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Summary 
 
This thesis provides an in-depth analysis and explanation of policy change in the 
Conservative Party on the question of European integration, from May 1997 to February 
2016. Firstly, it puts into context what is meant when we say that a political party has 
changed, before proceeding to examine the exogenous and endogenous factors that can 
influence a political party to change policy positions. Following from this, it considers how 
insights from new institutionalist theory can provide a more comprehensive explanation of 
how an institution like a political party changes policy over time. It achieves this by 
introducing further theoretical tools and mechanisms, such as path dependency and historical 
legacy, that helps provide a more detailed analysis of the processes behind policy change. It 
then traces Conservative European policy from May 1997 to February 2016, identifying the 
changes and continuities in chronological order. It categorises each period according to 
Lynch and Whitaker’s typology of different varieties of Euroscepticism and identifies the 
type of change observed. The following chapters are then structured thematically, using the 
exogenous and endogenous factors of policy change and the new institutionalist theory 
approach, to analyse the causes of policy change from 1997-2001, 2001-2005, 2005-2010, 
and 2010-2016. 
The main findings of the thesis are summarised as follows: 
• Incrementally over the period European policy moves in a more Eurosceptic 
direction. Using the Lynch and Whittaker (2013) party-based Euroscepticism 
spectrum, it is categorized as moving from a minimalist-Soft Eurosceptic position in 
May 1997 to a revisionist-Soft Eurosceptic position with Hard Eurosceptic elements.  
 
• Between May 1997 and February 2016 there were changes to policy on the single 
currency, referendums on further integration, repatriation of EU policy competencies, 
and the extent of participation in EU Justice and Home Affairs policy. Reform of EU 
immigration and welfare policy was introduced during the 2010-2016, as was the 
protection of the interests of non-Eurozone EU members. The position of 
Conservative MEPs in the European Parliament also changed multiple times. 
 
 xii 
• The degree to which exogenous or endogenous factors influenced policy is highly 
contextualized, with different factors being important at different times depending on 
the circumstances. 
 
• In terms of endogenous causes of policy change, the role of political elites was 
consistently the most important driver of change. This includes not only the party 
leaders themselves, but also the Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet ministers directly 
responsible for European policy. For endogenous factors, the influence of rival 
political parties (Referendum Party and UKIP) and the international political context 
were also important to policy change at different times over the period. 
 
• European policy developed a Eurosceptic path dependency during the 1997-2016 
period, in which the exogenous and endogenous factors combined with other 
influences on policy, such as historical legacies and contingent events, to keep policy 
on this path. This developed incrementally over time, in combination with a number 
of critical junctures, which stimulated more immediate change. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
On January 23rd, 2013, during a speech at the Bloomberg news agency headquarters in 
London, David Cameron (2013a) committed his party to holding a future referendum on 
whether the UK should remain a member of the European Union (EU). Cameron’s speech 
marked the first time a leader of the Conservative Party had publicly proposed an in/out 
referendum on UK membership of the EU. It was a critical juncture on a path that would 
eventually see the UK vote to leave the EU on June 23rd, 2016, in a national referendum. 
Many factors contributed to this result. But changing attitudes within the Conservative Party 
and the party’s developing European policy after May 1997 were particularly important. The 
Conservative policy moved during this twenty-year period from a minimalist-soft 
Eurosceptic position, to a revisionist-Soft Eurosceptic position with Hard Eurosceptic 
elements (Lynch and Whittaker, 2013a). This change in policy, to the point at which many in 
the party could contemplate the UK leaving the EU, raises questions about what causes 
policy to change in modern British political parties and how these factors interact to produce 
this change. 
This thesis aims to explain how the Conservative Party reached this point in the historical 
development of their position on European integration by analysing the causal factors which 
have shaped changes in the Conservative Party’s European policy between May 1997 and 
February 2016. It will therefore answer the following research questions: 
- In what ways has European policy changed in the Conservative Party between May 
1997 and February 2016? 
- What caused these changes in European policy and how can they be understood in 
relation to exogenous and endogenous factors? 
As the review of the literature in Chapter 2 will show, existing theories of party change which 
focus on a variety of exogenous and endogenous factors are not without value. However, they 
do not consider enough how temporality, contextual circumstances, and the influence of 
historical events and actions shape policy and are arguably restricted as explanations to the 
period and groups of parties to which they were immediately directed. The power of ideas to 
shape policy change in political parties is also neglected, as is the role of individual agency, 
with a tendency for explanations to be overly structural and deterministic. If policy change is 
a process that takes place over time, a more comprehensive theoretical framework is needed 
in addition to the exogenous and endogenous factors of party change, to explain the 
 2 
mechanisms at work. As will be developed in Chapter 3, this thesis proposes an integrated 
new institutionalist framework to overcome these inadequacies, drawing upon the strengths 
of the different strands of new institutionalist theory. 
1.1 Thesis Scope 
 
The justification for the time period this thesis considers, May 1997 to February 2016, is as 
follows. Firstly, this thesis argues the two events that bookend this period (May 2nd, 1997 
following the general election, and February 19th, 2016, when Cameron announced the 
conclusion to UK-EU renegotiation deal talks and confirmed he would be supporting the UK 
remaining inside the EU) mark critical junctures in the history of the Conservative Party and 
European policy. As argued in more detail in Chapter 5, the period from May 1997 marks a 
critical juncture as the party changed to an openly Eurosceptic position following the general 
election defeat. From the Shadow Cabinet, to the parliamentary party and party membership, 
for the first time each was now majority Eurosceptic in composition. Whereas previous 
leaders, Margaret Thatcher and John Major, had adopted more Eurosceptic rhetoric and 
outlooks in the latter stages of their leadership, Hague was elected upon and openly 
articulated a Eurosceptic platform from the outset. This marked the start of a new period for 
the Conservative Party and European policy, and as such, is the most logical starting point for 
the analysis of this thesis. 
After February 2016 a new period started, dominated firstly by the June 2016 EU referendum 
announcement, campaign, and vote. Secondly, from the subsequent aftermath of the 
referendum to the present, the question of how to negotiate a UK withdrawal agreement with 
the EU that is compatible with the result has been the focus of European policy. As such, 
February 2016 is the logical conclusion to the scope of this thesis, with the period following 
the referendum and including the withdrawal negotiations and transition period providing a 
new opportunity for future academic study of policy change in the Conservative Party on 
Europe. 
Additionally, there are a number of more pragmatic justifications for starting the analysis in 
1997, rather than, for example, 1992 or 1988. Firstly, a major strength of this thesis is the 
new data gathered through interviews with party elites. If the thesis had started from an 
earlier point it would have increased the likelihood that party elites with knowledge of the 
European policy development process would be retired from public life and therefore been 
either much more difficult to contact or have passed away. Moreover, it would have relied 
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more heavily on interviewees remembering events from which a substantial amount of time 
had passed, increasing the likelihood of inaccurate recollections of past events. Secondly, the 
thesis time period as it is already covers a significant period of time (19 years). Research 
which would have covered analysis of a 25 or 30-year period could potentially have been 
unmanageable considering the time and length constraints placed on both the researcher and 
thesis itself. The benefits of a more concise time period of 1997-2016 allows for a more 
detailed, in-depth, and higher quality of analysis than would have been practically possible if 
the thesis had covered a longer historical period. Thirdly, and as the bibliography of this 
thesis indicates, substantially more scholarship has already been completed on the 
Conservative Party and Europe during the 1988-1997 period than the post-1997 period. As 
such, the focus of this thesis on the 1997-2016 period allows for a clearer and more important 
original contribution to scholarship in this area to be made. 
 
1.2 Research Methods and Data Collection 
This thesis predominately uses an interpretative, qualitative approach to answer each of its 
research questions. It adopts process tracing as the main qualitative research method. Most of 
the primary data collected and analysed is qualitative. It has also been necessary to collect 
and use secondary quantitative data particularly on public opinion and voting intentions over 
time, or the attitudes of certain groups, in which secondary quantitative surveys are the best 
sources of information. These are used to triangulate with the primary qualitative data, as 
well as to test and challenge the evidence employed from personal accounts of political 
events. 
Process tracing uses a qualitative analysis of multiple documentary sources, such as speeches, 
interviews, and historical records, to identify the causal mechanisms and sequences at work 
in everyday social processes in order to explain specific political, economic, or cultural 
outcomes in single or multiple case studies (Pedersen and Beach 2016; Bennett and Checkel 
2015). Tansey (2007:765) observes that process tracing is an approach concerned with 
‘developing and testing theory in ways that incorporate attention to the causal processes at 
work in political life – to the causal mechanisms that link causes to effects’. Process tracing is 
the approach used here as it enables the analysis of political phenomena which develop as a 
process over time. 
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To answer the first research question, a range of documentary data sources were analysed. 
Firstly, public speeches on European policy by party elites were used to trace the process of 
policy change over the time period. These were archived, annotated, and analysed using the 
qualitative data software NVivo 10.  Public statements on European policy by Conservative 
Party spokesmen are a strong indicator of the party position on European policy at the time 
they are given. They are also much more frequent than party manifestoes and therefore allow 
for the development of European policy to be traced over time, in between the release of 
manifestoes. ‘Policy speeches’ are defined as stand-alone public speeches given by party 
elites, such as the party leader or foreign secretary, often with the main focus on one broad 
area of policy (crime, education, housing, etc).These types of public speeches are frequently 
used by the policy-making elites of political parties to give in-depth explorations of party 
positions on specific areas of policy, or to announce new or changed policy positions.  
Analysis of policy speeches was supplemented by the use of party manifestoes (UK and 
European elections) to establish the party positions at elections, in addition to statements in 
the House of Commons, policy documents, newspaper articles or interviews, especially, but 
not exclusively, those by the party leader and shadow or foreign secretary. Through the 
tracing of public statements by key party elites, from multiple points in time across the period 
and using a wide range of documentary sources, a clear and detailed account of the 
development of European policy can be established. 
A second set of documentary sources was also used, mainly to answer the second and third 
research questions. These include secondary sources such as the biographies, 
autobiographies, and memoirs of party elites close to the policy development process within 
the party, published diaries, historical studies, newspaper reports, and journalistic ‘insider’ 
accounts of the Conservative Party between 1997-2016.These were employed to support and 
corroborate explanations sourced from elite interviews, in addition to providing alternative 
evidence for European policy change. 
Secondary quantitative data was also used, for the second and third research questions, in 
order to trace the development of public opinion. These included quantitative data on voting 
intentions and public opinion from organisations such as Ipsos Mori, YouGov, and the British 
Social Attitudes survey, to name the most frequently cited sources. 
The primary data collection method used for answering the second and third research 
questions was a series of 36 semi-structured interviews with former and current Conservative 
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Party MPs, MEPs, Lords, special advisors, and other party officials. This provided new 
insights on the development of European policy in the Conservative Party during this period 
and is therefore a significant element of the original contribution this thesis makes. 
Additionally, to gain an insight into the development of European policy during the Coalition 
government, several Liberal Democrats with first-hand experience were also interviewed. 
Many of the most high-profile individuals, and those currently or most recently serving in 
government positions, were naturally unavailable or unwilling to be interviewed. However, 
considering the difficulty in arranging interviews with party elites, a wide range of decision-
makers and those with knowledge of the policy process were interviewed for this thesis (see 
Appendix). This includes former party leaders, deputy leaders, members of the Shadow 
Cabinet, and government ministers. Interviewees cover all the periods under analysis, and 
every effort was made to interview those from a variety of ideological positions on European 
integration from within the Conservative Party. 
As a data collection method, elite interviews are important as they provide researchers with 
an original insight into the political processes that contribute towards policy development in a 
political party, collecting information from ‘first hand participants’ (Beamer 2002; Tansey 
2007). They provide a useful way in which researchers can confidently generalise about the 
thought process of individuals in institutions such as political parties, as the individuals 
providing the information were active in the institution at the time (Goldstein 2002). In doing 
so, elite interviews can contribute towards establishing which internal and external factors 
most contributed to the development of European policy at different points in time during this 
period. Data from elite interviews can be used to corroborate information from other data 
sources, in addition to contributing to the reconstruction of specific events, or the 
involvement of certain political actors, that could have been significant to policy 
development and outcomes, but which are not currently covered in other documentary 
accounts (Richards 1996; Seldon 1988). In this way, elite interviews can be used to 
triangulate multiple data sources to improve the reliability of conclusions, as well as 
providing new additional information not available in from other sources (Davies 2001; 
Seldon 1988; Tansey 2007). 
Interviews were semi-structured in format to allow for both specific questions to be asked of 
certain events, individuals or policy decisions, and open-ended questions to be asked so that 
broad issues surrounding the European policy development process could be explored 
(Aberbach and Rockman 2002). As Seldon (1988:12) notes of the unstructured sections of 
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elite interviews, ‘what interviewees have to say unprompted, the way and order in which they 
say what they say, can be all enlightening’. This balances the requirement for specific in-
depth responses within a conversational approach, without falling into the trap of entirely 
unstructured interactions, which can produce poor information and unfocused ‘streams of 
consciousness’ (Beamer 2002:86). The questions set were focused on exploring the decision-
making process behind European policy development, in addition to the internal or external 
institutional factors that could have influenced this process. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two draws upon a variety of literatures to 
establish and assess the exogenous and endogenous factors that contribute towards policy 
change in political parties. Chapter Three set outs how an integrated new institutionalist 
approach can contribute to a better understanding of policy change alongside the 
exogenous/endogenous causes of policy change discussed in Chapter Two, by providing 
theoretical tools and mechanisms which enable a more rigorous and sophisticated theoretical 
explanation of the processes behind policy change. Chapter Four provides a chronological 
analysis of the changes and continuities in Conservative European policy from May 1997 to 
February 2016. Chapters 5 to 8 examines the causal factors which most contributed towards 
policy change during this period. Finally, Chapter 9 provides a conclusion, summarizing the 
key findings, setting out additional examples for applying this approach, and the implications 
for future research in this area. 
1.4 Original Contribution and Key Findings 
The analysis in the chapters that follow makes the following original contributions to the 
body of academic literature on the Conservative Party, British political parties and European 
policy, and policy change within political parties. Firstly, this thesis contributes a more 
empirically systematic and theoretically informed approach to understanding the 
development of European policy in the Conservative Party. It does so by assessing change 
through the perspective of endogenous and exogenous causes of policy change, in addition to 
theoretical insights on how institutions change over time from new institutionalist theory. 
Previously, long-form academic accounts on this subject have concentrated on narrative and 
description, lacking an organized empirical analysis of what has been significant in 
influencing policy change and what has not (Crowson, 2006; Patterson, 2011). Additionally, 
arguments have often leaned too heavily on ‘rising Euroscepticism’ as a catch-all, general 
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explanation of the causes of policy change and has underused theory as a means to explain 
the nature of policy change.  
Secondly, this thesis contributes a detailed empirical account of the development of European 
policy in the Conservative Party, 1997-2016. It does so with the benefit of original interview 
data from 36 interviews from elite individuals who experienced and participated in the policy 
development process directly, providing original first-hand insights often missing from other 
accounts. It aims to build upon the previous literature on the Conservative Party and 
European integration, providing an important contribution to what has historically been a 
major issue of interest in British politics since 1945, in addition to one that continues to 
attract widespread academic and public attention at the time of writing as the UK negotiates a 
deal to leave the EU in March 2019. 
Thirdly, it provides a framework and approach which can be adopted for the future study of 
policy change in other political parties, combining the qualitative process tracing research 
method with the exogenous/endogenous causes of policy change and the integrated new 
institutionalist framework. 
The main findings are as follows. Conservative Party policy towards the EU did move in a 
more Eurosceptic direction between 1997 and 2016. From May 1997 and to the end of the 
1997-2001 parliament, policy maintained a minimalist-Soft Eurosceptic position. During the 
2001-2005 parliament, under the leadership of Duncan Smith and Howard, the platform 
moved to a more revisionist-Soft Eurosceptic position with the party proposing specific areas 
of EU policy for repatriation to the UK. This was maintained post-2005 under the leadership 
of Cameron. There were certain points, most notably the immigration cap pledge under 
Howard and the in/out EU referendum commitment under Cameron, where European policy 
approached a rejectionist-Hard Eurosceptic position. However, during the period in question, 
there were no points when party policy as a whole is categorized as Hard Eurosceptic. 
European policy changed on the single currency, the question of treaty referendums, areas of 
EU policy to repatriate, and whether to participate in EU Justice and Home Affairs policy. 
European policy also expanded to include new areas of policy. For example, the party 
included reform of EU immigration and welfare policy during the 2010-2015 parliament, 
which previously had not been included. During the same parliament policy also included the 
question of the rights and protections of non-Eurozone EU members, which had not been part 
of the party’s agenda previously. 
 8 
In terms of the endogenous and exogenous causes of change, over the course of the period, 
political leadership and individual agency was consistently the most influential endogenous 
casual factor. This included not only the party leaders but also other individual actors such as 
the shadow/foreign secretary, Cabinet members, and special advisors. Intra-party pressure 
groups were influential in government during the 2010-2016 period but had much less impact 
on policy during the opposition years. The ideological profile of the parliamentary and 
grassroots party, in terms of increasing Eurosceptic attitudes over this period, was a necessary 
internal condition for guiding policy change in a more Eurosceptic direction but cannot be 
attributed to any one policy change. 
A further key finding is the contribution leadership elections have made to policy change on 
Europe. Commitments made on European policy by successful candidates, made during the 
competitive dynamics of the leadership elections, had long term implications for European 
policy. This occurred in 1997, when Hague proposed the ‘two parliaments’ policy on the 
single currency during the leadership election, and in 2005 when Cameron committed himself 
to removing Conservative MEPs from the European Peoples’ Party in the European 
Parliament. The latter would have long-term implications for the relationship between the 
Conservative Party and other mainstream center-right parties in Europe. 
Exogenous causes of policy change were also important, but the degree to which they 
influenced change fluctuated during the period. Rival political parties were the most 
significant factor here. Electoral competition, both real and perceived, from the Referendum 
Party during the 1997-2001 parliament, and UKIP in the later stages of the 2010-2015 
parliament, were influential in convincing the party leadership to change policy. This 
included policy changes related to referendum commitments, EU immigration, and EU 
citizen welfare entitlements. Policy change was often influenced by the anticipation of future 
electoral competition. For example, committing to the in/out EU referendum in anticipation 
of UKIP success at the 2014 European and 2015 UK general elections. 
The electoral performance of the party made an impact, but again this depended on the 
context of the election. The 1997 election was significant as it stimulated an endogenous 
change; the coming to power of leadership that was committed to changing policy in a 
Eurosceptic direction. The 2001 election persuaded Duncan Smith that the party needed to 
change policy on the single currency, while the 2005 election had little impact. The result of 
the 2010 election, and formation of the Coalition, changed much of European policy in order 
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to accommodate Liberal Democrat preferences. The 2015 election was less dramatic in this 
respect, though the manifesto and unexpected majority bound the party leadership into the 
referendum and renegotiation plan promised by Cameron in January 2013. This exogenous 
factor was often important for change as it stimulated endogenous change within the party, by 
persuading the party leadership that European policy needed to reflect new circumstances. 
As with the rising Eurosceptic attitudes in the internal institutions of the party, the parallel 
development of Eurosceptic attitudes in UK public opinion toward the EU during 1997-2016 
was an important external political condition for development of European policy. However, 
it was the increase in salience of immigration as a concern to the general public, specifically 
EU migration in the second half of the 2010-2015 parliament, which had more influence on 
policy than public attitudes to Europe. While public attitudes towards toward the EU grew 
steadily more Eurosceptic during the period, the EU/European integration as a political 
subject was generally ascribed a low priority by voters in public opinion surveys.  
The international political context, events taking place or decisions made outside of the 
domestic political environment, also contributed to policy change. The most important 
influence here were developments in the EU and the Eurozone.  Consistently over the period 
the Conservative Party changed and modified policy in reaction to the shifting political 
situation in the EU, the positions of prominent member states, and the direction and nature of 
European integration. European policy in this case was reactive, with little of this proactive 
policy change seen in response to anticipated change in the domestic political environment. 
European policy mostly developed incrementally over this period, with policy building up in 
layers over time, but could change more abruptly in reaction to events. Policy would go 
through periods of relative stability, for example during the 2001-2005 parliament, but also 
experience periods of instability, such as during the negotiations to form the Coalition in 
2010. Over the period individual policies would change, be modified, or dropped, and then 
get reintroduced under a new leadership depending on the influence of exogenous and 
endogenous factors. However, when individual policies or commitments to reform became 
institutionally entrenched in the parliamentary and grassroots sections of the party, these 
policies and commitments became path dependent and difficult to change. 
Each step in this direction increased the costs to the leadership of changing course and made 
each further step in this direction more likely as positive feedback reinforced the initial 
decisions. Though there would be some critical junctures (1997 election, the October 2011 
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rebellion) that directly influenced policy change, change would also be encouraged from 
smaller contingent events and acts of individual agency. History and the sequence of events 
also contributed significantly to policy change, with past ideas, events, and individual actions 
shaping and constraining the decision-making process of each future party leadership. 
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Chapter 2: Change in Political Parties 
This chapter outlines an approach for understanding how political parties change. It sets out 
to explore the literature on change in political parties and establish the key exogenous and 
endogenous factors that contribute towards this change. These factors will then form the 
structure for the thematic analysis in each of the separate empirical chapters on the 
Conservative Party and European policy change that follows. In addition, it also aims to 
establish the limitations of this approach and establish the areas in which the new 
institutionalist theoretical framework, set out in the chapter that follows, can address these 
limitations. It is specifically focused upon how and why political parties change their policy 
positions, so it will be this form of ‘change’ in political parties that is being referred to in the 
following discussion. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, it considers what is meant by change in political 
parties and the levels this can take place at. Secondly, it examines the insights from the party 
organisation and party competition literatures and how they relate to the research questions of 
this thesis. Thirdly, it considers the quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-methods research on 
the role of different endogenous and exogenous factors and their relative importance in 
stimulating change in political parties. 
 
2.1 Change in Political Parties 
Firstly, what do we mean when we say a political party has ‘changed’? Harmel and Janda 
(1994:275) argue that party change is ‘any variation, alteration or modification in how parties 
are organized, what human and material resources they can draw upon, what they stand for 
and what they do’. Mair (1989:258) argues that the essence of when a party changes ‘is 
elusive, and whether a party actually has changed…is difficult to ascertain’. In this 
discussion, the focus is on what motivates political parties to change their policy positions. 
In terms of the organisation itself, change can come in the form of new rules to elect the party 
leader or senior leadership team, communication strategies, the autonomy of local parties in 
relation to the central party or the selection of candidates for elections. Changes in ‘interparty 
relations’ could include the attitude or strategy towards one party from another, increased 
electoral competitiveness or policy consensus. Party change is therefore any identifiable shift 
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or adjustment in the political/ideological, organisational, strategic, or tactical choices and 
actions made by political parties from one point in time to another. 
 
2.1.1 Categorising Change in Political Parties 
These processes of change in political parties operate at what Dorey (2007:142, see also 
Dommett 2015:5) describes as ‘three discrete but logically sequential levels’ of change. The 
first is the macro-level; this is the overall ideological position of the party and acts as the 
‘philosophical’ structure in which policy positions are framed and the overall direction of the 
party is set. The second is the meso-level; this entails ‘general statements of principle or 
emphasis vis-à-vis key sectors or spheres of policy’, like local government, education or 
welfare. It can also include changes to a party’s organisation or structure. The third is the 
micro-level; these are ‘concrete proposals for specific areas’ of policy such as those 
mentioned above (Dorey 2007:142). Micro-level change can consist of the changing of 
personnel, such as the party leader or members of the party elite (Dommett 2015). Dorey 
(2007: 142) argues that these levels of change operate a funnelling effect (see Figure 1) on 
policy within a political party, with change at the macro-level filtering down to change within 
individual areas of policy before forming specific policies later on in the process. Dorey 
(2007) and Dommett (2015) use this theorisation of change in the context of party 
modernisation, but it can also be utilised in the context of policy change in political parties 
more broadly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Levels of Change 
 
Macro – overall change in ideological/philosophical position. 
Meso – change in principles, intent or emphasis over a defined area of policy, change in party 
structure or organisation. 
Micro– change to a specific policy, personnel, or strategy. 
Adapted from Dorey 2007; Dommett 2015. 
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Dommett (2015:5) argues that, contrary to Dorey (2007), change in parties should also be 
possible at the meso and micro-level independently. A political party should be able to 
change at the meso and micro-levels, without necessarily having to change at the macro-level 
first. However, change at the ideological macro-level is more likely to result in significant 
change to policy or party organisation at the meso and micro-levels. 
This conceptualisation has much in common with Hall’s (1993) ‘three orders of change’ 
developed in his examination of British economic policymaking during the 1970’s and 
1980’s. Micro and meso-level change in political parties is broadly analogous with Hall’s 
(1993:279) first and second orders of change. ‘First order’ change describes adjustments to 
the detail of policy, how it will be operationalised in practice, but not a change in the goal the 
policy is trying to achieve (Kroll and Blomberg, 2004). ‘Second order’ change, or ‘normal-
policy making’ (Hall: 1993), is defined as adjusting policy more broadly but not changing the 
goals of policy itself. Macro-level change in a political party is similar to Hall’s (1993:279) 
third order change, or ‘paradigm shift’, in the policymaking process of the British state. Hall 
(1993) argues (see also Dommett, 2015) that action can take place within the first and second 
orders of change without necessarily needing radical, paradigm shifting change to instigate it. 
As it is more specifically directed at policy change itself, as opposed to general party change 
in the case of the Dorey (2007) and Dommett (2015) framework, this thesis will utilise Hall’s 
(1993) levels of policy change framework to categorise the types of European policy change 
observed in the Conservative Party from 1997 to 2016. This analysis will take place in 
Chapter Three.  
Many scholars of political parties have contributed important theoretical ideas to our 
understanding of what motivates political parties to change. In what follows the most relevant 
theoretical contributions from the party change literature are used to identify the factors 
associated with change in political parties. Firstly, this section will examine the theoretical 
insights from classic studies of party change, from both a party organisation and party 
competition perspective. Secondly, this chapter will then examine the individual endogenous 
and exogenous factors of change in political parties from the wider quantitative and 
qualitative research on party change. 
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2.1.2 Party Organisation 
The key insight of the theoretical literature on party organisation is that political parties can 
be stimulated to change by changes in their own external environment. Environmental 
changes can be events, such as the changing of the electoral franchise (Durverger, 1951) or 
the breakdown of social and economic structures that encourage parties to appeal to new 
groups in society for support, which occur more gradually (Kirchheimer, 1966). Katz and 
Mair (1995) argue that environmental social, cultural, and political developments from the 
1970’s onwards have seen political parties change organisationally to become more 
connected with state institutions. External environmental factors, such as changes in public 
opinion, the media, or electoral regulation, have increased in importance, and are therefore 
more likely to stimulate change within a political party than internal factors such as the party 
membership (Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988; Katz and Mair, 1995). This highlights 
the importance of considering environmental, exogenous factors as drivers of change in 
political parties.  
2.1.3 Party Competition 
The rational choice literature on party behaviour, individual preferences, and spatial 
competition between competitive political parties has also contributed to our understanding 
of policy change in parties (Downs, 1957; Strom 1990; Budge, 1994; Laver, 2005; Bartle et 
al, 2011). Parties change policy for vote-maximising purposes (Downs, 1957), changing 
policies in-line with the policy attitudes and preferences of the median voter. Developing this, 
Strom (1990) identifies three rational choice models of party behaviour: 1) the Downsian 
vote-seeking party, which sees parties motivated primarily by vote-maximisation at elections 
2) the office-seeking party, which sees parties motivated primarily by achieving elected office 
and 3) the policy-seeking party, which sees parties motivated primarily by advancing change 
in particular policy areas.  
Different groups within a political party could theoretically have different competing goals. 
For example, the party leadership might prioritise vote and office-seeking, but for internal 
factions the primary goal could be change in a policy area. As such, different external and 
internal factors could motivate different groups within a party to achieve or instigate policy 
change. 
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A further consideration is whether parties have ‘reliable information’ about the policy 
preferences of voters in the electorate Budge (1994). Budge suggests factors such as external 
and internal pressure on the party leadership, perceptions of past and future electoral results, 
and the policy positions of rival political parties, could also be explanations for why a 
political party would change policy positions. 
The key insights, from the rational choice literature for this thesis are the contribution public 
opinion, electoral performance, and competition for voters between rival political parties 
could theoretically make to policy change within a party. 
2.2 Endogenous Causes of Party Change 
Within the literature that examines party policy change, three endogenous factors are argued 
to be central in the driving of this change. 1) the political leadership, or individual leader, 2) a 
change in the dominant faction within a party and 3) the internal party organisational 
structure (Fagerholm, 2015). 
2.2.1 Political Leadership 
Many studies identify leadership as an important factor explaining change in parties (see 
biographies of Thatcher and Blair such as Campbell 2013; Seldon 2004, 2008). Many of 
these accounts place powerful individual actors at the centre of political events, often to the 
relative exclusion of other explanatory factors such as environmental circumstances or other 
internal domestic influences. For example, Olsen (2011) emphasises the central importance 
of political leadership. While acknowledging that ideology and structural factors are 
important, Olsen (2011:357) argues that ‘the specific style and outlook of a leader is a 
crucial, and unfortunately under-acknowledged, factor in shaping executive leadership and 
policy outcomes’. Executive decisions, Olsen (2011) argues, were as much the ‘product of 
the biographies’ of the political leaders as they were result of environmental pressures and 
constraints. 
However, what do we mean when we say leadership matters to parties? Why could it have an 
influence on whether a party changes or not? Political leadership is effective in stimulating 
change within parties when leaders can project and utilise political influence to persuade 
individuals, or groups of individuals, to follow particular instructions or pathways. This 
influence is drawn from a leader’s ‘stock’ of political authority or ‘capital’ (Bennister, et al, 
2014). The degree to which a leader possesses political authority, and therefore the extent to 
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which they can stimulate or constrain change within a political party, is determined by the 
perception of the individual’s leadership skills and the strength of the relationship between 
the leader and party, and the strength of the leader’s reputation both inside and outside of the 
party (Bennister, et al, 2014). When a political leader possesses these, they have the required 
‘leadership capital’ to draw upon to stimulate change. A leader lacking these attributes is 
unlikely to have the political authority to push through transformative change. Such resources 
are not fixed but can change over time depending on external and internal conditions or 
events. 
The statecraft model of political leadership also provides insights into what structural 
conditions, as opposed to more individual characteristics, are necessary for leaders to gain the 
necessary leadership capital that can instigate change in political parties. It is also illustrative 
of how individuals can both gain and lose leadership capital over time.  
The statecraft approach to leadership, pioneered by Bulpitt (1986), suggests that successful 
political leadership is determined by a winning electoral strategy, a reputation for 
competence, good party management, and political argument hegemony. Political leaders that 
can develop reputations for being effective in these areas can build their leadership capital 
levels and be more confident of successfully beginning policy change in a political party. 
Political leaders that develop poor reputations in some or all of these areas will not only lack 
the leadership capital necessary to cause policy change but could also be in a weak position 
to resist policy change they are opposed to. 
While many empirical studies that have examined change within parties endorse the 
importance of the leadership factor, this is not universal. Several studies argue the effect is 
much more limited than the theoretical scholarship suggests. Harmel et al (1995), using data 
collected from the party literature of six British and German political parties, found that while 
the leadership factor was important in some individual cases, for others the effect on change 
was limited or negligible. Bille (2007) concluded change in the Danish Social Democratic 
Party between 1960 and 1995 in terms of party manifestos or organisational structure had 
little to do with the party leadership, nor the three leadership changes that occurred during 
this period. Changes in policy direction were instead the result of environmental factors and 
contingent events (Bille 2007:386-8). In subsequent research, Harmel et al (2008) conclude 
that there is little evidence to suggest political leadership is decisive in parties changing. 
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Meyer (2013:152-55), using a dataset of 748 European political parties, found leadership 
change had a ‘negative effect…on party policy shifts’. 
This is contradicted by individual case-studies that suggest the political leadership factor can 
be a cause of party change (Clemens 2009; Huneeus 1996; Müller 1997; Bale 2012). Müller’s 
(1997:309) study of change within the Austrian Socialist Party concluded that ‘leadership 
change must be regarded as the single most important factor’. In a similar manner Huneeus 
(1996) argues Helmut Kohl’s leadership was central to the transformation of the CDU during 
the 1970’s and 80’s. Clemens (2009:126) also emphasises the central role played by the 
leadership factor within the CDU, this time the influence of Angela Merkel on party change 
during her rise from general secretary to party leader between 1998 and 2000. Bale’s (2012) 
study of change within the British Conservative Party since 1945 concludes that the 
leadership factor was at least as important in instigating party change as other central drivers, 
such as electoral performance or dominant factions. However, when considering change in 
party policy specifically, Bale argues that the leadership of figures such as Thatcher, Heath, 
and Macmillan were the central factor in driving policy change. 
The role of party ‘leadership’ should not be limited exclusively to an examination of 
‘leaders’, in the singular case of an individual party leader. Leadership within a political party 
can also be extended to include members of the Cabinet such as the Chancellor or Foreign 
Secretary, or Shadow Cabinet when in opposition, if we take the British political context as 
an example. For example, Gordon Brown had considerable influence over the direction of 
domestic and economic policy in Tony Blair’s government, though less so over foreign 
policy. Keith Joseph was a major influence on the economic, fiscal, and education policy of 
the Conservative Party during the 1970’s and 80’s, providing much of the intellectual 
foundation behind Thatcherism. 
The concept of ‘leadership’ can be broadened further to include prominent special advisors or 
party officials who have close contact with a party leader, such as communication strategists, 
policy specialists, or party chairmen. In a similar fashion to that of influential 
Cabinet/Shadow Cabinet ministers, there are a number of advisors credited with influencing 
policy positions within British political parties. Alistair Campbell, communications and 
strategy advisor for Tony Blair between 1994 and 2003 was highly influential during the 
New Labour years, as was his colleague Peter Mandelson. Steve Hilton influenced 
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Conservative Party policy following the 2005 election of party leader David Cameron, 
especially in relation to the environment and public services. 
 
2.2.2 Dominant Factions 
An additional endogenous driver of change within political parties is the change or 
emergence of a new dominant faction. Factions within political parties are groups of political 
actors that work collectively, at times co-operating or competing with other factions, to 
pursue like-mind ideological/policy agendas, outcomes or other associated goals and interests 
(Boucek, 2009).  They are distinct from other forms of pressure group that seek to influence 
parties in that they comprise individuals from within the party structure, such as MPs or party 
members and officials (Rose 1964:37). Factions within political parties are sustained, ‘self-
consciously’ organised groups of individuals that seek to co-operate on a wide range of 
policy agendas (Rose 1964:37). This also separates them from pressure groups, who largely 
focus on one policy area, and what Rose calls political ‘tendencies’, which are not as 
formally organised and also lean towards focusing on one policy area. 
A faction that becomes dominant within a party can in theory be a powerful driving or 
constraining force, on policy change. This can occur through gaining control of internal 
decision-making processes, or through influence over the party membership or political 
leadership. Several examples in the recent political history of the Conservative Party that 
illustrate this point. Firstly, the gradual dominance of the economic liberal ‘dries’, and 
displacement of the One Nation ‘wets’, during the 1980’s had an important impact on the 
economic, social, and industrial policies of the Conservative Party in this period. Thatcher 
was the leading figure, but she could not realistically have executed Thatcherism in the 
manner that she did on her own. The prominence of the Cameron ‘modernising’ faction in 
influential positions in the party from 2005 had a significant impact on the formation of new 
positions in policy areas such as the environment, public services, and gay marriage. 
Panebianco (1988), Harmel and Janda (1994), and Appleton and Ward (1997) argue that 
dominant factions within parties could be a powerful driver of change. Dominant factions are 
often considered theoretically significant as an ‘intervening variable’ that exists between an 
environmental stimulus and a change in party organisation or policy (Panebianco 1988; 
Appleton and Ward 1993, 1997). For Panebianco (1988: 244-46) the conditions for party 
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change are necessitated by the existence of a new dominant faction that can take over the 
party and instigate change. 
The evidence from some empirical studies, however, qualify these theoretical assumptions 
about the importance of dominant factions in driving change in political parties. Harmel and 
Janda (1995) argue that their evidence supports the conclusion that ‘while factional change is 
viewed as contributing to special opportunities for party change, there is no implication that 
change of dominant faction is necessary for party change’ (italics added). Harmel and Tan 
(2003) also argue that changes in the dominant faction and the party leadership are needed for 
substantial change to take place. This is evident in the post-1998 German CDU. Following 
the CDU’s return to opposition a process of change both in the party’s dominant factions and 
political leadership was evident (Clemens 2009:125-26). After 1998 the CDU’s social and 
cultural conservative factions declined due to the shrinking size of the working-class Catholic 
and religious conservative sections of the German electorate. This, concurrent with the party 
membership becoming younger, more urban, and more middle class, strengthened the 
progressive market faction (Clemens 2009:125-26). This combined with the successful rise of 
Angela Merkel up the CDU’s leadership hierarchy, the party’s ‘most liberal leader ever’, to 
produce significant change within the CDU’s policy positions. 
In contrast Bale (2012:307) found surprisingly little evidence for dominant factions driving 
party change in the British Conservative Party post-1945. This is because the Conservative 
Party has been and remains a party of tendencies rather than factions (Rose, 1964). 
Fagerholm (2015:3) argues that when considering policy there is ‘no strong evidence 
supporting the expectation that political parties tend to change their positions as a 
consequence of a change in dominant faction’. So, the theoretical and empirical literature 
would appear to support the claim that while dominant factions can be important factors in 
facilitating change in political parties, they are rarely the principal instigators, or independent 
of other causes. 
2.2.3 Intra-Party Organisation 
How the internal decision-making process within a party is structured, and the position of 
party members and legislative members within that process, can have important 
consequences with regard to how likely a party is to change in terms of its policy positions. 
The more dispersed the policy-making power is among the different strata of the party, the 
more opportunities there are for policy change to be vetoed or constrained. Dominant 
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factions, however, can seek to overcome distributed levels of decision-making within 
political parties by ensuring that their supporters are themselves dispersed within each level. 
This can ensure de facto control of the party decision making process.  In reverse, if the 
ability to instigate change is concentrated within an individual party leader or small group of 
elites, it is both easier to change policy positions and pressures from external and internal 
sources can potentially increase. Parties with more hierarchical decision-making processes, 
such as the Conservative Party, should therefore exhibit greater flexibility to change policy in 
the face of endogenous or exogenous pressures. Additionally, the position and powers of 
internal-party institutions, such as conferences or policy forums, can also add to the number 
of veto points within a political party. The structure of the internal decision-making process 
can therefore, in theory, be an influential factor in both facilitating change and constraining it. 
Both Meyer (2013) and Schumacher et al (2013) have examined the influence of internal-
party organisation on party policy change. Meyer (2013:179-205) found that parties with 
more ‘hierarchically organised’ internal-decision making processes are more likely to change 
policy positions than political parties with more ‘decentralised’ internal structures. 
Additionally, greater opportunities for party membership involvement (and therefore more 
veto points), reduces the likelihood of change to policy positions. Schumacher et al (2013), 
using data from 55 European political parties, concluded ‘leadership-dominated’ (hierarchal 
decision-making) parties were more likely to change policy in response to changes in the 
position of the mean voter or to loss of office, while ‘activist-dominated’ (decentralised 
decision-making) parties were more likely to alter policy in response to the changes in the 
position of their voters. 
Some individual case-studies also endorse internal-party organisation as an important factor 
in policy change. Fabre’s (2008:326) examination of regionalism, party organisation, and 
state-wide political parties in Spain and the UK concluded that the historical organisational 
structure of political parties was a key determining factor in ‘explaining their multi-level 
structure and the level of autonomy of their regional branches’. Parties with a centralised 
‘ethos’ were more likely to resist changes in the power of regional branches (2008:326). 
However, Fabre (2008) concluded that it was actually the party leadership that was the 
crucial factor in determining the level of power at each stratum of the party. Intra-party 
organisation was also a central factor within the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) between the 
1970s and 1990s (Lago 2006). During the late 1970s to early 1980s the PSOE conducted a 
process of ‘intense concentration of power in the hands of the party leaders’ and a ‘great 
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emphasis on internal cohesion and discipline’ (Lago 2006:434). While advantageous during 
this period, this centralised system proved disadvantageous during the 1990’s when political 
competition increased, and the party left office and wanted to reorganise. The centralised 
organisation now inhibited party change. Lago (2006:435) argues that the organisational 
choices ‘taken at the time the party was reconstructed during the 1970s acted as a sort of 
‘genetic imprint’ that conditioned the subsequent development of the party, slowing its pace 
and intensity.’ 
 
2.3 Exogenous Causes of Party Change 
The literature on party change identifies seven main exogenous drivers, or environmental 
stimuli, associated with change. 1) Electoral performance, 2) Rival political parties, 3) 
Whether the party is in opposition or in office, 4) Public opinion, 5) The economic 
environment 6) The media and 7) Ideas. 
2.3.1 Electoral Performance 
Many theoretical studies have underlined the importance of electoral performance, both in 
terms of defeat and success, on change within vote-seeking parties (Panebianco 1988; Budge 
1994; Harmel and Janda 1994; Appleton and Ward 1997). Harmel and Janda (1994:269) 
argue that for vote-seeking parties the most ‘obvious’ environmental influence on party 
change would be ‘electoral failure or at least a pattern of electoral failures’. For parties 
predominantly motivated by ‘ideological/policy purity’ the impact of electoral defeats on 
party change diminishes. Appleton and Ward (1997:345), however, question the assumption 
that electoral performance must be considered purely in terms of defeat or failure. Electoral 
success must also be considered an environmental stimulus for party change. It is the 
difference between expectations and outcomes, as opposed to whether the electoral result is 
interpreted as success or a defeat, which determines whether or not a political party is 
stimulated to change. 
Quantitative research, however, questions the assumption that electoral results are a 
significant stimulus to party change. Using a sample of eight European parties, Janda et al 
(1995) compared changes in election manifestos to the outcomes of previous electoral 
performances. Of the 78 cases examined ‘only 17 striking instances of major changes in the 
issue positions taken by these eight parties when contesting elections from 1945 to the mid-
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1980s’ were detected. Fifteen were after elections categorised as negative results for the 
party. Parties that had successful elections were likely to replicate policy platforms at the next 
election. While poor electoral performance can indeed play ‘an important role’ in stimulating 
parties to change, on its own it is not a ‘sufficient cause’ to account for many types and 
degrees of change observed in political parties. Other research is considerably more critical 
of the performance theory (Adams et al 2004; Schumacher 2013). Adams et al (2004:608) 
rejected the hypothesis that past election results cause political parties to change their 
ideological positions. This definite conclusion is however questioned by Somer-Topcu 
(2009), whose study of 23 established democracies showed that parties tend to change policy 
more after they lost votes in the previous election, than if they had gained votes. This effect 
then diminishes as the election recedes further into history. 
Case-studies also suggest that electoral performance can have an observable impact on 
change within parties. Duncan’s (2007) study of the Dutch Christian Democrats concluded 
that the ‘external shock’ of the 1994 Tweede Kamer election instigated change within the 
party leadership, the factional balance of the party, and its organisational structure. However, 
as Adams et al (2004) found, the impact of electoral defeat on change was much more limited 
when the analysis considered the party’s policy platform post-1994 (Duncan 2007:83). The 
theory that electoral success can also drive change within parties (Appleton and Ward 1997) 
is also supported within the case-study literature on party change. Ágh’s (1997) examination 
of the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) during the 1990’s suggests that both the electoral 
defeat in 1990, and the electoral ‘landslide’ victory achieved in 1994, were both important 
drivers of change in the party’s ‘social position and institutions’. However, the analysis 
supports the position of Harmel and Janda (1994) as ‘change by defeat was easier than by 
success’ (Ágh 1997:427). The ‘change by defeat’ electoral performance theory is also 
supported by the case of the post-1998 German CDU. During this period the CDU 
experienced ‘radical’ and even ‘revolutionary’ change, including in policy positions 
(Clemens, 2009:124). Disappointing election results in 1998, 2002, and 2005 resulted in 
strong calls for significant changes in policy positions, which many believed would project 
an image of party renewal to the German electorate (Clemens 2009:124). 
2.3.2 Rival Political Parties 
Some theoretical studies argue that the positions of rival political parties can stimulate parties 
to change policy positions (Budge, 1994; Laver, 2005). Budge’s ‘marker model’ (1994:461) 
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argues that parties that are in ‘long-term competition’ with a rival party will seek to keep an 
ideological distance by adjusting their own positions to that of their rivals. In addition, Laver 
(2005:267) argues that some parties, whose leadership are formally unconstrained by party 
members in changing policy positions, will seek to shift their policy positions to that of the 
largest party in the party system in which they operate. This ‘predator’ party will continue to 
change its position until it has become the largest party, at which point it ‘stands still’ (Laver 
2005: 267). Laver argues that this is not an inconceivable position for party leaders to take, as 
it would be logical to assume that most voters are located close to the largest party, in terms 
of their preference for policy positions. 
Quantitative research also suggests that the positions of rival political parties are an important 
factor. The most in-depth study was conducted by Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) using 
data from the Comparative Manifestos Project. Based on data from 193 parties in twenty-five 
countries, the statistical evidence supports the above theories of party behaviour; political 
parties change policy positions in response to the political strategies of their competitors. In 
addition, they find that parties are more likely to change policy positions when rival parties 
that are competing in the same ideological space change their own positions (2009:826). For 
example, a right-wing party is more likely to respond to changes of a right-wing rather than a 
left-wing rival. Meyer (2013:165) also finds comparative statistical evidence that a ‘party 
shifts its policy position if its policy position is outside the ideological territory (defined by 
the policy positions of its rival parties).’ 
Several case studies also support these claims. Two prominent examples are the British 
Labour Party between 1992 and 1997, and the British Conservative Party between 2005 and 
2010. Between 1992 and 1997 the Labour Party adopted many of the same policy positions 
on taxation, public spending, privatisation, defence, and public service reform as the previous 
Conservative government, as a means of reassuring voters that they had fundamentally 
changed as a party. A similar process can be argued to have taken place within the 
Conservative Party following election defeat in 2005. Many of the new policy positions 
adopted by the party, most importantly increased focus on the quality and reform of public 
services, echoed the policy positions adopted by the electorally successful post-1997 Labour 
Party.                                                                                      
2.3.3 Opposition or Office 
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A further exogenous factor in party change is whether a party is in government or opposition. 
In a recent study, Schumacher et al (2013:467) theorised that leadership dominated parties 
would be more likely to change policy positions when finding themselves out of government. 
As the main aim of leadership dominated parties is office-seeking, losing power is a powerful 
incentive for these parties to change policy (2013:467). The argument is made that, if this is 
the case, a party in government is therefore less likely to change policy positions as this could 
jeopardise their main goal (being in government). Walgrave and Nuytemans (2009:194) also 
make the theoretical assumption that parties in opposition are more likely to have 
‘changeable’ policy platforms than governments, as this is one of the only means of attracting 
voter and media attention. 
Theoretically, this is therefore a further disincentive for government parties to change policy 
positions, in comparison to opposition parties. Meyer (2013:148), however, contradicts these 
assumptions by arguing that as government parties are likely to receive greater media 
attention, changes in policy positions are more likely to be noticed by the electorate. This 
therefore incentivises government parties to change policy positions. 
Quantitative empirical studies that have tested for the effects of the opposition/office factor 
show mixed results. Schumacher et al (2013:174) found while in general ‘office exclusion 
does not motivate parties to change their position’, this is contradicted when organisational 
structure is considered. Leadership-based parties are more likely to change policy positions, 
while activist-based parties are less likely to. Meyer (2013:148) however, finds that parties 
that have spent longer in government are more likely to change policy positions than those in 
opposition. Walgrave and Nuytemans conclude the opposite. They find that ‘the more parties 
tend to be government parties with a long track record of government participation, the less 
they change their party manifesto’ (2009:199). 
Nonetheless, overall the empirical evidence does seem to support the theoretical assumptions 
that the opposition/office factor is an important factor in understanding policy change in 
political parties. 
2.3.4 Public Opinion 
Public opinion is the factor which has received the most academic attention in explaining 
policy change in parties (Fagerholm, 2015). The theoretical underpinning can largely be 
attributed to the theoretical legacy of both Downs (1957) and Budge (1994), with their work 
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on theories of spatial party competition. Stimson et al (1995:543) described this theoretical 
concept, of policy being shaped by changes in public opinion, or the mean voter position, as 
‘dynamic representation’. Individual actors within political parties ‘sense the mood’ within 
an electorate. When the public mood changes actors within parties adjust their behaviour in 
anticipation of upcoming elections, which directly feeds into decisions of current and future 
policy positions. As Stimson et al (1995: 545) put it, this will ‘drive policy through rational 
anticipation’. The motivation here is to change party policy coming from the desire to avoid 
defeat at future elections. 
There is strong empirical evidence that variations in public opinion motivate political parties 
to change their policy. Stimson et al (1995) conclude that policy is influenced by changes in 
public opinion, although how responsive an institution is to public opinion varies. Using 
manifesto data from political parties in eight West European nations, Adams et al (2004:589) 
also conclude that parties change their policy positions when public opinion changes. The 
effects ‘are only significant in situations where public opinion is clearly shifting away from 
the party’s policy positions’ (2004:589). Developing these findings, Adams et al (2006:513) 
conclude that niche parties are much less likely to respond to changes in public opinion than 
mainstream parties. When niche parties did change policy positions they tended to be 
punished by voters at the next election, with mainstream parties receiving substantially less 
electoral punishment when they did the same (2006:513). 
2.3.5 Economic Environment 
A final exogenous factor associated with stimulating parties to change policy positions are 
changing economic conditions within the environment in which the party operates (Adams et 
al 2009). Such conditions could include increasing unemployment, high inflation or shifting 
international trade patterns. Ward et al (2011) suggest that globalisation has put significant 
constraints on the policy positions of political parties, especially social democratic parties. 
This is because interconnected global financial markets, and internationally networked 
businesses, now allow capital and business to move with much greater ease than in the past. 
Political parties are therefore extremely conscious of not adopting policy positions that could 
see capital and businesses relocate to other domains (Ward et al 2011:510). Ward et al 
(2011:515) hypothesise that globalisation will shift the policy positions of social democratic 
parties to the right, while conservative parties will be affected by globalisation indirectly, as 
they react to the changing position of their rival parties. 
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A number of studies have attempted to ascertain to what extent economic conditions affect 
the policy positions of political parties. Haupt (2010:7) analysed the policy shifts of 138 
European political parties, both right and left-wing, concluding that both types of political 
party do change their policy positions in response to international economic conditions. In 
this study there was no statistically significant difference between the policy changes of 
parties on the right or left, contradicting Ward et al (2011). Ward et al (2011:541) themselves 
conclude that economic conditions would only affect party policy positions ‘if the expected 
position of the median is far enough to the left, in which case it moves left parties, and to a 
lesser extent the right parties, in a rightward direction’. Adams et al (2009) also consider the 
influence of economic conditions on party policy positions. This study supports the overall 
finding of Haupt (2010:7) that economic conditions do affect the policy positions of political 
parties but disagrees that there is no difference between the response of left-wing and right-
wing parties. Adams et al (2009:612) conclude that right and centre parties react to changes 
in economic conditions by adapting their policy positions accordingly. Parties of the left 
however appear ‘less responsive to global economic conditions’ in comparison. Empirical 
research therefore largely supports the theoretical assumption that changes in economic 
conditions will stimulate political parties to change or adapt their policy positions, though 
there is contradictory evidence on the extent to which this varies according to the type of 
political party in question. 
2.3.6 Ideas, Think-Tanks, and Intellectuals 
The contention that ideas are important has a well-established position in the policy change 
literature (Hall 1993; John 1999; Lieberman 2002; Walsh 2000; Heffernan 2005; 
Baumgartner 2013). Ideas here interact with political actors, institutions, interests, society, 
and the socio-economic and political environment to build conditions in which policies can 
change or be adapted. Ideas, or paradigms, can contribute to party policy change by 
structuring the way they respond to a political problem, crisis or previous policy failure. A 
notable example of this is the influence monetarism had on the economic and fiscal policies 
of the Thatcher governments, a reaction to the perceived failures of post-war Keynesianism 
and the Labour government’s incomes policy (Walsh 2000:485). The idea of monetarism 
changed policy in a specific direction, controlling the supply of money in the economy, in 
order to combat rampant inflation. Heffernan (2005) identifies the role the idea of 
privatisation had on the economic policies of the Thatcher and Major governments between 
1979 and 1992, a reaction to the perceived failure of post-war nationalisation and associated 
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British economic decline. Ideas in and of themselves cannot cause policy agendas to change. 
They require facilitation through a combination of factors: the strategic interests of actors, the 
enabling political environment, the capacity to instigate change, and the perceived failure or 
inadequacy of previous policies. 
Paradigm shifts are disseminated to policy actors in political parties through the ‘actions of 
people and organisations’ (Walker 2014:169). Policy ideas are discussed, debated, and 
communicated within this environment through a number of sources; intellectuals, 
professional experts, and think-tanks. Walker (2014:169) suggests that one important cause 
of Conservative neo-liberal policy positions during the Thatcher years were the ideas 
originating from think-tanks including the Institute for Economic Affairs, the Adam Smith 
Institute, and the Centre for Policy Studies. Many of the ideas from these organisations were 
inspired by intellectuals such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, in a similar way to 
which the sociologist Anthony Gidden’s ‘Third Way’ political ideas would later influence 
New Labour. While not inside the structures of the Conservative party itself, they formed part 
of the ‘Conservative political environment’. Walker (2014:169) argues that ideas ‘must seep 
into the minds of the politicians, minds made receptive by external factors and their political 
experiences’. This is disputed by Bale (2014:174-75) who suggests that any direct influence 
of the New Right think tanks on Conservative policy during this period is a ‘myth’ and the 
relationship was more ‘altering the climate of opinion rather than shaping the detail of 
policy’. 
Studies on the influence think-tanks have on policymaking in political parties come to 
ambiguous conclusions. This is not only because it is difficult to quantitatively measure their 
influence, but also because it is difficult to qualitatively define what this influence actually 
amounts to. As Stone (1996:689) states, ‘rarely is there a one-to-one correspondence between 
a think-tank book or study and a particular policy change’. For example, Pautz (2013) argues 
that think-tanks most associated with ‘modernising’ Conservative policy positions since 2005 
(Policy Exchange, Reform, Civitas, Centre for Social Justice) played an important role in 
assisting the development of new ideas and policy, as ‘amplifiers’ of established party 
agendas set by influential advisors such as Steve Hilton. Think-tanks also provided means by 
which links with liked-minded ‘ideological fellows’ could be established, and ideas 
developed away from the constraints of the official party mechanisms (Pautz 2013:373). 
However, Labour’s social policy between 1997 and 2001 owed little to the ideas of the four 
think-tanks (Institute for Public Policy Research, Demos, Centre for Economic Performance 
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and the Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion), with the civil service leading change in 
this area (Pautz 2011). 
It is therefore likely that think-tanks, and their experts and ideas, contribute to the prevailing 
pool of ideas within the political environment or policy area in which they are focusing, 
raising the consciousness of certain ideas within the minds of actors in parties. Think tanks 
and experts ultimately want to ‘sensitise decision-makers to policy problems’ through the 
‘gradual, incremental creep of new ideas into the prevailing thinking’ (Stone 1996:689). In 
most circumstances, the influence of think-tanks on policymaking in political parties is likely 
to be indirect, rather than observable, concrete, and direct. 
2.3.7 The Media 
Media influences on party policy change has received relatively little academic attention 
(Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010). Theoretically, the role of the media in policy change is 
divided between the dichotomous positions of conduit or contributor (Shanahan et al 2008). 
The media acts as a conduit role when it amplifies the positions of others within a policy 
debate, for example between two factions within a party. From this theoretical perspective, 
the media facilitates the positions of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ that want to direct the policy 
process in a certain direction within a political party (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). A 
contributor role arises when the media provides its own positions, ideas, or narratives to a 
policy debate (Shanahan et al 2008). Kingdon (1984:59) advocates the conduit position, 
arguing that the ‘media report what is going on in government… rather than having an 
independent effect on government agendas’. The most sensible theoretical position is likely 
to be that of Sabatier and Jenkins (1993) who suggest that the media can be both a conduit 
and contributor to the policy process, depending on the political context or policy area under 
analysis. In other words, the influence of the media on policy change is conditional on 
facilitating circumstances being present (Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010). 
The question is also less about whether the media are a powerful influence or not, but in 
which circumstances it is a weaker or stronger influence (Newton 2006: 274-5). For example, 
Brandenburg (2002) concluded that the media did not influence the Conservative or Labour 
parties’ agendas during the 1997 election. This could be conditioned by the fact that the 
period being studied was during an election, when political parties are focused on promoting 
their own policy positions to the media themselves. Green-Pedersen and Stubager (2010) 
examined the influence of the media on the Danish opposition party’s policy agendas 
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between 1984 and 2003, measured using radio news data and questions to government 
ministers. The results concluded that the media did have an influence on the policy agendas 
of opposition parties in all areas except for foreign affairs (2010:675-6). Political parties were 
also only likely to react to media attention if the policy area was one in which they ‘owned’ 
and therefore wished to emphasise to the electorate. As Green-Pedersen and Stubager 
(2010:675) state ‘…mass media attention is thus likely to generate significant party-political 
attention only with regard to the few issues playing a central role in issue competition.’ It 
therefore must be in the interest of political parties for the media attention over a certain 
policy area to have an influence. Issues such as foreign affairs, in the Danish party system, 
are not part of the normal ‘issue competition’ between parties and, consequently, media 
attention on such issues does not influence party policy agendas. 
Walgrave et al (2008) supports the findings of Green-Pedersen and Stubager (2010) that 
media coverage does influence the agenda of party policy makers. This effect is greater on 
the agenda of individual MPs than on that of the government. Policy issues such as crime, 
justice or the environment were more likely to be influenced by media attention than foreign 
affairs (Walgrave, et al, 2008). In a further study of the media and the Belgian party system 
Walgrave (2008:457) concludes that the media has a more powerful agenda-setting influence 
with opposition MPs than with government MPs. This is because opposition MPs are more 
likely to use information they hear in the media as resource for challenging government 
policy. 
The degree to which the conclusions of these studies on the influence of the media are 
applicable to other parliamentary political systems such as Britain is an open question. 
However, as Walgrave (2008:458) points out, Belgium is a relatively closed political system 
with ‘strong political parties and corporatist interest groups’. It suggests that more open 
political systems, such as Britain, are likely to see the media have a similar strong influence 
on party elites and the policy process. There is not necessarily anything to suggest that party 
elites in Britain are going to be any more resistant to the influence of the media on policy 
than those in Belgium or Denmark. However, what is particularly relevant to this project is 
the conclusions drawn on the lack of media influence over the political agenda in relation to 
foreign affairs, which includes European policy. 
2.4 Conclusion 
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That political parties develop, and change is often taken for granted in much political 
commentary and academic research. It is described implicitly, as part of a wider narrative, 
and not analysed in detail to determine what individual or combination of factors has 
contributed to the actual process of change. This chapter has provided a detailed review of 
what we mean when we say a political party has changed and what factors contribute to this 
process. It has done so by examining a wide range of the theoretical and empirical literature 
that considers what endogenous and exogenous factors stimulate political parties to change, 
with a specific focus on political parties and their policy platforms. 
The following conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, there is often disagreement on the influence 
individual factors have in stimulating political parties to change between studies which have 
a quantitative data or qualitative case-study approach. It must be recognised that the different 
approaches can come to drastically different conclusions, partly due to the methodological 
and philosophical nature of the research methods themselves. For example, a number of 
quantitative studies reject the idea that political leadership has an influence over policy 
change in political parties, while many examples using qualitative case studies conclude the 
opposite. Secondly, what endogenous or exogenous factors that contribute to policy change 
in a political party are highly dependent on context, time, place, and the individual or group 
of parties in question. A contributing factor that is not relevant at one time, or for one 
political party, may be an influencing factor when the context and circumstances for that 
party changes. Lastly, it is often only when endogenous or exogenous factors work in 
combination that policy change can occur. Political parties, like many organisations, are often 
instinctively resistant to changes in policy and need more than one incentive to depart from 
the status quo. 
This chapter has examined the different theoretical and empirical arguments surrounding 
change in political parties. This has highlighted limitations with relying solely on the party 
change literature explored as the sole explanatory framework for this thesis. What is missing 
is an understanding of change in a political party as a process that develops over time and the 
causal mechanisms associated with this. The next chapter sets out how a new institutionalist 
theoretical framework can be applied to Conservative European policy, that can address these 
limitations, and work in combination with the insights on how political parties are stimulated 
to change that have been identified in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework: New Institutionalism 
 
This chapter will set out how new institutionalist theories will be applied to the empirical 
chapters of this thesis. It will identify ideas from new institutionalism on how political 
institutions, such as political parties, change over time and the theoretical mechanisms which 
contribute to this. It adds to this thesis’s understanding of what stimulates political parties to 
change, established in the previous chapter’s exploration of the party change literature, by 
developing a set of theoretical tools which helps to explain and describe the process of 
change set out in the empirical chapters. Combining the insights from these two literatures, 
party change and new institutionalism, provides for a stronger theoretical framework to 
explain European policy in the Conservative Party during this period. 
This approach is intended to be integrated and pragmatic. New institutionalist theory, as this 
chapter will establish, provides many insights into how institutions like political parties 
change. Different elements of new institutionalism (historical, rational choice, sociological, 
and discursive) could provide better explanations for change at different points in time over 
the period of analysis. An integrated approach allows for this and does not exclude an 
explanation because it does not fit within the traditional parameters of one particular new 
institutionalist approach. This approach aims to be problem-driven, rather than theory-driven, 
as these different approaches ‘ask somewhat different questions and so bring different aspects 
of social life into focus’ (Fearon and Wendt, 2002:53). This can only be a strength when 
attempting to explain change in a political party over a twenty-year period. 
The first section will introduce new institutionalism and establish the strengths and 
limitations of each of the four main institutionalist approaches. It will be argued that each 
approach used in isolation will not capture the complex and dynamic factors that contribute 
towards the process of change in a party. The second section will set out a new institutionalist 
approach to explaining change in political institutions that will be applied to the empirical 
chapters of this thesis. Throughout this section particular attention will be given to how this 
framework provides a balanced understanding of the relationship between structure and 
agency, arguing that it is not question of privileging either, but of explaining their interaction 
within a dialectic relationship to produce institutional change.  
 32 
 
 
3.1 New Institutionalism 
The new institutional theory that developed during the 1980’s argued that institutions 
structure politics (March and Olsen, 1984; Steinmo, 2008). Or, to put it another away, 
institutions structure the preferences and actions of political actors. This gave institutions a 
causal role in explaining political processes and outcomes (Mohanan, 2013). However, it 
soon became clear that new institutionalism was being interpreted and applied in a number of 
different ways (Hall and Taylor, 1996). These correspond to what Hall and Taylor (1996) 
identify as the three new institutionalisms of rational choice, sociological, and historical 
institutionalism. Each has a different, though not entirely alien, approach to the role 
institutions have in structuring the preferences and actions of individuals, in addition to how 
individuals instigate institutional change themselves. Discursive institutionalism was 
introduced later and is also included as the fourth main strand of new institutional theory. 
3.1.1 Historical Institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism defines an institution as either a formal organisation (political 
party, trade union, pressure group) or a system of formal or informal rules (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992). These institutions structure the behaviour of individual actors, and therefore 
shape political outcomes, by influencing the goals and preferences of these actors (Steinmo, 
2008). Preferences are therefore endogenous to the analysis and must be explained through 
an examination of the institutional and historical context. Institutions within this approach 
work to constrain and limit the political choices that individual actors have to shape 
outcomes. In addition, institutions influence political outcomes by structuring the power 
relations between different individuals by privileging some individuals more than others. 
Those with less institutionally determined power are therefore less likely to be able to 
instigate change (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). 
Thelen and Steinmo (1992:2) expand this by stating that ‘institutionalists are interested in the 
whole range of state and societal institutions that shape how political actors define their 
interests and that structure their relations of power with other groups’. This definition enables 
the inclusion of a wide range of internal and external social, political, and economic 
institutions, systems, and rules that can influence the preferences and actions of individuals. 
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For the research questions of this thesis, the influence of internal, domestic, and international 
institutions on Conservative European policy will be considered. 
Historical institutionalism also places an important emphasis on historical factors when 
explaining political change, but also continuity through concepts such as path dependency 
and positive feedback. Path dependency is a term used to describe a series of political 
changes which are linked to previous historical decisions and existing institutions (Wilsford, 
1994). Positive feedback is the theory that the more decisions made which take an institution 
in a certain direction, or ‘path’, the harder it becomes for internal or external factors to 
change this ‘path’ in a new direction (Peters, 2000a). The historical context, place, and time 
in which individuals, institutions, and structures interact shapes political outcomes and 
processes of change by influencing the behaviour and decisions made by actors. A historical 
institutionalist account would argue that without considering the historical circumstances 
(context, place, and time) an account of political change, for example within the development 
of a party’s approach to policy formation, will be unable to capture the complexity and 
dynamic interaction between multiple factors that is observed in real political processes. This 
is an important strength of this approach and enables in-depth, contextualised, and detailed 
accounts of political change through predominantly qualitative single or small n case study 
research. 
Historical institutionalism has however encountered a number of criticisms from other 
strands of institutionalist theory, particularly rational choice and discursive institutionalism. 
The first of these is that historical institutionalism on its own, through historical concepts 
such as path dependency and positive feedback, are often much better at explaining why 
institutions don’t change than why they do change (Schmidt 2008, 2010). Environmental 
structures and historical forces within historical institutionalism operate a power over 
institutions which can be overly deterministic and does not leave enough theoretical space for 
processes of change to be explained, as opposed to continuity. Secondly, a historical 
institutionalist approach that can quickly descend into structuralism provides inadequate 
space for the role individual agents have in instigating institutional change (Hay and Wincott, 
1998:952). This is because the focus within historical institutionalism can often be on the 
power of institutions and structures to constrain and restrict agency, ignoring the ability of 
individuals to shape their own institutional environment (Blyth, 2002). Thirdly, discursive 
institutionalists criticise historical institutionalism for failing to address the power that ideas 
and discourse, utilised by strategic actors, can have in prompting change within political 
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institutions (Schmidt 2008, 2011). Fourthly, sociological institutionalism can legitimately 
criticise this approach for having no explanation of how change can occur incrementally, 
without the need for an exogenous shock, as there is no guarantee one will be recognisable in 
every case where change is identified. Lastly, rational choice institutionalism suggests that a 
weakness of this approach is that it lacks generalisable conclusions.   
Historical institutionalism on its own therefore fails to consider a number of important 
insights into political change identified by the other new institutionalist approaches.  
3.1.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism 
In terms of the ’institutionalist’ element of rational choice institutionalism, this approach 
shares much with historical institutionalism in how they see institutions as key components of 
political outcomes and processes. They also share a theoretical understanding that 
institutional rules create ‘incentives and constraints’ that shape the behaviour of individual 
actors (Weyland, 2002). However, rational choice institutionalism has a much narrower 
interpretation of what an institution is, restricting these to simply ‘rules of the game’, such as 
electoral laws that govern the administration of elections (Aspinwall and Schneider, 
2000:12). The more formal political, economic, or social institutional or structural factors are 
generally excluded from a strict rational choice approach (Weyland, 2002:60). In addition, 
this approach also views institutions as not only constraining influences on individual actors 
but also the product of individual actors’ interactions. As Weyland (2002:60) indicates this 
places ‘methodological individualism’, and the primacy given to the role and actions of 
individual actors, at the heart of rational choice institutionalist accounts of political change. 
This is supported by Aspinwall and Schneider (2000:10) who state that ‘human action is 
considered to be the cornerstone of any [rational choice institutionalist] social scientific 
explanation’. This is a significant strength of this approach when analysing change in a 
political party, as ultimately it is the individual actions or decisions of actors that make 
changes in organisational or policy structures, not institutions or structures themselves. This 
is an insight that is underplayed in traditional historical and sociological institutionalist 
explanations, though not entirely absent. 
Rational choice institutionalism also makes a number of assumptions about the behaviour of 
individual actors drawn from its deductive methodology (Bell, 2002). In this approach, 
individual actors are assumed at the start of analysis to have a fixed set of preferences, act to 
maximise the successful outcome of these preferences and do so strategically, extensively 
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weighing up the costs and benefits of many possible options (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Bell, 
2002). These preferences are given exogenously from the theoretical model. This simplicity 
allows for formal and generalisable mathematical models to be constructed, which can be 
applied to many cases simultaneously. The institutional ‘rules of the game’ act to constrain 
and incentivise this process of utility maximisation by individual actors. Institutions, 
therefore, act as the context around which individual action occurs and change does, or does 
not, take place (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000:11). These ready-made assumptions and 
systematic formal models, as Weyland (2002:61) states, are advantageous for explaining 
institutional change due to their coherent logical structure. 
The requirement in rational choice institutionalism for simple behavioural assumptions, a 
narrow conception of institutions and generalisable models has drawn a number of legitimate 
criticisms. Firstly, from a historical institutionalist perspective, Bell (2002) argues that the 
depiction of actor preferences in rational choice institutionalism as being static and 
exogenous to the analysis, in addition to institutions being reduced to simply ‘rules of the 
game’, does not provide an adequate framework for explaining complex and dynamic 
political processes. In other words, Bell (2002) is justifiably arguing that simplistic 
assumptions about individual behaviour and institutions does not accurately reflect the 
complex nature of the social world (see also Peters,1999). For, as Hay and Wincott 
(1998:952) observe, these assumptions actually ‘strip away distinctive features of 
individualism’ and replace political actors with ‘calculating automatons’. As such, rational 
choice institutionalism as an ‘analytical tool’ on its own cannot produce satisfactory accounts 
of these processes, nor the complex endogenous formation of actor preferences, which are 
partly caused by their changing structural and institutional environment.  
Secondly, the ahistorical nature of rational choice institutionalism, displayed in its tendency 
to explain change over relatively short time periods or at fixed points in time, does not always 
allow for the analysis to capture the influence of long-term processes. Additionally, this 
ahistorical approach also fails to take into account that the ‘impact of institutions is often 
heavily mediated by features of the overarching political or historical context’ (Thelen 
2002:93). This matters because historical and political circumstances affect the beliefs, goals, 
and preferences of actors (Steinmo, 2014). 
In summary, rational choice institutionalism has a number of strengths and weaknesses as an 
approach to explaining political change. The main strength identified is the primacy given to 
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agency and individual action in rational choice explanations of institutional change. This is 
not explicitly ruled out by other institutionalist approaches but is often implicitly downplayed 
or marginalised in the analysis. This is not a trivial insight, as it is actors within political 
parties that ultimately make the decisions to change or continue with certain policies. A new 
institutional theoretical framework of party change must therefore take agency and individual 
action seriously, a point often lacking in overtly structural historical or sociological accounts. 
However, the major drawbacks of the rational choice approach, the unrealistic simplifications 
of individual and institutional behaviour, an inability to see change as occurring 
endogenously, and the ahistorical approach of the overall analysis, is a barrier to adopting a 
purely rational choice approach to this case study of the Conservative Party and European 
policy. 
3.1.3 Sociological Institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism is characterised by a desire to distance explanations of change 
away from the methodological individualism of rational choice approaches, in addition to 
going much further than historical institutionalism in the emphasis upon the power of social, 
political, and cultural structures to shape individual behaviour. In terms of the structure-
agency divide within new institutionalism, the sociological approach is generally the most 
firmly associated with structural explanations of institutional change. 
In the sociological approach, institutions are defined as norms, rules, conventions, templates, 
and symbols. This is a much broader and looser conception of institutions compared with the 
rational choice and historical approaches (Koelbe, 1995). As Hall and Taylor suggest 
(1996:947) these institutions are effectively indistinguishable from culture. It is these cultural 
institutions and structures that frame individual preferences and behaviour and shape political 
outcomes. The preferences of individuals are therefore endogenously formed, based on the 
cultural environment in which they exist. Individuals become culturally and politically 
‘embedded’ within this institutional environment, becoming used to a certain ‘way of doing 
things’ and resistant to change (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). To explain change, as opposed 
to continuity, sociological institutionalism will often draw upon the influence of new cultural 
norms or conventions imposed from outside the environment under analysis (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010). This works in a similar way to the exogenous shock in rational choice or 
historical institutionalism. 
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However, sociological institutionalism also draws upon other concepts that can be utilised to 
explain how institutions, such as a political party, change incrementally over time (Mohanan, 
2013). This allows the sociological approach to avoid the tendency of historical 
institutionalism to sometimes rely only on exogenous shocks to explain institutional change. 
Sociological institutionalism does this by drawing upon ideas from social or ‘population’ 
ecology. The main contribution that population ecology makes is to “emphasise the 
dependence of institutions upon their environment, and their ‘embeddedness’ in society and 
economy” (Peters, 1999:102). As Peters (1999:102) continues, ‘It also points to the extent to 
which institutions may be in explicit or implicit competition with one another for resources 
and even survival’. This insight into the competitive nature of the institutional environment is 
of particular relevance to the study of political parties, as they compete with other parties 
(institutions) in the political environment over policy, office and votes (Müller and Strøm, 
1999). Change therefore occurs continuously and incrementally as political parties compete 
with each other and react to alterations in their environment. This is a significant theoretical 
strength of sociological institutionalism that could be utilised to explain policy change within 
a political party in the absence of critical junctures or conjunctures. 
Yet, sociological institutionalism has a number of limitations that make it unsuited to 
explaining the development of European policy in the Conservative Party, if used on its own. 
Firstly, although sociological institutionalism can accommodate incremental institutional 
change, in general the approach is still better at explaining institutional stability than 
institutional change (Koelbe, 1995). Cultural institutions and structures act to largely 
perpetuate the status quo and guide actors to maintain this, as opposed to instigating change. 
Secondly, Hay and Wincott (1998:952) are also critical of sociological institutionalism’s 
‘structuralist orientation’.  This is a legitimate criticism, as the cultural institutions, structures, 
and prevailing environment in which these operate within sociological institutionalism appear 
to leave little room for individual agency or groups in explaining institutional change (Bell, 
2011). For example, as Hall and Taylor state (1996:954), ‘In some cases, the new 
institutionalists in sociology seem so focused on macro-processes that the actors involved in 
these processes seem to drop from sight and the result begins to look like ‘action without 
agents’. As outlined above, a similar criticism of historical institutionalism’s lack of attention 
to micro-processes is also made. This is not an unimportant observation, as both macro 
(structural) and micro (agential) processes are evident in policy decision-making processes 
within a political party. 
 38 
 
 
3.1.4 Discursive Institutionalism 
Discursive intuitionalism sometimes also referred to as ‘constructivist’ or ‘ideational’ 
institutionalism (Hay, 2008), is often argued by its proponents to constitute the ‘fourth’ main 
branch of new institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008, 2010, 2012). The defining characteristic of 
this approach is the centrality of ideas and discourse to explanations of institutional change 
(see also Blyth 2002). Institutions in the discursive approach are conceptualised as arenas 
which ‘frame the discourse’ and act as ‘simultaneously constraining structures and enabling 
constructs of meanings which are internal sentient (thinking and speaking) agents’ (Schmidt, 
2010:4). Importantly, discursive institutionalists often explore the impact of ideas and 
discourse on political change by using one of the other main new institutionalisms for 
‘institutional context’ (Schmidt 2008:304). Discursive institutionalism is therefore often used 
with the insights of other approaches as ‘background information’ (Schmidt, 2008:304). 
Institutional change is instigated by actors through an endogenous process using their 
‘background ideational and foreground discursive abilities’ (Schmidt, 2008:304). Or, in other 
words, an individual actor or group’s social skill in communicating new solutions to 
collective problems (ideas), for example a new or adapted policy position. In a political party 
these ideas could be promoted by individual policy entrepreneurs, advocacy coalitions, 
dominant factions or internal and external pressure groups or think-tanks. Institutional change 
is therefore not only dependent on the ideas themselves, and the context in which they are in, 
but also the success (or not) of how and by what means they are communicated and 
promoted, both internally and externally, by individual actors or groups. This brings ideas 
and discourse together in the discursive institutional explanation of political change. As 
Schmidt (2008:305) argues, this allows ‘for a more dynamic, agent-centred approach to 
institutional change’ when compared to historical, rational choice, and sociological 
institutionalism. Individual actors, and their ideational and discursive abilities, are 
empowered within this approach with a considerable ability to instigate or ‘construct’ change 
and overcome structural constraints. This approach therefore avoids ‘latent structuralism’ 
(Hay and Wincott, 1999:952) and focuses on agency, with structure a peripheral 
consideration. The ability of agents to shape their own institutional environment, despite 
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constraints, is an important insight that must be taken seriously in any theoretical framework 
of institutional change. 
The apparent marginal role for structure and institutions within discursive institutionalism has 
been strongly contested (Bell, 2011, 2012). For Bell (2011:887) discursive or constructivist 
institutionalist accounts of institutional change quickly descend into ‘ideational essentialism’, 
in which ideas and discursive agents essentially explain all aspects of change, with 
institutions and structure explaining relatively little. The discursive approach, Bell (2011: 
884) argues, is therefore in danger of taking institutions ‘back out’ of political analysis. This 
is a legitimate criticism, as discursive institutionalism could be argued to be guilty of the 
same fault it levels at institutionally deterministic approaches, except in this case overly 
privileging agency rather than structure. This over-privileging of the role of agency and ideas, 
disconnecting these from the wider institutional and structural factors that can ‘shape and 
empower agency’, is therefore an important limitation of the discursive institutionalist 
approach when used in isolation (Bell, 2011:884). Discursive institutionalism can also be 
criticised for conceptualising an institutional and social world that is constantly in a state of 
flux, which is contrary to the evidence provided by historical institutionalist studies that show 
strong patterns of continuity (Pierson, 1994, Dyson, 1999, Torfing, 2001, Kuipers, 2009). 
3.2 A New Institutionalist Framework of Institutional Change 
To overcome these problems, this thesis will adopt a mixed new institutional approach that 
attempts to incorporate the insights of these four new institutional approaches, provide a 
balanced explanation that does not seek to overly privilege structure or agency, and that 
explains institutional change as a dynamic and interactive process between institutions, 
structures, and agents. Instead it is conceptualised that each is ‘mutually constitutive in a 
dialectic manner’ (Bell, 2011:891, emphasis in original). Ultimately theoretical frameworks 
should guide empirical investigations and should not determine their outcomes. An integrated 
new institutionalist theoretical framework that does not privilege institutions, structure, or 
agency therefore has the advantage of approaching the evidence with a more open mind. 
This section will set out in detail the mixed new institutionalist model of institutional change 
that will form part of the explanatory framework for this thesis. It will establish this 
framework’s conceptualisation of the structure-agency relationship and define the role of 
individuals and institutions in ‘institutional change’. It will set out the mechanisms that 
explain how institutions, such as political parties, change, and how institutions resist change. 
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3.2.1 Institutions 
This framework will define an ‘institution’ as either a formal organisation or a set or system 
of formal or informal rules. In the context of this study this means the political party in 
question, rival political parties in the same party system, international institutions such as the 
European Union, in addition to formal systems of rules such as the electoral system or the 
parliamentary legislative process. Institutions also have the ability to effect change through 
influencing the behaviour and actions of ‘institutionally situated’ individual actors. 
Institutions possess a constraining influence over agents but are not confined to only this role. 
As Bell (2011:891) explains: 
Institutions have properties that help structure thought and behaviour at one 
remove from the immediacy of thought or action by agents at any given point 
in time. Institutions can thus shape or sometimes even impose behaviour. This 
is what gives institutions causal properties and why, at bottom, we pursue 
‘institutional’ analysis. 
 
The acknowledgment of institutional situated agents in this process brings in agency and 
shows how it is the interaction between institutions, structures. and agents that drives change. 
Institutions are tangible and play an active role in the analysis of institutional change. 
Institutions possess internal structures. For example, the Conservative Party itself, a formal 
institution, can be disaggregated into separate institutions such as the party leadership, 
parliamentary party, party membership and local associations, intra-party pressure 
groups/think-tanks, or candidate selection rules or the leadership election system. Externally 
to the Conservative Party itself are two separate but interlinked institutional spheres, a 
domestic and international sphere. The domestic sphere includes institutions such as pressure 
groups, the media, and other political parties. The international sphere includes the European 
Union and other non-European governments, such as the United States or Australia.  These 
institutions are also structured, for example the European Union can be disaggregated to the 
Commission, the Council, the Parliament, and the Court of Justice.  
3.2.3 Agency 
This approach is attempting to bridge the gap between rational choice and sociological 
institutionalism by arguing that individuals can make decisions both through a process of 
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calculating their self-interest and from the influence of wider social, political, and economic 
structures and institutions. It rejects the idea that preference formation must be viewed from 
either a ‘calculus’ (rationalist– individuals are rational self-interest maximisers) or ‘cultural’ 
perspective (sociological institutionalism – shaped by wider cultural structures) and seeks a 
‘middle ground’ between the two (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Kato, 1996). This dichotomy is 
problematic as it presents an unrealistic view of human behaviour, as humans both consider 
their self-interest and wider structural factors when making decisions, depending on the 
circumstances. How individual actors behave partly depends on the perception of the 
individual, or group, in question and the institutional context they are interpreting. In 
addition, this institutional (or structural) context can impose ‘costs and benefits’ on agents 
and/or restrict the ‘resources and opportunities’ available to them (Bell, 2011:892). This can 
also influence individual behaviour and incentivise or constrain institutional change. 
This leads to this framework’s conception of rationality as bounded rationality (Simon, 
1957). Bounded rationality suggests when individuals, or groups, make decisions they do 
using incomplete or unreliable information. Individuals lack a complete knowledge of all the 
information to hand and an understanding of all the consequences of the actions that they 
could take. Individuals also have both a limited amount of capacity, and time, to make 
decisions based on the information available to them. In complex decision-making processes, 
where the possibility of unintended consequences is high, such as decisions around policy 
positions, rationality is bounded for those individuals involved and therefore the institution as 
a whole. 
This new institutionalist approach, constituted by these conceptions of preference formation 
and bounded rationality, is an approach that ‘focuses on active agency within institutional 
settings and that sees the agents in question as being shaped (but not wholly determined) by 
their institutional environment’ (Bell, 2011:890). This bridges the gap between a rationalist 
and discursive institutionalist focus on individualism and agency, and the historical and 
sociological institutionalist focus on institutional and structural environments. This is of great 
value when looking to explain periods of change, as well as continuity, in a political party. It 
also goes a considerable way towards providing a more balanced theoretical focus between 
agency and structure. Human agency has causal power, like institutions, that directly affect 
the outcomes of political processes, such as policy development in a political party, to use the 
subject of this thesis as an example (Fairclough, 2005:923). 
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3.2.4 Structure 
Briefly, it is important to distinguish between ‘institutions’ and ‘structure’, as they are very 
often portrayed as the same thing in many institutional studies. Structure refers in this 
framework to the wider context of the political, economic, and social environments in which 
agents and institutions operate within. Like institutions, structures have the power to both 
constrain and empower agents and create conditions in which certain decisions are favoured 
more than others (Bell, 2011:898). Institutionally-situated agents interpret and reinterpret 
these structural environments when considering their actions. A structural environment could 
include the stability in a national banking system, demographic change such as increasing 
levels of immigration within a society or public opinion towards the rights of sexual 
minorities. Structures therefore have ‘institution-like effects in that they shape the options 
and strategies available to agents’ (Bell, 2011:899). How institutionally situated agents 
interpret their structural environment also depends on the institution they are situated within. 
Structures themselves have causal powers, like institutions, that can shape institutional 
change through their influence over the decision-making processes of strategic agents. 
3.2.5 Institutions, Structure, and Agency 
Many, if not all, research into change within institutions such as political parties have at their 
theoretical core a debate over the relationship between the structure and agency. However, as 
Hellman (2011:465) suggests, this debate has led those interested in party development into a 
‘theoretical deadlock’. In a similar fashion to those that debate the importance of nature and 
nurture in explanations of certain phenomena in human societies, such as war, neither the 
structure or agency position is ever likely to land a knockout blow on the other (Thelen, 
2010). What can be achieved is a synthesis between these two positions, one that treats both 
structure and agency as important components of institutional change, and that ‘situates 
agents within a context that frames and shapes the strategies they are likely to pursue’ 
(Thelen, 2010:56).  This new institutionalist framework attempts to provide this theoretical 
synthesis between structure and agency, or in this context, between institutions, structures 
and agents.  
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This is done by theorising a dialectical relationship between institutions, structure and agency 
(Bell, 2011; Hellman, 2011). As Hellmann (2011: 465) states this conceptualisation of 
structure-agency sees ‘agents…able to develop different strategic responses to the same 
structural environment, while, at the same time, the structural environment is strategically 
selective, favouring certain strategies over others’. Institutions, structures, and agents, 
‘operating in a dialectical, mutually constitutive relationship’, interacting with each other to 
produce institutional change (Bell, 2011:899). Actors within institutions have the ability to 
instigate change, but what options or strategies are available, or perceived to be the best 
course of action, are contextualised by the institutional and structural environment at the time 
and therefore constantly open to different interpretation by actors. Fundamentally, whether 
the influence is institutional or structural, these effects are mediated through interpretive 
agents, as it only agents that can take the decisions to change an institution of which they are 
a part. This provides a position which is a synthesis between structure and agency, with 
neither concept privileged within the framework, but both interacting in a dialectical 
relationship. 
This section has established how this new institutionalist framework theorises the relationship 
between institutions, structure, and agency. Drawing on Bell’s (2011, 2012) historical 
institutionalism, in addition to insights from rationalist, sociological, and discursive 
institutionalism, this framework conceptualises institutions, structure, and agency working in 
a dialectic relationship which changes institutions through continuous interaction. It is 
therefore not a case of privileging either institutions, structure, or agency, but of 
understanding that all three are intricately linked. However, institutional and structural effects 
are filtered through agents, so it is human actions that ultimately cause institutions, such as a 
political party’s Europe policy, to change. This new institutionalist approach attempts to 
bridge the structure-agency question, providing an integrated theoretical framework for the 
empirical research questions. 
3.3 Mechanisms 
The second section of this chapter introduces the mechanisms this new institutionalist 
approach will use to explain how institutions, such as the Conservative Party and European 
policy, change. It will also explain the mechanisms that work upon institutions to resist 
change. This theoretical framework accepts that political parties can experience change that is 
both abrupt and incremental, and instigated via institutional, structural, or agential 
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mechanisms. This allows for a broad ‘synthesis of explanatory elements’ that captures the 
dynamic nature of institutional change (Bell, 2011:906). 
 
 
3.3.1 Path Dependency 
One of the main claims of historical institutionalism on the process of change and 
development in institutions is that an action or decision, policy or organisational in nature, 
made individually or collectively, will operate a constraining hold over any actions or 
decisions made in the future (Greener, 2005). In simple terms, a decision at point A is likely 
to have an influence on decisions at point B and C. Once this action or particular institutional 
direction becomes entrenched within an institution it becomes increasingly difficult for this 
direction to be reversed by institutional agents. This is because as time moves on, and more 
moves in this same direction are made, the costs to the institution and agents of changing 
course increase (Pierson, 2000a). However, this does not mean institutions are ‘locked-in’ 
permanently. Institutional, structural, and agential mechanism effects can all contribute to an 
institution, such as a policy area like European integration within the Conservative Party, 
changing direction. 
A good example of the power of path-dependency to shape the politics of the future is 
Pierson’s (1994) study of welfare policy under the Thatcher and Reagan administrations. 
Entrenched institutional welfare systems that had developed over many decades proved 
extremely difficult to dismantle, due in large part to the significant costs this would have 
imposed on both governments. This was despite rhetoric about substantially reforming the 
welfare state in both countries. Dyson (1999:181) found path-dependent tides, such as a long-
term cross-party consensus and hegemonic concepts of Franco-German reconciliation, 
‘powerful but not determining’ in the French political elite’s commitment to Economic and 
Monetary Union. 
In the context of a political party a good example of this would be an important change in 
policy, such as the William Hague’s commitment to rule out a Conservative government 
joining the Euro (Bale, 2016:79), which, once firmly established within the culture and 
identity of a party, is difficult to reverse. This helps explain why many institutions, like 
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political parties, are considered conservative institutions that are resistant to change in many 
areas once a certain ‘way of doing things’ has become entrenched. 
3.3.2 History and Historical Legacy 
Here it is important to make explicit the contribution history makes to path dependency, 
individual behaviour, and why it is taken so seriously in historical institutionalism more 
broadly. History is defined here as the individual or collective interpretation of past events, 
decisions, and actions. The prime reason is that the historical context in which actors, and 
groups of collective actors, make decisions and formulate strategies is shaped and structured 
by previous decisions and strategies. This is due to the changing social, political, cultural or 
economic circumstances that shape the behaviour and decision-making processes of actors 
(Steinmo, 2008). For example, the policy decisions made by a political party during a long 
period of economic decline are likely to, though not deterministically, shape these same 
policy decisions. 
3.3.3 Positive Feedback 
Positive feedback is a concept that helps explain why path dependency can have a powerful 
influence over political institutions. The concept of positive feedback is closely associated 
with the notion of increasing returns (Pierson, 2000a). Positive feedback argues that once an 
actor or group of actors make a decision or takes a specific course of action, supplemented by 
further decisions that re-state this action, over time the costs of changing this action increase. 
These costs could occur in a number of different ways, for example in political costs such as 
reputational damage or material costs such as money or manpower. It therefore becomes 
increasingly beneficial to the individual or group to maintain this current trajectory. The path 
dependent trajectories identified in many studies of national welfare states are themselves the 
products of accumulated positive feedback built up over many decades of policy decisions 
(Pierson,1994, Torfing, 2001, Kuipers, 2009)  
However, while path dependency can help explain periods of relative continuity in 
institutional arrangements, it does not explain how institutions like political parties can shift 
to a new path or direction. It does not account for the moments or periods of relatively abrupt 
change. Within this theoretical framework this is conceptualised through contingent events 
and critical junctures/conjunctures. 
3.3.4 Contingent Events and Critical Junctures 
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The idea of contingency and critical junctures/conjunctures are central to historical 
institutionalism’s idea of how the process of change works within institutions such as a 
political party (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). A contingent event is an occurrence that 
transpires which cannot be accurately predicted or anticipated by actors with bounded 
rationality. It can be understood as an event that is comprised of elements of chance or 
random effects and is possible, but not necessarily likely, to happen. These contingent events 
can alter the interpretation actors have of their institutional and structural environment and 
thus their current preferences (Mohanan, 2013). Logically, therefore, these contingent events 
can affect actor behaviour. Previous decisions or actions are reassessed in the light of new 
institutional and structural circumstances, with new actions potentially taken in response.  
Contingent events can signify the point where a critical juncture can take place. In these 
critical moments, an actor’s preferences can be altered enough to make choices that deviate 
from the current ‘path’. Critical ‘conjunctures’ are moments were multiple events take place 
at the same time. The institutional constraints on actors are metaphorically relaxed and the 
potential for lasting change is possible, though not inevitable (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). 
Critical junctures can initiate a period, either during or following the contingent event where 
decisions are made that can guide institutions down a new path (Pierson, 2004). However, a 
critical juncture can also occur without the need for a contingent event. For example, 
elections have the potential to be critical junctures for an office-seeking political party such 
as the Conservative Party, depending on the results and their interpretation by actors (see 
previous section on electoral performance and party change). These are hardly unforeseen 
events, as elections must take place by law and are therefore foreseen, but undoubtedly have 
the potential to be critical junctures for a political party because of their element of 
unpredictability. 
The degree to which an election can contribute towards a critical juncture and changes within 
European policy for the Conservative Party is affected by the nature of the election in 
question. Drawing on the scholarship of a number of American political scientists and their 
studies of US electoral history (see Key, 1955, 1959; Sundqvist, 1973; Brady, 1978), Norris 
and Evans (1999) distinguish between five different types of elections; maintaining and 
deviating elections, dealignment and realignment elections, and finally critical elections.  
Maintaining elections are defined as an election in which political parties mobilise a 
traditional level of support, based on recent elections. Additionally, maintaining elections are 
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characterised by little deviation from the norm in terms of policy positions, again in 
comparison to recent elections (Norris and Evans, 1999). The 2001 British general election 
can be considered to be a maintaining election, with the balance of power in parliament 
relatively unchanged compared to the 1997 general election (Labour lost five seats with the 
Conservative Party gaining only 1). In contrast, deviating elections are characterised by 
‘sharp reversals’ in the ‘normal’ share of the vote (within the political context of the time). 
These are often temporary occurrences and are associated with second-order elections such as 
those to the European Parliament, which are important to this thesis as political parties have 
used these elections to ‘road-test’ and develop European policy before a first-order national 
election. Dealigning elections are characterised by a cumulative weakening of the voter-party 
bond over a number of elections, while realignment elections are a strengthening of these 
bonds (Evans and Norris, 1999). Critical elections are ‘those exceptional contests that 
produce abrupt, significant and durable realignments in the electorate with major 
consequences for the long-term party order’ (Evans and Norris, 1999: xxxi).  Critical 
elections will also significantly alter the policy agendas of future governments. 
Critical junctures therefore can provide actors within a party with what Kingdon (1984) 
describes as a ‘windows of opportunity’. These are ‘windows’ in which agents can act to 
change policy positions (party leader or leadership) or increase the pressure for policy 
positions to change if they do not have the authority to directly make changes themselves 
(backbench MPs, MEPs, party members). Firstly, they can reveal to policy-makers the 
inadequacy of a current policy position in the light of changing events (Cortell and Peterson, 
1999: 183). Secondly, they can provide the opportunity for individual actors within a political 
party to discredit an existing policy position and therefore increase pressure on policy-makers 
to make changes. Whether or not actors take advantage of windows of opportunity created by 
critical junctures depends on their individual or group preferences. This depends on the 
individual or group in question and their ideology, domestic political considerations, and 
institutional status (Cortell and Peterson, 1999:183). 
It is possible for individual actors to recognise these critical junctures as providing a window 
of opportunity for change to take place, and for these actors to take advantage of this to 
instigate change, concurrently. Other individuals, in the same institution or environment, will 
not recognise these windows and will fail to either instigate change themselves or prevent 
change they do not want from taking place. This will depend on the perceptive ability of the 
individuals or group of individuals in question and their specific circumstances.  
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It is important to establish that the significance of the window of opportunity provided by a 
critical juncture is subject to variation. This is due to the type of critical juncture that an 
institution experiences and how they are perceived by individual actors, both in terms 
instigating or preventing change from occurring. For example, a critical juncture such as the 
collapse of a national banking system is likely to provide a wider window of opportunity to 
instigate policy change than a ‘undramatic, non-crisis’ event such as a European Council 
summit (Cortell and Peterson, 1999:185). The costs or opportunities that might result from 
these to policy-makers and party actors are also different. This can affect the significance of 
the critical juncture. For example, a damaging election result is going to raise the cost in the 
minds of party actors of not changing certain policy positions more than one quarter of 
disappointing economic growth figures. Keeler (1993) describes these variations as ‘macro-
windows’ (created by more significant critical junctures) and ‘micro-windows’ (created by 
less significant critical junctures). These are defined by the extent of the change that follows 
them. 
What triggers macro and micro critical junctures? These can be either international or 
domestic in nature (Cortell and Peterson, 1999). As established within the chapter on policy 
change in political parties, domestic triggers can have exogenous or endogenous origins to 
the party (Panebianco, 1988; Harmel and Janda ,1994, 1995). An international trigger may be 
a global downturn in the economic environment, a political decision by an international 
institution such as the European Court of Justice, a new international treaty, or a change in 
policy by an individual or group of nations. Domestic triggers that are exogenous to the party 
itself could include elections, the policy positions of rival parties, a slowdown in the domestic 
economic environment and changes in public opinion. Domestic triggers that are endogenous 
to a political party include changes in the party leader or leadership team or shifts in the 
power of dominant party factions. 
While international and domestic triggers can create these critical junctures, and therefore the 
windows of opportunity to instigate policy change, political actors must still have the 
preference to make these changes happen. The preferences of these political actors within a 
political party are shaped by four factors; environmental conditions (international and 
domestic triggers), domestic political calculation, ideology, and institutional position (Cortell 
and Peterson, 1999: 188-89). Cortell and Peterson (1999) apply these to government officials, 
but these can also be utilised for actors in political parties. Changing environmental 
conditions can alter the preference formation of political actors. That is, they modify the 
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perceptions of actors within a party to believe that changing the salience or position of a 
policy will be preferable to no change at all, due to considered high risks of inaction. This is 
closely associated with domestic political calculation. 
3.3.5 Sequencing 
It has been established thus far that institutions, historical mechanisms, and contingent or 
critical events are important to this theoretical framework’s analysis of political processes. 
What also plays a central role in a historical institutionalist explanation of political and 
institutional change is the sequence, or temporal ordering, in which these events take place. It 
is therefore not only important to consider what happens when analysing a period of 
historical time, but when these events happen (Pierson 2000b). This is because the order or 
sequence of events are likely to ultimately affect the political outcomes and processes further 
on in time. So, for example, the fact that A, B, and C happened in the sequence that they did 
could have a considerable impact, a historical institutionalist analysis would suggest, on the 
potential outcome at point D. If a sequence is maintained and not interrupted by a new 
contingent event or critical juncture, with one event linking and reinforcing the other, a self-
reinforcing path dependency can evolve. As Mahoney (2000:510) states ‘path dependent 
analysis involves the study of causal processes that are highly sensitive to events that take 
place in the early stages of an overall historical sequence.’ 
The sequence of events will therefore act as a structuring, though not determining, influence 
on the preferences and actions of political actors within institutions. As Monahan (2013:95) 
observes, ‘Sequencing is critical because it allows the analyst to understand how events and 
structures operated to seemingly narrow down the options available to an actor so that an 
ultimate decision or path was taken.’ 
3.3.6 Incremental Change 
Many new institutionalists have suggested that this explanation of institutional change, long 
term path-dependent trajectories punctuated with critical junctures and windows of 
opportunity in which actors can exploit to instigate change, does not adequately explain some 
of the complex ways in which institutions can change gradually (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; 
Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). This is because this model does not seek to explain change that 
can take place in the absence of critical junctures, or in periods between critical junctures. It 
implies that during these intervening periods, institutions remain relatively static or do not 
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change at all. In the case of a political party and policy, in this case European policy, while 
there might be periods were there are no significant or dramatic changes in content or 
emphasis, policy does not remain completely static but will change incrementally, in small 
steps.  
To move beyond this punctuated equilibrium model of institutional change, and to allow 
room for agency as well as structure, an understanding of how political institutions can 
experience incremental change is necessary (Thelen, 2010). This also enables this approach 
to incorporate endogenous factors more readily in explanations of institutional change, as 
opposed to solely relying to exogenous shock factors, which most often characterise critical 
junctures in the classic punctuated equilibrium model. As Streeck and Thelen (2005:19) state, 
‘rather than emanating on the outside, change is often endogenous and in some cases is 
produced by the very behaviour an institution itself generates’. Within the context of a 
political party this links strongly to those within the party change literature that suggest that 
endogenous factors, such as the actions and behaviour of political leaders and dominant 
factions or tendencies, should be considered significant sources of change in political parties 
in their own right, with or without the environmental factors (Panebianco, 1988; Appleton 
and Ward, 1993, 1997). 
Streeck and Thelen (2005:19-30) identify five ‘broad modes of gradual but nonetheless 
transformative change’ within institutions which they call displacement, layering, drift, 
conversion and exhaustion. As the exhaustion mode is principally to do with institutional 
breakdown, this section will concentrate on the first four modes as they more applicable to 
political parties. Many of these modes of gradual change can be utilised to categorise the 
incremental development and change of a political party’s approach to a specific area of 
policy, as European policy within the Conservative Party could itself be considered an 
informal institution, subject to these same modes of gradual change. This approach to 
institutional change is drawn from the ‘social ecology’ concept found in sociological 
institutionalism (Peters, 1999). 
Firstly, displacement can occur within a political party when new ideas emerge, be they in 
terms of policy or organisational structure, that bring into question existing institutional 
practices or positions. However, rather than simply being stimulated by a change in 
environmental conditions as Panebianco (1988) would suggest, these ideas are drawn from 
previous historical moments and reintroduced into the party under a new institutional context. 
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These new ways of thinking are essentially reintroduced or ‘reactivated’ by political actors. If 
these newly emergent ideas gain credibility amongst more and more political actors, 
traditional or current ways of thinking, for example within a specific policy area such as 
Europe, can become displaced. Streeck and Thelen (2005:20) develop this by suggesting that 
‘…in critical moments or periods latent subsidiary ways of action can be rediscovered, 
and by switching over actors then promote them to dominance or move them from the 
periphery of the institutional system to its centre.’ 
 
These critical ‘moments’ or ‘periods’ are however likely to be stimulated by change in a 
political party’s external conditions, which motivates political actors to rediscover latent 
policy ideas and test whether they can persuade the party to change and adopt them. 
Exogenous factors encourage, and provide endogenous political actors with support, to ‘push 
in the same direction’ towards certain institutional change they could not have justified on 
their own. Streeck and Thelen (2005: 22) note, ‘for external shocks to bring about 
fundamental transformation it helps if endogenous change has prepared the ground’. This is 
supported in the party change literature by Panebianco (1988), who also agrees endogenous 
factors are required to ‘condition’ a political party, in order for exogenous factors to be in a 
position to stimulate change. This also implies that displacement can be both a sudden or 
gradual process of change, depending on the circumstances in question (Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2009:16). 
Secondly, political institutions can also change incrementally through a process called 
layering (Shickler, 2001, Thelen, 2002, Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Through the process of 
layering, political actors attempt to work around the traditional institutional practices by 
adding, or layering, additional practices that do not immediately challenge the status quo but 
gradually serve to undermine it. These are presented by political actors as ‘refinements’ or 
‘amendments’ to the existing arrangements. As Streeck and Thelen (2005:23) note, these will 
not ‘typically provoke counter mobilisation by defenders of the status quo’ and will over time 
‘alter the overall trajectory of development as the old institutions stagnate…and the new ones 
assume an ever-prominent role in governing individual behaviour’. In theory, a similar 
process of layering could explain the gradual change in a specific area of policy within a 
political party, with the proponents of policy change making incremental amendments to the 
overall direction of a policy area that, in the long term, sets in motion dynamics that 
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fundamentally undermine it. This could, in theory, incrementally change a political party’s 
policy position on European integration from pro-European to Eurosceptic over time. 
Thirdly, change can occur gradually through drift (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Drift results in 
change when political actors, intentionally or not, allow a policy platform to remain unaltered 
even when the environmental conditions change and bring these positions into question. As 
Mahoney and Thelen (2009:17) state, ‘When actors choose not to respond to such 
environmental changes, their very inaction can cause change in the impact of an institution’. 
Or, in this case, a political party’s position on a specific area of policy. The act of not altering 
the policy platform itself thus leads to the change, as the new political and economic 
environment changes their impact and meaning. Examples of this occurring in other areas of 
policy include American welfare policy, which having failed to respond to a number of new 
‘risks’, over time saw the overall social protections available to Americans decline (Hacker, 
2005). Policy was allowed to drift and not adapt to the new conditions, which ultimately 
changed its original impact and meaning. 
A fourth mode of incremental change is conversion. This is different from the previous three 
modes in that policies are not displaced, amended or allowed to drift but instead are 
‘redirected to new goals, functions, or purposes’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005:26). In terms of 
an institution such as European policy with the Conservative Party, this could involve 
political actors adapting policy positions in response to changing environmental conditions in 
order to meet new policy goals. Or, alternatively, this could mean new political actors, for 
example as a result of a change in the dominant faction within the party, taking a specific 
area of policy and converting this to a new purpose (Streeck and Thelen, 2005:26). This can 
be the result of political actors exploiting the unintended consequences, or ambiguities of a 
previous policy position, opening the space to allow the reinterpretation of existing policy. 
Policy conversion could also occur simply through the passage of time (Pierson, 2004). This 
is because, as time moves on, the environmental conditions in which the original policy was 
developed have changed, in addition to the political actors within the party and the perceived 
political problems of the day (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Policy is therefore converted slowly 
over time as it adapts itself to the new environmental conditions and political actor 
preferences.   
By incorporating these four modes of incremental change (displacement, layering, drift, and 
conversion) into this new institutionalist approach, it enables political change to be theorised 
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as not only a process of institutional equilibrium occasionally punctuated by exogenous 
events, but as gradual change from endogenous causes and human agency. This makes the 
framework more dynamic and sensitive to how real-world events develop. 
 
 
3.3.7 Ideas 
Another way in which this theoretical framework can develop upon the punctuated 
equilibrium, or exogenous shock, model of change is to take seriously the role that ideas play 
in institutional change. Ideas are here defined as ‘creative solutions to collective action 
problems’ (Steinmo, 2008:131). Incorporating ideas into the theoretical framework allows for 
the greater role of individual actors in instigating change within political institutions, 
including political parties, and avoids explanations of change that are overly deterministic or 
narrowly focused on structural and institutional factors that constrain and reduce individual 
agency (Lieberman, 2002, Steinmo, 2008). In doing so, it draws upon the key insight of 
discursive institutionalism. It therefore provides an endogenous mechanism in which political 
actors can actually change institutions themselves through the introduction of solutions to 
problems, or ideas. Looked at from this perspective, the collection of policies that make up 
‘European policy’ within the Conservative Party are creative solutions to the collective action 
problem of how Britain should interact with those nations that most closely border it 
geographically. European policy within the Conservative Party, can therefore in theory be 
changed by political actors through the introduction of solutions to real or perceived 
problems with the UK-EU relationship. 
Ideas have significance in this context because conceptually they cannot be separated from 
interests, as an individual’s ‘interests’ are firmly rooted in their desires, beliefs, and values 
(Blyth, 2002, Steinmo, 2008). An individual’s ideas and interests are therefore interrelated, 
with each influencing the other. Examining the role of ideas is therefore an important 
component of explaining why individuals within institutions, such as elite actors within a 
political party, make the decisions they do regarding policy. Ideas shape an individual’s or 
group’s interests and ultimately, therefore, their actions. This makes the understanding of the 
role ideas have played in the development of Conservative European policy necessary for a 
comprehensive understanding of this process of political change. 
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Arguably the most well-known new institutionalist to incorporate the power of ideas into 
explaining institutional change is Hall (1986, 1989, 1993). In each of these studies Hall 
explores how specific ideas, such as Keynesianism and monetarism, gradually changed the 
economic and fiscal policies of countries like the US and UK. These ideas, and the policy 
changes that they helped shape, would go on to make significant changes to each country’s 
economy. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out how a new institutionalist theoretical approach can help better 
understand the process of change in a political party and the mechanisms which can 
contribute to this process. It adds to the insights set out in the previous chapter on external 
and internal drivers of change by providing the language and theoretical toolkit to describe 
the process of change over time. Combining the insights from the party change literature and 
new institutionalism establishes a detailed approach in which change in a political party can 
be understood. 
It has established how a general new institutionalist perspective provides for an approach that 
is integrated and pragmatic, in which a range of theoretical insights into what processes can 
contribute towards change in a political institution work in co-operation with each other and 
not in competition. Institutions, structures, and individual agents are in a constant process of 
interaction, forming dialectical relationships. Institutions can change both quickly and more 
incrementally over time, depending on the historical context. The importance of critical 
junctures, individual actors, or ideas therefore depends on the evidence for these in the 
empirical chapters. This is a strength of this general new institutionalist approach and reflects 
the limitations applying strict interpretations of the four-traditional historical, rational choice, 
sociological, and discursive perspectives. The following empirical chapters apply this 
approach to understand the development of European policy in the Conservative Party, 1997-
2016. 
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Chapter 4: Conservative Party and Europe 1997-2016 - Analysis of Change 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a descriptive analysis of the development of European 
policy in the Conservative Party between May 1997 and February 2016. This will set out the 
general position of the party in relation to European integration during this time as well as 
identifying important policy changes, continuities, and substantive themes. To achieve this a 
qualitative analysis of 119 speeches, 267 parliamentary statements, 290 newspaper articles, 9 
manifestoes, and a number of other documents, such as the Coalition Agreement, from this 
period has been completed. This chapter will be sub-divided into separate periods that start 
with the beginning of a new parliament and end with the subsequent general election. Each 
sub-section sets out to describe in detail the changes in European policy identified in that 
parliament, sequenced chronologically, in addition to the continuities with previous historical 
periods. At the conclusion of each section the type of policy change and Euroscepticism 
observed will be categorised. This analysis has consciously sought to avoid providing 
explanations for the changes identified, which is the role of the four subsequent empirical 
chapters. 
 
In the last twenty years there have been a considerable number of studies published 
concerning the definition and appropriate categorisation of Euroscepticism in political parties 
(Taggart, 1998; Kopecký and Mudde, 2002; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002, 2004; Flood and 
Usherwood, 2005; Conti and Verzichelli, 2005; Riishøj, 2007; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 
2008a, 2008b; Kaniok, 2009). This chapter therefore firstly sets out to briefly consider this 
literature and establish the typology that will used to categorise each parliamentary period in 
the sections that follow. 
 
4.1 Categorising Party-based Euroscepticism 
 
The most noted attempt at a broad definition of Euroscepticism, in the context of political 
parties, was by Taggart (1998). Here Euroscepticism is defined as the expression of ‘the idea 
of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified 
opposition to the process of European integration’ (Taggart, 1998:366). A more detailed 
breakdown of the concept of Euroscepticism in political parties was put forward by Szczerbiak 
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and Taggart (2008a:7) that distinguishes between ‘Hard’ Euroscepticism and ‘Soft’ 
Euroscepticism. Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008:7-8) define Hard Euroscepticism as being: 
 
…where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European 
integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their 
countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards 
the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of 
European integration as it is currently conceived. 
 
Soft Euroscepticism is defined as where: 
 
…there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU 
membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas 
leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there 
is a sense that ‘national interest ‘is currently at odds with the EU’s 
trajectory. 
 
While Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008:241) have stated that the hard-soft Eurosceptic binary 
model was introduced to stimulate a conceptual debate about party-based Euroscepticism, 
and was not intended to be a definite position, it can be criticised for being overly simplistic 
and not allowing for distinctive positions that exist within the hard and soft Eurosceptic 
definitions (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002). 
 
Lynch and Whitaker (2013a) who combine the Szczerbiak and Taggart hard-soft Eurosceptic 
binary model (2008a) with Flood and Usherwood’s (2005) six category model, construct a 
‘Conservative Eurosceptic spectrum’, from outright rejectionists (Hard Eurosceptic) to 
minimalists (Soft Eurosceptic). This is set out below in Table 4.1. This provides for a more 
detailed categorisation than a simple binary distinction, but not so complex that it becomes 
difficult ‘to operationalise and categorise parties’ effectively (Szczerbiak and Taggart 
2008:246) (see Riishøj, 2007). This approach will therefore be utilised to categorise each 
period in the following sections of this chapter. Table 4.2, as discussed in Chapter 2, shows 
Hall’s three orders of policy change model which will be used to categorise the type of policy 
change during each parliamentary period. 
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4.2 Conservative European Policy: May 1997 
The purpose of this benchmarking exercise is not to explore in-depth the development of 
European policy during John Major’s seven-year leadership of the party, but to establish the 
policy position of the Conservative Party in this area immediately before the beginning of 
this thesis’s timeframe, which is the period following the May 1997 general election. The 
most efficient means of establishing the European policy position of the Conservative Party 
as of May 1997 is to consider the 1997 general election manifesto. At this point in time, the 
Table 4.1: Conservative Eurosceptic Spectrum 
Hard 
Eurosceptic 
Maximalist Revisionists:  
 
Support an alternative relationship with the 
EU, for example the ‘Norway’ or 
‘Switzerland’ models, where a country 
would not be part of the EU but would still 
have access to the Single Market or other 
EU-wide initiatives.  
 
Outright Rejectionists:  
 
Support withdrawing from the 
EU. 
Soft 
Eurosceptic 
Minimalists:  
 
Support membership of the EU and the 
current status quo but are opposed to any 
additional European integration beyond 
this point. 
 
Minimalist Revisionists: 
 
Support membership of the EU 
but favour a limited repatriation 
of powers, in certain specific 
areas, from EU competence to 
national control. 
 
Source:  Lynch and Whitaker (2013a) 
Table 4.2: Hall’s Orders of Policy Change 
First Order 
Change 
The instruments, or practical mechanisms, of individual policies are 
changed, but the overall policy goals remain. 
Second Order 
Change 
More broad adjustments to an area of policy, for example new individual 
policies, but the overall goals of policy remain. 
Third Order 
Change 
New goals introduced to an area of policy. 
Source: Hall (1993) 
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general election manifesto was the most comprehensive statement of official Conservative 
European policy available. The limitation of only using the 1997 general election manifesto 
at this point is that it does not provide a detailed outline of the European policy developed 
under Major during the 1992-1997 parliament. However, for the purposes of establishing the 
position of European policy at this point, May 1997, the general election manifesto provides 
the best starting point from which European policy can be traced from and into the preceding 
time periods. 
 
The 1997 manifesto sets out a European policy for the Conservative Party that is opposed to 
any further European social, economic, or political integration for the UK, the only exception 
being a ‘wait-and-see’ policy towards the UK joining a single currency. Nevertheless, the 
manifesto states the Conservative Party aim is to maintain Europe as a ‘partnership of 
sovereign states’ and to oppose any drift towards the establishment of a ‘federal Europe’ 
(Conservative Party, 1997). 
 
In terms of social policy, the party was committed to keeping the UK out of the Social 
Chapter (Conservative Party, 1997:9). The Social Chapter extended EU competences in 
social policy in areas such as working conditions and gender equality. These provisions were 
applicable to all member states apart from the UK, after Major had negotiated an opt-out at 
Maastricht. The Conservative Party also opposed any additional expansion of EU 
competence over employment policy, for example a new European employment chapter, or 
UK participation in the Working Time Directive. 
 
On economic and monetary policy, Major had also secured an opt-out from the single 
currency at Maastricht. The Conservative Party’s main policy commitment was to ‘keep our 
options open’ and only move towards UK participation in the single currency if the economic 
conditions were right and sustainable in the long term. The UK would, however, continue to 
be involved in discussions surrounding the single currency before the official launch on 
January 1st, 1999. In addition, a Conservative government in the next Parliament would only 
join the single currency if the British electorate had approved the decision in a referendum 
(Conservative Party, 1997). 
 
Institutionally, the Conservative Party opposed ‘any further extension of qualified-majority 
voting’ (QMV) in EU decision-making processes that would reduce the number of policy 
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areas in which the UK currently had a veto and erode national sovereignty (Conservative 
Party, 1997). Additionally, they opposed any increase in the powers of the European 
Parliament if this was at the expense of national parliaments. The role for national 
parliaments in the EU would be increased, although there were no proposals in the manifesto 
for how this would work in practice. Any further moves towards centralised decision-making 
or removal of the option of permanent opt-outs would be opposed (Conservative Party, 
1997). For example, the Conservative Party opposed extending QMV into the justice and 
home affairs pillar of the Treaty on European Union established at Maastricht, as proposed by 
the French and German governments at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference in 
Amsterdam (Conservative Party, 1997). Before the Amsterdam Treaty was ratified EU justice 
and home affairs policy measures could only be agreed by unanimous intergovernmental 
agreement between member states and therefore could not be passed via QMV. 
 
In other policy areas, such as the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies, the 
Conservative Party committed a future government only to seek far reaching reforms of these 
policies and to, especially when concerning the Common Fisheries Policy, bring greater 
regional control over rules and management (Conservative Party, 1997). 
 
Not every European policy position in the 1997 Conservative manifesto was tasked with 
opposing or resisting UK participation in further European integration. As the manifesto 
states, the first priority for the Conservative Party in the future development of Europe was 
the commitment to EU enlargement (Conservative Party, 1997). The Conservative Party 
supported the ‘aspiration’ of countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to 
join the EU, in addition to unspecified ‘others’ (Conservative Party, 1997). On the subject of 
trade, the policy was to work towards completion of the single market and, eventually, a 
transatlantic free trade deal (Conservative Party, 1997). In terms of defence, foreign, and 
security policy, the Conservative Party wanted to see increased co-operation between 
member states in all these areas, in addition to initiatives to combat international organised 
crime (Conservative Party, 1997). 
 
The Conservative Party position on European policy, as presented to the British electorate in 
May 1997, can be summarised as one in which the party had reached, or was at least very 
close to reaching, the limits of European integration it was willing to countenance. If we 
adopt the Lynch and Whitaker (2013a:319) framework of Conservative Euroscepticism 
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policy at this point can be categorised as minimalist-Soft Euroscepticism. The Conservative 
Party was opposed to the extension of EU competences in almost every policy area, the 
further centralisation of decision-making, surrender of permanent UK opt-outs, and the 
introduction of qualified majority voting into any additional policy areas. It is, as Lynch and 
Whitaker (2013a:319) have described in another context, a ‘this far but no further’ position. It 
does not, however, suggest any policies that should be transferred from EU competence to 
full UK control. They support the enlargement of the EU to the eastern and central European 
nations, the completion of the single market and enhanced co-operation, but not supranational 
control, in areas such as defence, foreign, and security policy. 
 
4.2 May 1997 – June 2001 
 
European policy in the Conservative Party during William Hague’s leadership sees much 
continuity with the European policy set out in the 1997 manifesto. The Conservative’s policy 
position continued to be opposed to any further European integration. Any form of EU 
institutional development or change that was perceived as reducing national sovereignty, 
such as an increase in the use of QMV or the expansion of EU competences into new areas, 
was opposed (Maude, 2000). A clear indication of this was the party position on the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which the Conservative Party opposed and voted against at 2nd and 3rd 
reading during its ratification in the House of Commons. During his first major speech as 
party leader on June 27th, 1997 in Perth, Hague called for a referendum on the Amsterdam 
Treaty (BBC, 1998). This position was repeated by the shadow Foreign Secretary Michael 
Howard in The Times the following month (Howard 1997a). This policy towards the 
Amsterdam Treaty was eventually dropped between July and November 1997, with the 
Conservative Party no longer committing to a referendum when challenged over the issue by 
the Labour Party in Parliament (Howard, 1997c). The enlargement of the European Union, as 
it had been under the previous leadership, remained the ‘top priority’ for Conservative 
European policy (Conservative Party, 1999: 1).  
 
However, while the principle of opposition to further integration shows continuity, the 
Conservative position on Europe during this period did experience important changes. The 
most significant change was on policy towards the single currency. The policy at the end of 
Major’s leadership was to ‘wait-and-see’ how the single currency developed and then, if the 
economic conditions were right and the project had proved to be sustainable, consider the UK 
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participation after a referendum. The policy towards the single currency under Hague went 
through two changes. Firstly, at the October 1997 conference in Blackpool, the position set 
out by the leadership on the single currency was not to join for ‘the foreseeable future’ 
(Deans, 1997). Following from this, on October 23rd, 1997, the leadership announced that the 
party would commit to opposing the UK joining the single currency for the life of the current 
parliament. The leadership also agreed to maintain this policy for the next general election 
manifesto, subsequent to a positive endorsement of this policy from a ballot of party 
members (Deans, 1997). This initiative was privately known as ‘Operation Sunrise’. The 
result of this ballot was announced in September 1998, with 84.4% of the party members that 
participated in the vote supporting the party leader’s policy on the single currency. Turnout 
for the referendum was 58.9%. This was a notable change from the ‘wait-and-see’ single 
currency policy under Major. 
 
The second notable change in European policy during this period was the so-called 
‘flexibility clause’, announced by Hague in Budapest in May 1999, on the eve of the June 
1999 European elections. This proposed clause would allow all EU member states the final 
decision on which future EU laws it did or did not want to participate in, outside the areas of 
the single market, competition, and trade policy (Watson, 1999). In all other areas, national 
parliaments would have the final say on whether a member state participated. As Hague 
stated when announcing the policy, “This is about a Europe with the flexibility to allow 
different destinations as well as different speeds” (Hague, 1999a). It would also protect the 
UK from being “dragooned into a federal Europe’ (Hague, 1999a). This policy would enable 
those that did not want to integrate any further, but still wanted to continue to co-operate in 
other policy areas, the legal option of doing so. Though Major (1994) had spoken of ‘greater 
flexibility’ and ‘varied geometry’ in the future development of the EU while in government, 
this was the first time an amendment to the EU treaty had been proposed to formalise it. 
A third notable policy development during this period was announced by Shadow Foreign 
Secretary Francis Maude in June 2000. This was the creation, through domestic legislation, 
of ‘reserve powers’ for the UK parliament. This was needed because EU institutions, 
especially the European Court of Justice, had ‘sometimes extended their competence beyond 
what was set out in the Treaties’ (Maude, 2000). This so called ‘Treaty creep’ was interpreted 
as a means by which EU institutions could extend the powers of the Treaties beyond what 
was originally intended, and without the ability of national parliaments to block them. 
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Reserve powers would ‘guarantee the supremacy of Parliament over certain areas of policy’ 
(Maude, 2000). This would ensure that areas not included in the competences of the EU 
under the Treaties, such as defence and taxation, could not face ‘Treaty creep’ through the 
decisions of the European Court of Justice. This policy aimed at protecting national 
sovereignty and the supremacy of Parliament. 
Lastly, the 2001 manifesto also committed the Conservative Party to ‘veto any further 
transfer of powers from Westminster to Brussels’ (Conservative Party, 2001). Going a step 
further than this, the 2001 manifesto also committed the Conservative Party in government to 
ensure that any future government wanting to transfer powers from Westminster to Brussels, 
would require approval for this in a referendum (Conservative Party, 2001). This went 
considerably further than the 1997 general election manifesto, which only committed the 
party to a referendum on joining the single currency (Conservative Party, 1997). 
These four policies, on the single currency, the flexibility clause, reserved powers, and the 
referendum commitment, can be considered to be the main changes in relation in to European 
policy between 1997 and 2001. When categorising them in terms of Hall’s (1993) framework 
of policy change, these are second order changes. The European policy goals between the 
two periods remained the same. These policies were new instruments to which past policy 
goals could be achieved in the future. Using the Lynch and Whitaker spectrum of a 
Conservative Euroscepticism (2013a) the Hague period can also be categorised as 
minimalist-Soft Eurosceptic. There is opposition to any further European integration and the 
suggestion that EU policy in certain, undefined, areas should be optional rather than 
mandatory – the so called ‘flexibility clause’. However, at no stage during this period is there 
a clear list of EU policy areas that the Conservative Party suggest they would repatriate. 
There is a change to a clear Soft Eurosceptic position on the single currency, with the 
Conservative Party ruling this out for at least 10 years. 
 
In addition, the Conservative Party during this period also developed a number of policies 
that aimed at reforming both the institutional structures and processes of the EU, and the 
ability of the UK parliament to hold these EU institutions accountable. These would tackle 
some of the negative consequences of the functioning of the EU, as they perceived it, such as 
a lack of democratic accountability and tendency to over-centralise decision making through 
deliberately opaque processes. As these policies constitute a similar theme, they have been 
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grouped together. They can then be easily compared with groups of institutional reform 
proposals in subsequent time periods. 
 
The first of these themes concerns scrutiny of EU institutions and EU decision-making, in 
which the Conservative Party proposed a number of policies, often involving the 
establishment of new independent institutions. These included the establishment of a new 
European authority, independent from the EU, to scrutinise European Commission decisions 
and establish the costs and benefits of newly proposed, and already established, EU 
legislation (Conservative Party, 1999); an independent mechanism to scrutinise EU 
institutions to prevent ‘over implemented or otherwise misapplied’ EU regulations 
(Conservative Party, 1999) and a ‘state-aid scoreboard’ to be established by the EU to 
publicly identify member states providing anti-competitive support to protect their own 
industries from market forces (Conservative Party, 1999). Other scrutiny policies, aimed 
specifically at the European Commission, included the power for the European Parliament to 
remove individual Commissioners from office; a binding code of conduct for all senior 
Commission officials; and for all Commissioners to be ‘personally responsible in EU law’ for 
all the money administered in their name (Conservative Party, 1999). 
 
The second of these themes involve the establishment of new independent European 
institutions that would take over, from the European Commission, competences in specific 
policy areas. For example, in the 1999 European election manifesto the party proposed 
removing the European Commission’s authority to implement and enforce EU competition 
policy and transfer this competence to a new independent European competition authority 
(Conservative Party, 1999). In the same manifesto the Conservative Party also proposed the 
establishment of a new independent Anti-Fraud Office, based outside the European 
Commission, to tackle fraud within EU institutions (Conservative Party, 1999). To enforce 
the subsidiarity principle the Conservative Party proposed a ‘subsidiarity panel, set up by the 
Member States’ to screen EU legislative proposals before they were discussed by the Council 
of Ministers or the European Parliament. This would ensure the EU did not legislate in areas 
that would be better dealt with at the national level (Conservative Party, 1999). 
 
A last group of policies coalesce around enhanced European policy scrutiny in the UK 
Parliament. Firstly, the UK Parliament should have the power to debate, and vote upon, UK 
candidates for European Commission positions put forward by the government (Hague, 
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1999). Secondly, the Conservative Party also proposed that before Ministers attend Council 
meetings they should be questioned on the government’s position. Subsequently, if the 
government agreed to a position that differed to those presented to MPs before the meeting 
Ministers would be required to provide an explanation to MPs on the specific reasons for this 
(Conservative Party, 1999). 
 
These policy themes indicate that there was strong emphasis during the Hague leadership on 
European policies associated with increasing the scrutiny and accountability of European 
institutions and decision-making processes, in addition to enhancing the power of MPs to 
question the government over European policy decisions. Importantly, however, under Hague 
it should be noted that there was a specific focus on increasing the scrutiny and accountability 
of the European Commission and European Commissioners, as well as the reduction in its 
powers in important areas such as competition policy. 
 
In summary, the Conservative Party policy towards Europe under the Hague leadership 
shows a degree of both continuity and change with the policy bestowed upon it by Major. 
Areas of policy continuity include a commitment to resist any further steps towards greater 
European integration for the UK or the introduction of more qualified majority voting. There 
are strong continuities in commitments to expand the membership of the EU, complete the 
single market, increase economic competitiveness, reduce regulation, and develop a more 
flexible form of decision-making. Areas of policy change during this period include the move 
to rule out the single currency for 10 years, the commitment to hold referendums on all future 
EU treaties, the flexibility clause treaty change, and the reserved powers legislation. 
 
 
4.3 June 2001 to May 2005 
 
4.3.1 Ian Duncan Smith, June 2001-November 2003 
The goals of European policy in the Conservative Party, following the election defeat in June 
2001, continued under the new leadership of Iain Duncan Smith. As Shadow Foreign 
Secretary Michael Ancram (2001) confirmed to the House of Commons in October 2001: 
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I am happy to admit that we do not support further political integration…we 
would want some powers to be returned to national Parliaments where the 
national interests can be most effectively pursued. 
 
The Conservative Party reflected this position by opposing ratification of the Nice Treaty 
through the House of Commons on the basis that it was over-centralising and extended QMV, 
damaging national and parliamentary sovereignty (Ancram, 2001). The Conservative Party 
also opposed the proposed EU Constitution, calling for approval through a national 
referendum prior to UK ratification (Ancram 2002c). 
 
However, while maintaining continuity in terms the overall goals of European policy, a 
number of policy positions changed during the leadership of Duncan Smith. During this 
period Conservative policy on the single currency changed. Before the new leadership came 
to power policy on the single currency had been to oppose UK membership for at least the 
lifetime of the current and next parliament – at least 10 years. Under Duncan Smith this 
changed to opposition at any point in the future (Duncan Smith, 2001a). The party had 
therefore shifted from a position in which in the long term it could be in the UK interest to 
join the single currency, to a new position in which the party was opposed regardless of the 
circumstances. 
 
In addition, following the September 11th terrorist attacks, new EU-wide criminal justice 
powers were proposed in order for member states to more effectively tackle terrorism and 
organised crime. The Conservative’s policy position on these plans went through a number of 
changes between September and December 2001. Initially, in the immediate aftermath of 
9/11, the Shadow Cabinet reported that the Conservative Party would ‘co-operate fully’ with 
the government in introducing these new EU powers, which included the European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW) (Jones, 2001). The Shadow Cabinet decided ‘that the priority of tackling 
terrorism overrode its opposition to further loss of sovereignty by giving the European Union 
greater powers’ (Jones, 2001). The following week, after a meeting in Brussels with 
Conservative MEPs, Duncan Smith hinted that the Conservative Party would only support 
those powers that they considered necessary, with the suggestion that support for the EAW 
scheme would be withdrawn (Evans-Pritchard, 2001). In the House of Commons on 17th 
December 2001, in his response to the Prime Minister’s statement on the Laeken European 
Council, Duncan Smith confirmed the Conservative’s new position in opposition to the 
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EAW, stating that it was a further example of the EU goal of ‘deeper and deeper integration’ 
and a ‘shift towards greater central authority’ in the EU (Duncan Smith, 2001a). 
A further EU policy issue was the subject of whether Conservative MEPs should cease to be 
members of the European Peoples Party – European Democrats (EPP-ED) grouping in the 
European Parliament, the largest grouping of centre-right MEPs. In December 2002, it is 
clear that the Conservative leadership was prepared to change this position. In a letter to the 
EPP-ED, Duncan Smith confirmed his intention to remove Conservative MEPs from the 
EPP-ED after the 2004 European elections, unless they were given much greater individual 
autonomy (Watt, 2002). In February 2004, with the party now under the leadership of 
Howard, this policy was again changed. In a letter to Conservative MPs, Shadow Foreign 
Secretary Michael Ancram confirmed that this was no longer policy to leave the EPP-ED 
group after the 2004 European elections. Instead, an agreement had been reached with the 
leadership of the EPP-ED in which Conservative MEPs would be allowed more autonomy to 
express their different views on European integration (Webster, 2004). 
 
During Duncan Smith’s period as leader of the Conservative Party he made only one major 
speech on European policy. This took place in Prague on July 10th, 2003. In terms of policy 
continuity, Duncan Smith confirmed the Conservative’s opposition to any further EU 
integration for the UK, re-stating that the Conservative Party rejected the EU Constitutional 
Treaty (Duncan Smith, 2003). Commitments to working towards the long-term goal of global 
free trade through the EU, in addition to the more medium-term goal of a free trade 
agreement with member nations of NAFTA, had also been established policy during the last 
parliament. In this speech, however, Duncan Smith also made a number of new policy 
commitments. The Conservative Party would seek not only to reform, but also repatriate 
powers from the EU back to Britain in the specific areas of agriculture, fishing, and foreign 
aid policy (Duncan Smith, 2003). Furthermore, the Conservative Party would not support the 
expansion of the EU’s role in foreign policy, and, were therefore against EU initiatives such 
as the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Rapid Reaction Force 
(Duncan Smith, 2003). 
 
As in the previous Parliament, the Conservative Party had a number of policies on 
institutional reform of the EU that aimed to increase the scrutiny and accountability of EU 
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institutions, enhance the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process, and 
protect the UK from deeper EU integration. 
 
With regards to EU scrutiny and accountability, the Conservative Party under Duncan Smith 
maintained continuity with Hague era policy. In terms of enforcing the principle of 
subsidiarity the Conservative Party now wanted a full independent institution in which 
national governments could appeal if they felt the subsidiarity principle had not been 
respected by the EU institutions (Ancram, 2002c). In addition, there were policies that aimed 
to hold the European Commission more accountable, reduce its powers, and simplify the EU 
legislative process. These included the introduction of a new system of ‘full’ and ‘junior’ 
Commission posts, full Commission posts would be given to large member states, junior ones 
to smaller member states (in terms of population); the Council to take the lead in initiating 
legislation from the Commission; and that directives from the Commission should only state 
the desired outcome with member states deciding themselves how to implement them 
(Ancram, 2002c). To reduce the complexity of the decision-making processes, the 
Conservative Party suggested that the EU should have two types of legislative outcome – 
binding and non-binding EU law. Binding laws would cover single market policies and ‘other 
important areas’, which every member state had to follow, with non-binding laws covering 
all other areas of policy, which member states could follow on a voluntary basis. This was 
essentially the continuation of the ‘flexibility clause’ policy outlined by Hague between 1997 
and 2001.  
 
At this point we see more policies aimed at increasing the role of national parliaments in the 
work of the EU than had previously been the case under Hague. These include four main 
policy proposals: replacing the UK Permanent Representative in Brussels with a Europe 
Minister who would be questioned by MPs every fortnight in the House of Commons; 
national parliamentary committees to be given an enhanced role in setting the agenda of the 
Commission; to give five national parliaments that reach agreement together the power to 
block EU legislative proposals; and for each national parliament to have an EU Scrutiny 
Committee that would scrutinise EU legislation before it reached the Council (Ancram, 
2002a). 
 
Concerning the theme of protecting the UK from deeper EU integration the Conservative 
Party during this period proposed two changes to the EU treaties. The first suggested that the 
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preamble of the founding treaty, which includes the commitment to seek an ‘ever closer 
union’, should be reconsidered in terms of how it applies to the UK (Ancram, 2002b). 
Secondly, that the founding treaty should be amended to include a precise definition of what 
are, and what are not, competences of the EU (Ancram, 2002b). These aimed to protect 
national sovereignty from expansionist interpretations of the treaties by EU institutions, such 
as the Commission and the Court of Justice. 
 
These policies show continuity in terms of policy themes, such as increasing the scrutiny and 
accountability of the EU institutions. However, there are also elements of change, with a 
greater policy emphasis on increasing the powers of national parliaments in terms of both the 
development and scrutiny of new EU laws. 
 
4.3.2 Michael Howard, November 2003-December 2005 
The first major speech on European policy by Michael Howard, following his appointment as 
party leader in November 2003, was given at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung think-tank in 
Berlin on February 12th, 2004. In this speech, Howard returns to the ‘flexibility clause’ policy 
advocated between May 1997 and June 2001 (Howard, 2004a). However, though the policy 
is not explicitly re-cycled, Howard suggested that the EU needed to expand the use of the 
‘enhanced cooperation’ procedure, which was formalised following the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(Howard, 2004a). This procedure allowed a minimum of nine-member states to co-operate, 
within the formal EU structures, over certain policy areas if they could not reach agreement 
with the other member states or wished to proceed more quickly than the other member 
states. In this case, Howard advocated a policy that would extend the use of the enhanced co-
operation procedure to all areas of policy beyond those associated with the single market 
(Howard, 2004a). Any member state would have the ability to opt-in to an enhanced co-
operation measure, rather than ‘having fraught negotiations to opt-out of a new initiative’ 
(Howard, 2004a). In this same speech, Howard renewed the Conservative’s commitment to 
repatriate powers from the EU concerning fishing, agriculture, and overseas aid, in addition 
to confirming the Conservative’s opposition to the EU Constitution and the single currency 
(Howard, 2004a). 
 
In the 1997 general election manifesto, the Conservative Party had confirmed that they would 
seek to maintain the British opt-out from the EU Social Chapter (Conservative Party, 1997). 
However, after the May 1997 election the new Labour government opted-in. Under the 
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leaderships of Hague and Duncan Smith, though they had not been in favour of the UK 
opting-in, they had not committed a future Conservative government to restore the opt-out. In 
his October 2004 party conference speech, Howard committed the Conservative Party to 
restoring the UK’s opt-out from the EU Social Chapter (Howard, 2004b). This had previously 
been confirmed by a Conservative Party spokesman in May 2004 as not being part of a future 
Conservative government’s European policy (Jones, 2004). 
 
Aside from the commitment to the EU Social Chapter opt-out, the second major policy 
change in relation to Europe that came under the Howard leadership was in the area of 
immigration. Prior to this point, there had been no explicit policies that directly contradicted 
the EU competence in this area, this being the free movement of EU citizens across member 
states. In September 2004, however, Michael Howard committed a future Conservative 
government to an ‘annual limit to immigration’ (Howard, 2004c). This policy, if 
implemented in government, would have been incompatible with EU law. 
 
The Conservative Party under Howard also proposed a number of EU policies in the area of 
institutional and procedural reform. These are set out below and can be grouped around a 
number of themes: EU scrutiny and accountability; enhancing the role of national 
parliaments; enhancing the role of the European Parliament and reducing unnecessary 
regulations. Many of these policy themes show continuity with the previous Conservative 
Party leaderships under Hague and Duncan Smith. However, increasing the powers of the 
European Parliament is a notable change from previous leaderships, who had worried that 
increasing the powers of the European Parliament could threaten the role of national 
parliaments in the EU. 
 
With regards to the second theme, one particularly strong area of continuity is the increased 
scrutiny and accountability of the European Commission. However, the policy instrument 
that would achieve this goal changed. To reduce waste and fraud at the European 
Commission the 2004 European election manifesto contained a commitment to seek a new 
EU Commissioner role for budgetary control, who would ensure officials responsible for 
budget management were performing effectively (Conservative Party, 2004). 
 
Several policy proposals also sought to enhance the role of national parliaments in the EU 
decision-making processes. Some of the policy instruments to achieve this goal continue 
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from the Duncan Smith leadership, as well as the overall policy goal. Under Howard the 
Conservative Party are also committed to working towards the establishment of a ‘red card’ 
system, whereby five or more national parliaments could work together to block new or 
repeal existing EU legislation (Conservative Party, 2004). There are restatements of policies 
such as the introduction of a government minister to head the UK permanent delegation to the 
EU; the right for member states to initiate EU legislation, instead of only the Commission 
and the introduction of more than one state holding the rotating presidency of the EU 
Presidency (Conservative Party, 2004).  
 
Enhancing the role of the European Parliament, however, had not previously been an 
important area of EU institutional reform for the Conservative Party.  These policy proposals 
were indirectly also connected to reducing waste and fraud at the Commission, as they 
involve increasing the powers of the European Parliament to hold the Commission to 
account. The 2004 European manifesto suggested increasing the European Parliament’s role 
in a number of areas, such as giving the European Parliament the right to cross-examine any 
EU official and see any documents relevant to its role (Conservative Party, 2004). This 
manifesto also proposed the setting up of a new deregulation and competitiveness committee 
in the European Parliament to ensure legislation from the Commission was justified and cost 
effective, in addition to new MP and MEP committees to hold ministers and EU officials to 
account for EU agreements and legislation. 
 
For the last theme, reducing the cost of EU regulation, this had also consistently been a theme 
during the previous leaders. Here we also see the policy goal (reducing EU regulations) 
maintaining continuity but the policy instrument (how the goal would be achieved in practical 
terms) change. Under Howard the Conservative Party committed to working towards a 25% 
reduction in current EU regulations, with sunset clauses introduced on all new regulatory 
proposals. 
 
The period between June 2001 and June 2005 shows European policy becoming more 
Eurosceptic. Using the Lynch and Whitaker (2013a:319) spectrum, policy during this period 
can be categorised as minimalist revisionist-Soft Eurosceptic. This is because policy was 
concerned not only with preventing the UK being subjected to more European integration and 
reforming the institutions, but also with repatriating powers from the EU. Both Duncan Smith 
and Howard committed the party to repatriate EU powers over fishing policy, agricultural 
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policy and overseas aid policy, as well as the restoration of the UK’s opt-out from the EU 
Social Chapter. The move towards an annual limit on immigration can be categorised as a 
maximalist-revisionist Hard Eurosceptic position, as it sought to change EU policy to before 
freedom of movement was introduced, but still remain full members of the EU. 
 
Consequently, this period also shows elements of not only second order change (changing the 
instruments of policy but not the goals) but also third order change (changing the goals of 
policy). Second order change is evident in Howard’s proposal to expand the use of the 
enhanced cooperation procedure to produce a more flexible EU. Third order change is 
evident in the commitment to repatriate powers back to the UK and introduce an annual limit 
on immigration, as these are both new goals for Conservative European policy. 
 
Conservative policy on Europe during the 2001 to 2005 Parliament shows a number of 
continuities with the Hague leadership period between 1997 and 2001. Duncan Smith and 
Howard remained committed to future referenda on all new EU treaties that would deepen 
UK-EU integration, to deregulation, the expansion of the single market, the enlargement of 
EU membership and the completion of a transatlantic-EU free trade agreement. During this 
parliament, we also see a number of significant changes. On the single currency Duncan 
Smith moves the Conservative Party to a definitive position of opposing British entry 
whatever the future economic circumstances, which was not party policy under Hague. 
Additionally, in this parliament we also see commitments, both from Duncan Smith and 
Howard, to repatriate a number of powers from the EU institutions back to the UK 
government. Under William Hague the policy position was one of reform and opposition to 
further integration. During this period both Duncan Smith and Howard add the repatriation of 
powers to the goals of Conservative European policy. 
 
 
4.4 May 2005 – May 2010 
 
Both during the leadership election campaign and the early days of Cameron’s period as 
Leader of the Opposition, a number of policy commitments on Europe were made. The first 
was a commitment to return all current EU competences in the areas of social and 
employment policy back to the UK (Cameron, 2005). This was to ensure that excessive 
regulation from the EU did not limit the growth and competitive potential of the UK 
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economy. Cameron stated that this would be the ‘first priority’ of his plan for EU reform and 
the ‘strategic imperative’ of Conservative European policy under his leadership (Cameron, 
2005). In March 2007, Cameron again stressed that the repatriation of these powers from the 
EU back to UK control would be a ‘top priority for the next Conservative Government’ 
(Cameron, 2007a). This commitment shows policy continuity with the previous leadership 
under Howard, who before the June 2005 election defeat, had also promised to restore the 
UK’s opt-out from EU social and employment policy. In this same speech, Cameron also 
rejected the EU Constitutional Treaty and renewed the commitment to use UK-EU 
membership to encourage the promotion of international free trade (Cameron, 2005). Both 
these commitments demonstrated policy continuity with previous Conservative leaderships. 
 
Cameron also committed the Conservative Party to withdrawing Conservative MEPs from 
the EPP-ED grouping in the European Parliament. This policy commitment on Europe was 
first made privately, then publicly, during the summer of 2005 while Cameron campaigned 
for the party leadership. It was later confirmed in November 2005 by an official spokesperson 
that this would be party policy once Cameron was elected (Carlin and Isaby, 2005). However, 
no detail surrounding the timetable for withdrawal was made at the time. By June 2006 the 
Conservative leadership was under pressure to reveal how and when this policy would be 
implemented (Helm, 2006). At this point in June 2006 Cameron is understood to have given 
Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague one month to organise the formation of a new 
European political group and withdraw Conservative MEPs from the EPP-ED (Kite, 2006). 
This proved impossible to implement.  
 
An announcement came the following month on July 13th, 2006 in a joint statement with 
Mirek Topolánek, then leader of the Czech Civic Democratic Party, that they would both 
form a new European political grouping following the 2009 European elections (Cameron, 
2006). In the same declaration, Cameron and Topolánek announced the creation, outside of 
the European Parliament, of the Movement for European Reform (Cameron, 2006). This 
would work towards promoting the ‘ideals of a more modern, open, flexible and 
decentralised European Union, ready to face the challenges of the 21st century’ (Cameron, 
2006) and would provide a platform to develop such ideas before the founding of the new 
European political group in 2009. The policy was finally implemented following the 2009 
European elections when the new European Conservative Party and Reformists Group, in 
which the Conservative MEPs would now formally sit, held their inaugural meeting. 
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In June 2006, the Conservative leadership also confirmed that the party was changing its 
position on the Common Fisheries Policy. Under the Duncan Smith and Howard leaderships, 
the Conservative Party had been committed to repatriating these powers from the EU, either 
during a future EU treaty negotiation or as part of a UK-only reform package. In June 2006, 
however, a Conservative Party spokesperson confirmed that it was no longer party policy to 
‘unilaterally withdraw’ from the EU Common Fisheries Policy but instead to ‘reform the 
fisheries regime from within’ (Helm, 2006). This moved party policy over EU fishing policy 
into line with the Conservative’s long-standing commitment to push for comprehensive 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, rather than unilateral withdrawal. 
 
The next most significant European policy commitment made by Cameron during his period 
as Leader of the Opposition was in relation to the Lisbon Treaty. This treaty contained many 
of the provisions of the EU Constitutional Treaty, but instead amended the founding treaties 
of the EU instead of replacing them with a new treaty. As with the position on the defunct EU 
Constitutional Treaty, the Conservative Party pledged to give the voters a referendum on any 
new treaty that emerged from the negotiations between EU national leaders in 2007. This 
commitment was underlined in a letter to readers of The Sun, which appeared in print on 
September 26th, 2007. In this letter, Cameron gave the following commitment with regards to 
the Lisbon Treaty: ‘Today, I will give this cast-iron guarantee: If I become PM a 
Conservative government will hold a referendum on any EU treaty that emerges from these 
negotiations’ (Cameron, 2007b). This was reiterated the following month by the Shadow 
Foreign Secretary William Hague in his Conservative Party conference speech when he said 
‘so let everyone be clear: a Conservative Government elected this autumn will hold a 
referendum on any EU treaty which emerges from the current negotiations’ (Hague, 2007).  
 
In his last major speech on European policy before the 2010 general election, on November 
4th 2009, Cameron announced that the Conservative Party policy of a referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty could not be implemented as all EU member states had by that point ratified 
the treaty (Cameron, 2009). As a result, Cameron announced a series of measures to ensure 
this could never happen again. A number of these were policies had been announced 
previously by Conservative leaderships since 1997, such as a commitment to pass a law to 
ensure that no future government could legally ratify an EU treaty or transfer power to EU 
institutions without a referendum. This ‘referendum lock’ would come about through 
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amending the European Communities Act 1972 (Cameron, 2009). The triggering of any 
mechanisms in the Lisbon Treaty, the so called ‘ratchet clauses’, that enable the expansion of 
EU competences without amending the treaties would also require the passing of a full Act of 
Parliament (Cameron, 2009).  Cameron also announced that a future Conservative 
government would introduce a United Kingdom Sovereignty Bill to make it clear that 
‘ultimate authority rests with our Parliament’ (Cameron, 2009). 
 
In addition to commitments to repatriate social and employment powers already announced, 
Cameron also committed a future Conservative government to gaining a full opt-out from the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, recently legally enshrined in EU law by the Lisbon Treaty 
(Cameron, 2009). The Conservative Party would also seek an additional protocol for the UK 
over EU criminal and justice policy, to ensure that EU judges could not extend their influence 
over the UK criminal justice system (Cameron, 2009). This would involve not only the return 
of criminal justice powers to the UK, but also the reform of the European Court of Justice to 
ensure that its powers in relation to criminal justice returned to ‘pre-Lisbon’ levels (2009).  
These would be negotiated with other member states and the EU institutions over the course 
of the next parliament and added to any future EU accession treaty to give them enforceable 
legal affect (Cameron, 2009). Cameron also made it clear in this speech that as party leader 
he was not in favour of a ‘made-up referendum’ on the UK’s relationship with the EU. A 
referendum would be unnecessary, Cameron argued, since if the Conservative Party were to 
form the next government, the people will have given their consent for his European policy at 
the election (Cameron, 2009). 
 
Conservative European policy under Cameron between 2005 and 2010, in terms of 
Eurosceptic categorisation, shows overall continuity with the Duncan Smith and Howard 
leaderships. It would therefore be right to categorise it as minimalist-revisionist Soft 
Eurosceptic on the Conservative Eurosceptic spectrum. There is opposition to further 
European integration, a commitment to press for significant reforms of EU institutions and 
pledges to repatriate a number of areas of EU competences back to full UK control. Unlike 
under Howard there are no policies that approach the Hard Eurosceptic end of the spectrum, 
such as the previous commitment to impose an annual limit on immigration, which was 
dropped under Cameron’s leadership. On the Hall spectrum of policy change the Cameron 
leadership period can be categorised as a mixture of first and second order change – the detail 
and instruments of policy change, but the overall goals and positions show continuity with 
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the previous Parliament. However, one element of third order change was the pledge to 
remove the Conservative MEPs entirely from the EPP-ED and establish an entirely new 
grouping in the European Parliament. Most of the previous leaderships since 1997, with the 
exception of Duncan Smith between 2001 and 2003, had maintained a policy to reform the 
Conservative Party position with the EPP-ED from within the group. 
 
Overall, the Conservative Party position on European policy during the 2005 to 2010 
Parliament shows alignment with those policies adopted under Howard. The Conservative 
Party would remain opposed to further European integration, displayed in their opposition to 
both the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, for which they demanded national 
referendums for both treaties. On the repatriation of powers Cameron maintained Howard’s 
pledge to remove the UK from EU social and employment policy but changed the 
Conservative Party position on the Common Fishieries Policy to one of ‘reform from within’ 
rather than repatriation through negotiation. On the question of the Conservative MEPs place 
in the EPP-ED Cameron changed policy from relative autonomy within the group to 
complete separation in 2009. Cameron also committed a future Conservative government to 
amend the 1972 European Communities Act to ensure any future pooling of further powers 
with the EU would require a national referendum and ensure that the power of the EU over 
the UK in terms of criminal justice policy returned to ‘pre-Lisbon’ levels. 
 
4.5 May 2010 to May 2015 
 
After the failure to achieve an outright majority in the House of Commons following the May 
2010 general election, the Conservative Party formed a coalition government with the Liberal 
Democrats. A mutually agreed policy programme for government, most commonly referred 
to as the Coalition Agreement, was published on May 12th 2010. This was the first formal 
policy document at the beginning of this new parliament in which we can establish the 
European policy of the Conservative led-government and compare this with the European 
policy programme the Conservative Party had stated they intended to pursue if they had 
formed a single party government. 
 
4.5.1 Coalition Agreement 
The Coalition Agreement set out the European policy of the Coalition government for the 
duration of the agreement. There were many areas of continuity with Conservative European 
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policy objectives before the 2010 election, but as will be established, many areas of 
significant change. 
 
In terms of areas of continuity with European policy in the 1997-2010 period, the Coalition 
Agreement states that government ‘will ensure that there is no transfer of sovereignty or 
powers over the course of the next Parliament’ (Coalition, 2010:19). The Coalition would 
also implement Conservative policy through legislating for a ‘referendum lock’ (Coalition, 
2010:19). The use of any ‘ratchet’ clause in the EU treaty would require the passing of 
primary legislation. The agreement also ruled out joining, or preparing to join the single 
European currency, to ‘limit the application’ of the Work Time Directive to the UK, to work 
towards a single seat for the European Parliament, and to support the continued enlargement 
of the EU (Coalition, 2010:19). This shows that the Conservative Party managed to transfer 
many of their pre-2010 election European policy positions into the Coalition’s programme 
for government, despite being in government with the more pro-EU Liberal Democrats. 
 
The Conservative Party were certainly successful in getting a number of their European 
policy positions into the Coalition Agreement, but a comparison with their stated European 
policy platform prior to the 2010 election show a number of changes. These range from 
complete omissions, to modified policies, and new policies on Europe. Dealing first with the 
omissions, it is notable that the one policy position Cameron (2005) had previously described 
as the ‘first priority’ and ‘strategic imperative’ of his European policy, the repatriation of 
social and employment powers from the EU back to the UK, was absent from the Coalition 
Agreement. There was also no mention of working towards a full UK opt-out from the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which Cameron (2009) had stated as the second most 
important policy area in which powers needed to be repatriated back to the UK. 
 
A number of policy positions were modified. For example, a pre-2010 commitment to 
introduce a UK Sovereignty Bill was modified to a commitment to ‘examine the case’ for 
such a Bill (Coalition, 2010:19). It was announced later, on October 11th 2010 by the Europe 
Minister David Lidington, that government had decided it was unnecessary to introduce a bill 
confirming UK sovereignty, as common law already explicitly stated that Parliament is 
sovereign (Lidington, 2010). EU criminal justice powers, the third area in which Cameron 
(2009) had previously stated powers needed to be returned to the UK, has been modified to 
reviewing these powers on a ‘case-by-case basis’ (Coalition, 2010:19) when the UK is 
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eventually asked which of 130 criminal justice powers associated with the Lisbon Treaty it 
wants to opt-in or opt-out of. This leaves open the option for the Conservative led-
government to opt-in to some specific areas of EU criminal justice powers, which is a change 
from the pre-2010 election position. There is also no mention of reforming the European 
Court of Justice to limit the power it has over criminal justice policy. The new European 
policy included in the Coalition Agreement, which was not Conservative policy before the 
2010 general election, is the commitment to ‘examine the balance of the EU’s existing 
competences’ (Coalition, 2010:19). 
 
4.5.2 EU Criminal Justice Powers 
The Conservative Party position on EU criminal justice powers changed during the course of 
the Coalition government from their position in opposition, which was to return these powers 
back to the UK. On July 27th, 2010 during a speech in the Commons confirming the 
government’s decision to opt-in to the European Investigations Order draft directive, the 
Home Secretary, Theresa May, confirmed that EU criminal justice powers would be decided 
on a case-by-case basis and on what is in the ‘national interest’ (May, 2010). In this May also 
confirmed that while the Conservative Party had been opposed to the EAW in the form it was 
negotiated under the previous Labour government, the EAW was currently under review by 
the government (May, 2010). On the October 15th, 2012, May confirmed that the government 
would provisionally opt-out of all 130 EU criminal justice powers established under the terms 
of the Lisbon Treaty, in order to be able to negotiate with the Commission those individual 
measures the government would like to opt-back into before the final deadline in 2014 (May, 
2012). The following year, on July 9th 2013, Theresa May confirmed that the government had 
decided to opt-back into 35 EU criminal justice powers, including the EAW (May, 2013). 
The policy of opting into 35 EU criminal justice powers, enforceable through the European 
Court of Justice, was therefore a substantial shift in position from 2009, when Cameron 
(2009) committed the Conservative Party to reduce the European Court of Justices 
jurisdiction over criminal justice policy to pre-Lisbon levels. 
 
 
4.5.3 EU Renegotiation and Referendum Policy 
The most important European policy change for the Conservative Party during the Coalition 
government was on the question of a referendum on British membership of the EU. In 
opposition, Cameron had decried ‘made-up referendums’ that did not ask the electorate to 
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approve specific proposals, such as a new EU treaty (Cameron, 2009). This position was 
maintained during the early Coalition period. On September 6th, 2011, while giving evidence 
to the House of Commons Liaison Committee, Cameron stated that he was against an In/Out 
referendum: “I don't actually think that is the question most people in Britain want 
answering. It is about what sort of Europe. I believe we should deliver the sort of Europe 
people want” (Cameron, 2011a). Cameron also stated the potential for drawing back some 
unspecified powers in a future negotiation on a new treaty (Cameron, 2011a). Cameron later 
restated this position in the House of Commons on October 24th, 2011, explaining to MPs that 
the approach of an In/Out referendum on EU membership ‘would not be right’ (Cameron, 
2011b). However, on this occasion Cameron went further than he had previously done before 
the Liaison Committee, stating that legislating for an in/out referendum now would ‘not be 
the right time’ given the fiscal crisis in the Eurozone (Cameron, 2011b). While reiterating his 
opposition to a referendum with an in/out option Cameron did not explicitly rule it out in the 
long term, if an improvement in the fiscal climate in the Eurozone arose or a new treaty 
negotiation failed to materialise. This is a notable, though small, change from the 
Conservatives’ earlier position on the EU referendum. 
In June 2012 an article for the Daily Telegraph further adjusted policy on an EU referendum. 
Cameron (2012) stated in the article that he is ‘not against referendums in our parliamentary 
democracy’ and ‘not against the referendums on Europe’. While indicating that he believed 
leaving the EU through an ‘out’ vote in a referendum would not be in the national interest, 
Cameron also argued that an ‘in’ vote now would also not be in the national interest as this 
would be used as an argument to prevent further EU reform (Cameron, 2012). While still 
indicating that the most likely route to reforming the UK’s relationship with the EU was 
through the on-going and future discussions about the Eurozone, Cameron (2012) indicated 
the ‘need to spell out in more detail the parts of our European engagement we want and those 
that we want to end’, while stating that the Eurozone crisis and Coalition meant a ‘tactical 
and strategic’ approach to achieving these goals. Cameron concluded by signalling that a 
referendum was a potential future option to gain consent from the British people after reform 
of the UK’s relationship had taken place (Cameron, 2012). 
 
This is an important change from the Conservative Party position between September and 
October 2011, explicitly indicating here that a referendum on the UK’s relationship with EU 
is a future policy option under active consideration. However, as this stage there is ambiguity 
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about whether a future referendum would be asking consent for a specific package of reforms 
to the UK’s relationship with the EU, or consent on whether the UK should be in or out of the 
EU. 
 
This ambiguity was resolved on January 23rd, 2013. In the so-called ‘Bloomberg speech’, 
Cameron (2013a) announced he was now ‘in favour of a referendum’ on the UK’s 
relationship with the EU. The Conservative Party would commit in their 2015 election 
manifesto to negotiate a new settlement with the EU, after which they would hold an in/out 
referendum to determine whether the British people wished to remain members on these new 
terms (Cameron, 2013a). Legislation would be drafted in the current Parliament and passed 
by a future Conservative government in the first year of the next Parliament. This new 
settlement needed to achieve ‘fundamental, far-reaching change’ (Cameron, 2013a). This 
future negotiation would focus on five main areas of reform. Competitiveness: renewed 
commitments to complete the Single Market in services, energy and digital; a push towards 
more free trade deals; the exemption of small businesses from new EU directives. Flexibility: 
acknowledgement that some members of the EU will want different levels of European 
integration, and that differences must be respected; end to the application of the ‘ever closer 
union’ principle to the UK. Power must be able to flow back from the EU to member states: 
the EU needs to assess what it should be doing and what it should not be doing. Democratic 
accountability: a bigger role for national parliaments in EU-decision making. Fairness: 
decisions taken by Eurozone members to protect their interests must be fair to those non-
Eurozone member states (Cameron, 2013a). These five areas would form the central elements 
of a future Conservative renegotiation with the EU either as part of a new treaty negotiation, 
or unilaterally if this does not take place. 
 
Despite stating in the Bloomberg speech that the Conservative Party would draft the 
legislation for an EU referendum now and introduce the Bill at the beginning of the next 
Parliament, the Conservative side of the government supported the introduction of a draft EU 
Referendum Bill in the 2010-2015 Parliament. The backbench Conservative MP James 
Wharton came first in the private members bill ballot and proposed an in/out referendum on 
EU membership must take place before the end of 2017. The bill was opposed by both the 
Liberal Democrats and Labour, running out of time during the Committee Stage in the House 
of Lords on 31st January 2014. Cameron indicated that the Conservative side of the 
government would support the re-introduction of the EU Referendum Bill during the next 
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session of Parliament. The bill was re-introduced on July 2nd 2014, after backbench 
Conservative MP Bob Neil came third in the annual private members bill ballot, but again 
failed to pass, this time in the House of Commons. 
 
During the course of 2013 the Conservative Party made a number of changes to their EU 
renegotiation plan. The Bloomberg speech delivered by Cameron in January 2013 did not 
include any proposals to include policy areas such as EU immigration, EU freedom of 
movement, or EU immigration welfare entitlements in a future renegotiation with the EU. 
However, through a number of interventions in March and November 2013, the question of 
EU immigration and welfare entitlements were introduced by the Conservative Party as 
policy areas to be included in this future renegotiation. During a speech on immigration in 
Ipswich Cameron announced a series of measures the government would now be taking to 
reduce the draw of the UK welfare system to EU citizens. These included giving EU citizens 
looking for jobs in the UK the entitlement to only six months of welfare benefits; tightening 
the test to ensure EU citizens were genuinely looking for work, checking to see whether an 
individual’s English ability was a barrier to work (Cameron, 2013b). Cameron announced 
that the government ‘would take forward negotiations with European partners’ to explore 
whether economically inactive EU migrants could remain the responsibility of their home 
country before they were entitled to benefits, in addition to exploring whether limits could be 
placed on the amount of child benefit paid to those with children living outside the UK 
(Cameron, 2013b). This theme was developed further in an article for the Financial Times on 
November 26th, 2013 titled ‘Free movement within the European Union needs to be less 
free’. In this article, for the first time, Cameron introduced the objective of reforming the EU 
free movement of people principle. The article also suggested that, in order to protect the 
economies of current member states, when future nations join the EU arrangements must be 
introduced to limit the access new EU citizens have to national labour markets. Cameron 
(2013c) suggested two policy instruments to achieve this goal: 
 
 
One would be to require a new country to reach a certain income or economic 
output per head before full free movement was allowed. Individual member 
states could be freed to impose a cap if their inflow from the EU reached a 
certain number in a single year. 
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During this period, between January 2013 and November 2013, we see important changes to 
the Conservative Party policy of renegotiating the UK’s relationship with the EU. EU 
immigration, freedom of movement and welfare entitlement rules, absent from the initial 
renegotiation plan announced by Cameron in January 2013, are by the end of that year a 
central component of the renegotiation and referendum policy. 
 
A further significant change in the relation to the EU renegotiation and referendum policy 
took place on November 28th 2014, during a speech on immigration by Cameron at the JCB 
world headquarters in Staffordshire. In this speech Cameron specified negotiating aims in 
two areas, the free movement of people and welfare entitlements. With the former Cameron 
indicated the Conservative Party ‘want EU jobseekers to have a job offer before they come 
here and to stop UK taxpayers having to support them if they don’t’, rather than being free to 
move to the UK first and then start searching for employment (Cameron, 2014c). In his 
November 2013 Financial Times article Cameron had suggested two policy instruments for 
reforming the free movement principle, either an economic convergence principle to ensure 
full free movement rights only apply to member states of similar economic development, or 
the ability for EU member states to cap the annual number of EU migrants it will accept 
(Cameron, 2013c). In his November 2014 speech Cameron only mentioned the economic 
convergence principle (Cameron, 2014c). On the question of welfare entitlements Cameron 
indicated that the Conservative Party ‘will insist that in the future those who want to claim 
tax credits and child benefit must live here and contribute to our country for a minimum of 
four years’ (Cameron, 2014c). Cameron also made clear the policy on EU citizens’ 
entitlement to UK child benefit and child tax credits stating that ‘there should be no child 
benefit or child tax credit at all no matter how long they have worked in the UK and no 
matter how much tax they have paid’ (Cameron, 2014c).  
This speech therefore makes a number of changes to the package of EU reforms the 
Conservative Party had announced during the previous 12 months, introducing new policy 
instruments to reform EU free movement rules (EU citizen must have job offer to move to 
the UK), whilst omitting (annual cap on EU workers) and continuing (ban on the exporting of 
child benefit and child tax credit) with others. In the Conservative Party 2015 general election 
manifesto, however, the position that EU citizens must have a job offer to move to the UK 
was absent. 
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In general, the Euroscepticism of the Conservative Party policy towards the EU during the 
Coalition period is consistent with that of Cameron’s period in opposition between 2005 and 
2010. This places this period of policy on the minimalist-revisionist Soft Eurosceptic 
category of the Conservative Eurosceptic spectrum – a commitment to reform, a resistance to 
further integration, and pledges to repatriate powers– at least until the Bloomberg speech in 
January 2013. However, when considering the most important change in European policy 
during this period, the commitment to hold an in/out referendum on UK membership of the 
EU, it is difficult to place this policy in the ‘Soft Eurosceptic’ section of the spectrum as it is 
a policy that at least opens the possibility of UK leaving the EU. Cameron (2014) himself 
alludes to this possibility in his November 2014 speech on European policy when he declares 
that if the EU does not listen to his proposals for EU reform he would ‘rule nothing out’. This 
policy could legitimately be categorised as at least moving towards an outright rejectionist - 
Hard Eurosceptic position as it suggests that the Conservative Party could support the UK 
leaving the EU in the future. 
Using Hall’s orders of policy change the Coalition period shows examples of first or second 
order changes, as well as a significant number of third order changes. There is a much more 
significant mix than under the previous Parliament. First order changes include the 
adjustment on the Sovereignty Bill policy from a commitment to introduce it in opposition to 
‘examine the case’ for it during the Coalition period and the change on EU criminal powers 
from opposition to each being evaluated on a ‘case-by-case’ basis. Second order changes 
include the commitment to remove the UK from the ‘ever closer union’ principle as a new 
policy instrument to prevent the UK from being drawn into closer European integration. 
Third order policy changes include the commitment to an in/out referendum and the 
introduction of EU immigration and free movement into the renegotiation plan. All these 
areas emerged as new goals for Conservative European policy during this period. 
In summary, Conservative European policy during this period underwent a number of 
significant changes. Though the Conservative Party were successful in including the 
referendum lock policy in the Coalition agreement, a number of previous policy 
commitments such as the repatriation of EU social and employment powers and Sovereignty 
Bill did not survive negotiations with the Liberal Democrats. During the course of the 
Coalition period the most important change in policy was the commitment to hold an in/out 
referendum on EU membership after renegotiating the UK’s relationship with the EU. The 
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basis for this renegotiation also changed during the Parliament with EU immigration, welfare, 
and free movement as a central pillar of the renegotiation when previously it had not been 
mentioned. The Coalition period also sees the modification of the Conservative Party policy 
on EU criminal justice powers from hostility to review on a ‘case-by-case’ basis. 
 
4.6 May 2015 to February 2016 
Following the general election victory on May 7th, 2015 the Conservative Party formed a 
majority government. As in the previous parliament the major area of European policy 
change would be seen in the Conservative Party EU renegotiation and referendum policy. 
However, it was not until November 10th, 2015 that Cameron formally announced the basis 
from which the Conservative government would negotiate with the EU. Cameron did this 
both in a formal letter to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, released to the 
public and in a speech on the same day in London. In both the letter and speech Cameron 
identified, as of November 2015, the key policy areas the UK government wanted to 
renegotiate with the EU.  
In both the Chatham House speech and the Tusk letter Cameron identified four main EU 
policy areas for the formal negotiation: Economic governance and the Eurozone; 
Competitiveness; Sovereignty and Subsidiarity; and Immigration (Cameron, 2015a). In terms 
of the general areas of policy there is much continuity here with the Conservative Party EU 
renegotiation policy developed during the Coalition period. Economic governance and the 
Eurozone, competitiveness, sovereignty and subsidiarity were all identified as key areas for 
EU reform in the Bloomberg speech, while EU immigration and welfare was included later. 
In terms of the first two policy areas, economic governance and the competitiveness, 
Cameron went into detail for the first time on the specific policies the UK sought agreement 
with the EU and member states (Cameron, 2015b:2-4). The policies on economic governance 
and the Eurozone include ‘recognition’ that: 
• The European Union has more than one currency. 
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• There should be no ‘discrimination or disadvantage’ to a member state if they use a 
currency that isn’t the Euro. 
• Any changes to economic governance decided by Eurozone member states must 
always be non-compulsory for non-Eurozone member states. 
• The taxpayers in non-Eurozone member states must never be ‘financially liable’ for 
initiatives designed to support the single currency. 
• That non-Eurozone member states have their own institutions responsible for 
financially stability. 
• Any issues regarding economic governance that affect all member states much be 
discussed by all member states. 
On competitiveness, the Conservative Party included two main policies, ‘a target to cut the 
total burden on business’ of EU regulations and a ‘clear long-term commitment to boost the 
competitiveness and productivity of the European Union’ (Cameron, 2015b:3). 
 
On the third policy area, sovereignty and subsidiarity, we see strong continuity with Coalition 
policy in this area. These policies included an end to the ‘ever closer union’ principle 
applying to the UK’s EU membership; the ability for national parliaments to act together to 
block EU legislative proposals; a clear EU commitment and mechanism to enforce the 
principle of subsidiarity; and a clear commitment that the UK will maintain the ‘ability to 
choose to participate’ in Justice and Home Affairs policy will be fully respected by EU 
institutions (Cameron, 2015b:4). 
 
In the Tusk letter Cameron identified three policies related to immigration: full free 
movement would only be implemented for future new member states when their economies 
have ‘converged’ with existing EU members; tougher and longer re-entry bans for those who 
abuse the free movement principle; a ban of EU citizens qualifying for any in-work benefits 
or social housing until they have lived in the UK for 4 years and a ban on EU citizens being 
able to export child benefit or child tax credits  to children living outside the UK (Cameron, 
2015b:5). 
 85 
 
The UK-EU reform settlement was formally agreed by member states at the February 2016 
European Council meeting in Brussels. In the first three policy areas (economic governance, 
competitiveness, and sovereignty) set out by Cameron in the Tusk letter the Conservative 
government was largely successful in finding agreement with the EU institutions and other 
member states. On economic governance the Council agreed to recognise that the EU has 
more than one currency; guaranteed that the UK would not have to participate in any further 
bailouts of Eurozone member states; prohibited discrimination towards non- Eurozone 
member states; guaranteed that if central EU funds were used to support the single currency 
the UK will be reimbursed; permitted any member state to bring to the European Council for 
discussion any concern they might have surrounding a decision made by Eurozone countries 
(European Council, 2016:12-15).  
 
Within the competitiveness policy area, the government won agreement on commitments to 
complete the single market, ‘enhance the competitiveness’ of the EU, lower the regulatory 
burden on businesses and undertake an ‘active and ambitious trade policy’ (European 
Council, 2016:15). However, the Council conclusions on competitiveness did not include a 
specific ‘target to cut the total burden on businesses’, which Cameron had sought in his 
November 2015 letter to Donald Tusk.  
 
On sovereignty there was no change between what was outlined in the Tusk letter and the 
final Council conclusions. Cameron was successful in securing agreement on the principle 
that the UK was ‘not committed to further political integration into the European Union’, that 
the ‘ever closer union’ preamble in the EU treaties cannot be used to promote further 
integration or extend the powers of the EU, and that these clarifications would be written into 
the European Union treaty ‘at the time of their next revision’ (European Council, 2016: 16). 
While a clear commitment to the principle of subsidiarity was included there were no ‘clear 
proposals’ (Cameron, 2015b:4) on how this would be implemented (European Council, 
2016:17). The proposal to give national parliaments the ability to block EU legislative 
measures, the so called ‘red card’ mechanism was also agreed. For a proposal to be 
considered for rejection 55% of the national parliaments of EU member states must support 
such an action, completing these votes within a 12-week period (European Council, 2016:17). 
Cameron’s proposals for commitments on the UK’s status regarding EU Justice and Home 
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Affairs policy and the right for member states to have full control of national security were 
also agreed (European Council, 2016:17). 
 
The most significant change when comparing the November 2015 Tusk letter with the 
February 2016 European Council conclusions is in the area of immigration policy. Instead of 
a complete ban on EU citizens receiving in-work benefits for four years Cameron secured a 
commitment to allow the UK to limit the in-work benefits an EU citizen can receive over a 
four-year period but on a graduated basis. An EU citizen would initially be entitled to no in-
work benefits but after four years this entitlement would gradually be increased until it was at 
the same level as UK citizens (European Council, 2016:23).  This mechanism would be 
authorised for seven years from the point that it was activated by a member state following a 
decision by the Commission as to whether the member state had legitimate concerns over the 
levels of immigration it was experiencing (European Council, 2016:23). With regards to the 
policy on banning the export of child benefit and child tax credits Cameron also had to 
change the Conservative policy in order find agreement with other member states. Cameron 
agreed that instead of a ban, the level of these payments could now be linked to the cost of 
living in the country where the child or children benefiting from these payments were living 
(European Council, 2016:23). This would initially apply only to new claimants but could be 
extended to all claimants by January 2020 (European Council, 2016:23). On both the in-work 
and child benefit areas these were significant changes to their initial policies. In terms of free 
movement for new member states, no specific proposals were agreed to, despite this being 
one of Cameron’s key policies in the immigration area. The Conclusions only note that 
appropriate transitional arrangements would be agreed to at the relevant time by all member 
states (European Council, 2016:23). 
 
European policy during this period, in terms of the Eurosceptic categorisation, does not 
change dramatically with the position the Conservative Party had established towards the end 
of the Coalition period. This locates Conservative European policy in the minimalist-
revisionist Soft Eurosceptic category of the Conservative Eurosceptic spectrum. As the main 
policy instruments and goals of European policy show continuity with the end of the 
Coalition period most of the change seen during this period is as a result of negotiations 
between the Conservative government and other EU member states over the details of policy. 
As a result, the policy change can be categorised as first order change as it is adjustments to 
the detail of policy instruments aimed at achieving certain goals. Here the most significant 
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first order changes are in the immigration policy area of the negotiations. Cameron did not 
secure the 4-year restriction on in-work benefits or the ban on the exporting of child benefit 
but did get agreement for the UK to impose limited restrictions on the payment of in-work 
benefits for a seven-year period and the indexing of child benefit payments to the cost of 
living in each member state. This is first order change as the detail of the policy has changed 
(level and process of payments) but not the policy instrument (EU in-work and child benefit 
payments) or goal (to reduce EU migration levels to the UK). 
 
This period was dominated by discussions between the Conservative government and the EU 
institutions and member states over the UK renegotiation package. Cameron confirmed in 
November 2015 that his renegotiation deal would centre on the four main ‘baskets’. The first 
three policy areas had been established as the main focus of a UK-EU renegotiation during 
the Bloomberg speech in January 2013, with the new focus on EU immigration and welfare 
policy emerging during the period between this speech and the general election in May 2015. 
The Conservative Party was successful on getting a form of agreement in all four policy 
baskets, though the detail of the policy instruments designed to reduce the appeal of UK 
welfare system to EU migrant workers were changed during the negotiations. This is because 
when considering the first three baskets the detail of what Cameron was proposing was vague 
or absent, whereas the proposals surrounding immigration and welfare were specific. Policy 
in this last area of immigration therefore appears to have changed the most between May 
2015 and February 2016. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this section is to provide a summary of the continuities and changes in 
Conservative European policy outlined in the previous sections of this chapter. This section 
highlights the substantive themes that can be extrapolated from this analysis. It will first 
consider the continuities in European policy before then moving on to the changes. 
 
 
4.8.1 Continuities in Conservative European Policy, 1997-2016 
 
• The single market and free trade – exhibits strong continuity throughout this period as 
each leader, from Hague to Cameron, supported both the UK maintaining its position 
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within the EU single market and expanding the areas which it does not yet fully cover 
such as the services sector, digital products and the energy market. Each leadership 
also maintained the commitment to prioritise a transatlantic trade agreement and 
expand the number of free trade agreements between the EU and other important 
trading nations or blocs. 
 
• Economic competitiveness, deregulation, and the protection of free markets were all 
consistent priorities for each Conservative leadership during this period, exemplified 
by Cameron putting economic competitiveness and deregulation as one of the central 
‘baskets’ of his UK-EU renegotiation deal. Howard also had a policy to work towards 
a reduction in total EU regulation by 25%. 
 
• EU decentralisation and flexibility – Conservative European policy placed great 
emphasis on policies to decentralise EU decision-making and create greater flexibility 
for member states. Under Hague and Maude this took the form of a ‘flexibility 
clause’. Duncan Smith and Ancram proposed a new system of ‘binding and non-
binding EU laws’. Howard proposed using the enhanced cooperation route to allow 
for more intergovernmental decision-making; Cameron secured the removal of the 
UK from the ‘ever closer union’ principle. 
 
• EU enlargement – Each leadership was committed to supporting expansion of the EU, 
especially Eastern European nations, and Turkey. Cameron confirmed in the House of 
Commons on October 19th 2015 that Conservative policy remained to support Turkish 
accession to the EU. 
 
• Opposition to further European integration – Following the May 1997 general 
election Conservative policy consistently opposed any further UK integration or 
pooling of sovereignty with the EU. Since the Maastricht Treaty was agreed by EU 
member states in February 1992 three further European treaties were successfully 
ratified – Amsterdam (October 1997); Nice (February 2001); Lisbon (December 
2007). Each was opposed by the Conservative Party for committing the UK to deeper 
European integration and eroding national sovereignty, for example through the 
expansion of QMV. 
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• Opposition to an expanded EU role in European defence policy –the Conservative 
Party consistently opposed the EU developing a separate defence identity. Hague, as 
Foreign Secretary, went as far as to veto a proposal in July 2011, proposed by France 
and Germany, for a permanent operational HQ for EU military operations 
(Waterfield, 2011). 
 
4.8.2 Changes in Conservative European Policy, 1997-2016 
 
• The Single Currency – The policy of ‘wait and see’ on the single currency established 
by Major underwent two major changes in this period. During the 1997-2001 
parliament policy changed from ‘wait and see’ to a rejection of the single currency for 
up to 10 years. This changed again under Duncan Smith when Conservative policy 
changed to definitive rejection of the single currency no matter the future 
circumstances. This position was maintained subsequently by both Howard and 
Cameron. 
 
• Referendums – Although Major did commit the Conservative Party to hold a 
referendum on the single currency before allowing the UK to become members, there 
was never a commitment to hold referendums on future EU treaties. This changed 
when the 2001 general election manifesto committed the party to ensure that any 
future transfer of powers from the UK to the EU would require a national referendum. 
This ‘referendum lock’ policy was maintained by each subsequent leadership and put 
into law by Cameron after the passing of the European Union Act 2011. 
 
• Repatriation of Powers – The question of which, if any, powers the Conservative 
Party wanted to repatriate from the EU and return to the UK fluctuated considerably 
during this period. Under Hague there were no firm commitments on repatriating EU 
powers. Duncan Smith subsequently proposed repatriation of EU powers over 
agriculture, fishing, and foreign aid policy. Howard maintained this but added 
restoring the UK opt-out from the EU Social Chapter. During opposition Cameron 
maintained the priority to remove the UK from EU social and employment legislation, 
but changed position on agriculture and fishing policy to ‘reform from within’ rather 
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than repatriation. During the Coalition, the commitments on social and employment 
policy were dropped, and were not revived on the formation of a majority 
Conservative government in May 2015. 
 
• EU Immigration, Free Movement of People, and Welfare – This emerges as an 
important part of Conservative European policy after 2013 and became a central part 
of Cameron’s EU renegotiation policy between 2015 and 2016. This is in sharp 
contrast with all previous Conservative leaderships for whom EU migration and 
welfare entitlements did not form a central part of European policy. They are 
mentioned little, if at all, in policy speeches, parliamentary debates, or election 
manifestoes on European affairs. 
 
• EU Justice and Home Affairs Policy – For the majority of this period the 
Conservative Party opposed giving the EU further powers in relation to criminal 
justice and home affairs policy. However, once in government following the 2010 
general election the Conservative Party took a more pragmatic position and examined 
UK participation in these EU policies on a ‘case-by-case’ basis. In July 2013, the 
government confirmed that they would be opting in to 35 EU justice and home affairs 
powers. This is clear change during the transition from opposition into government. 
 
• Protections for Non-Eurozone members in the EU – Protections for Non-Eurozone 
members in the EU became a central part of the David Cameron’s EU renegotiation 
deal. This policy aimed to address the perception from some EU member states that a 
more centralised and integrated core group of Eurozone members in future could 
make decisions that would damage the interests of Non-Eurozone members of the EU 
like the UK. 
 
• Conservative MEPs and the European Parliament – The Conservative MEPs status in 
the European Parliament went through many changes during this period. Under 
Hague the Conservative Party renegotiated their relationship with the EPP to gain 
greater autonomy. Duncan Smith initially attempted to negotiate further autonomy for 
Conservative MEPs, but decided it was preferable to leave and establish a new 
grouping. This policy was reversed when Howard decided to remain within the EPP 
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but under renegotiated terms. Cameron then reversed this position pledging to leave 
the EPP during his leadership election campaign in 2005. This was achieved in 2009 
when the Conservative Party established the European Conservative Party and 
Reformist group. 
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Chapter 5: Europe and Policy Change under Hague: 1997-2001 
 
This chapter sets out to explain the development of European policy in the Conservative 
Party during the 1997 to 2001 parliament. As such it encompasses the entire leadership 
period of William Hague. Firstly, the analysis in this empirical chapter (in addition to the 
three that proceed it) is structured thematically, combining the exogenous and endogenous 
causes of party change (rival political parties, public opinion, etc) examined in chapter 2 and 
the causes of institutional change set out in chapter 3 (historical legacies, critical junctures, 
etc). This chapter also uses the theoretical ideas from the new institutionalist framework (path 
dependency, incremental change, etc) to better describe and understand this process of 
change. 
As set out in Chapter 4, which traces policy change from May 1997 to February 2016, the 
empirical chapters in this thesis focus on the most significant changes in Conservative Party 
European policy during this period. In this chapter the changes examined are the opposition 
to the Treaty of Amsterdam; the ‘two parliaments’ single currency policy; ‘Operation 
Sunrise’ and the ballot of party members on the Euro; the flexibility and reverse powers 
policies; the future EU referendum commitment; and the policies surrounding EU 
institutional reform. This parliament, under the leadership of William Hague, was a period 
overshadowed by the conflict and division surrounding Europe during the Major premiership. 
It is this historical legacy, and the impact it had on policy change during the 1997-2001 
parliament, that this chapter turns to first. 
 
 
5.1 Historical Legacies 
 
5.1.1 The Maastricht Treaty 
 
The debate over the negotiation and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty left the 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary Conservative Party bitterly divided. ‘Everyone’ was 
remembering what had happened in the Conservative Party over Maastricht when the party 
returned after the 1997 election (Mackay, 2016). It was a period in which Anne Widdecombe 
(2016), Shadow Cabinet 1999-2001, says ‘you can only call a civil war in the party’. Michael 
Spicer (2012:203), Conservative MP 1974-2010 and leading opponent of the Maastricht 
Treaty in Parliament, illustrates the extent to which the treaty caused division in the party: 
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It is hard to describe the enmity which built up at the time between 
Conservative MP and Conservative MP. In the dining room Eurosceptics 
would not sit at the table of Europhiles and vice versa. In the voting lobbies, it 
was not unknown for one Conservative MP to spit at another. Physical violence 
occurred during the course of one or two crucial votes. 
 
Even after Maastricht was ratified the Conservative Party remained divided over Europe. In 
November 1994 Major took the unprecedented move to withdraw the whip from eight 
Conservative MPs who had refused to vote for the European Communities (Finance) Bill, 
after previously threatening to call an early general election if his colleagues did not support 
the Bill. To confront Eurosceptics in the parliamentary party and Cabinet, Major called a 
leadership election in 1995, in which he defeated leading Eurosceptic Cabinet minister John 
Redwood. 
For the Conservative Party the historical legacy of the 1992-1997 parliament was a period 
dominated by in-fighting over the future direction of European policy. The narrative attached 
to this legacy is one of policy division and conflict. William Hague was a minister and 
Cabinet member during this period, as were many MPs who survived the 1997 election, and 
are likely to have been influenced by the experience of division over Europe during this 
period. It provides an important element to the historical legacy that the Conservative Party 
brought with it into the 1997-2001 parliament and provides additional context to the 
structural environment in which European policy was developed. The historical legacy of the 
Maastricht rebellion period is therefore an important contributory factor that shaped the 
content of European policy in this period. As Andrew Copper, the Conservative Party 
Director of Strategy 1997-1999, explained to me, the legacy of this conflict cast a long 
shadow over the early Hague leadership period, incentivising it to identify a position which 
would pacify a majority of the party over Europe: 
 
It was obviously incredibly divisive during the 92-97 parliament and the 
position, the Major government’s position, was not where the centre of gravity 
of either the MPs or the party members, and indeed not where Hague, was. So, 
I think the priority was to find a robust and defendable position, especially in 
terms of the single currency. From the position of effectively being ambivalent 
about it to something closer to ruling it out. 
 
This contributed to the minimalist soft Eurosceptic policy platform established by the 
Conservative Party in the 1997-2001 parliament. 
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5.1.2 Black Wednesday 
The ERM crisis, more commonly known as Black Wednesday, refers to September 16th, 1992 
when the pound was forced to leave the ERM after a wave a currency speculation had 
reduced its value in comparison to the Deutschmark close to the previously agreed floor. 
Britain had originally joined in October 1990 under Margaret Thatcher to link sterling 
directly to the value of the Deutschmark which was considered ‘the most inflation resistant 
currency in the Europe’ (Heppell, 2014:104). From May 1992, but specifically in the run up 
to Wednesday September 16th, 1992, currency speculators began aggressively short selling 
the pound in order to reduce its value. The government, despite increasing interest rates to 
15% on the day and using £3.3 billion in reserves to maintain the value of the pound, 
withdrew from the ERM on September 16th, 1992.  
The Conservative’s reputation for competence in economic policy declined significantly 
following Black Wednesday, with Labour replacing them as the voters’ preferred party to 
manage the economy (Heppell, 2014). Disputes about Europe ‘dominated the political 
agenda’ from then on (Major, 1999:352). As Major (1999:352) later noted: ‘Black 
Wednesday turned a quarter of a century of unease into a flat rejection of any wider 
involvement in Europe’. The reputational damage of this event contributed to the landslide 
election defeat in May 1997 and, in addition, to the growth and legitimisation of 
Euroscepticism in the Conservative Party (Gifford, 2014). 
In the early speeches on European policy by Hague, it is clear that the events of Black 
Wednesday have influenced the Conservative’s position on European integration, specifically 
in terms of financial and economic policy. They show a discursive justification for his 
sceptical position towards the single currency. This was symbolised in October 1997 with 
Hague (1997b) devoting a section of his first conference speech as party leader to an apology, 
on behalf of the Conservative Party, for entering the pound into the ERM: 
 
In looking to the future, we have to be informed by the past. I remember when 
we went in to the ERM…looking back, I believe that going in to the ERM was 
a great mistake. I am sorry we did it - and we should have the courage and the 
confidence to say so. It did enormous damage to the credibility of our party and 
we paid the price. Black Wednesday, negative equity, sky high interest rates, 
we went in to something when the time was not right. We will never let that 
happen to our country again. 
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In his speech to the Confederation of British Industry on November 10th, 1997 the historical 
legacy of the ERM crisis was also utilised by Hague (1997c) as a discursive tool to warn 
delegates of the risks of entering into EU financial integration without assessing if it was 
compatible with the UK economy. In both these early speeches it is evident that the historical 
legacy of Black Wednesday, for the Conservative leadership, was a contributing factor in the 
formation of the ‘wait and see’ approach towards the single currency. The language around 
this event is associated with ‘negative equity’, ‘sky high interest rates’, ‘job losses’, ‘falling 
investment’ and ‘repossessed and bankrupt businesses’ for the country and ‘enormous 
damage’ to the ‘credibility’ of the Conservative Party on financial and economic competence. 
This narrative is also used by Hague as a discursive tool to justify his Eurosceptic approach 
to the single currency, warning of the dangers of entering without a full assessment of the 
potential consequences. 
It is also important to note that Hague uses both of his first two major speeches as party 
leader to associate the legacy of Black Wednesday to his position on the single currency. This 
period, as mentioned elsewhere, in the second half of 1997 is the crucial period in which the 
new single currency policy was agreed by the Shadow Cabinet. It is therefore significant that 
Hague is using the dominant historical legacy of the ERM crisis to justify the ‘two 
parliaments’ policy during this point in time, as it suggests that the sequence of events in the 
preceding part of the decade following and including Black Wednesday influenced his policy 
development. 
 
5.1.3 Major’s Post-Maastricht European Policy 
 
The Conservative’s post-election European policy was not created from a vacuum but 
developed from the historical legacy of the 1992-1997 parliament. The new parliament, and 
new leadership team, provided the party with a window of opportunity to makes changes. 
However, as discussed in the theoretical chapter, history and the decisions made by actors 
constrain future actions. To change policy is always likely to create tension among those who 
had previously created and supported it. Radical policy change is likely to create much more 
serious and sustained conflict. This likelihood acts as a constraint on those individuals in the 
present. It is a potential cost to radical change that encourages more incremental action. This 
was certainly the case for the new Conservative leadership in 1997, who had experienced 
serious conflict over European policy during the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. 
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The policy platform of the past can also be used as resource for policy decision-makers in the 
present to draw ideas from. As will be established here, Conservative European policy under 
Hague, perceived as a Eurosceptic, was significantly influenced by the past European policy 
legacy of Major, perceived at the time as pragmatically pro-European.  The ideas and 
concepts of the Major European policy, post-Maastricht ratification, were built upon and re-
formulated by the Conservative leadership during the 1997-2001 parliament. 
To provide context, it is important to briefly set out the nature of the Major European policy 
post-Maastricht. Following Maastricht, Major adopted rhetoric and policy positions that 
aimed to placate both pro-integration and Eurosceptic elements of the party (Turner, 2000). 
For pro-integrationists, it was emphasised that Conservative policy was still to continue as a 
fully engaged member of the EU. On the single currency, the policy was to ‘wait and see’. 
However, after Maastricht Major began to adopt more Eurosceptic positions. There was a 
determined effort to slow down plans for further integration, with Major calling for a ‘new 
approach’ to Europe focusing on everyday concerns of ordinary people, rather than ‘abstract 
concepts’ about political union (Major, 1993). At the 1996 Turin intergovernmental 
conference Major established his aim as a ‘partnership of nations’ and for agreement on more 
subsidiarity, more power for national parliaments, reform of the European Court of Justice 
and the QMV system (Major, 1996). From ‘we belong at the heart of Europe’ in March 1991, 
the Conservative European policy had seen a ‘slow but sure movement’ to a more 
Eurosceptic agenda (Turner, 2000:172). 
The intervention that left the most significant legacy on Conservative European policy in the 
1997-2001 parliament was delivered by Major in a speech in September 1994. This firmly 
established flexibility as the ‘central plank’ of Conservative European policy (Lynch, 2003). 
He proposed a ‘multi-track, multi-speed, multi-layered’ EU which allowed member states to 
co-operate in the EU, or not, in areas they considered of mutual interest. As long as this did 
not damage the interests of other member states or confer a form of second-class status on 
non-participants, member states should not be constrained from doing so. No member state 
would be forced to take part in any new EU initiative if they decided this was not in their 
national interest (Major, 1994). The legacy of these ideas of ‘greater flexibility’ and ‘greater 
tolerance of diversity’ developed by Major in 1994 can be seen in a number of the central 
elements of European policy under Hague. The ‘flexibility clause’, a new policy announced 
by Hague in a speech in May 1999, draws directly from the concepts discussed by Major 
1994. This policy, to insert a flexibility clause into the EU treaties the next time they were 
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reformed, would effectively implement in practice the Major flexibility idea. As Lynch 
(2003) points out, much of the detail around the policy was not developed, but the concept it 
was trying to implement drew directly from Major’s legacy. 
The new policy on the single currency, to rule out membership for two parliaments and only 
enter the Euro after approval from parliament and national referendum, also built upon the 
legacy of Major’s ‘wait and see’ policy. Hague made the new policy more acceptable to 
Eurosceptics, by putting a specific time frame to it, but it was not significantly more radical 
than the Major position. As Major himself stated, Hague’s new policy was ‘wait and see a 
little longer’. Rhetorically, Hague signalled a position that was close to ruling out the single 
currency in principle. However, the substance of the new policy was constrained by the 
legacy of the Major position. This had been to triangulate a position which would placate 
both the Eurosceptic and pro-integrationist wings of the party. The legacy of the Major 
European policy acted both as a historical constraint on the Hague European policy, but also 
a source of policy ideas during a period where, both in the content and rhetoric of policy, the 
Conservative Party was moving in a Eurosceptic direction. 
5.1.4 The 1997 Conservative Leadership Election 
 
The Conservative leadership contest during the summer of 1997 was dominated by European 
policy, specifically the question of the single currency. Hague, who was elected leader on 
June 19th, 1997, made commitments during this leadership contest which would eventually 
emerge as Conservative Party policy on the single currency: the ‘two parliaments’ policy. 
The dynamics of the 1997 leadership contest are therefore an important factor which 
contributed to the emergence of this policy. 
In total six candidates competed for the leadership; William Hague, Kenneth Clarke, John 
Redwood, Peter Lilley, Michael Howard, and Stephen Dorrell. The candidate of the 
Thatcherite Eurosceptic wing of the party before the election, Michael Portillo, had lost his 
seat during the election. There was therefore an opening for a new Eurosceptic candidate. 
The absence of the leading pro-integration candidate from the contest, Michael Heseltine, 
also opened up space on the pro-European wing of the party (Heppell, 2007). The 
competition between the candidates was dominated around the issue of European integration 
and the single currency, especially between the rival Eurosceptic candidates. Howard, 
Redwood, and Lilley were associated with strong Eurosceptic views, while Hague was 
considered a moderate Eurosceptic. Clarke and Dorrell were the pro-integration candidates. 
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The failure of the Thatcherite Eurosceptics to unite around a single candidate (their support 
was fragmented among four candidates) allowed Hague to emerge the winner, appealing to 
centrists and moderate Eurosceptics in the final two ballots. 
The importance of the leadership election to European policy change in the 1997-2001 
parliament lies in the tactical position Hague and his campaign team took in order to compete 
with other candidates with more Eurosceptic credentials (Howard, Redwood, and Lilley). 
Although favourably placed after the first leadership ballot with 41 votes, Hague and his team 
moved to increase his Eurosceptic appeal to Howard, Redwood, and Lilley supporters, the 
last two having withdrawn after the first ballot (Bale, 2016). At the beginning of the contest 
Hague implied opposition to the single currency in principle and that those dissenting from 
this view would be barred from his Shadow Cabinet (Macaskill and White, 1997). In the 
second ballot the dynamics changed, with Hague competing against two candidates with 
strong, but contradictory, positions on the single currency. Redwood was opposed to Britain 
ever joining the single currency. Clarke supported entry in the future under the right 
economic circumstances. Nadler (2000, 2015) suggests that it was the strategy to triangulate 
between these two positions that influenced Hague to decide on the ‘two parliaments’ policy 
on the single currency. The tactic was to appeal to moderates from both the Clarke and 
Redwood supporters, in addition to centrists who wanted a united, compromised position. 
The Conservative Party would oppose the single currency, but not absolutely rule it out. This 
was a change in Hague’s position from before the first ballot, in which he said was opposed 
to the single currency on principle. This change was effective at placating both pro-
integrationists and Eurosceptics and contributed, in combination with an endorsement from 
Margaret Thatcher, to Hague beating Redwood and Clarke over the course of the final two 
ballots (Widdecombe, 2016). 
The competitive forces between the Eurosceptic and pro-integration candidates during the 
leadership election therefore contributed directly to the emergence of the ‘two parliaments’ 
policy on the European single currency during the summer of 1997, a policy later adopted by 
the Shadow Cabinet and endorsed in a ballot of party members. Hague, a moderate 
Eurosceptic competing with strong Eurosceptic and pro-integrationist candidates, formulated 
a compromise policy that appealed to enough sections of the party to bring him the votes 
needed to win. This was a compromise position similar to the one Major had reached in the 
previous parliament. Once adopted by the winning candidate, a path dependent effect took 
hold of the policy. This meant that as time moved on, and more steps to cement this policy 
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were adopted, there would have been increasing costs to Hague’s authority and credibility as 
leader if he had attempted to change the policy in either a more Eurosceptic or pro-integration 
position (Pierson, 2004). The leadership contest is therefore a significant contributing factor 
to the establishment of the ‘two parliaments’ policy between 1997 and 2001. 
 
 
 
5.2 Rival Political Parties 
 
5.2.1 The Referendum Party 
 
The electoral impact of the Referendum Party at the 1997 general election had important 
consequences for the Conservative Party approach to European policy post-1997. The 
Referendum Party, a single-issue Eurosceptic party, was active between 1994 and 1997. 
Established by millionaire businessman James Goldsmith, the party’s sole aim was to achieve 
a referendum on the UK’s relationship with the European Union. They stood 547 candidates 
at the 1997 election, 83% of the total contested constituencies, and gained 105,722 votes 
(Carter, et al, 1998). The pressure they put on Conservative candidates, both in the preceding 
year and during the 1997 election itself, is evident from their campaign spending. A poster 
campaign was launched on 1,500 sites in January 1997. In total, during 1996-1997, 
£7,208,000 was spent on press advertising. Two cinema adverts were produced in addition to, 
during the campaign, one million leaflets and 100,000 VHS video tapes sent to targeted 
households. The focus of the campaign and the recourses invested in it were largely directed 
to influencing Conservative candidates to take more Eurosceptic positions (Carter, et al, 
1998). 
Academic studies (Curtice and Steed, 1997; Carter et al, 1998; Heath et al, 1998; McAllister 
and Studlar, 2000) suggest the electoral performance of the Referendum Party made a 
marginal to insignificant contribution to the Conservative Party election defeat. This 
contradicts the accounts of the impact of the Referendum Party given during elite interviews.  
Curtice and Steed (1997) identify only six seats where it could be argued the Referendum 
Party cost the Conservative Party the seat. Heath et al (1998) suggest that the Referendum 
Party had little impact on the Conservative Party electoral performance as the two thirds of 
people who voted for the Referendum Party in 1997, but who had also voted Conservative in 
1992, would more than likely have spread out evenly amongst the other ‘anti-Conservative’ 
candidates if they had not voted for the Referendum Party. This was because these voters 
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were equally as disillusioned with the Conservative Party in 1997 as other voters who 
supported non-Conservative candidates. McAllister and Studlar (2000) concluded that on 
average a Referendum candidate cost the Conservative Party 3.4% of the vote in the 
constituencies in which they stood. They estimate that in 16-19 seats the Referendum Party 
contributed to the defeat of the Conservative candidate (McAllister and Studlar, 2000). 
Research is therefore contradictory, with a range of somewhere between 0 and 19 seats 
affected. 
This is in contrast with the perception of some party elites in the immediate period after 1997. 
As Tim Collins (2016), Conservative MP 1997-2005 and speechwriter to Hague, told me: 
 
One of my memories at a constituency level at the 1997 general election, and I 
was hearing this in spades from other colleagues, was just how rattled many 
Conservative activists and long-term Conservative voters were by the campaign 
tactics of the Referendum Party. They sent VHS tapes to many voters’ homes, 
or at least it seemed like it a lot. There were pledges in all the newspapers. My 
recollection is that The Times in 1997 didn't endorse a political party. They 
printed a list by constituencies and they put beside the name of each candidate 
who they recommended you should vote for, according to whether or not you 
had endorsed the Goldsmith pledge1. So the starting point in 1997 has to be that 
the Conservative Party managed to convince itself, and not entirely irrationally, 
although probably more fancifully than really, that a very big reason, and 
possibly the biggest single reason, why it had been defeated in the general 
election of 1997 was because of its divisions on Europe, because it had drifted 
out of line with public opinion on Europe which it believed was much more 
Eurosceptic and that the essential component of it getting back to electability 
was actually to become more Eurosceptic. 
 
While we know that a more Eurosceptic position was not electorally successful for the party 
at the 2001 general election, it would be incorrect to judge the thinking of individuals in the 
Conservative Party during 1997 based on this use of hindsight. Evans (1998) argues that the 
party failed to benefit from growing public Euroscepticism between 1992 and 1996 due to 
confused signals on what the official Conservative position was. As Evans (1998:575) states, 
during the Hague leadership period, ‘the optimal support-attracting solution for this electoral 
dilemma would be a united Eurosceptic position’. As bounded rationality limits the extent to 
which political agents in an institution can predict all the consequences of a particular action, 
                                                 
1 It is correct that The Times did not officially endorse a political party at the 1997, instead publishing a list of 
individuals it decided were sufficiently Eurosceptic to vote for. These endorsements were, however, not 
connected to the ‘Goldsmith Pledge’. See ‘Principles Not Party’, The Times, Tuesday April 29th 1997, p23 and 
‘Candidates who deserve the Eurosceptic vote’, The Times, Thursday May 1st 1997, p11. 
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it is therefore understandable, given the political and institutional context, why it would have 
been viewed as ‘rational’ by many Conservative MPs and the leadership to pursue a more 
Eurosceptic policy position. The academic evidence, however, suggests this did not have a 
meaningful electoral impact at the 1997 election. 
Andrew Mackay (2016), Shadow Cabinet member 1997-2001, emphasises the impact the 
Referendum Party had on thinking inside the Conservative Party following the 1997 election: 
Tony Blair wouldn't have won that complete landslide he did, the biggest since 
1945, he would have won a big majority but not 160-170 seats. They did that 
because of the divisions in the Conservative Party over Europe and of course 
because Jimmy Goldsmith set up the Referendum Party.  UKIP was also set up 
at that time. Take my great friend Seb Coe who was in the Whips Office with 
me. He lost Falmouth and Camborne by about 1,500 votes to a Labour MP and 
between them the Referendum Party and UKIP got over 5,500 votes. Seb 
would not have lost otherwise. So, we had this stunning defeat and Europe had 
become toxic. Everyone is remembering Maastricht. Everyone is upset about 
what happened with UKIP and the Referendum Party. 
 
These two examples illustrate the extent to which Conservative MPs who survived the 1997 
election defeat had attributed the success of the Referendum Party to the inability of the 
Conservative Party to maintain a consistently Eurosceptic message and policy platform. In 
order to win back voters lost to the Referendum Party, many MPs believed policy needed to 
become more Eurosceptic (Crowson, 2006). This understanding was then taken forward into 
the 1997-2001 parliament in which it became common wisdom, contributing to a political 
environment in which it was accepted that Conservative European policy needed to become 
more consistently Eurosceptic. 
5.2.2 The Labour Party and European Policy 1997-2001 
It is also necessary to consider what influence a further rival political party had on 
Conservative European policy during this period. The Labour Party had, since the beginnings 
of European integration post-1945, shifted between positive and negative positions towards 
Europe (Daniels, 1998). During the 1950’s and much of the 1960’s Labour moved from 
opposition to general ambivalence on the question of whether the UK should participate in 
the EEC. While Labour moved to a pro-integration position following the 1966 general 
election deep divisions remained for much of the 1970’s over European policy, with Labour 
moving back to an anti-European integration position in their 1983 election manifesto 
(Daniels, 1998). During the period 1983 to 1997, Labour moved gradually to a more 
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enthusiastic, pro-integration, position on Europe under the leaderships of Kinnock, Smith, 
and Blair. This policy change was encouraged through a series of electoral and policy factors, 
including the need for a major modernisation of policy following a third successive general 
election defeat in 1987, the drift towards a more Eurosceptic policy platform by the 
Conservative Party following Thatcher’s 1998 Bruges speech (Daniels, 1998), and the shift 
towards a greater role for European institutions in protecting and extending social and 
employment rights during the European Commission presidency of Jacques Delors (1985-
1995).   
Lynch (2003), in his assessment of Conservative European policy between 1997 and 2001 
states that, along with a number of other factors, that ‘policy would also be forged in 
response to a pro-European Labour government.’ Vail (2014:3) also suggests that this shift in 
policy by the Labour Party ‘created strong incentives for the Tories to embrace a harder 
Europhobic line’. While this was undoubtedly a consideration for Conservative policy-
makers during the 1997-2001 parliament, it should not be exaggerated. While Labour’s 
rhetoric and the policy it adopted were more pro-integration than the Conservative Party 
would have been, such as signing the Social Chapter provisions and greater EU military 
cooperation, in general Labour policy in this period shows much continuity with the Major 
approach to Europe (Holden, 2011). 
 
The section on European policy in the 1997 Labour Party manifesto included statements 
Eurosceptic Conservative Party would have agreed with, such as ‘Our vision of Europe is of 
an alliance of independent nation states’, ‘We oppose a European federal superstate’, and 
support ‘a detailed agenda for reform’ in the EU (Labour Party, 1997) The Labour manifesto 
also mirrored Conservative Party positions on protecting the national veto, expanding the 
single market, and increasing free market competition in Europe (Labour Party, 1997). On 
the single currency, Labour even had a version of the Conservative’s ‘wait and see policy’. 
Both Conservative and Labour 1997 manifesto sections on European policy showed 
significant similarities (Wall, 2008). As Holden (2011:157) states, it is ‘difficult to argue that 
there was not substantial commonality in regard to the positions taken on key issues’. 
Bale (2006) also agrees that European policy ‘hardened’ in response to a more pro-European 
Labour Party. For example, Bale (2006:388) states that the ‘two parliaments’ policy was 
decided ‘when it became clear that the Labour government would not try to join EMU in its 
 103 
first parliamentary term’. While the decision to commit to the ‘two parliaments’ policy on the 
single currency may have been influenced by the Labour decision not join in the first term, it 
was only in a small way. As this chapter shows, the decision on the content of the policy was 
the result of the historical legacy of Major, the 1997 leadership election, growing 
Euroscepticism in the party, and Hague’s own individual conviction. 
It is therefore difficult to argue that Labour policy on Europe during this period led to 
changes in Conservative policy. The Conservative Party had established their opposition in 
those areas in which Labour policy was different, such as on enhanced EU defence 
cooperation, social policy and employment, prior to the 1997 election. Labour Party rhetoric, 
for example concerning Blair and his early support for the single currency, could be argued to 
have been an electoral incentive for Conservative Party to enhance their own Eurosceptic 
rhetoric, but it did not seem to encourage changes to the substance of policy during this 
period. 
The change seen in European policy from the Labour Party was in tone, rather than policy 
content (Holden, 2011). This change in tone was important because it gradually limited the 
political space in which a pro-integration Conservative Party had to speak out and advocate 
for alternative approaches. The Labour Party was now the party in which pro-Europeanism 
was mainly centred, which alienated those with similar positions in the Conservative Party. 
When leading pro-integration Conservatives did speak out, such as in October 1999 when 
Clarke and Heseltine helped launch the pro-single currency group ‘Britain in Europe’, they 
were heavily criticised by many inside the party for sharing a platform with political rivals. 
This reaction was a powerful disincentive for pro-integration Conservative MPs to speak out, 
as doing so associated them with the political rhetoric of the party’s main political rival. The 
more pro-European integration tone from Labour, therefore, could be argued to have 
suppressed the role of pro-integrationists inside the Conservative Party by associating 
positive rhetoric towards the EU with a direct political rival. This is not to say it would have 
changed the minds pro-integrationist Conservative MPs, but it would certainly have 
encouraged some to keep a low profile in opposition, out of fear of being identified as 
sympathetic to Labour European policy. 
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5.3. Ideological Composition of the Conservative Party 
 
5.3.1 Parliamentary Party 
A further element of the historical context for the Conservative Party when entering in the 
post-1997 parliament was the composition of the parliamentary party. In his recollections of 
this period Ken Clarke (2016:398), Chancellor of the Exchequer 1993-1997, argues that the 
parliamentary party experienced a ‘dramatic transformation on 1 May 1997. Many senior 
pro-European MPs had resigned, and many had been defeated…The 1997 intake of new 
MPs, who became known as ‘Thatcher’s Children’, was a fairly talented bunch, but much 
more Eurosceptic than previous cohorts, altering the balance of the party considerably’. 
Michael Heseltine, Deputy Prime Minister 1995-1997, contends that at this point in 1997 ‘for 
many in the party Europe had become not just an issue, but the issue’ (Heseltine, 2001:530). 
Analysis of the ideological composition of the parliamentary party in 1997 would support 
these accounts. Of the 165 Conservative MPs who voted in the 1997 leadership contest, 
Heppell and Hill (2008) categorised 139 as ‘Eurosceptic’, 11 as ‘agnostic’, and 14 as 
‘Europhile’. Or, in percentage terms, it is estimated that 88.4% of Conservative MPs after the 
1997 election were ideologically Eurosceptic2. This was a significant increase on the 
Eurosceptic composition of Conservative parliamentarians before the 1997 election. In 1992, 
using attitudinal mapping by Heppell (2002, 2013), only 58% (192) of the 336 Conservative 
parliamentarians were Eurosceptic. This 30.4% increase between 1992 and 1997 was a much 
greater increase than in subsequent periods (88.4% to 89.8% 1997-2001, and 89.8% to 91.4% 
2001-2005. The number of pro-European integration MPs fell from 98 (29.6%) in 1992, to 14 
(8.5%) after the 1997 election. 
Survey data on the attitudes of Conservative parliamentarians to European policy show a less 
dramatic change. Using survey data collected in 1994 by Baker et al (1995), 59% of 
Conservative MPs agreed with the statement that ‘The disadvantages of EU membership 
have been outweighed by the benefits’, while 32% disagreed (corresponding figures for 
MEPs were 77% and 23% respectively). In addition, 64% agreed with the statement that 
‘Sovereignty cannot be pooled’ and 56% agreed that ‘An Act of parliament should be passed 
                                                 
2 In this context ‘Eurosceptic’ refers to ‘soft Euroscepticism’, which refers to those critical of European 
integration and the EU institutions, but who fall short of ‘hard’ Eurosceptics who wish to withdraw from the EU 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008). Euroscepticism in the Conservative Party during this period was of the ‘soft’ 
variety, with the debate around withdrawal as a policy option very limited (Mackay, 2016; Widdecombe, 2016). 
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to establish explicitly the ultimate supremacy of the UK parliament over EU legislation’. The 
survey was repeated in 1998. While the first question was not repeated in the 1998 survey, 
the questions on sovereignty and parliamentary supremacy were. In 1998 61% agreed that 
sovereignty couldn’t be pooled and 69% liked the idea of an UK parliament Act of 
Supremacy (Baker, et al, 1999). The survey data would conclude that Euroscepticism had 
increased in the Conservative parliamentary party, but not as substantially as when using the 
attitudinal mapping. 
The attitudinal mapping by Heppell could give a more realistic measurement of the change in 
the Eurosceptic composition of the parliamentary party, which would correspond with eye-
witness accounts from Clarke (2016) and Heseltine (2001). The advantage of the attitudinal 
mapping is that because it does not require a direct response from the individual, the entirety 
of the parliamentary party can be categorised using the four sources of data (voting records, 
early day motions, group membership, and public/private comments). The disadvantage of 
the survey data is that it does not provide in-depth assessment of each individual’s views 
from multiple sources, instead relying on responses to a set of questions from one source, the 
survey, from one point in time. While the response rates of 38% and 42% for the 1994 and 
1998 surveys are good (Bryman, 2012), it is still possible to argue that the attitudinal 
mapping of the period gives a more accurate reflection of the process of change. 
 
The post-1997 Conservative parliamentary party therefore can be argued to represent a 
significant change in ideological composition on the question of European integration. This 
qualitative and quantitative evidence illustrates the Eurosceptic nature of the parliamentary 
party going in to the 1997-2001 parliament and the political environment in which the 
Conservative leadership made policy decisions. This institution within an institution, the 
parliamentary party in the Conservative Party, provided a substantial incentive for the party 
leadership to follow the grain of opinion. It was also a constraint, as going against this 
direction would have created conflict which could have damaged the party reputation further. 
 
5.3.2 Shadow Cabinet 
The ideological composition of the Shadow Cabinet formed by Hague in June 1997 ‘set the 
tone’, as Bale (2016:73) suggests, for the direction of Conservative European policy in the 
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1997-2001 parliament. Influential positions were given to leading Eurosceptic MPs. The new 
Shadow Cabinet included Peter Lilley as Shadow Chancellor and Michael Howard as 
Shadow Foreign Secretary. Both Lilley and Howard had been prominent Eurosceptic voices 
in the Major Cabinet during the previous parliament. Other established Eurosceptic voices 
included John Redwood, David Heathcoat-Amory, and Iain Duncan Smith. As Table 5.1 
indicates, 13 of the 18 MPs in the Shadow Cabinet were Eurosceptic on European policy, 
with Brian Mawhinney and George Young categorised as agnostic. Importantly, at this early 
stage Hague also appointed three MPs who were supportive of further European integration, 
particularly in terms of the single currency; Stephen Dorrell, David Curry, and Alistair 
Goodlad. It is likely that both Ken Clarke and Michael Heseltine, the party’s two most senior 
pro-European MPs, would have also been included in the initial Hague Shadow Cabinet 
(Snowdon, 2010). Both decided not to serve on the frontbench. This indicates that at the 
beginning of his leadership Hague was prepared to form a Shadow Cabinet that was 
reflective of the balance of opinion in the parliamentary party on European policy; a clear 
Eurosceptic majority but with pro-European MPs also included. 
Table 5.1 also shows how the ideological composition, with regards to European policy, of 
the Shadow Cabinet under Hague changed during the course of the 1997-2001 parliament. It 
shows that gradually, over the course of six occasions when Hague altered his leadership 
team, the Shadow Cabinet become more dominated by Eurosceptic voices than it had been in 
June 1997. As Pro-European MPs such as Dorrell, Curry, and Goodlad left the Shadow 
Cabinet they were replaced with Eurosceptics such as Liam Fox, Anne Widdecombe, and 
Michael Portillo (following his return to parliament in November 1999 at the Kensington and 
Chelsea by-election), rather than likeminded MPs. This reflects a determination by Hague, as 
his leadership progressed, to form a Shadow Cabinet that would fully support his Eurosceptic 
direction to European policy. Hague developed a reluctance to placate those MPs that 
supported further European integration, which was reflected in those he selected for 
promotion. 
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Initially the Shadow Cabinet was reflective of the ideological composition of the 
parliamentary party after May 1997; dominated by Eurosceptics, but some individuals who 
supported further European integration. After the pro-European members had left, over 
opposition to party policy on the single currency, Hague formed a Eurosceptic leadership 
team, with the notable exception of Tim Yeo. However, after this point, it is unlikely the 
Shadow Cabinet – as an institution within an institution – played a significant role in shaping 
the content of European policy. What role the Shadow Cabinet did play was in supporting 
and approving the Eurosceptic direction of policy set out by William Hague. Anne 
Widdecombe (2016) explains that while the Shadow Cabinet was consulted on policy, this 
only became formalised late in the parliament: 
 
It was a Shadow Cabinet that was run very largely on consultation and consent. 
In the first couple of years our decision-making processes were not that 
streamlined on anything and I mean I announced policies at party conference in 
1998 and 1999 that I think would have caused a lot more trouble later on. That 
was because we hadn't got the decision-making process streamlined. By 2000 
we had. From 2000 onwards, I would say that everything was shared. William 
made a point of his Shadow Cabinet giving presentations on their own 
individual policies and what they were doing so that the Cabinet was up to 
date. 
 
 
As Widdecombe (2016) explained when interviewed on the role of the Shadow Cabinet with 
regards to European policy at this point: 
 
 
I think that you will find that there was an assumption around the Shadow 
Cabinet table that Europe was a winner for us and that we were on the right 
track with Europe. So, I don't actually think that William had a hard job of 
trying to sell a policy which a substantial number of his Shadow Cabinet didn't 
Table 5.1: Conservative MPs in the 1997-2001 Shadow Cabinet 
Month/Year Eurosceptic Agnostic Europhile 
June 1997  13 2 3 
June 1998 18 2 0 
December 1998 18 2 0 
June 1999 16 2 0 
February 2000 16 2 0 
September 2000 17 1 0 
Source: Heppell and Hill (2008). 
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want. He didn't have that challenge. So, when you say were we consulted I 
think that the answer to that is yes but there was already large-scale agreement 
around the table. 
 
 
Nonetheless, the Shadow Cabinet was a key factor in committing to official party policy on 
October 24th, 1997 that the Conservative Party would oppose membership of the single 
currency for ‘two parliaments’, a change in the position from ‘the foreseeable future’ phrase 
used by Hague (1997b) at the party conference. This was itself interpreted by many 
Eurosceptics as a change in policy from Hague’s statements during the leadership campaign, 
though pro-European Shadow Cabinet members such as Dorrell and Curry believed the 
policy had not been officially adopted (Nadler, 2000). There was therefore substantial 
confusion at all levels of the party. It was then leading Eurosceptics in the Shadow Cabinet, 
namely Redwood, Heathcoat-Amory, and Duncan-Smith who insisted that Hague committed 
to the ‘two parliaments’ policy, abandoning ‘the foreseeable future’ line (Nadler, 2000). 
For most of this period though, as an institution within the Conservative Party, the Shadow 
Cabinet was a force which maintained policy on a Eurosceptic trajectory, as opposed to one 
that sought to change it radically, either in terms of a harder Eurosceptic or more pro-
European position. Once the ‘two parliaments’ policy on the single currency was agreed in 
October 1997 and the pro-European MPs had left, Hague formulated European policy with a 
Shadow Cabinet fully signed up to the Eurosceptic direction he was taking. The Eurosceptic 
composition of the Shadow Cabinet provided an internal institutional factor which would 
have constrained Hague diverting from a Eurosceptic policy agenda during the parliament. 
5.3.3 Party Membership 
The ability to consider the changing nature, and trace it over time, of Conservative Party 
members’ attitudes towards European integration in the 1997-2001 parliament is hampered 
by the lack of research during this period. However, indications of grassroots’ opinion can 
also be ascertained from private polling conducted by the Conservative Party and later 
reported in national newspapers. While these sources need to be treated with caution, as they 
are not published academic studies in which all the data and survey questions can be 
evaluated, they do at least provide some insight into the state of opinion at the time. 
Combining these two sources can give a good indication of the direction of travel for 
Conservative members and their attitude towards European integration. 
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The most representative research of grassroots views on European integration does not start 
until the 1990’s (Whiteley, et al, 1994). Whiteley, et al, (1994) undertook a survey of 
Conservative members in 1992, with follow up interviews with the same individuals 
conducted in 1994 (Whiteley and Seyd, 1995). In the 1992 survey, 54% of members agreed 
with the statement that ‘Conservative Party should resist further moves to integrate with the 
European Community’ (Whiteley, et al, 1994:265). This had increased to 61% by 1994 
(Whiteley and Seyd, 1995). In 1992 a majority of members also opposed the single currency 
(57%). A significant minority of members in 1992, 30%, disagreed that the Conservative 
Party should rule out the single currency or resist further European integration. In 1992, 
therefore, about a third of the Conservative Party grassroots were pro-integration, although 
by 1994 this group appears to have started to decline. This trend is likely to have continued in 
the membership as research into Conservative voters and party identifiers show a noticeable 
increase in hostility to European integration during the 1992-1997 parliament (Clements, 
2010; Stevens, 2013). It is nonetheless interesting that in the early 1990’s there remained a 
significant minority of members who did not support a Eurosceptic direction to European 
policy. 
The indications are that attitudes towards European integration among Conservative members 
started to move in a Eurosceptic direction after 1992. Evidence for this comes from a number 
of surveys of grassroots’ opinion conducted by the Conservative Party during the 1992-1997 
parliament. A national survey of 3,400 grassroots Conservative members, conducted by the 
Conservative Political Centre think-tank (renamed the Conservative Policy Forum in 1999), 
before the 1994 European elections and showed ‘a substantial majority’ opposed to a 
reduction in Britain’s powers to veto European legislation, with a ‘small majority’ calling for 
more powers to block European laws (Grice et al, 1994). A survey of 70 backbench 
Conservative MPs, conducted by The Sunday Times during the same period, saw 68.5% of 
MPs surveyed reject the idea of enhanced blocking powers, an indication that perhaps at this 
stage grassroots members were more Eurosceptic than the parliamentary party on some 
European issues.  
In 1996 the Conservative Party conducted a survey of the views of 30,000 Conservative 
members. The subsequent report was entitled Our Nation’s Future: Listening to the 
Conservative Party (Lees-Marshment 2001). The report’s findings suggest that by 1996 
Conservative members, though supportive of the UK’s EU membership, were ‘fiercely 
resistant’ to transferring more powers to Brussels, with most also opposed to UK membership 
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of the single currency (Deans, 1996). The Conservative leadership are argued to have used 
the results of the survey to inform the 1997 Conservative election manifesto (Deans, 1996), at 
that point the most Eurosceptic general election manifesto produced by the Conservative 
Party since Britain joined the community in 1973 (Lynch and Whittaker, 2013a). 
This suggests that Conservative members became noticeably more Eurosceptic in their views 
between 1992 and 1997. This is significant as ordinary party members, and the activists that 
campaign and organise for the party, would have interacted with parliamentarians and 
parliamentary candidates on a regular basis in their own constituencies. It is likely therefore 
that there would have been awareness from parliamentarians, more importantly those that 
would go on to form the party leadership after 1997, that many grassroots party members 
favoured a more Eurosceptic direction to European policy. The potential popularity of an 
enhanced and coherent Eurosceptic policy with the party membership could therefore have 
influenced the preferences of policy-makers in the party leadership after 1997. 
Overall the change in the ideological composition of the Conservative Party, from grassroots 
to the Shadow Cabinet, was an important internal institutional factor, which guided the 
Conservative leadership to take a more Eurosceptic policy position from 1997-2001. This 
supports other research, which has identified growing levels of Euroscepticism in all levels of 
the party as being central to this process (Turner, 2000; Forster, 2002; Bale, 2006; Webb, 
2008; Lynch and Whittaker, 2013a, 2013b). As this chapter shows, however, growing 
Euroscepticism in the institutions of the Conservative Party was one of the institutional 
factors which gave the Eurosceptic direction of policy its path dependency. 
5.4 Critical Junctures 
 
5.4.1 The May 1997 Election Defeat 
 
The historical context in which the Conservative Party found itself in May 1997 was one of 
landslide electoral defeat and entrenched internal divisions that had been generated during the 
Maastricht and single currency debates. The 1997 election was the worst electoral defeat the 
party had suffered since 1832 (Heppell, 2007). The Conservative Party lost 178 seats and 
returned only 165 MPs to Westminster, the worst result since 1945. The share of the vote, at 
30.7%, was an 11.2% reduction on the 1992 general election and lower than the previous 
worst post-war return of 35.8% in October 1974 (Heppell, 2013). In total nine members of 
the Cabinet lost their seats, including senior MPs such as Michael Portillo, Malcolm Rifkind, 
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and William Waldegrave. The impact of the defeat hit the Conservative Party ‘very deeply’ 
and produced a form of ‘psychological trauma’ for many of those involved (Nadler, 
2015:354). 
The May 1997 election defeat was also a critical juncture for the party with regards to the 
future direction of European policy. It represented the final phase in the transition of the 
Conservative Party to a Eurosceptic party, from the pro-European integration party of 
Macmillan and Heath, to the rise of Euroscepticism during the Margaret Thatcher and John 
Major leaderships. As the data in the previous section indicates, one institution within the 
party, the parliamentary party, had a Eurosceptic majority before the 1997 election. This 
increased after 1997, as many supporters of integration had either left parliament or been 
defeated at the election (Cowley and Stuart, 2010). However, after the 1997 election there 
was both a Eurosceptic leader, opposed to further political integration, and a majority 
Eurosceptic Shadow Cabinet, in addition to a majority Eurosceptic parliamentary party. This 
had not been the case under previous leaderships. Thatcher was arguably a Eurosceptic 
leader, but only in the second half of her leadership, and certainly did not run as a 
Eurosceptic in the 1975 leadership contest as Hague did in 1997. Major took a pragmatic 
approach to European policy, while both Thatcher and Major organised Cabinets with leading 
pro-integration and Eurosceptic members. The May 1997 election was therefore a critical 
juncture for Conservative European Policy, with all of the component institutions of the party 
becoming majority Eurosceptic. This meant that European policy was likely to move in a 
Eurosceptic direction from this point on. 
 
5.4.2 The 1999 European Elections 
 
The June 1999 elections to the European Parliament were considered a great success for the 
Conservative Party (Snowdon, 2010).  The Conservative Party put considerable effort into a 
campaign that was heavy on Eurosceptic rhetoric about substantial EU reform, resistance to 
further integration and the protection of national sovereignty. This effort was rewarded with 
the Conservative Party winning 35.7% of the national vote and 36 MEPs, a notable 
improvement on the last European elections in 1994 (28% and 18 MEPs). Labour managed 
only 28% of the national vote and 29 MEPs. 
Many sources credit the Conservative victory in the 1999 European elections as a turning 
point, or critical juncture, for the Hague leadership. Snowdon (2010:64) describes this as a 
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‘crucial turning point for Hague’. This was because both the Conservative opinion poll rating 
and election results, and Hague’s own approval ratings, had been poor since his leadership 
began. Many thought Hague would not be able to survive a poor performance in these 
elections, including Hague himself. ‘I thought that if we lost the European elections I would 
have outlived my usefulness and maybe it would have been time for me to go. As it turned 
out we did very well so that thought went away very quickly’ (Hague, as quoted in Snowdon, 
2010:64). Coming first in the European elections was therefore clearly a significant event for 
the survival of the Hague leadership. 
It is less clear, however, whether this was a critical juncture for European policy during the 
1997-2001 parliament. In terms of the substance of policy it is arguable that the 1999 
European election victory was not a critical juncture, as the substance of policy did not 
radically change between 1999 and the 2001 general election manifesto. In theory, the 
Conservative leadership could have taken a more Eurosceptic position on the Euro, in 
reaction to the electoral success, ruling it out indefinitely regardless of the circumstances. 
They did not, with this change not happening until after the 2001 election. 
The impact of the election was that it confirmed to Hague and the Shadow Cabinet that 
European policy positions they had developed up to this time were right for the party, in 
terms of where public opinion was, and needed to be emphasised more rather than changed 
significantly in either ideological direction. The change was of attitude more than the content 
of policy, which most people in the party were comfortable with. It ‘galvanised’ the Shadow 
Cabinet behind the current position of European policy (Widdecombe, 2016). As 
Widdecombe put it to me: 
 
…the point at which it really took off big time was - we had been doing very 
badly in elections - not only had we lost the general election on a catastrophic 
scale but we were doing badly in elections in general. Then came the European 
elections. We had a slogan 'In Europe not run by Europe'. That was our slogan. 
We had vast successes in those elections. It actually sent seismic shockwaves 
through Labour because they thought they were utterly safe, invincible, and all 
the rest of it. And then that happened. From that moment, onwards when we 
had had that big success the Shadow Cabinet as a whole, not just William, saw 
Europe as a winner for us. So, I date the real hardening of attitudes on Europe 
from that point. 
 
 
Andrew Cooper (2016), Conservative Party Director of Strategy 1997-1999, argues that even 
though turnout was poor, the fact that the leadership had politically been at a low point before 
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June 1999, the success at these elections meant that, in terms of European policy,‘they were 
never going to turn back from that point on’. Tim Collins agrees that the surprise victory in 
the European elections that year validated the position and convinced the leadership that they 
had the right policy on Europe: 
 
At the time, European elections were considered a very significant pointer. It 
came off the back of two years of opinion polls which had told us we were 30-
40 points behind and then suddenly we win. So again, I think that at the time, 
and not irrationally, that this validates what we had thought. That a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for rebuilding our relationship with the electorate 
and getting to the point where people would trust us again is to have been seen 
to have sorted out the European issue. 
 
 
The emphasis on European policy between mid-1999 and 2001 general election is therefore 
very strongly connected with the election victory in June 1999. There is however no evidence 
to suggest the content of policy changed as a direct result of this. Ultimately, the most 
significant implication of success at the 1999 European elections, and subsequent failure for 
this message to bring electoral success in 2001, was to convince future Conservative leaders 
that European policy was not the key to returning the party to government at future general 
elections.  What it did do was provide more positive feedback for the policy status quo, 
enhancing the path dependency of European policy. 
 
5.5 Public Opinion 
 
5.5.1 Euroscepticism and Public Opinion 
 
Public opinion towards European integration changed substantially between 1992 and 1997. 
Public attitudes towards the EU during this parliament forms a significant part of the 
structural environment in which present and future policy-makers in this period, such as 
Hague and the Conservative leadership, would have been forming their policy preferences. 
Public opinion, and how it had developed in the preceding parliament, is therefore an 
important factor in the overall historical context in which William Hague became 
Conservative leader. 
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Table 5.2 draws upon data from the British Election Panel Study (BEPS) 1992, 1994, and 
1997 waves. Participants in the survey were interviewed at the 1992 election, re-interviewed 
in 1994, and then interviewed again at the 1997 election. As we can see from this table the 
UK electorate moved in a Eurosceptic direction during the 1992-1997 parliament. Although 
the number of voters who support leaving the EU during this period is relatively low, there is 
a noteworthy increase in the number of voters who would support a government policy aimed 
at reducing the powers of the EU, from 35% in 1992 to 52% in 1997.  Table 5.3, drawing on 
the same data source, also shows a Eurosceptic shift in voters’ opinion towards the single 
currency. In 1992 25% of voters supported replacing the pound with the single currency, 
while in 1997 this had reduced to 16%. During the same period voters who wanted to keep 
the pound as the only British currency had increased from 49% in 1992, to 55% in 1997. 
 
Table 5.2: UK Voters and Euroscepticism, 1992-1997 
% agreeing that 1992 1994 1997 
Britain should leave the EC 9 10 14 
Reduce powers 35 39 52 
Leave as is 13 14 16 
Increase its power 29 21 9 
Work for Single European government 11 11 5 
Don’t know 4 6 4 
Source: Heath, et al, (1998). 
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Table 5.4 shows the mean scores from respondents in the 1992-1997 BEPS survey who were 
asked to position themselves on an 11-point scale in response to a series of two contrasting 
questions on a range of policy issues, including European integration. The scales were coded 
so that higher scores represented more right-wing and Eurosceptic positions (Heath, et al, 
1998). As we can see from the Table 5.3, European policy was the only issue during the 
1992-1997 parliament in which voters were moving in a more right-wing or Eurosceptic 
direction, mirroring that of the Conservative parliamentary party. On most other issues the 
electorate were moving away from the Conservative Party and towards the Labour position. 
This data shows that the electorate was moving in a more Eurosceptic direction during the 
1992-1997 parliament. It provides evidence for the structural environment in which the 
Conservative Party began to formulate the future direction of European policy in the 
preceding parliament. It does not provide a direct causal link between itself and the policy 
changes made to European policy during the preceding period, but it does provide the 
historical context which would have contributed to and influenced the policy preferences of 
political actors within the party during the period in question. 
 
Table 5.3: UK Public Attitudes towards the Euro, 1992-97 
% Agreeing that 1992 1994 1997 
Replace pound 25 20 16 
Have both ECU and 
pound 
24 21 16 
Only have pound 49 58 55 
Don’t know 3 2 3 
Source: Heath, et al, (1998). 
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5.5.2 Euroscepticism and Conservative Voters/Identifiers 
In addition to public opinion, it is also important to consider the change in attitude towards 
Europe of Conservative voters and identifiers. Figure 5.1 shows data from the British 
Election Study surveys in 1987, 1992, and 1997. The question asked during these surveys 
was ‘Should Britain withdraw from the EU or should its membership of the EU continue?’ It 
indicates that Conservative voters were becoming more Eurosceptic in the decade preceding 
the 1997 general election. Those identifying with the Conservative Party show a near 
identical change in attitude during this period also. Euroscepticism among Conservative 
identifiers increased particularly between 1992-1997 (Clements, 2010), a parliament 
dominated by conflict and division amongst elites in the Conservative Party over events such 
as the Maastricht Treaty, ERM, and the single currency. British Social Attitudes Survey data 
also supports this. Conservative identifiers who agreed that we should either ‘leave the EU’ 
or ‘stay in the EU but reduce its powers’ were 45% in 1994, 53.3% in 1995 and 70.9% in 
1996. The corresponding figures for the general population were 36.4% in 1994, 36.6% in 
1995 and 58.2% in 1996 (Clements, 2010).  
 
Table 5.4: UK Voters’ Positions on Major Issues (Mean Scores), 1992-1997 
  1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 Change 
Europe 5.9 6.5 6.7 6.9 6.7 +0.8 
Privatisation 5.9 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.5 -0.4 
Inequality 4.9 - 4.3 4.5 4.6 -0.3 
Unemployment 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.7 +0.1 
Taxes 4.1 4.5 4.1 3.9 3.8 -0.3 
Source: Adapted from Heath, et al, 1998:100. 
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Both the BES and BSA surveys show Conservative voters and identifiers moving in a 
Eurosceptic direction, particularly between 1995 and 1996. Clements’ analysis of the BEPS 
1992-1997 data, which conducted interviews in every year of the parliament, shows that 
Conservative identifiers were ‘more likely to hold unstable views and change from 
supporting continued membership to believing that Britain should withdraw from the EU’ 
(2010: 63). Clements (2010:63) argues that this provides evidence that Conservative Party 
identifiers were inclined: 
 
…to change their view on the European question, perhaps reflecting at the 
grassroots level the increasing Euroscepticism evident in the parliamentary 
Conservative Party during John Major’s administration. 
 
This raises the question of whether the process is voter-driven or party-driven.  As Stevens 
(2013) points out, the evidence is contradictory. Evans and Butt (2007:42) argue that since 
the 1990’s, as salience towards the issue increased and attitudes to European integration 
became ‘no longer constrained’ by left-right values, it has been voters who have shaped party 
opinion on European policy. As Evans and Butt (2007:43) describe it, increasingly during 
this period ‘voters lead and politicians followed’. 
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Research by Stevens (2013), however, supports the party-driven model. Using data from 
1964-2010 Steven’s (2013:553) argues that change in party identifiers is ‘calibrated to the 
speed and clarity of elite re-positioning, only seeming to unfold over several election cycles 
when elite change is also gradual’. Conservative identifiers would also respond quickly to 
changes in elite opinion, for example between 1992-1997 when Conservative elite messages 
became increasingly Eurosceptic (seven out of ten changers who became more Eurosceptic 
during this period identified with the Conservative Party) (Stevens, 2013). A similar pattern 
was evident between 1970 and October 1974, when the pro-integration messages of Heath’s 
Conservative Party also saw more Conservative identifiers than Labour identifiers switch to a 
more pro-European position during the same period (Stevens, 2013). This process of change 
was most intense when the issue was highly salient, between 1992-1997, but also continued 
more gradually in subsequent parliaments. 
The evidence shows that both Conservative voters and those who identified with the 
Conservative Party were becoming more Eurosceptic in their attitudes towards European 
integration, particularly during the 1992-1997 parliament. This would have further added to 
the structural environment in which the Conservative leadership and parliamentary party 
would have encountered Conservative voters and supporters who were becoming more 
Eurosceptic in their views. This, in turn, is likely to have influenced the direction of future 
policy, if not the specific content. As Cooper (2016) points out, the Conservative leadership 
were specifically conscious of where they thought Conservative voters and public opinion 
were when deciding to stick to the new single currency policy: 
The public were clearly against joining the Euro. I think that was the honest 
conviction of most Tory MPs and most Tories. Public opinion suggested that 
most Tory voters were even more of that view. In order to stabilise the party 
internally because the position Major ended up with, it wasn't a hard-enough 
position, in either sense of that word, and it wasn't where the country or the 
party actually were. It is weird looking back on it, that it was so hard to do, 
because it is now so unthinkable that we would ever join the Euro but at that 
point the mood was it felt like a sought of mad, hard-line thing to do - to say 
never…We were certainly conscious of the fact that as a party that had lost 
heavily and were trying to find ways to re-connect with the British people there 
weren't many issues on which the British people agreed with the Tory party but 
this was in fact one of them. 
 
On the single currency, the Conservative Party was acutely aware that Conservative voters, 
identifiers, and public opinion in general was close to the party’s position. This clearly was 
an important factor in convincing, over time, many members of the Shadow Cabinet and 
parliamentary party that a more Eurosceptic line on the single currency was politically the 
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best position to be in if they wanted to unite the majority of the Conservative Party, in 
parliament and the country. Public opinion was therefore an important structural factor which 
contributed to this policy change. 
 
5.5.3 European Policy and Issue Salience 
A further structural factor connected with public opinion and European integration, that 
contributed to the overall political environment in which the Conservative Party formulated 
European policy during this period, is the salience of European integration. That is, the extent 
to which public opinion saw European integration as an important issue facing the country. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, shifts in public opinion are identified by numerous quantitative 
studies in the party change literature as being an important influence on policy change in 
political parties (Stimson, et al, 1995; Adams, et al 2004, 2006; Ezrow 2011). 
Figure 5.2 below uses data from the Ipsos Mori Political Monitor (1988-2006). This is a 
monthly survey that seeks to track changes in the salience of policy issues amongst UK 
public opinion. Survey participants are asked two questions; What would you say is the most 
important issue facing Britain today? and What do you see as other important issues facing 
Britain today? The answers to these questions from respondents are then combined to 
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produce a percentage of respondents identifying a given policy issue as an ‘important issue 
facing Britain today’. 
Figure 5.2 shows that between January 1992 and January 1997 the salience of European 
integration amongst the British public increased incrementally over this period, from 12% in 
January 1992 to 29% in January 1997. It was as low as 4% of respondents in February 1994 
and as high as 38% in December 1996. However, while Figure 5.2 shows that the salience of 
European integration fluctuated considerably during this period, the overall trend was 
towards higher saliency of European integration amongst the public over the course of this 
period. This is likely to be a response to the widespread media coverage of events such as the 
parliamentary ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the debate surrounding Britain and the 
single currency, as well as the conflict in the Conservative Party over European policy. This 
data is informative as it helps to put in context the environment the individual actors, who 
would become the policy-makers in the party after May 1997, experienced between 1992-
1997. This higher saliency amongst the public, combined with shift towards a public opinion 
which was more Eurosceptic, helps explain why individual actors within the Conservative 
Party could perceive a more coherent Eurosceptic European policy being a potential vote 
winner. 
Figure 5.2 suggests higher saliency in the 1997-2001 parliament, in which the saliency of 
European integration reached its highest point between 1992-2001 at 43%, than during the 
1992-1997 parliament. However, the trend between January 1997 and May 2001 itself is it 
actually towards lower saliency for European integration, especially after January 2000. This 
could be explained by the public focusing more on domestic issues, such as the economy and 
the public services, in the run up to the 2001 election. What is harder to explain using this 
data is the shift after June 1999, and in the period preceding the June 2001 general election 
and the campaign itself, by the Conservative Party leadership to focus heavily on Eurosceptic 
messages surrounding the single currency and opposition to future political integration. The 
trend in the saliency of European integration amongst the public is actually at some of its 
lowest points post-January 2000. This suggests the saliency of European integration amongst 
the public was not the main driver of this change in emphasis, and that other factors were 
more influential. 
Figure 5.3 provides data, also from Ipsos Mori, on public opinion and Britain joining the 
single currency. Respondents to the survey were asked; If there were a referendum now on 
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whether Britain should be part of a Single European Currency, how would you vote? This 
indicates that between November 1991 and June 2001 the public were consistently, and by a 
substantial margin, against Britain joining the single currency. This suggests that strong 
public hostility to the single currency could have been an influential factor in the 
Conservative Party adopting the ‘two parliaments’ policy on the single currency after May 
1997. As Nadler (2000:242) argues, it was ‘Hague’s gut instinct (and informed opinion) that 
his European line was the majority view.’ On the question of the single currency this was 
accurate at the time. 
 
An internal memorandum, circulated amongst the Conservative leadership in late 1997, 
indicates that public opinion on the single currency was an important factor in the party 
placing so much emphasis on the policy. The memorandum discusses focus group and survey 
data which indicated that the public shared the concerns of the Conservative Party with UK 
membership of the single currency. This, the memorandum argues, provides an important 
political opportunity for the Conservative Party (Private information): 
The fact that we are in tune with the overwhelming popular instinct on what is 
widely understood to be the single most important decision facing us in the 
years ahead gives us the chance to use the single currency as a means to draw 
people back to the Conservative Party. Crucial to this opportunity is the fact 
that most people do not know what our policy on the single currency is (or 
indeed the government’s). People do now know that their instincts on the single 
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currency are by and large the same as ours. Properly executed, the process of 
communicating this fact to them can play a major part in restoring our standing 
as a party which is to be taken seriously, which understands their concerns, 
which can – and does – speak on their behalf. 
 
This shows direct evidence that the Conservative Party leadership were influenced by public 
opinion, both of ‘lost’ Conservative voters and the wider general public, when considering 
the future direction of European policy. The influence, however, is to confirm to the party 
leadership that public opinion is closer to their policy position than to that of the Labour 
Party and that this should be emphasised as a ‘mobilising issue’ to re-build support for the 
Conservative Party lost since 1992. The content of the policy, the ‘two parliaments’ position, 
does not appear to be affected by, or the result of, the influence of public opinion. As a 
contributory factor its role is to confirm to the party that their overall position on European 
policy, and the single currency, is in tune with Conservative voters and the general public. 
The Conservative leadership believed that as surveys showed public opinion agreed with 
them on this issue, this indicated that the ‘two parliaments’ policy could be an electoral 
strength for the party in the elections to come (Bale, 2016). 
 
5.6 Domestic Political Context 
 
To fully understand changes made to Conservative European policy between 1997-2001, the 
domestic context in which this policy was formed must be considered. The domestic political 
context in which the Conservative Party existed as an institution in UK during this time, was 
one contributory factor that structured the preferences of individual actors and the decisions 
they made regarding European policy.  
Hague began his leadership of the Conservative Party in June 1997 with a perceived lack of 
authority from the party as a whole (Cooper, 2016; Collins, 2016). This is partly down to the 
circumstances surrounding Hague’s victory over Clarke in the third ballot of the 1997 
leadership election. Widdecombe (2016) argues that the result of the final ballot of MPs, in 
which European policy had been the ‘deciding factor’, was ‘actually quite close’. Hague was 
victorious in the final ballot with 92 votes (56.1%) to Clarke’s 70 votes (42.7%). While 
Heppell (2008:123) is entirely correct to suggest this was actually a ‘comfortable victory’, the 
perception in the party was that the victory over Clarke, and the pro-integration agenda he 
represented, was far from convincing. In the background, there was also the issue that, had 
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Portillo not been defeated at the 1997 election, he would have been expected to easily have 
won the leadership contest that year (Collins, 2016). This contributed to a perception within 
both the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary party that Hague lacked authority, with a 
leader-in-waiting (Portillo) ready to takeover. European policy, a perceived strength for 
Hague, therefore became an important policy area to focus on for Hague and his leadership 
team. As Cooper (2016) notes of the single currency question in the early part of the 1997-
2001 parliament: 
From 1997 to 1998 it was a dominant internal issue. It wasn't the highest 
priority as the party was in an unbelievable mess and from fairly early on in the 
Hague leadership was wobbly. One of the respects in which it was wobbly, 
aside that it didn't have much of an impact on the wider public, was that within 
the party he wasn't considered particularly strong which made this a very 
important issue. Then it was getting through to the European elections.  
 
Collins (2016) agrees that Hague lacked authority in this early period and that European 
policy, particularly the hardening of the Conservative position on the single currency, was a 
response aimed at correcting this problem: 
From the very start, there were some people who had question marks over the 
legitimacy of Hague’s leadership, because he was someone who hadn't been 
terribly well known in the country when he took over. He was seen as very 
young, he was kicked about very hard by the so-called Tory papers.... So, 
William’s position, though not by me, was always seen by some as provisional, 
slightly under threat. There was always the sense there were people out there 
who would be strong alternatives to William, who if they got back into 
Parliament or who had been in Parliament in 1997, would have won, and I 
think Portillo would have won very comfortably in 1997 if he had held his seat. 
So, all of that was part of William Hague’s attempt to entrench his leadership, 
to establish a direct relationship with the membership who had not had a ballot 
on whether he should have been leader or not. 
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This perception from inside the Conservative Party is matched by the public perceptions of 
Hague as a leader, in the early months of his leadership. As the Ipsos Mori data in Figure 5.4 
indicates, public perceptions of Hague fell dramatically between June and December 1997. 
While both Labour and Liberal Democrat leaders also saw their satisfaction ratings decline, 
the ratings for Hague remained poor throughout his leadership. 
In addition, as Figure 5.5 shows, the Conservative Party also experienced sustained periods in 
which voting intention data showed them a considerable distance away from the Labour 
Party, especially in the first three years. This political context created a structural 
environment which incentivised the Conservative leadership to use his perceived strengths on 
European policy to connect and establish a relationship with party members and the general 
public. 
 
Another element of the domestic political context during this period that encouraged Hague 
and the Conservative leadership to focus on European policy during this period was the fact 
that it was a policy area, unlike others such as the economy, crime, health, or education, in 
which the public considered the Conservative Party the most competent. Widdecombe (2016) 
suggests that this context during 1997-2001 was an important factor: 
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One of our biggest problems during that period of opposition - immediately 
after the first success Blair - Blair was on so much of our ground that we 
couldn't actually find things that really distinguished us, and Europe was that 
big opportunity. It was the big opportunity. It was the one area in which they 
are never going to come on to our ground. That was how we saw it at the time - 
he is never coming that far…. they were right on our territory and we had to 
find something that distinguished us. Europe was the big opportunity. That was 
a very big driving force. 
 
This perception is supported by quantitative evidence from Ipsos Mori’s ‘Best Party on Key 
Issues’ survey, which shows that for much of this period the public considered the 
Conservative Party the ‘best party’ for European policy. 
 
The domestic political context for the Conservative Party was therefore one in which they 
were also playing catch-up to their main political rivals, the Labour Party, in every respect 
apart from European policy in which the public perceived the Conservative Party to be the 
strongest party. With strong economic growth, the economy was effectively neutralised as an 
area in which the Conservative Party could stand out from Labour between 1997-2001 
(Nadler, 2015). As interviews with party elites indicate, the party leadership focused on this 
policy issue as one area in which ‘clear blue water’ could be placed between themselves and 
the Labour Party (see also Kelly, 2001). As result of this perceived strength, European policy 
was also focused on to enhance Hague’s authority both in parliament and the country. 
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5.7 International Political Context 
 
Another dimension to the structural environment in which the Conservative Party formed 
European policy was the international political context. Events and actions which took place 
in this environment, most specifically within the EU, would be interpreted and reacted to by 
policy-makers in the Conservative Party. This would then, potentially, influence the policy 
preferences and result in new or changed policies in response to a particular event or change 
in circumstances. The international political context could therefore act to directly influence 
the policies adopted. 
The international event which most directly produced change in Conservative European 
policy during this parliament was the scandal associated with Jacques Santer’s presidency of 
the European Commission (1995-1999). In December 1998 Paul Van Buitenen, an official in 
the Commission’s financial control unit, sent a report to the European Parliament alleging 
that fraud and corruption was widespread at the Commission. The scandal would lead to the 
resignation of the entire Commission on March 15th, 1999, after the publication of a highly 
critical report by an independent committee. A debate followed on the lack of powers the 
European Parliament and member states had to hold Commission officials accountable, in 
addition to the perceived culture of secrecy in the Commission itself (BBC, 1999; Craig, 
2000; Ringe, 2005). 
The Conservative Party used the scandal as a window of opportunity to propose wide-ranging 
reforms that would both reduce the Commission’s power and increase the scrutiny capacity 
of the European Parliament and national governments. Hague (1999), responding to the 
scandal in a newspaper article, announced a number of new policies: new British 
Commissioners must be scrutinised and confirmed by the House of Commons before taking 
office; an independent fraud office; a new code of conduct for Commission officials; a 
register of interests for Commission officials and new powers for the European Parliament to 
swiftly remove those Commissioners found to have abused their power. This was a direct 
response not only to the end of the scandal, but to a number of years of reports of financial 
mismanagement and poor accountability of officials at the Commission. 
The Conservative Party also used this as an opportunity to argue that the Commission was in 
turmoil was because it had too many responsibilities. As Hague (1999) stated, ‘Europe’s 
politicians in general, and our Prime Minister in particular, must acknowledge that this crisis 
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has been caused by a European Union whose reach is greater than its grasp…after this of all 
weeks, Europe should do less, not more’. This would mean reducing the powers and 
responsibilities of the Commission. To achieve this the Conservative Party proposed 
removing Commission responsibility over two areas, new regulation compliance costs 
analysis and the administration of competition policy. Each would be handed to new 
independent regulatory bodies. These policies were developed further in May 2001, with 
Francis Maude announcing that the Conservative Party would reduce the Commission to an 
‘impartial civil service’ with its right to initiate legislation reduced (Lynch, 2003). The 
shadow of corruption and mismanagement that surrounded the Santer Commission, and those 
events connected to it, provided the stimulus for these institutional reform policies to be 
introduced. 
A further international event of significance to European policy, immediately prior to this 
time period, was the result of the 1992 and 1993 Danish referendums on the Maastricht 
Treaty. Danish voters had initially voted ‘No’ to the Maastricht Treaty in a constitutionally 
required referendum on June 2nd 1992. This sent shock waves through the EU and member 
states, as all EU members had to ratify the treaty for it to come into legal effect. The EU and 
Danish government subsequently renegotiated a series of opt-outs - on the single currency, 
the Common Foreign and Defence Policy, Justice and Home Affairs, and EU citizenship – 
which was put to Danish voters in a second referendum on May 18th, 1993. This was 
approved with 56.7% voting in favour of the new deal. 
This event stimulated the renewed interest – and subsequent calls for such procedures with 
regards to the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties – for referendums in Conservative European 
policy, especially when concerning changes to the EU treaties. These referendums would 
then, in the presumption that they would be lost, lead to Britain renegotiating a new 
membership arrangement. Major, after initially resisting such an idea, conceded a referendum 
on the UK joining the single currency but did not formally agree to hold referendums on 
future EU treaties. This changed during the leadership of Hague. Collins (2016) argues that it 
was the Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty which stimulated an interest within the 
parliamentary and grassroots party for referendums on future treaty changes: 
 
By the time you come to Maastricht it may not have been such a massive issue 
had it not been for the result of the Danish referendum. Probably no one would 
have noticed that the ratification process in other states was different and some 
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member states were getting referendums. The fact that the Danes voted ‘No’ 
flagged up the fact that they were getting asked, and that the UK was holding 
the presidency of the EU in first half of 1993, so therefore John Major had to 
play a big role in sorting out what was going to happen. That then meant that 
people said 'Well, so the Danes get a say and get told that they have to have 
another go, but the Danes are going to be given special terms'. So, that sparked 
all that off. 
 
 
The change in policy over the use of referendums on EU treaties, can be traced back to the 
impact of the 1992 Danish ‘No’ vote on Conservative parliamentarians and members. 
Eurosceptic members of the Major Cabinet at the time of the Danish rejection, such as 
Howard, Lilley, Portillo – all who became leading members of the Hague Shadow Cabinet – 
saw this as an opportunity to ‘reject a treaty they had never liked and substitute it with a 
looser agreement with the EC’ (Seldon, 1998: 294). This, following the 1997 election, would 
become Conservative policy on the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. Those who had at the time 
failed to persuade Major in 1992 found Hague much more receptive to the ‘referendum and 
renegotiation’ policy response to future treaty changes. The influence of Margaret Thatcher, 
who had started calling for a referendum and renegotiation policy prior to the 1992 election, 
was also a factor, but it was the impact of the unexpected Danish ‘No’ vote which sparked 
future Conservative Party commitments to the referendum and renegotiation policy. 
In addition, the direction of European integration during this period was also moving in the 
opposite direction to Conservative European policy. The Amsterdam Treaty was a ‘revising 
rather than a pioneering treaty’ (Nugent, 2010:60) but it included the extension of QMV, a 
High Representative for foreign policy, in addition to elements of security policy coming into 
the remit of the EU for the first time (Nugent, 2010). The Treaty of Nice, initially regarded as 
a tidying up exercise for items not completed at Amsterdam, expanded qualified majority 
voting and EU competences in a number of areas. As Nugent (2010:63) rightly points out, 
these covered ‘relatively uncontentious and not very politically significant matters’. 
Lastly, the development and introduction of the European single currency between 1992 (the 
provisions for which were set out in the Maastricht Treaty) and 1999 created a new economic 
context for the European Union, with an inner Eurozone bloc and outer non-Eurozone group. 
This contributed further to a path towards closer political and economic integration which 
many EU nations and political parties, of both the left and right in Europe, saw as the future 
of European integration. This added further to the sense that Conservative European policy 
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and the mainstream consensus view of political opinion in the rest of Europe were heading 
towards very different destinations. 
The direction of travel, however incremental, was the EU integrating more and expanding 
into more policy areas. Conservative policy was that the EU should do less in fewer areas, 
concentrating mainly on full completion of the single market, removing international trade 
barriers and implementing competition law. Amsterdam and Nice were the first EU treaties in 
which the Conservative Party issued a three-line whip to oppose in the House of Commons 
(Lynch, 2003). This process ensured that European policy drifted in a Eurosceptic direction 
during this period, as the process of European integration and Conservative policy objectives 
continued to diverge. 
5.8 Pressure Groups 
 
During the 1997-2001 parliament, several pressure groups attempted to influence 
Conservative Party policy over European integration, with varying degrees of success. These 
groups operated from both the Eurosceptic and pro-integration wings of the party. Evidence 
suggests that activity by one pressure group, Conservative Mainstream, played an important 
role in shaping the implementation of ‘Operation Sunrise’, the September-October 1998 
referendum of Conservative members on the single currency. Conservative Mainstream was 
founded in 1996 as a Conservative pro-European pressure group. 
In a private memorandum circulated amongst the Conservative Party leadership in 1998, the 
activity of Conservative Mainstream is connected with the need to conduct a referendum of 
the party membership to confirm the ‘two parliaments’ policy on the single currency. The 
group was accused of organising a campaign of events for the 1998 party conference to show 
that many party members believed the single currency policy is only temporary (Private 
information). This challenge to party policy led to the implementation of Operation Sunrise, 
before the 1998 conference. This was to marginalise Conservative Mainstream, by 
demonstrating that the party membership endorsed the policy, reassert the leadership’s 
authority and ‘mark the unarguable resolution of the question of what the party’s policy on 
the single currency is or should be’ (Private information). It would also be a ‘unmistakably 
bold stroke of personal leadership’ from Hague to prove to these opponents that the 
membership supported him on this issue (Private information). 
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This evidence shows that activity from a Conservative pressure group did cause the party 
leadership to change policy and conduct the single currency policy referendum a number of 
years before they had originally planned to. The content of the policy did not change, but the 
timing and implementation did, as the leadership were worried that the party could be 
depicted as divided over European policy during a period in which they were trying to move 
on from the Maastricht/ERM crisis period. 
A second pressure group also attempted to influence European policy during this period. The 
Thatcherite pressure group Conservative Way Forward, founded in 1991 to promote the 
political principles of the Thatcher governments, has been argued to have played an 
influential role in trying to encourage Euroscepticism within the Conservative parliamentary 
party during the 1997-2001 parliament (Walters, 2001). This involved a campaign by 
activists to put pressure on local Conservative associations, mainly in safe or marginal seats, 
to select Eurosceptic candidates before the 2001 general election (Walters, 2001). An 
investigation carried out by Party Chairman Michael Ancram, indicated that many of these 
operations could be linked back to Conservative Way Forward activists (Walters, 2001). 
Walters (2001:131) suggests that ‘the operation at the 2001 election by a hardcore of right-
wing activists to make sure Eurosceptics got selected and Europhiles kept out was the most 
sophisticated – and successful – ever conducted inside the party’. Through this campaign 
Conservative Way Forward activists directly sought to influence the balance of opinion 
within the parliamentary party on European integration. 
Unlike the activity of Conservative Mainstream, which was focused on policy, the evidence 
suggests that Conservative Way Forward was mostly interested in influencing candidate 
selections. Conservative Mainstream, in collaboration with other pro-integration pressure 
groups, had the more immediate impact on European policy with the timing and 
implementation of Operation Sunrise. Conservative Way Forward can be seen as a more 
long-term strategy to incrementally create a more Eurosceptic parliamentary party. The 
impact of this is difficult to measure, and there is no evidence to suggest that the 
Conservative Way Forward strategy led directly to any policy changes itself. However, 
indirectly, an increasingly Eurosceptic parliamentary party after 2001 could in turn then put 
pressure on the decision-makers to guide European policy in a Eurosceptic direction. 
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5.9 Individual Political Actors 
 
 
 
5.9.1 Shadow Foreign Secretaries 
 
The first European policy change of the Hague leadership was the announcement that it 
would be party policy to oppose the Amsterdam Treaty and to call for a referendum to be 
held before it could be ratified by parliament. This was made less than two weeks into 
Hague’s leadership during his first major speech at the Scottish Conservative Party 
conference in Perth on June 27th, 1997 (BBC, 1998). Major had been successful in managing 
to delay any significant decisions on the new treaty until the June 1997 European Council 
summit, minimising divisions within the Conservative Party before the May general election 
(Seldon, 1998). While the 1997 Conservative manifesto did include opposition to further 
extensions of QMV, more powers for the European Parliament, and UK participation in the 
Working Time Directive, they did not include opposition to the treaty itself or a pledge to 
hold a referendum on the agreed text. It was instead implied that they would be opposed if 
the treaty resulted in significant institutional change. 
The action of an individual agent, Shadow Foreign Secretary Michael Howard, during the 
summer of 1997 is likely to have been a significant factor in convincing Hague that the 
Conservative Party should support a referendum on the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
While it is understandable that an openly Eurosceptic leader and Shadow Cabinet would have 
opposed the Amsterdam Treaty, it is less clear why Hague would have announced 
Conservative support for a referendum at this time. Heywel Williams (1998), former special 
advisor to John Redwood 1993-1997, suggests that it was Howard who encouraged Hague to 
support a referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty. That Howard continued to press for a 
referendum on the Amsterdam agreement during this period is also suggested by Crick 
(2005). Howard (1997a) confirmed the Conservative’s call for a referendum in an article in 
The Times on July 1st, 1997. In a report published by the Centre for Policy Studies on May 
8th, 1997, The Future of Europe, Howard (1997b) made clear that ‘The British people must 
have a final say over any decision taken at Amsterdam to reduce their right to govern 
themselves…that must not be allowed to happen without the explicit consent of the people, 
expressed through a referendum.’ This indicates that Howard considered calling for a 
referendum on the constitutional provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty a central policy option 
for the Conservative Party prior to his appointment as Shadow Foreign Secretary.  Combined 
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with the evidence above, it points to Howard’s influence as a policy entrepreneur in the new 
Shadow Cabinet as being the crucial factor in convincing Hague to call for a referendum on 
the Amsterdam Treaty as his first major European policy enouncement. 
 
5.9.2 Special Advisors 
As is the case with the leaders of most political parties, Hague had a group of advisors that 
worked closely with him. Hague has himself described Sebastian Coe (Chief of Staff), Tina 
Stowell (Deputy Chief of Staff), Daniel Finkelstein (Director of Policy) and George Osborne 
(Political Secretary) as his four closest advisors during this period (Hague 2016:44). Others 
included Archie Norman (Party Chief Executive), Andrew Cooper (Director of Strategy), 
Rick Nye (Director of Research), Amanda Platell (Head of Media 1999-2001) and Nick 
Wood (media advisor). Alan Duncan and John Whittingdale both acted as Hague’s 
Parliamentary Private Secretary during this period. 
As mentioned above, Hague himself had a very clear idea that European policy needed to 
progress in a Eurosceptic direction and that further European integration needed to be 
resisted. As such both Cooper (2016) and Widdecombe (2016) are both sceptical of the idea 
that these advisors had a significant influence on this policy area, as Hague himself had 
strong convictions for where he wanted the Conservative Party to be on European policy. 
Widdecombe (2016) suggests that it was Coe and Finkelstein who ‘wielded the most 
influence over his thinking’, but there is no evidence that this included European policy. 
Amanda Platell, who joined as Head of Media in 1999, and her media colleague Nick Wood, 
were influential with regards to getting Hague to focus his energy on ‘core vote’ issues, 
specifically the ‘two parliaments’ policy on the single currency (Cooper, 2016). This was 
especially true after the 1999 European elections, in which the single currency pledge was 
perceived to have been so influential to the result (Cooper, 2016). Andrew Lansley and Tim 
Collins were both key to the emphasis placed on the single currency at the 2001 election, as 
both had been advisors to Hague during the 1999 European elections (Walters, 2001). This 
influence appears to have extended only to emphasising and communicating aspects of 
European policy they perceived to be electoral winners for Hague and the party, rather than 
influencing the content of policy itself. 
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5.9.3 The Leader 
It can be argued that the main factor, when considering European policy change in the 
Conservative Party during this period, comes down to the importance of the individual 
agency of the leader, as opposed to institutional or structural factors. Hague himself, as the 
leader and the chief policy maker in the Conservative Party, was fundamentally more 
Eurosceptic that Major. Nadler states that while at the time he was publicly supportive of 
Major during the Maastricht negotiations, privately he was much more Eurosceptic when 
discussing European policy during Cabinet meetings and in conservations with Major himself 
(Nadler, 2000). This is supported by others close to Hague (Cooper, 2016). Mackay (2016) 
states that at this time ‘William had strong Eurosceptic views without being what I would call 
pointy headed’. Edward Macmillan-Scott (2016), leader of the Conservative MEPs 1997-
2001, supports this view suggesting that Hague was ‘initially…seen as Eurosceptic, but not a 
fanatic’. Free from the constraints of collective Cabinet responsibility after the 1997 election, 
Hague indicated during the leadership campaign that European integration had reached its 
limits. Writing in the Daily Telegraph Hague (1997) stated that: 
 
It is our role to show a line can be drawn in the transfer of sovereignty to 
elsewhere, that we can be in Europe, yet not run by Europe, and that we will 
fight a government that sells off our sovereignty for the sake of happy summit 
photo-calls. 
 
 
The evidence suggests that Hague had strong Eurosceptic convictions when he became leader 
in June 1997 and maintained this, with the support of colleagues in the Shadow Cabinet, 
throughout his leadership. As Cooper (2016) makes clear, Hague was resistant to those 
individuals who wanted a more moderate approach: 
 
He had a very clear view. But he was leader, so he listened to people around 
him. Not everyone around him agreed with him. Osborne, who was his political 
secretary, was very uneasy about going too far on it and favoured a more 
moderate position. Seb Coe, who was closest to him and his immediate team 
was constantly trying to pull him back into a centrist position and didn't like 'In 
Europe, Not Run by Europe'. Quite often William would say 'In Europe, Not 
Run by Europe' but also 'In Europe, not taken over by Europe'. That really used 
to annoy Seb. He used to push back against that quite a lot. More of the voices 
in the Shadow Cabinet were the other way, whose own view had been a more 
robust view pre-1997 and it was mostly the same characters that had been in 
the government. So, you had people like Howard, Portillo, Lilley. Lidington 
was William's PPS, he had a much more centrist view. But most people were 
comfortable with taking a more Eurosceptic position. 
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Widdecombe (2016) supports this view that the individual agency and Eurosceptic conviction 
of Hague, as leader, was one of the most important factors in changing European policy 
during this period: 
 
I don't think that William ever thought 'How do we position the party?' I think 
that he knew. Don't forget the Clarke/Hague election had essentially been about 
Europe…William knew what he wanted, and he wanted a Eurosceptic party… 
He ran the show on that basis. So, I think that he looked at the agony of the 
Maastricht years and the fact that John Major had, as far as he could, tried to 
accommodate everyone and it simply didn't work. William just took the line 
that he knew accorded with most people in the party, if not with all his MPs, 
and promoted that. So, when you say 'he was trying to position this, he was 
trying to position that' he actually had a very firm view from the start. 
 
As Holmes (1998) points out, Hague’s soft Eurosceptic instincts worked ‘with, rather than 
against, the grain’ of opinion on European policy within the parliamentary party and 
grassroots. This confidence that Hague’s attitude towards European integration was inline 
with party opinion enabled him to construct a European policy and a Shadow Cabinet that 
reflected his own convictions, without fear that this would cause significant conflict in the 
party. Because of this Hague was resistant to senior pro-integration MPs such as Clarke and 
Heseltine because he believed they were in the minority, not him, on European policy 
(Holmes, 1998). Change in European policy during this period – on the Amsterdam Treaty, 
the single currency, Operation Sunrise, the flexibility clause, the reserved powers provision – 
fundamentally took place because the Conservative Party now had a soft Eurosceptic leader 
who believed that the UKs relationship with the EU needed to be extensively reformed, and 
that further integration needed to be resisted on principle. A Conservative leader more 
sympathetic to European integration, or more supportive of the EU status quo, would not 
have made the changes to Conservative European policy as Hague did as leader between 
1997-2001. The Eurosceptic instincts of Hague were therefore central to driving this process 
of policy change. 
 
5.10 Media 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the academic evidence for the media influencing the policy 
change in political parties is mixed. Collins (2016) notes that there was an understanding 
within the elite circles of the Conservative Party that European policy had drifted away from 
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the Eurosceptic attitudes of the Daily Mail and The Sun who they needed to gain the support 
of if they were ever going to return to government. However, this is more to do with the 
growing Eurosceptic attitude of the general public, as shown previously in this chapter. 
Newspaper editors and owners are more likely than not responding, in part, to this trend in 
public opinion during the 1990’s in much the same way the Conservative party elites were. 
Collins (2016) also suggests that the media was influential in encouraging Hague to announce 
a referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty. The content of the policy, opposing a new EU treaty 
on principle, would likely be picked up by Eurosceptic newspapers during a time in which 
Hague and the Conservative Party were struggling for national media attention: 
 
Particularly in the early part of his leadership William was very conscious of 
the fact that he was getting very little publicity for what he was trying to do, so 
he was thrashing around a bit to find something that was newsworthy to say. 
Which doesn't at all mean that he had come up with the idea believing that it 
was the wrong idea, but more that it was produced for a headline at a particular 
time. 
 
Or, in other words, the content of the policy had already been decided but the timing of the 
announcement was in part influenced by a lack of media coverage during the early months of 
the 1997 parliament. A Eurosceptic policy announcement such as this would likely attract the 
attention of the media and start connecting Hague with voters. Overall, during this period, the 
evidence suggests that while the need for media coverage at certain points in time might have 
encouraged the announcement of policies, there is little evidence the media influenced 
Conservative policy makers to specifically change the content of policy. At most the 
Eurosceptic positions of newspapers such as The Times, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail and The 
Sun provided an additional Eurosceptic structural element to the political environment 
experienced by Conservative Party elites during the 1997-2001 parliament. 
5.11 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has shown how Conservative Party European policy changed and developed 
during the 1997-2001 parliament, using a thematic structure and guided by the new 
institutional framework. It has drawn upon the themes from the party change literature and 
the new institutionalist framework (historical legacy, individual agency, critical junctures, 
path dependency, internal and external institutions, the structural environment) established in 
 136 
chapters 2 and 3, in addition to new insights from elite interviews. This concluding section 
will set out how each policy change has been explained, any limitations to this explanation, 
how it adds to the existing literature on this topic, and how the new institutionalist framework 
has enhanced the explanation beyond existing accounts. 
Firstly, the change which defined this period was the ‘two parliaments’ policy on the single 
currency, was the result of a combination of factors. The historical legacy of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the ERM crisis, created an incentive for Hague to change policy on the single 
currency to a more Eurosceptic position in order to avoid future conflict. The historical 
legacy of policy ideas from the Major era, ‘the wait and see’ position, also constrained Hague 
from ruling the single currency out completely for the same reasons. As a result, in the 
competitive environment of the 1997 leadership election, Hague established a triangulated 
position to win the leadership that could appeal to Eurosceptics and the remaining pro-
integrationists. The individual agency and Euroscepticism of Hague was also a key factor, as 
this chapter has set out, in driving through a more Eurosceptic position on the single 
currency. 
Individual agents, specifically the Shadow Foreign Secretaries Howard and Maude, appear to 
have been crucial individuals in some specific policy changes. Howard was key to the 
decision to propose a referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty, and Maude appears to have been 
directly responsible for the ‘reserved powers’ proposal. It was unfortunately not possible to 
interview Francis Maude for this thesis, but it does appear that he was the individual most 
responsible for this policy change (Maude, 2000). The origins of the ‘flexibility clause’ can 
be traced directly to the historical legacy of policy ideas from the Major era, in which the 
concept was established, and is a key example of historical ideas influencing future policy 
decisions. 
Operation Sunrise, the membership ballot on the ‘two parliaments’ single currency, was 
stimulated by the domestic political context of Hague’s lack of authority during the early 
stages of the parliament, with the timing of the ballot the direct result of activity by pro-
integration party pressure groups at the 1998 party conference. The international political 
context, both in terms of the Santer Commission scandal and the move to further European 
integration in the EU, provided a window of opportunity for the party to propose Eurosceptic 
reform policies designed to decrease the power of EU institutions. 
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The 1997 general election was a critical juncture for the party with regards to European 
policy. As this chapter has established, many in the party blamed the success of the 
Referendum Party on an insufficiently Eurosceptic policy, which created pressure on the 
leadership to move in this direction. After the 1997 election, a majority of the parliamentary 
party, Shadow Cabinet, party membership, in addition to the leader himself, were now 
Eurosceptic for the first time. This ideological composition of the internal institutions of the 
party corresponded with increasing public Eurosceptic attitudes in the external structural 
environment. This created a path dependency which incentivised European policy to move in 
a Eurosceptic direction, with positive feedback from internal and external institutions to the 
changing content of policy reinforcing this path as time progressed. This combined with 
Hague, as a Eurosceptic party leader and main policy-maker, to provide the necessary 
conditions for policy to change. 
This chapter has contributed a broader and more in-depth empirical and theoretical analysis 
of the development of European policy during this period than the current Conservative Party 
literature, which has tended to credit changing policy to only a limited range of factors, such 
as rising levels of Euroscepticism in the party and public opinion. The application of the new 
institutionalist approach, as set out in Chapter Three, has enabled this chapter to consider the 
institutional, structural, individual, historical, and ideational factors working as part of this 
process of change. As such, it provides a richer and more detailed explanation of change. 
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Chapter 6: Duncan-Smith to Howard - Policy Change and Europe, 2001-
2005 
 
This chapter seeks to explain the development of European policy within the Conservative 
Party during the 2001-2005 parliament, under the leaderships of Iain Duncan Smith (2001-
2003) and Michael Howard (2003-2005). It takes as its starting point the immediate aftermath 
of the Conservative Party’ defeat at the June 2001 general election and concludes at the end 
of the subsequent parliament, just before the May 2005 general election. 
As chapter 4 indicated, there was some continuity in the general framework of European 
policy between the Hague, Duncan Smith, and Howard leaderships.  The Conservative Party 
continued to oppose further political integration, such as increases in the supranational 
powers for EU institutions, new policy competences for the EU or changes to the number of 
EU policy areas subject to qualified majority voting in the EU Council of Ministers. In 
addition, both the Duncan Smith and Howard leaderships opposed ratification of the Nice 
Treaty and Constitutional Treaty, calling for national referendums before ratification in both 
cases, in which the party would campaign to reject both treaties. 
The changes that this chapter will seek to explain include the movement to unconditional 
opposition to the single currency; the support, then opposition, towards the EAW after 9/11; 
changes to the Conservative Party’ relationship with the European Peoples’ Party-European 
Democrats grouping in the European Parliament; repatriation of EU policy competences, 
such as the social and employment policy; the move to an annual limit on immigration, in 
addition to a collection of smaller policy changes focused around institutional and procedural 
changes to the functioning of the EU, such as on enhancing the role of national parliaments in 
the EU decision-making process. 
 
6.1 Historical Legacies 
 
 
6.1.1 Hague and European Policy, 1997-2001 
 
The historical legacy of the Hague approach to European policy had a direct impact on the 
thinking of the Conservative leadership in the aftermath of the 2001 general election. 
Although it was acknowledged that Hague had developed a more Eurosceptic position with 
which the Conservative Party was comfortable, Duncan Smith believed that the policy 
platform was ‘intellectually incoherent’ (Heppell, 2015: 369). This was especially true of the 
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‘two parliaments’ policy on the single currency. Hague had also failed to prevent conflict on 
the European issue within the Conservative Party during the 1997-2001 parliament. As Iain 
Duncan Smith, Conservative Party leader September 2001 - November 2003, explained when 
interviewed: 
When I took over as leader I wanted it [the single currency policy] to end 
because it didn't end the arguments in the party. They went on and on. It got 
bad under William. So, I said that the only way to end this is to accept the fact 
that the Conservative Party will not, if in government, ever take the UK into the 
single currency. That was the bubbling issue at the time. It was really the flag at 
the top of the flag pole in terms of European policy, although it was only a tiny 
part of the whole European issue, but it was a critical issue. So, I then launched 
my campaign on the basis that we would never join. I was roundly assailed by 
what I call the so-called intelligent media who said, 'You can't say never!', 
'Why have you said never?', and I said well you can say never because I know 
that if I'm leader, or if I was to become PM, I would never do it…it is just not 
right for the UK. 
 
It was this legacy of ‘incoherence’ on the single currency that convinced Duncan Smith that 
policy on the single currency needed to change from ruling out membership for ‘two 
parliaments’, to ruling out entry forever, whatever the circumstances (Eastham, 2001). As the 
quote above indicates, Duncan Smith’s decision was influenced by pragmatism as much as 
by his Eurosceptic principles (Heppell, 2014). The need to lower the saliency of European 
policy within the party was crucial, as the party wanted to talk about other policy areas, such 
as health and education, and to prevent the issue dominating coverage of the party in the 
media (Crowson, 2006). This view was supported by other senior members of the 
parliamentary party3. The historical legacy of European policy during the Hague years, as 
interpreted by Duncan Smith himself and others like Chief Whip David Maclean, therefore 
contributed directly to the change of policy on the single currency. As set out in the new 
institutionalist approach in Chapter 3, the historical legacy of past events had direct influence 
on future policy change in this case. 
6.1.2 The 2001 General Election 
During the Conservative’s 2001 general election campaign the question of European policy 
was a constant feature (Butler and Kavanagh, 2002). Interventions by Thatcher, her 
commitment to ‘never’ accept the single currency, and ‘leaked’ documents from the 
European Commission on plans for EU tax harmonisation, ensured that Europe was never far 
                                                 
3 See Spicer (2012:465) diary entry for October 8th, 2001, in which he meets the new Chief Whip David 
Maclean: ‘Maclean wants to suppress everything European’. 
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from the headlines (Jones, 2001). The ‘Keep the £’ campaign was a central theme of the 
Conservative campaign (Butler and Kavanagh, 2002). Despite preliminary hopes that the 
question of the single currency and Europe would attract voters towards Conservative 
candidates, the Conservative campaign team played down European policy in the last week 
of the campaign as it became clear it was not appealing to marginal voters and those who had 
backed the Labour Party in 1997. This was a change from the original campaign strategy, in 
which the party had planned to push hard on Europe until election day (Butler and Kavanagh, 
2002). The 2001 general election was another defeat for the party. The Conservative Party 
gained only a single seat. The share of the vote, 31.7%, was only 1% greater than it had 
achieved at the previous election. On a low turnout of 59%, the Conservative’s total votes 
had decreased by 1.2 million to 8.3 million (Heppell, 2014). The academic consensus is that 
campaigning on opposing more European integration, channelled through high profile 
opposition to the UK joining the single currency, was ineffective in attracting ‘swing’ voters 
away from Labour in 2001 (Collings and Seldon, 2001; Geddes, 2002). 
The chief campaign organisers, Andrew Lansley and Tim Collins, were adamant that the 
focus on the single currency was the best available electoral strategy for the party in the 
circumstances (Lansley and Collins, 2001). Lansley and Collins’ reasoning was that Labour 
were dominant in policy areas such as the economy and public services, and therefore the 
campaign had to focus on subjects in which the Conservative Party had the strongest policies 
in the eyes of the public. Many in the parliamentary and grassroots sections of the party 
disagreed. They believed that the focus on European policy, at the expense of other policy 
areas, during the campaign ‘directly’ contributed to the scale of the defeat (Alderman and 
Carter, 2002:570). The key impact from the 2001 general election campaign for many in the 
subsequent leadership teams, Duncan Smith and Howard, was to discredit the idea that a 
focus on European policy could deliver success at a general election. The party needed a 
settled, coherent position from which they could then spend more time on developing new 
policies for the public services and the economy. As Michael Ancram, Shadow Foreign 
Secretary 2001-2005, explained when interviewed: 
…in the last week of that 2001 campaign we majored very much on 'Save the 
Pound'. Which didn't shift the polls one iota. I think that after the election there 
was a feeling that there is no point going on screaming and shouting about 
Euroscepticism in that format because that it didn't have any effect politically. 
Then we saw, almost as a counter-reaction to this, the Labour Party losing 
interest in it. 
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Ancram (2016) also explained that the impact of the 2001 general election defeat on 
European policy was to convince the party leadership that this was not the answer to 
expanding Conservative support in future general elections. Voters in marginal constituencies 
had not been persuaded to shift their support from Labour to the Conservative Party. This 
shift away from the single currency moved the focus onto other areas of European policy 
during the 2001-2005 parliament: 
I don't think that it did consciously, I think it did so unconsciously. There we had been, the 
great party trying to save the country from the dreaded Euro, and the country didn't seem 
to want to be saved from the Euro. So, there was no point banging on about it, to use 
Cameron’s famous phrase. So, we began to concentrate much more on the development of 
Europe, the position Europe was taking on various issues. 
 
The impact, therefore, of the 2001 general election on European policy during this period was 
threefold. Firstly, it contributed to Duncan Smith’s belief that a definitive party position on 
single currency membership was needed for Conservative European policy to have any 
credibility with the pubic (Duncan Smith, 2016). Secondly, it convinced the party leadership 
that a parliament and general election campaign in which European policy was a central 
theme would not be electorally successful (Ancram, 2016; Duncan Smith, 2016). The focus 
would instead turn to developing policy to improve public services and the economy. Thirdly, 
it saw a shift away from the question of the single currency and towards policies associated 
with constitutional change in the European Union, such as increasing the role for national 
parliaments in the EU policy-making process. 
 
6.2 Ideological Composition of the Conservative Party 
 
6.2.1 Parliamentary Party 2001-2005 
Analysis of the 2001 Conservative Party leadership election allows us to determine the 
ideological composition of the parliamentary party on European policy. This leadership 
election was, as it had been in 1997, dominated by tensions over the Conservative Party 
position on the single currency and the direction of European policy in general (Fowler, 
2008). Duncan Smith used his reputation as a Eurosceptic, and history as a leading 
parliamentary opponent of the Maastricht Treaty, to win the support of both Eurosceptic 
colleagues in parliament and party activists in the final membership ballot (Alderman and 
Carter, 2002; Heathcoat-Amory, 2012). Alderman and Carter (2002:584) suggest that the 
 142 
2001 leadership contest ‘underlined the supremacy of the Eurosceptics in the parliamentary 
party’, as the leading pro-integration candidate received only 36 first round votes in the 
parliamentary ballot, in comparison to 49 during the 1997 contest (Ken Clarke was the 
candidate on both occasions). 
Heppell and Hill (2010:50), using the same attitudinal mapping methodology discussed in the 
previous chapter, determine that at the time of the 2001 leadership contest the parliamentary 
party consisted of 149 (89.8%) ‘Eurosceptic’, 8 (4.8%) ‘Europhile’, and 9 (5.4%) ‘Agnostic’ 
members. The comparative figures for 1997 are 139 (84.8%) ‘Eurosceptic’, 14 (8.5%) 
‘Europhile’, and 11 (6.7%) ‘Agnostic’. This indicates that both in numbers, and 
proportionally, the parliamentary party was becoming more Eurosceptic. The pro-integration 
element of the parliamentary party had also diminished in comparison to the 1997 
composition. The change is steady, rather than dramatic, but this must be placed in context 
with the substantial change observed between the 1992 and 1997 parliaments. Thus, it is 
difficult to attribute much direct causal influence for this change on the development of 
European policy under Duncan Smith and Howard, as the increase in the Eurosceptic 
composition of the parliamentary party is small. The influence on policy of this dramatic 
change in opinion during the 1992-1997 parliament had predominantly been ‘spent’ during 
the 1997-2001 parliament under Hague, in which European policy had moved in a 
distinctively soft Eurosceptic direction. As such changes in policy as a direct or indirect result 
were unlikely. It did ensure, however, that any major changes in policy in a more pro-
integration direction were just as likely to be strongly resisted by the parliamentary party. 
With one committed Eurosceptic leader (Duncan Smith) taking over from another (Hague), 
this was also unlikely. 
During the Duncan Smith leadership period, there was pressure from some Eurosceptic MPs 
to focus more heavily on European policy4. This was largely because a number of his 
Eurosceptic colleagues expected Duncan Smith, as a former Maastricht rebel, to take a high-
profile stance on the issue. Theresa May, then a Shadow Cabinet member, recalls that many 
Conservative MPs had supported Duncan Smith during the leadership election because of his 
Eurosceptic reputation and were subsequently disappointed when more focus was not placed 
on the issue when he became party leader (May, as cited in Hayton and Heppell, 2010:429). 
                                                 
4 John Redwood, for example, was one prominent Eurosceptic who disagreed with this approach. 
See ‘Redwood: Europe is our trump card’, Daily Mail, Tuesday, October 09, 2001; pg. 34-35. 
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Duncan Smith (2016) recalls this pressure, but also his view that, as party leader, he was 
determined to focus on other policy areas: 
Everyone knew what our opinion was, saying never to the single currency 
allowed us to be very clear about that. I said that I wanted us to re-focus on 
domestic issues. It was the beginning of my travels to Easterhouse and 
Gallowgate and to various other parts of the UK. Also, where I started 
travelling around Europe looking at different health services. I wanted the 
Conservative Party across these domestic issues and not Europe. So, for the 
first year or so of my leadership I deliberately did not talk about Europe and did 
not want to talk about Europe. For quite a while I got a lot of criticism from 
Eurosceptics who wanted us to go on about Europe and I said I don't want to do 
it. So, I didn't actually say anything about Europe. 
 
Ancram (2016), who was a leading member of both the Duncan Smith and Howard Shadow 
Cabinets, suggests that apart from a persistent few, the parliamentary party did not lobby the 
party leadership much on European policy during this period: 
There was the unavoidable Bill Cash. He raised it on every single possible 
occasion. He was very persistent. So, there were those in the party but in a 
sense, they were on the outside edges. I think most of the party had been 
reasonably comfortable with where IDS first, and then Howard, were trying to 
place the party. Europe was not an issue in the 2005 election. 
 
This would suggest that European policy was of relatively low saliency in the Conservative 
parliamentary party during the 2001-2005 parliament, with other factors contributing more to 
the direction of European policy during this time. Howard was assisted in maintaining 
discipline in the parliamentary party by the expectation of a general election in 2005. This 
focused the minds of MPs on party loyalty and a successful result at the election, as opposed 
to questioning the content and prominence of Europe. In addition, Howard was also assisted 
by the deeply troubled leadership period under Duncan Smith. Conservative MPs were 
willing to give Howard considerable space, and the benefit of the doubt in many policy areas 
such as European integration, to take the party forward to the 2005 election in a competent 
manner. They were desperate to move on from the Duncan Smith leadership and the disunity 
this had displayed to the public. This gave Howard an advantage in maintaining discipline in 
the parliamentary party and protected him from policy confrontation in some areas, including 
Europe. The parliamentary party was thus a less significant factor during the 2001-2005 
parliament than in the previous parliament. 
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6.2.2 Shadow Cabinet 2001-2005 
 
The first Duncan Smith Shadow Cabinet in September 2001 ‘leaned heavily to the 
Eurosceptic right’ (Ball and Seldon, 2005:259). Using the Heppell and Hill (2005) 
ideological categorisations we can estimate the composition of the Shadow Cabinet as 19 
(86.3%) ‘Eurosceptic’, 1 (4.5%) ‘Europhile’, and 2 (9.1%) ‘Agnostic’. Ancram and Howard, 
both prominent Eurosceptics, were installed as Shadow Foreign Secretary and Shadow 
Chancellor, respectively. Other notable Eurosceptics included Bernard Jenkin, Eric Forth, 
and John Whittingdale. Bill Cash was appointed Shadow Attorney General, though remained 
outside the Shadow Cabinet. The number of Eurosceptics in the Shadow Cabinet are likely 
due to Duncan Smith being a prominent Eurosceptic himself, personal connections to fellow 
Maastricht rebels (Cash, Jenkin, Winterton, and Whittingdale) and the fact that a number 
entered parliament at the same election as him (Jenkin and Whittingdale). Quentin Davies 
was the sole pro-integration member.  
Given Duncan Smith’s brief tenure there was only one significant reshuffle, in July 2003, 
when the Shadow Cabinet was expanded. The ideological composition remained relatively 
unchanged with 21 (87.5%) Eurosceptics, 1 ‘Europhile’ (4.1%) and 2 ‘Agnostics’ (8.4%). 
Howard introduced a smaller Shadow Cabinet, reducing its size from twenty-four to eleven. 
Proportionally it was less Eurosceptic than the first Duncan Smith Cabinet, with 9 (81.8%) 
‘Eurosceptics’, 1 (9.1%) ‘Agnostic’, 1 (9.1%) ‘Europhile’, becoming more Eurosceptic 
(90.9%) in when the sole pro-integration member, David Curry, resigned from the Shadow 
Cabinet in March 2004. 
Despite the majority Eurosceptic composition of both the Duncan Smith and Howard Shadow 
Cabinets, minus Tim Yeo and a token pro-integration member, there is not much evidence to 
suggest that the Shadow Cabinet played an important role in influencing European policy 
during this period, as an institution itself. This is likely because both party leaders had solid 
reputations as strong Eurosceptics in the parliamentary party and were therefore more trusted 
to maintain a Eurosceptic European policy than Cameron would be later, and Hague had been 
earlier, due to their lack of association with this policy area. Duncan Smith and Howard both 
had a history of resisting closer European integration during the 1992-1997 parliament. 
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This reflected the low saliency of the issue in the parliamentary party during this parliament. 
Mark MacGregor, Chief Executive Officer of CCHQ 2002-2003 and Conservative 
parliamentary candidate 1997-2005, says the Shadow Cabinet under Duncan Smith was 
supportive of his European policy position:  
It is surprising that there were people in the Shadow Cabinet - take David 
Maclean - who was Chief Whip, strong Eurosceptic - but became absolutely 
persuaded that the way the Tories had to revive themselves was not talking 
about Europe. So once the more intelligent people got into the Shadow Cabinet 
you are presented with polling. You can do one of two things.  You can say 'Oh 
I think we can ignore that and wait until the public moves to us' or you should 
recognise the logic of the case that other people are making. Lots of people 
who were strong Eurosceptics said 'Completely get it. We need to have a policy 
on this. I'm not going to change my mind on this, but I am going to focus on 
other issues’. So, people like David Maclean became very strong advocates 
within the party to stick by that new approach. 
 
As the above quotation suggests, the fact that the Eurosceptics had some of their ‘senior 
representatives’ in the Shadow Cabinet actually meant the partly leadership faced less 
difficultly with the parliamentary party over European policy during the Duncan Smith 
leadership period, not more. As the Eurosceptics had their ideological soulmates on the 
‘inside’, they could be more confident policy would stick to a strongly Eurosceptic path. 
This continued during the change of leadership to Howard in November 2003, who continued 
the Duncan Smith strategy of maintaining the soft Eurosceptic direction of European policy, 
as inherited from Hague, while focusing in public on other policy issues like health, crime, 
and education (Hayton, 2012:70). Prominent Eurosceptics were still uneasy about the 
downgrading of European policy, as Spicer (2012:518) records in his diary. Owen Paterson 
was also, like Spicer, privately not happy about European policy being side-lined (Spicer, 
2012:526). This, however, does not seem to have deterred the Conservative leadership team. 
As Stephen Sherbourne (2016), Chief of Staff to Michael Howard 2003-2005, explained 
when interviewed: 
Very simply, Michael’s position was that he wanted to close down the debate 
while he was leader. So as not to get the party into a state of division or 
distraction. As I recall he managed to do this quite effectively. I don't think that 
the party was obsessed with the issue publicly while he was leader and managed 
to close down the debate to a very large extent. He made one major speech on 
Europe which was all about variable geometry that was designed to make sure 
that he had a definitive statement of policy. But by and large we didn't want to 
have a debate about it because we thought that it was a distraction from the main 
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issues that we wanted to fight on. We didn't want to run the risk of divisions in 
the party. 
 
6.2.3 Euroscepticism and Conservative Party Members 2001-2005 
 
The development of Euroscepticism in the Conservative membership during this period, and 
the potential impact it had on the direction of European policy, is difficult to ascertain as 
there are no academic sources of information on which to draw.  A potential proxy, if not an 
entirely satisfactory one, is to use the result of the 2001 Conservative leadership election 
members ballot, as this was between two candidates with distinctive Eurosceptic (Duncan 
Smith) and pro-integration (Clarke) positions on European policy. In this ballot turnout was 
79% and 256, 797 votes were cast. Duncan Smith received 155,933 votes (60.7%) and Clarke 
100,864 (39.3%). In a leadership election campaign dominated by discussions about the 
single currency and Europe, it is likely that many votes were cast reflecting the members’ 
views on European integration. However, this is likely to be underestimating the level of 
Euroscepticism amongst the party membership. As we know from the parliamentary ballot in 
the 2001 leadership election, Duncan Smith drew his support exclusively from Eurosceptic 
members, while Clarke attracted some Eurosceptic support, in addition to the pro-integration 
wing of the parliamentary party (Heppell and Hill, 2010). Using the membership ballot data 
could therefore give a slightly distorted picture. Nonetheless, it does give an indication that 
the party membership remained strongly Eurosceptic in late 2001. 
Evidence from elite interviews suggests that Euroscepticism in the membership of the party 
was impacting on those candidates being selected to contest parliamentary elections. Mark 
MacGregor was a parliamentary candidate at the 1997, 2001, and 2005 general elections and 
suggests Euroscepticism in the membership did contribute towards more Eurosceptic 
parliamentary candidates being selected: 
It [Euroscepticism] was built into the DNA [of the party membership]. So, if 
you wanted to get selected as a candidate… if you expressed a 'Europe’s not all 
bad' attitude - if you said that - forget that, you just weren't going to get 
selected…it’s part of the DNA of the Tory Party. People who were 
Eurosceptics selected Eurosceptic candidates. 
 
This was not the case with every Conservative association, however. Some were less likely to 
consider a candidate’s ‘Euroscepticism’ as a significant factor in the selection process. James 
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Wharton, Conservative MP for Stockton South 2010-2017, told me when asked whether 
Eurosceptic credentials were required to be selected as a candidate: 
No. It might be now… I remember in… before the 2005 election, so it would 
have been in about 2003-2004. I was the chairman of my local association in 
Stockton and we did the selection, the selection for Stockton South. No one 
asked about Europe. One person suggested asking about Europe... that was at a 
time when it was starting to exist as an issue. It doesn't mean there weren't lots 
of Eurosceptics around but in my association, it was a bit of a non-issue. Yet if 
you had read the media even then it was a Eurosceptic party etc. etc., so I think 
it became self-fulfilling. 
 
This suggests that the picture is more complicated than simply rising Eurosceptic attitudes 
leading automatically to more Eurosceptic candidates and then MPs, and that the degree of 
influence will have varied between different associations in different parts of the country. 
One indication of party membership opinion on European policy can be determined from a 
survey of constituency association chairman conducted by The Times in March 2002. In 
response to media reports that Thatcher now advocated the leaving the EU, 71 of 100 
constituency association chairmen disagreed with Thatcher and believed the UK should 
remain in the EU (Lister, et al, 2002). This is an indication that while the party membership 
might have accepted soft-Euroscepticism, there was still a clear majority that had not 
accepted hard-Euroscepticism, at this stage. Overall there is little evidence, from elite 
interviews or other sources, to suggest that the party membership was a significant 
contributory factor on European policy in the 2001-2005 parliament. The low saliency 
experienced by the parliamentary party also extended to the party membership, who 
maintained their Eurosceptic attitudes but wanted the party leadership to focus on other 
political issues. 
 
 
6.3 Rival Political Parties 
 
6.3.1 UKIP and the 2004 European Elections 
The 2001-2005 parliament saw the gradual emergence of the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP) as a serious force in the UK political system with the potential to provide 
serious competition for the Conservative Party (Usherwood, 2008, 2014, 2016). Their 
influence at the 2001 general election was limited, lacking the impact the Referendum Party 
had made at the 1997 general election. On average, support for the Conservative Party was 
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only 1.6% lower in seats where either UKIP itself, or the Referendum Party, had stood 
previously, with the most significant falls in areas with the most Eurosceptic voters in 1997 
(Ford and Goodwin, 2014:40). Despite this poor performance, there is evidence to suggest 
that Conservative Party were concerned about UKIP even at this early stage. Bale (2016:118) 
notes that Conservative strategists were worried enough about the impact of UKIP in key 
marginal seats that they tried to persuade local UKIP parties to not contest those seats which 
had Eurosceptic Conservative candidates. This impact, however, was still only at the fringes 
and does not appear to have been a major subject in the 2001 leadership election, or for the 
Duncan Smith leadership team afterwards 
The most important electoral breakthrough for UKIP, at this point in time, was the 2004 
European elections. When the election was over the results for UKIP were ‘by far the best set 
of results in their brief history’ (Ford and Goodwin, 2014:48). UKIP increased their vote by 
9.2% on the previous election in 1999, winning 2.6 million votes and 12 seats in the 
European Parliament. Post-election research indicated that 45% of UKIP voters had 
supported the Conservative Party at the 2001 election (Bale, 2015:384). The question is to 
what extent did the success of UKIP at the 2004 elections impact on Conservative European 
policy. Ford and Goodwin (2014a:47) suggest that pre-election polls in the preceding weeks 
before the election, a YouGov poll for The Daily Telegraph suggested 18% of people likely 
to vote would support UKIP, ‘was creating panic in Conservative central office’. Whether 
there was ‘panic’ or not is debatable, but references to the ‘extreme’ UKIP candidates who 
supported the UK leaving the EU appeared in a Howard (2004) speech on European policy, 
for the first time, nine days before the June 10th election.  
Howard (2016) denies that the UKIP success at 2004 elections impacted on the development 
of European policy before the 2005 general election: 
 
I don't think that it did. UKIP did well in those European elections in 2004 but 
they weren't generally thought to be much of a threat at the general election. I 
knew what I wanted to put in our manifesto because it was what I believed in. 
 
This is supported by Sherbourne (2016) who also argues that, despite the success UKIP 
enjoyed at the 2004 European elections, the effect on Conservative European policy was 
limited: 
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It [European policy] wasn't dictated by the threat from UKIP, it was dictated by 
the fact that we had to have a position on Europe, it had to reflect Michael's 
Euroscepticism, which was basically the way that the party was moving 
anyway. So, Michael was in tune with the party. Let’s have a position which 
hopefully people can sign up to which was not going to antagonise the pro-
Europeans. He was very keen, as I recall, before he made his big speech 
[February 2004], I think he phoned up some of the Europhiles, like Ken Clarke, 
to let them know he was saying this and that even though they wouldn't 
necessarily sign up to the policy, they wouldn't necessarily open up the whole 
debate again. The tactics were let’s have a position, not everyone will sign up 
to it, it will reflect the majority opinion of the party, but it didn't need to open a 
great division, divide, or debate. That was the strategy. I think even without 
UKIP that would have been the strategy on Europe. 
 
Spicer (2012:537) records that at a special meeting of the 1922 committee, called following 
the 2004 European elections, Howard told those MPs present that Conservative policy on 
Europe wouldn’t change following the success of UKIP. While it is plausible to argue that 
the overall policy on Europe did not change following the 2004 European elections, as 
Howard (2016) and Sherbourne (2016) do, it is less plausible to argue that no changes were 
made to the detail of policy. Sherrington (2006:73) suggests that the success of UKIP in the 
2004 European elections ‘required the Conservative Party to revert to the more comfortable 
sceptical ground on Europe’. This would be a more realistic assessment, though this was not 
all down to the European election results. A September 2004 parliamentary by-election in 
Hartlepool saw UKIP beat the Conservative Party into fourth place, with only 9.7% of the 
vote. Howard responded by bringing John Redwood, a senior Eurosceptic MP, back to the 
Shadow Cabinet as his ‘deregulation’ spokesman, who immediately announced that the 
Conservative Party would be reviewing all EU laws as applied to the UK and would consider 
‘renegotiating’ any they decided were ‘excessive’ (Carlin et al, 2004). This was interpreted as 
a move to reassure Conservative voters tempted by UKIP’s hard-Eurosceptic policies 
(Snowdon, 2010). Additionally, Howard’s October 2004 party conference speech announced 
that following a Conservative victory at the next general election the UK would be removed 
from the jurisdiction of EU social and employment policy. This had previously been ruled out 
in May 2004 by a Conservative spokesman, a month before the 2004 European elections, and 
this change is likely to have been partly due to both the influence of John Redwood and the 
electoral success of UKIP during the previous four months. The sequencing of these events 
and the changes outlined above suggests UKIP did have some causal impact on the content of 
European policy. 
The Conservative Party also announced a new immigration policy, after the June 2004 
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European elections, but before the September 30th Hartlepool by-election. In a speech on 
September 22nd, 2004, Howard (2004b) stated that it would be Conservative policy to allow 
parliament to set an annual limit to legal immigration to the UK, introducing an ‘Australian-
style points system’ to evaluate work permit applications. This policy announcement, and the 
overall speech itself, was communicated as a statement on Conservative immigration and 
asylum policy. What was not acknowledged was that this policy clearly had a European 
policy dimension, as any ‘annual limit on immigration’, would logically have to include EU 
citizens, which would be illegal for the UK to restrict under EU ‘freedom of movement’ 
rules. On face value this constituted a major policy change and could be interpreted as a 
response to the success of UKIP at the 2004 European elections. 
Elite interviews, however, suggest this was not the case. Sherbourne (2016) contends that at 
the time the Conservative leadership did not interpret this announcement in this way, 
insisting that they saw this policy announcement and their position on Europe as entirely 
separate issues: 
…the immigration thing was not really to do with the European free movement 
of labour. It was a general policy that was really outside the European 
argument. So, it is true that Howard's position was that we were supposed to 
have transitional controls, as I think that France and Germany did, when we 
had the new entrants like Bulgaria and Romania joining. But it wasn't deployed 
in the way, let us say, in the way that UKIP have deployed the argument, or 
some Eurosceptics do today. As I recall it was basically a separate 'We need to 
get control on immigration'…We didn't have a policy of opting out of freedom 
of movement. So, I think that the immigration debate was a general one not a 
European one…Whether it was deliberately or unintentionally ambiguous I'm 
not sure, but I'm not sure that we wanted to get into the position of wanting to 
link this to Europe because it would have confronted us with the question of 
either our policy would have had to have been to leave the EU, or have to opt-
out of what clearly is a fundamental tenet of the EU which was the free 
movement of labour. 
 
This immigration policy announcement, for reasons of political necessity and party 
management, was therefore not connected with European policy and was not meant as a 
challenge to EU freedom of movement rules. As Sherbourne (2016) suggests, the party 
leadership was aware that to include EU migration in this policy was to suggest that they 
wanted to end freedom of movement, a position which the Conservative leadership did not 
support. This suggests that while the announcement was highly likely to have been a response 
to the success of UKIP, and concerns about a loss of voters and activists to them over this 
period, it did not cause a change in European policy as EU citizens were not included. That 
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this was not exploited by rival parties or the media at the time highlights that, even with the 
Eastern enlargement of the EU at the time, EU migration had not become the highly salient 
issue for the Conservative Party that it would later become during the 2010-2015 parliament. 
It does appear, however, that the decision to call for the exit from EU employment and social 
legislation was connected to the electoral success of UKIP in 2004, as this matches the 
sequence of events. 
 
6.3.2 The Labour Party and European Policy, 2001-2005 
The dominant issue for the Labour government in European policy terms during the 2001-
2005 parliament was a third phase, following the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, of 
negotiations for a new constitutional settlement for the EU. This new path was agreed by the 
EU heads of government in December 2001. A ‘Convention on the Future of Europe’ was 
established at the same meeting, to consist of EU and national politicians. The Convention’s 
recommendations were given to the European Council in June 2003, with negotiations 
beginning in October 2003. However, these talks broke down in December 2003, before 
being revived the following spring when Spain and Poland dropped objections to reforms of 
the voting system. The EU Constitutional Treaty was agreed in October 2004 but was 
rejected by voters in France and the Netherlands in May 2005. The start of negotiations 
raised the saliency of European policy in the Conservative Party and the UK. It had been 
relatively dormant as an issue since the 2001 general election. 
The Conservative Party opposed the EU Constitutional Treaty under both the Duncan Smith 
and Howard leaderships. The principal objections were that it took powers away from 
member states, centralising it in EU institutions, and would fail to reform the EU to make it 
more flexible. Both leaderships promised national referendums on the treaty. If already 
ratified when they entered office at the next election, they would seek to renegotiate it with 
the EU. The Conservative Party campaigned heavily on the referendum issue during 2004 in 
the build-up to the European and local elections. The party started a national petition calling 
for the government to hold a referendum on the EU treaty (Bale, 2015). In April 2004, Tony 
Blair committed a future Labour government to hold a referendum on the new treaty, under 
pressure from referendum campaigns organised by the tabloid newspapers and the 
Conservative Party, in addition to Cabinet ministers who feared the issue would severely 
damage the party at the June elections (Baker and Sherrington, 2005:306). The Conservative 
Party had banked on capitalising on the Labour government’s reluctance to hold a 
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referendum, and Blair’s announcement in April 2004 left them without a unique selling point 
to their European policy before the elections. Howard, in private, then considered calling for 
a referendum on a ‘fundamental renegotiation’ of the UK’s overall relationship with the EU, 
in response to the Labour referendum pledge (Bale, 2015:383). The concern was that UKIP 
could portray Labour and the Conservative Party as having the same policy on the EU 
constitution. He was persuaded, by advisors including David Cameron, that this would prove 
counterproductive and ‘only legitimise UKIP’ in the eyes of voters (Bale, 2015:383). The 
interesting point here is that despite the change in policy from the Labour Party, and the 
temptation to change to a harder Eurosceptic position by Howard in response, the 
Conservative Party did not react by changing policy themselves to ‘outbid’ Labour. The risk, 
at the time, was that this would subsequently increase the electoral threat of UKIP, rather 
than diminish it. 
6.4 Public Opinion 
6.4.1 Euroscepticism and Public Opinion 
Table 6.1 shows data, drawn from the British Social Attitudes survey, of UK attitudes 
towards the European Union during the 2001-2005 parliament. Overall, the data shows that 
British attitudes remained relatively stable over the course of the 2001-2005 parliament. 
There was a small increase in the number of respondents taking a hard-Eurosceptic attitude, 
advocating leaving the EU, but this had only increased from 14% in 2001 to 16% in 2005. 
However, in contradiction to this, there was also a small increase in the number of 
respondents supporting the status quo, from 21% in 2001 to 24% in 2005. Most respondents 
supported the soft Eurosceptic position, 38% in 2001 and 36% in 2005, to remain members of 
the EU but to try and reduce the powers it has over member states like the UK. 
The stability of public attitudes towards the EU during this period largely discounts this as a 
factor which stimulated change in Conservative Party European policy during this 
parliament, as there was little change in public attitudes. The structural political environment, 
at least in terms of the public opinion towards the EU, was stable. What it does help explain 
is the low priority in which both Duncan Smith and Howard gave to European policy during 
this parliament and the continuity seen in the soft Eurosceptic direction of policy, as this 
correlated with public opinion at the time. 
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The sector of the public that would have been responsive to harder Eurosceptic policies 
towards the EU was small, whereas the section of public open to soft Eurosceptic policies, 
aiming to reduce the powers of EU institutions, was significant. As Eurosceptic politicians 
themselves, it was therefore convenient to align policies that aimed to reduce EU power over 
the UK, with that of public opinion. This data therefore provides some of the structural 
context in which the Conservative leaderships considered European policy during this 
parliament. 
Figure 6.1 presents data from Ipsos Mori on public attitudes to joining the single currency 
during the 2001-2005 parliament. It shows a significant majority of the public still opposed 
the UK joining the single currency in line with public opinion during the 1997-2001 
parliament. This provided Duncan Smith with the political space to rule out single currency 
membership for the UK under a future Conservative government, with the understanding this 
was working with, and not against, the current structural political environment. It was not a 
factor that ‘triggered’ this decision, as opposition to the single currency had been well 
established in the UK for many years. Public opinion was a necessary enabling condition, as 
it would have been a political risk to have opposed the single currency if there was strong 
public support, but it did not determine the timing of the decision itself. If public opinion was 
the main stimulus, Hague would have ruled out the single currency during the 1997-2001 
parliament, when public opinion was equally as hostile. The fact that Hague and Duncan 
Smith took different decisions when both faced strong levels of public hostility to the single 
currency, suggests that other factors played a more pivotal role. 
Table 6.1: UK Attitudes towards the EU, 2001-2005 
% Agreeing 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Leave the EU 14 15 15 18 16 
Stay in EU but reduce its power 38 35 32 38 36 
Leave things as are 21 23 27 23 24 
Stay in EU and increase its powers 10 12 11 7 10 
Work for single European government 7 7 6 5 4 
Source: British Social Attitudes 33 (2016). 
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Figure 6.2 provides an indication of the salience of Europe during the 2001-2005 parliament. 
Overall, the trend for Europe during this period was to decline in salience though, as in the 
previous parliament, there were sporadic fluctuations in both directions of higher and lower 
levels of salience. The spike in the salience of EU issues between April and June 2003 is 
likely to be the result of several events. Tensions between the UK and other EU member 
states, especially with Germany and France, following the Labour governments support for 
the US coalition led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, had been the focus of media attention 
during this period. Additionally, on June 9th, 2003 Gordon Brown announced that the single 
currency had only passed one of the five tests the Treasury had set it for compatibility with 
the UK economy. This accounts for the notable spike in salience in June 2003. However, this 
period of high salience for EU issues did not influence Conservative Party policy as Duncan 
Smith had already formally ruled out the Conservative Party supporting the UK joining the 
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Figure 6.1: UK Public Attitude towards the Euro, 2001-2005
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single currency in 2001. The Conservative Party had also supported the Labour government’s 
position on the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.  
 
6.5 Domestic Political Context 
 
The domestic political context of the 2001-2005 parliament for the Conservative Party was 
one in which the ‘heat’ surrounding Europe in the party gradually diminished. For the early 
part of the parliament, Duncan Smith (2016) credits this with the early, and definitive, 
decision to rule out joining the single currency, ‘…as soon as I did that, Europe went off the 
boil slightly.’ Ancram (2016) agrees that during this parliament ‘…the temperature had gone 
out of it. That was the progression’. Heppell (2015) suggests that the focus on European 
policy declined during this period as the pro-integration members of the parliamentary party, 
which amounted to only eight MPs following the 2001 election, had essentially given up 
trying to keep their colleagues open to new forms of integration with the EU. Many, like 
Major and Heseltine, had retired, and those remaining, like Clarke, focused their attention on 
other policy areas. The election of a strong Eurosceptic leader in Duncan Smith and the 
decision on the single currency marked the end of the ‘Eurosceptics v Europhiles’ debates of 
the Major and Hague years, with the division reforming later between soft Eurosceptics v 
hard Eurosceptics (Heppell, 2015). This allowed Duncan Smith the domestic political space 
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Figure 6.2: % UK Voters saying Europe No 1 Issue, 2001-2005 
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to focus on non-European policy issues. When Howard became leader in November 2003 this 
domestic political context on the European issue continued, allowing Howard to maintain a 
low profile on the issue in the run up to the 2005 general election (Hayton, 2012). 
Howard (2016) agrees with Duncan Smith (2016) that the European issue had diminished in 
salience for the Conservative Party during this parliament: 
…it wasn't a big issue in domestic politics… I had inherited a party that had 
been wracked with dissent for well over a decade, particularly on this kind of 
issue, but on other issues as well. I was fortunate, I think, as by the time I took 
over I was elected unopposed and, secondly, I think people were a bit tired of 
all the wrangling that had gone on and that made it easier for me to impose 
discipline on the party which was one of my key priorities, which I think I 
succeeded in doing. So that for the 18 months between the time I took over and 
the general election of 2005 we were a united party and there was very little 
dissent. Obviously after the election and in the 6 months between the election 
and my stepping down we were in a leadership contest and things were...not 
difficult, but different. But for the 18 months between my election and the 
leadership election we were a united, disciplined party, I think I can fairly 
claim. 
This is understandable when considering the part played by European policy within domestic 
politics during this parliament. The only major European policy development in domestic 
politics during the 2001-2005 parliament, aside from the Labour government’s announcement 
on the single currency, was the ‘Convention on the Future of Europe’ and the start of the 
negotiations over the EU Constitutional Treaty in October 2003. As the survey data from the 
Ipsos Mori Issue Index suggests, these two events did not lead to significant increases in the 
salience of Europe amongst the public. The Conservative response, under both Duncan Smith 
and Howard, showed path dependency with the position taken by Hague to the Amsterdam 
and Nice Treaties. This continuity with the previous leaderships position was therefore also 
unlikely to raise the salience of European policy within the party itself, as it was entirely in 
line with the previous policy and party opinion. 
MacGregor (2016) sums up the attitude the Conservative Party took to European policy 
development during this period: 
 
There wasn't much to change. You change your policy for two reasons. One 
because other things happen - external events - the introduction of the Euro for 
example - you need to have a policy on that if it comes in. Or treaties. So, you 
tend to change your mind on things like that when external events drive you to 
make a decision but there was nothing of that nature. And because it wasn't 
very important. It was almost like there was a ban on talking about it. We are 
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going to talk relentlessly about issues that feature at the top of the political 
agenda rather than ones that were at the bottom on the agenda. If something 
came up and someone asked us about it, we are going to do something about it, 
but otherwise we will be entirely reactive about how we deal with these things. 
So, all are pro-active actions, when we send the leader to do speeches, that is 
going to be about other stuff. There wasn't a deliberate plan to downplay it. It 
didn't need to be deliberately downplayed because it wasn't very important. 
That is the weird thing about the previous experience under William that he 
hyped up something that wasn't important. 
 
On both leadership ratings and voting intention, according to Ipsos Mori survey data shown 
in Figures 6.3 and 6.4, the Conservative leaders and party during this parliament were more 
competitive with Blair and the Labour Party, than under Hague who consistently lagged well 
behind both. Of course, this data hides many of the internal party management issues and 
policy conflicts the party also experienced, but it is perhaps also an indication why both the 
Duncan Smith and Howard leaderships did not retreat to the comfort zone of trying to raise 
the salience of European integration by introducing new Eurosceptic policy positions. 
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In the previous chapter, there was clear evidence from elite interviews and other sources that 
many in the Conservative leadership team believed that during the 1997-2001 parliament, and 
especially following the 1999 European election victory, European policy was an electoral 
winner for the Conservative Party as the public trusted them more than the Labour Party on 
this issue. As Figure 6.4 shows, this was not the case during the 2001-2005 parliament, with 
the Labour Party often more trusted than the Conservative Party on European policy. This is 
perhaps another reason why the Conservative leaderships were not incentivised to focus on 
European policy during the 2001-2005 parliament, as they were starting to lose their 
traditional competitive edge on the Labour Party over this issue. 
6.6 International Political Context 
The international political issue which dominated headlines during the 2001-2005 parliament 
was not the future of the EU, but the threat from global terrorism. The response to the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks, the global response to Al Qaeda, and the wars in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, were the focus of heated debates on the direction of British foreign 
policy. The relationship between the UK and the EU was relegated to a second order 
consideration. This was despite the ‘Convention on the Future of Europe’ and the 
negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty which followed it. However, the UK political 
and media establishments focus was on world affairs and terrorism. For other EU member 
states, such as Germany and France, their participation was much more limited, with more 
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focus on the future development of the EU. Overall, the result of this international context for 
the Conservative Party was to direct most of the leadership’s energy and time on these 
immediate foreign policy concerns, rather than Europe. 
Michael Ancram (2016), Shadow Foreign Secretary during the 2001-2005 parliament, 
believes the relative policy continuity and low priority given to European policy during this 
period by both the Duncan Smith and Howard leaderships is partly explained by the impact 
the response to 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had on the Conservative foreign 
policy agenda: 
My feeling as party chairman at the time was that the party’s opening stance 
was much more Eurosceptic than it was afterwards. But I think that is because 
these other things, the war in Afghanistan and Iraq were taking up peoples’, if 
you like, international consciousness… As I mentioned before, my two annual 
outings on Europe were the two post-Council of Ministers debates. I don't think 
my speeches changed all that much over the four years. There was a 
consistency. They were not the things of the moment though. The things of the 
moment were 'shock and awe'. Afghanistan, eventually towards the end of my 
time Helmand, which I was against. The party were also much more interested 
in that than they were on Europe at that time. 
 
The Conservative Party leadership had given their support to the Labour government’s 
response to 9/11 and to direct British military involvement in the US-led invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The Conservative Party were strongly connected with these areas of 
policy, which helps to partly explain the lower priority, and the stability of policy, given to 
European affairs in this parliament. The foreign policy team were focused away from the EU 
and the leadership wanted to talk about it as little as possible. The international political 
context of the 2001-2005 parliament, therefore, is an additional structural factor which helps 
to explain the relative stability of European policy during this period. 
 
6.7 Individual Actors 
 
6.7.1 The Leaders – Duncan Smith and Howard 
As with the previous chapter, in which it was argued that the Eurosceptic conviction and 
individual agency of Hague was central to European policy change during the 1997-2001 
parliament, the same applies with the leadership factor in the 2001-2005 parliament. The 
individual agency of the leaders was crucial in not only the change that did occur, but also 
resisting further change in a harder Eurosceptic direction, which Duncan Smith and Howard 
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at the time did not believe was necessary or appropriate. Both leaders were considered more 
Eurosceptic by their parliamentary colleagues than Hague, which considering the control 
Conservative Party leaders have over policy-making, partly explains why European policy 
moved gradually in a harder Eurosceptic direction. Moving European policy to a more 
moderate position would have been against the ideological convictions of both Duncan Smith 
and Howard, and considering their reputations for vigorously opposing European integration, 
would have looked inauthentic to both the rest of the party and the general public. 
Duncan Smith was the key figure in establishing the ‘harder but quieter’ position on 
European policy during this parliament (Bale, 2016), specifically on making the key decision 
to rule out, indefinitely, a Conservative government ever joining the single currency. This 
decision was made individually by Duncan Smith (2016) as he believed the party could not 
move on without it being made. As he responded when asked directly if this was an 
individual decision on his part: ‘Yes. My view was that you could never settle this until it 
was clear.’ 
Despite a revival during the early days of the Hague leadership the Conservative Policy 
Forum, which ostensibly had a role to play in party policy development, was by this point 
inactive and not considered an internal institution that had to be formally consulted on major 
policy changes such as this. There is no evidence to suggest they played a meaningful role in 
European policy development at this time. 
It is also clear that the decision to oppose the proposed introduction of the EAW by EU 
members in late 2001, following the September 11th terrorist attacks on New York, was the 
result of a change of mind by the party leader. The Conservative Party had initially welcomed 
the idea of the EAW (Jones, 2001), on the grounds that sacrifices needed to be made in order 
to enhance European security, but later opposed the measure in December 2001 as an 
unnecessary centralisation of power in EU institutions. A key figure in this change of view 
was Duncan Smith, who explains his thinking as follows: 
I do remember that I was unhappy and uneasy about agreeing to British citizens 
being allowed to be taken somewhere else. Giving the power to the EU. That I 
didn't agree with. 
 
Evans-Pritchard (2001) notes that this change of policy followed a meeting between Duncan 
Smith and the Conservative Party MEP group in the European Parliament. The suggestion 
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here is that Conservative MEPs opposed to the EAW could also have played an influential 
role in this policy change, though there is no additional evidence to suggest they played a key 
role, or that Duncan Smith disagreed with their position at the meeting in Brussels. 
Duncan Smith also played a key role in changing European policy from not simply opposing 
further political integration, or vaguely suggesting that the EU institutions should have less 
power, but to proposing specific EU policy competences in which a future Conservative 
government would seek to repatriate to the UK parliament. Duncan Smith (2003) did this in 
his only major speech on European policy during his time as leader of the opposition, in 
Prague on July 10th, 2003. A future Conservative government would seek to repatriate powers 
over agriculture, fishing, and foreign aid from the EU back to the UK (Duncan Smith, 2003). 
Duncan Smith (2016) explains why he took European policy in this more specific direction, 
away from the general Eurosceptic messaging of the Hague years: 
 
We took it further on from there and said we have a view, an agenda, which was shared 
by quite a lot of countries, including East European countries which was why I made that 
speech in Prague. It was a stronger position than William's. I thought we had to develop 
our position. I think we had got into a mess on things like 'flexible Europe' which didn't 
work for me. I thought we needed to be much clearer about what we were looking for, 
that if we wanted a different relationship we needed to define what that meant. That was 
what that speech was about. 
 
Duncan Smith can therefore be credited with edging Conservative European policy at this 
point away from the abstract constitutional reforms of the Hague leadership (see the 
‘flexibility clause’ or ‘reserved powers act’) to specific ideas about what policy areas should, 
and what should not, be reserved for the EU institutions. The Conservative Party would not 
abandon policies on constitutional reform of the EU, but they would not be the main pillars of 
their European policy platform. 
When Howard replaced Duncan Smith as leader in November 2003, he maintained the policy 
to repatriate EU competences over agriculture, fishing, and foreign aid. These were all 
included in the 2005 Conservative election manifesto, with the commitment on EU 
agriculture policy downgraded from repatriation to ‘further and deeper reform’ (Conservative 
Party, 2005:26). In October 2004, however, Howard (2004b) extended this by also including 
social and employment policy, the so called ‘EU Social Chapter’, which was also included in 
the 2005 manifesto. While this policy change can partly be explained by the success of UKIP 
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in the 2004 European elections and Hartlepool by-election, the role of Howard himself as a 
political actor also contributes to the explanation. As Employment Secretary during the 
Maastricht Treaty negotiations in December 1991, Howard had been a strong opponent of the 
EU Social Chapter and had threatened resignation if Major did not achieve a full opt-out for 
the UK. There is also evidence that ‘repatriation of powers’ was a central part of Howard’s 
own Eurosceptic philosophy on UK-EU relations. In The Future of Europe, a 1997 pamphlet 
produced by the Centre for Policy Studies and written by Howard (1997b), he makes clear 
that the future relationship between the UK and the EU must work on the basis that powers 
can move back to the member states when those individual members believe it would be in 
their national interest. The idea that powers can only move in the traditional direction, from 
member states to the EU, was ‘a perception that must be reversed if Europe is to maintain 
public confidence’ (Howard, 1997b). Howard, therefore, had a strong personal commitment 
to the repatriation of powers from the EU, in addition to long-term opposition to the ‘EU 
Social Chapter’. It was, of course, partly a continuation of Duncan Smith’s European policy 
agenda. Nonetheless, Howard’s own personal commitment and historical policy positions 
were also an important factor in this policy change. 
A further change in the European policy agenda of the Conservative Party following the 
change of leadership between Duncan Smith and Howard was more philosophical. In his only 
major speech on European policy, Duncan Smith (2003) set out the philosophy that would 
establish his European policy as one that would aim for a ‘New Europe of sovereign 
democracies’.  Although only loosely defined in the speech, it would include an EU which 
was less centralised, less interventionist, and more focused on economic enterprise, and 
global poverty reduction. Duncan Smith (2003) was specific that this would mean an EU 
which was ‘intergovernmental – not supranational’, an ‘alliance of sovereign nations’. This 
was an agenda that envisioned a radically changed purpose and structure to the EU, which 
was then, and is now, an international organisation with a mix of intergovernmental and 
supranational institutions. 
In his main speech on European policy during his leadership, Howard (2004) moved away 
from this philosophy set out by Duncan Smith in the Prague speech. His main proposal was, 
as he described it, for an EU based on a ‘live and let live’ philosophy, or ‘variable geometry’, 
in which individual member states or groups of member states could choose the level of 
integration they believed was appropriate, rather than it be imposed on them by other member 
states or the EU. This was similar in nature to the ‘flexibility clause’ proposed under Hague, 
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and originally proposed by Major in 1994. This was less radical than the Duncan Smith 
agenda, as it was not calling for the end to supranationalism in the EU, but was instead 
calling for member states to have more choice and flexibility about which elements of 
integration they participated in. 
When asked about the differences between how Duncan Smith’s and Howard’s approaches, 
Ancram (2016) supports the suggestion that although there was much continuity, it is not 
accurate to state there was no change in policy or differences in philosophy between the two 
leaders: 
I suppose in a rather strange way Howard's was a little more flexible than 
IDS… we were trying to find an accommodation. But more broadly than that 
the structure of our policy changed a bit. I was very much part of the movement 
to a return to the Europe of nations. Which I had always been for many, many 
years. I think IDS would have liked to have gone further than that. He didn't 
even like there being even that much of a link. Howard had the variable 
geometry solution. Which was quite difficult to explain but it was basically a 
multi-speed, multi-shaped Europe. That was where in my time we ended up. 
That was our position. Not a comfortable position but one in which the party 
was willing to accept… I made a major speech in Germany where I set out 
what I regarded as the Conservative Party's position which was very much 
towards the Europe of Nations direction. Which was going back a long way. 
Howard’s variable geometry was not going back as far as that. So that's what I 
mean when I say...I think Howard was more, I wouldn't say pro-European, but 
he was less radical than IDS and to that extent me. 
 
Both Duncan Smith and Howard, as key individual actors within the Conservative Party, 
were therefore central to changes in the party’s European policy during the 2001-2005 
parliament. Their own individual commitments and beliefs on the future direction of UK-EU 
relations, in combination with their position as party leader, were directly responsible for the 
overall philosophy and many of the key policy positions, if not all of the more minor 
changes. These subtler changes, as it will be explained below, were the responsibility of the 
Shadow Foreign Secretary and his foreign affairs team. 
6.7.2 Conservative MEPs and the EPP-ED 
The question of which grouping Conservative MEPs were members of in the European 
Parliament developed gradually into a controversial issue for the Conservative Party during 
the 1992-1997 parliament. As the Conservative Party became more Eurosceptic during this 
period, greater attention was paid to the ideological stance of the European Peoples’ Party 
towards European integration, the main centre-right political grouping in the European 
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Parliament. Conservative MEPs had been aligned to the EPP since April 1992 (Lynch and 
Whitaker, 2008). While ideologically similar to the Conservative Party in many policy areas, 
the EPP also supported further European integration for EU member states, a position the 
Conservative Party in Westminster and the country became strongly opposed to between 
1992 and 2001. Pressure began to develop for Conservative MEPs to leave the EPP, but this 
was resisted by Conservative MEPs who were more pro-integration than most MPs or party 
members (Lynch and Whitaker, 2008). As a compromise, Hague renegotiated the 
Conservative Party position in the EPP, what Lynch and Whitaker (2008:33) describes as a 
‘revised relationship’, with the EPP changing its name to the ‘European Peoples’ Party-
European Democrats’. Conservative MEPs would now be aligned to the ‘European 
Democrats’ section of the grouping, with more rights to operate separately from the rest of 
the group.  
This change was stimulated by the election in 1999 of more Eurosceptic Conservative MEPs, 
such as Daniel Hannan, Geoffrey van Orden, Martin Callanan, and Roger Helmer. Van Orden 
(2016) describes the new MEPs as having ‘a very different approach to the EU compared 
with some of our predecessors.’.  This result was encouraged by a change to the selection 
procedure for MEP candidates, instigated by Hague after 1997, that effectively ensured more 
Eurosceptic MEPs would be elected in 1999. Edward Macmillan-Scott (2016), Conservative 
MEP leader 1997-2001, believes that Daniel Hannan was the main individual actor at the 
time agitating for Conservative MEPs to leave the EPP grouping in the European Parliament. 
Duncan Smith was the first party leader to actively consider leaving the EPP-ED for a new 
Eurosceptic group. However, Duncan Smith had initially followed the Hague position on 
EPP-ED membership of remaining aligned to the group but seeking further autonomy. This 
was the preference of Ancram and MEP leader Jonathan Evans (Lynch and Whitaker, 2008). 
Duncan Smith then changed his policy back to leaving the EPP-ED when his preferred new 
membership terms were rejected by EPP-ED group leader Hans-Gert Poettering (Lynch and 
Whitaker, 2008). Howard then changed policy once again and reverted back to a policy of 
renegotiating the Conservative MEPs membership terms within the EPP-ED, which was 
agreed ahead of the 2004 European elections. Howard appears to have had a clearer view 
from the beginning of his leadership, that leaving the EPP would cause more problems than it 
would solve. Howard (2016) explained to me why he decided against forming a new 
grouping: 
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Because I thought that there was a real difficulty over who we would sit with in 
the European Parliament and I thought it would be used against us in domestic 
politics. I could see Blair every other week at PMQ's saying this is the party 
that sits with X, Y, and Z in the European Parliament and that was something I 
was determined to head off if I possibly could. To be honest that was my main 
motivation. 
 
During his leadership Duncan Smith was trapped between an ideological desire to distance 
the Conservative Party from a political affiliation in Brussels that he, and many others at all 
levels of the party, considered to be far too pro-integration, but also a pragmatic 
consideration that establishing a new grouping could bring with it additional problems. 
Michael Spicer (2012), 1992 Committee Chair, records in his diary during the period the 
pressure Eurosceptic MEPs put on both Duncan Smith and Howard to leave the EPP-ED, 
with Daniel Hannan threatening to resign from the party on two occasions between 2001 and 
2002 unless this was achieved (see 470 and 479). 
Ancram (2016) appears to have played an important role in convincing Duncan Smith that 
forming a new Eurosceptic grouping was not in the best interests of the party: 
At the very start IDS was keen to do, funnily enough, what Cameron did 8 
years later, which was to walk away from the EPP and form another grouping. I 
think I stopped that because I went around mostly Eastern parts of Europe, the 
new members, to see what sort of partners we might find in order to get a 
grouping together. They were a pretty strange bunch. I came back and said I 
don't think it would be very good for the perception of the party to be 
associated with that group of people who were on the extremes and some 
distinctively eccentric. So, we had one or two quite hard conversations 
with Hans-Gert Poettering and the rest of the EPP. In the end, I was asked if I 
could reform our position acceptably to them within the EPP. Which is what 
under Howard I succeeded in doing. 
 
Ancram (2016) is also insistent that Duncan Smith had come around to his argument that for 
political and pragmatic reasons it would be better to stay within the EPP-ED but push for 
further reform, and suggests that if Duncan Smith had remained leader beyond 2003 he 
would have signed the renegotiated agreement like Howard: 
IDS had basically accepted my advice that the alternative to the EPP was 
unacceptable. I did two tours, I think, through Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary, the 
rest of the Baltic countries, and Denmark because that was another country 
with anti-European parties. I came away with the feeling that this just wasn't 
going to work for us. I don't think that it has worked particularly well, I have to 
say, since Cameron took the same choice. I think that IDS would have been 
happy to take a compromise. 
 166 
 
This evidence suggests that Ancram played an important role as an individual political actor, 
across both the Duncan Smith and Howard leaderships, in persuading both party leaders that 
alternatives to the Conservative Party maintaining their alliance with the EPP-ED group in 
the European Parliament would be politically damaging to the party in the long-term. 
Although the party leaders themselves were also central to the policy ultimately adopted, it is 
also clear that a determined policy entrepreneur, in the form of Conservative MEP Daniel 
Hannan, was also key. He was responsible for a well-organised campaign in multiple 
institutional arenas within the Conservative Party, to change party policy on the EPP-ED 
alliance and leave to form a new Eurosceptic group. Hannan and his fellow campaigners were 
unsuccessful during the 2001-2005 parliament but would return to the campaign during the 
2005 leadership election, which is discussed in the following chapter. 
 
6.7.2 The Shadow Foreign Secretary – Michael Ancram 
In addition to the high profile European policy changes during the 2001-2005 parliament, 
such as those on the single currency and EPP-ED membership, there were also a number of 
more low-profile policies connected to the EU and European integration that were also 
announced during this parliament. These policies were often technical in nature, normally 
associated with changes to the institutional and policy-making procedures of the EU, which is 
perhaps why they received little media attention. They broadly fall into three themes; EU 
scrutiny and accountability; the role of national parliaments in EU decision-making process; 
and protections for UK national sovereignty, the details to which are set out in Chapter 4. As 
Chapter 4 illustrates, these three themes showed some continuity between the Hague, Duncan 
Smith, and Howard leaderships. However, the detail and content of the policies did change 
between these time periods, as different actors developed different mechanisms to implement 
the same policy objectives. 
From elite interviews, it is clear that the shadow Foreign Secretary, Michael Ancram, in 
addition to his team of shadow ministers, had considerable autonomy to develop these more 
low-profile elements of European policy, as long as they did not stray from the leader’s 
Eurosceptic philosophy. Ancram (2016) explained that while more technical policies were 
important, they did not change the central ideas of party policy, which was set by the leader: 
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Well Howard set them out in the first European speech that he made in which 
he set out five principles, one of which was accountability. Which then became 
part of the policy as we deployed it. I can't remember my exact speeches, but I 
seem to remember all those elements were involved in them. They weren't 
window dressing, but they were kind of the decorations on the tree. The tree 
was very much the same…If we talked about accountability we began to 
deploy what we meant by accountability and how we saw it being operated. It 
may sound funny, but they were the decorations on the tree, they weren't the 
tree itself. The tree itself was fundamental reform. For all the decorations, they 
were important, but they weren't the main drift of policy. 
 
Richard Spring (2016), Opposition Spokesman for Foreign Affairs 2000-2004, explains 
further how this hierarchical policy making process worked: 
The general lines were set, and we had agreement on those. There was no 
difficulty about that. The issues, proposals coming out on the EU, perhaps 
accepted by the government. This was by Ancram and Maude, with IDS and 
Hague. Then later I would discuss with either one of those two in more detail 
how we would handle this, what specifically we would ask for and what 
amendments we would put down. Then there would be further discussions. We 
had policy experts, lawyers etc, who would help us formulate the responses. 
So, it was a kind of macro down to a micro level. I was not involved in the 
ultimate macro conversations. Obviously, they did happen, say before Michael 
or Francis went into talk to the leader, we would sometimes have chats about 
what we were seeking to do. But that was it, I was not party to those 
conversations. I think that is the way it always works. 
 
These low-profile technical policies, essentially how to operationalise the key European 
policy themes, were the responsibility of the Shadow Foreign secretary and his team of 
shadow ministers and advisors, and changes to these policies during the 2001-2005 
parliament can be attributed to them as the main causal factor. What input the leader had in 
the detailed discussions surrounding these technical policies would appear to be limited, 
although they could veto suggestions as party leader.  
 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 
 
In the previous chapter, utilising the new institutionalist approach theoretical mechanisms 
and tools set out in Chapter 3, this thesis argued that the 1997 general election was a critical 
juncture for the Conservative Party and European policy. It established a path dependent 
Eurosceptic trajectory for Europe, in which the Conservative Party policy platform was 
moving incrementally in a more Eurosceptic direction. In this chapter, also utilising the new 
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institutionalist concepts, it has been shown that this path dependency continued and was 
relatively stable, though there were important policy changes. As both elite interviews and 
analysis of secondary survey data indicates, European policy was a low policy priority both 
within the internal institutions of the Conservative Party and external structural environment. 
The 2001 election and the emphasis on Europe had convinced many within the party that 
though policy would remain on a Eurosceptic path, it was not a high priority area for policy 
development. The international political environment contributed to this, with foreign policy 
dominated by the response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Incrementally, Eurosceptic attitudes in the institutions of the party and 
in the external political environment continued to increase, but this contributed to the stability 
of the Eurosceptic path to European policy during this period rather than influencing policy 
change. 
The decision to rule out membership of the single currency was the result of a combination of 
factors. The historical legacy of the 1997-2001 parliament, and the perception that the 
‘incoherent’ position on the single currency had contributed to disunity within the party, 
contributed to Duncan Smith’s decision on the single currency. The failure of the position to 
have any impact on the electorate at the 2001 election was also a factor. The domestic 
political context for Duncan Smith was also different than to Hague at the start of his 
leadership. Duncan Smith, with a history of Eurosceptic activism, had secured the leadership 
via ballots of parliamentary colleagues and party members. This gave him the authority 
necessary to change policy to a more straightforwardly Eurosceptic position. 
Ultimately, however, it was the individual agency and Eurosceptic attitude of Duncan Smith 
himself that was the key factor in the single currency decision being made. With the low 
saliency of Europe both in the internal institutions of the party and the domestic/external 
environment, the role of the individual leaders was key to policy change in this period. As 
this chapter has set out, the policy change on the EAW, the renegotiation of EPP 
membership, the inclusion of specific EU policy areas to repatriate, and the annual limit on 
immigration, were all ultimately the result of individual judgements by Duncan Smith, 
Howard, and Ancram. On the detailed proposals for EU institutional reform, this chapter has 
established through elite interviews that these were the prerogative of Ancram and his 
shadow foreign affairs team. 
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Chapter 7: Cameron in Opposition – Policy Change and Europe: 2005-
2010 
 
This chapter seeks to explain the development of European policy within the Conservative 
Party during the 2005-2010 parliament, in which, from December 6th 2005 to May 11th 2010, 
David Cameron was leader of the opposition. It takes as its starting point the May 2005 
general election and concludes just before the May 2010 general election. Overall, and in 
keeping with the policy of each leadership period explored in the previous chapters, the 
Conservative Party maintained the Soft Eurosceptic policy platform that had been established 
since 1997.  
The analysis of changes in Conservative European policy in this chapter will endeavour to 
explain Cameron’s commitment to remove Conservative MEPs from the EPP-ED group; the 
subsequent decision to delay leaving the EPP-ED until after the 2009 European Parliament 
elections; the change in position on the Common Fisheries Policy, from unilateral withdrawal 
to ‘reform from within’; the reversal of the decision to commit a future Conservative 
government to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty; and the commitments in November 
2009 speech to introduce a ‘referendum lock’ and a ‘UK sovereignty bill’ after the 2010 
election, in addition to fully opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the return 
EU powers of crime and justice policy to ‘pre-Lisbon levels’. 
This chapter will begin by reflecting on two important political events that immediately 
proceeded the start of Cameron’s period as opposition leader, the 2005 general election and 
the 2005 Conservative Party leadership election, considering what influence they had on 
European policy change in this parliament. 
 
 
7.1 Historical Legacies 
 
 
7.1.1 The 2005 General Election 
 
In contrast to the 2001 general election, in which the issue was a prominent feature of the 
campaign (Butler and Kavanagh, 2002), European policy ‘barely registered’ as a topic during 
the 2005 general election (Geddes, 2005:280). Instead, the election focused on crime, 
education, health, immigration, and the economy (Green and Hobolt, 2010). The 
Conservative Party and Labour were content for Europe to be a non-issue during the 
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campaign, with Howard preferring to concentrate on immigration policy. As elite interviews 
suggested in the previous chapter, Howard sought to avoid opening up the debate on Europe 
within the Conservative Party and during the election campaign. This strategy was effective 
in holding on to support in the seats the party already held, but was much less effective in 
Labour held constituencies, where the Conservative share of the vote declined by 0.21% 
(Norris and Wlezien, 2005). Overall, it was another poor electoral performance, with the 
Conservative share of the vote increasing by only 0.7% compared with 2001, despite a net 
gain of 33 seats in total. 
The 2005 general election campaign itself, unlike those of 1997 and 2001, therefore had little 
direct impact on the future content of European policy in the parliament which followed, as it 
did not feature as a major issue. Indirectly, however, it did lead to the eventual resignation of 
Howard and subsequent election of Cameron, who did make changes to the European policy 
platform. Howard was unlikely to have made these himself, such as the decision to leave the 
EPP-ED. The 2005 election was, nonetheless, directly important in convincing those 
remaining individuals, in the parliamentary party at least, who had not been convinced by the 
result of the 2001 election, that focusing heavily on topics such as Europe, immigration, tax 
cuts, or crime would not return the party to government anytime soon.  Those who had 
previously emphasised the need for the leadership to focus more energy in these areas now 
accepted that for the party image to be detoxified, policies needed to be developed which had 
more widespread electoral appeal. As a result, there was less pressure for the leadership to 
focus on Europe. 
 
7.1.2 The 2005 Leadership Election 
 
The Conservative Party leadership contest of 2005, much like the general election campaign, 
was not dominated by the European question in the same way the 1997 and 2001 contests had 
been, both of which had elected Eurosceptic candidates in Hague and Duncan-Smith. 
Cameron made a number of promises to both the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary party 
during this election process that led to party policy change on Europe. In a similar way to 
which Hague’s commitment to a ‘two parliaments’ policy which had emerged during the 
1997 leadership contest, Cameron would promise to remove Conservative MEPs from the 
EPP-ED grouping in the European Parliament. The 2005 leadership contest is therefore an 
important factor to consider when analysing the development of European policy during this 
parliament. 
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Four candidates entered the 2005 leadership contest; Clarke, Fox, Davis, and Cameron. In 
terms of their positions on Europe, Clarke once again entered the leadership contest, as he 
had done in 1997 and 2001, representing the pro-European Conservative Party on the centre-
left of the party. Davis and Fox both represented the Eurosceptic Thatcherite right of the 
party, with Fox also known for his social conservative views (Heppell, 2007). Cameron, the 
least known candidate, was socially liberal and moderately Eurosceptic, representing a 
triangulated position between Davis/Fox and Clarke. As Heppell (2007:179) accurately 
states, ‘by the time of the 2005 leadership election, the centrality of the European ideological 
divide had diminished considerably’. As a result of this, the question of Europe was of 
relative low salience during the contest in comparison with previous leadership elections. A 
quantitative study by Green and Hobolt (2010) on the issues most discussed during the 
campaign supports this assertion. 
Despite this, Cameron made a number of policy commitments on Europe during the course of 
his successful campaign. On November 8th, in a speech to the Centre for Policy Studies, 
Cameron (2005) committed a Conservative government under his leadership to ‘the return of 
powers over employment and social regulation’ as the ‘strategic imperative of my European 
policy’. This demonstrated continuity with Howard, who had made the same commitment in 
October 2004. Cameron showed further continuity on European policy with previous 
leaderships in this period by renewing Conservative opposition to further EU treaties and by 
supporting calls for the EU to re-focus on reducing trade barriers and business regulation. 
The major break with the European policy inherited from the Howard leadership came over 
the issue of the affiliation of Conservative MEPs in the European Parliament. Though trailed 
during the summer, a spokesperson for Cameron confirmed that if elected he would remove 
Conservative MEPs from the EPP-ED and establish a new Eurosceptic grouping as soon as 
possible (Carlin and Isaby, 2005). Davis, Cameron’s main rival at this point, was not 
prepared to make a similar commitment. The pledge was perceived as an effort to persuade 
Eurosceptic Conservative MPs to support Cameron in the parliamentary ballot stage, rather 
than Davis or Fox. In the final ballot of MPs, Cameron secured the support of more 
Eurosceptic MPs (78) than either Davis (53) or Fox (50) (Heppell and Hill, 2009).  
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Table 7.1 shows the results of both rounds of voting in the parliamentary section of the 
leadership election. The interesting question here is to what extent the competitive dynamics 
of the leadership election campaign, and the need for Cameron as the least well-known 
candidate to stand out from his rivals, was an important causal factor in this policy change. 
Clarke (2016:428), eliminated after the first ballot of the leadership contest, believes that the 
commitment was ‘totally unnecessary in terms of winning votes’ and that ‘his team could 
obviously not bring themselves to believe that he was on his way to victory without the hard-
line Eurosceptics and he was persuaded to reach out to them.’ This implies, on one level, that 
Cameron was on course to get to the membership ballot and win, even at this stage. However, 
it also suggests that Cameron and his campaign team were not confident that they were on 
course for victory and needed to make this pledge to secure the support of Eurosceptic MPs 
and party members. Another Conservative MP (Private interview), in Parliament at this time, 
supports the view that the EPP pledge was not needed for Cameron to win: 
When he was running for leader he promised some of the Eurosceptics that he 
would withdraw from the European Peoples Party in the European cohort. I 
don't think he had to make the commitment, but it was a commitment, for 
whatever reasons, that he made, perhaps to try and differentiate from other 
candidates, show his Eurosceptic credentials. Or possibly it was a demand from 
a small rump of the Conservative Party, the Bill Cashes and the Bernard 
Jenkins who were demanding this, along with Daniel Hannan in Europe. I don't 
know but I suspect that was the case. He fell for it. I think that he would have 
won anyway. 
 
This interpretation is reflective of the perspective of many Conservative MPs at the time. It 
is, of course, impossible to know for sure that Cameron would have won without the EPP 
pledge, but it is certainly plausible that he could have. However, this being the said, there is 
also evidence to suggest this was not the view of Cameron, his advisors, and many other 
members of the parliamentary party. 
Cameron and his advisors were confident they could win the most votes in the final MPs 
ballot if they were up against Davis and Clarke, but were concerned that he was competing 
Table 7.1: MP Ballots: Conservative Party Leadership Election, 2005 
 First Ballot Percentage Second Ballot Percentage 
David Davis 62 31.3 57 28.8 
David Cameron 56 28.3 90 45.4 
Liam Fox 42 21.2 51 25.8 
Kenneth Clarke 38 19.2   
Sources: Lynch and Garnett, (2007); Heppell (2008) 
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for the support of the same group of, predominately Eurosceptic MPs, as Fox (those who 
would not vote for Davis or Clarke) and was in danger of being eliminated in the first ballot 
as a result (Elliot and Hanning, 2012). Announcing his candidature in the last week of 
September, Fox pledged to leave the EPP if he were leader. Cameron and his team saw “the 
danger to his right flank, decided to break his ‘no promises’ rule and matched this sop to the 
Eurosceptic right” (Elliot and Hanning, 2012:291). This was effective in persuading many 
Eurosceptic MPs to support Cameron rather than Fox in the first ballot (Denham and O’Hara, 
2007; Elliot and Hanning, 2012). Many of the 56 MPs who had not declared their support for 
a candidate prior to the first ballot on the day voted for Cameron, his support rising from 27 
‘assumed supporters’ to 56 ‘real votes’ (Heppell, 2007:183). 
In addition, a YouGov survey of Conservative Party members in early September 2005 
indicated that if Davis and Cameron made the final ballot, the grassroots would elect Davis 
with 53% of the vote, to Cameron’s 36%. A repeated survey in early October 2005 showed 
that Cameron would now defeat Davis, 66% to 33%. This was remarkably close to the final 
result. In the last stage of the leadership election, the membership ballot, Cameron defeated 
Davis by 134,446 (67.7%) votes to 64,398 (32.3%). While it is not being claimed the EPP 
pledge was the only cause in the eventual success of the Cameron campaign, the modernize 
to win agenda and the sense Cameron was a ‘winner’ were obviously crucial factors as well, 
it nonetheless contributed to the turnaround witnessed.  
Graham Brady MP, Shadow Minister for Europe September 2004 – May 2007, believes that 
the EPP policy commitment was the significant factor in Cameron’s victory during the 2005 
leadership election:  
It is important to note that the key to Cameron’s leadership election was the 
pledge to take the Conservative Party out of the EPP. He had used this as a 
vehicle to secure the support of a significant number of very Eurosceptic 
colleagues. One thinks of people like Bill Cash who were voting for Cameron 
in that leadership election…. if Cameron had asked me for advice on that point 
I personally would have advised him that I didn't think it was the most 
important thing to do. I always thought it was somewhat of a diversion from 
the substantive changes. But it was more about the politics. It was positioning 
which was intended to demonstrate unshakeable Eurosceptic credentials. 
 
Malcolm Rifkind, Conservative MP 1974-1997 and 2005-2015, who announced that he 
would campaign for the party leadership in 2005 but withdrew before the official process 
began, also believes that this policy change was motivated by competition between Cameron 
and the other Eurosceptic candidates: 
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I think he recognised that, first, he had to get to the final two names that would 
be put to the party membership and his opponent at that time was Davis who 
had a strong Eurosceptic background. I think Cameron wanted to neutralise that 
potential advantage Davis might have had by demonstrating his own 
Eurosceptic credentials. I think that he does have Eurosceptic credentials, but 
they are not nearly as ideological. 
 
The evidence suggests that, while it may not have been the only contributory factor in 
Cameron making the EPP withdrawal commitment during the leadership campaign, 
competition between Cameron and the other candidates (Davis and Fox), viewed as having 
stronger Eurosceptic backgrounds, was the most significant factor in influencing this policy 
change. It was a commitment neither Hague, Duncan Smith, or Howard had previously made, 
despite Eurosceptic voices in the party campaigning for it during all three previous 
leaderships. It also mirrors the decision by Hague during the 1997 leadership campaign to 
commit to change party policy on the single currency to outflank his Eurosceptic rivals, 
suggesting competitive leadership elections are an important factor in policy change on 
Europe during this period. 
 
7.2 Ideological Composition of the Conservative Party 
 
7.2.1 Parliamentary Party, 2005-2010 
Following the 2005 general election the Eurosceptic component of the Conservative 
parliamentary party continued to increase proportionally, if only slightly, with the overall 
increase in the number of new MPs elected (Heppell and Hill, 2009). After the 2005 election 
91.4% of Conservative MPs were identified, or self-identified, as Eurosceptics. This is a 
1.6% increase on the previous 2001-2005 parliament (89.8%). However, it can be argued that 
by this point the Eurosceptic-Europhile distinction had become obsolete and that the Soft 
Eurosceptic-Hard Eurosceptic distinction had emerged as a more accurate way of identifying 
the ideological division over Europe in the parliamentary party. From the 181 Conservative 
MPs identified as Eurosceptic by Heppell and Hill (2009) it can be estimated that 89% took a 
Soft Eurosceptic ideological position and 11% a Hard Eurosceptic ideological position. 
The proportion of pro-European integration MPs had decreased by 1.3%, down from 4.5% in 
the 2001-2005 parliament to 3.5% after the 2005 election. The number of MPs deemed 
agnostic on the subject was broadly similar, 5% after the 2005 election, in comparison with 
5.4% in the previous parliament (Heppell and Hill, 2009). 
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As in the previous general elections since 1997, the trend of a proportionally more 
Eurosceptic, and less pro-European integration, parliamentary party continued. As stated in 
previous chapters, it is not possible, or sensible, to draw any direct causal link to any specific 
policy change and attribute this to the general rise and decline of Euroscepticism and pro-
Europeanism in the party. This was a necessary institutional condition, within the different 
levels of the Conservative Party, for policy in general to change in a Eurosceptic direction, 
but they did not directly cause the individuals with decision-making powers to make these 
choices. These are the result of other historical, structural, institutional, and ideational factors, 
in addition to acts of individual agency, that are discussed in this and the previous chapters. 
The significance of the parliamentary party after the 2005 general election was not the 
general rise in Euroscepticism itself, but the number of Conservative MPs elected who had 
strong Eurosceptic views that approached the hard-Eurosceptic end of the European 
ideological spectrum. These newly elected MPs were not only strongly Eurosceptic in their 
views but also active on the promoting these views. They included Douglas Carswell, Phillip 
Hollobone, David Davies, Brian Binley, Stewart Jackson, Anne Main, Phillip Davies, Peter 
Bone, and Mark Pritchard. 
These new MPs signified a new generation of Eurosceptic campaigners within the 
Conservative Party, who would enter parliament following the 2005 and 2010 elections, 
associated but distinctive from the veteran Eurosceptics of the 1990’s. Significantly, it was 
Phillip Davies who founded the ‘Better Off Out’ group in 2006, a cross-party organisation 
that advocated the UK leaving the EU. Fellow MPs from the 2005 intake that supported the 
launch of the group in Parliament included Douglas Carswell, David Davies, and Phillip 
Hollobone (ConservativeHome, 2006a). Davies (2016) explained when interviewed that: 
Lots of people would say 'we need to get powers back' but no one would 
actually say that we need to leave the EU. I made a speech at the Freedom 
Association saying that we should leave and then in April 2006 I started Better 
Off Out and we had a parliamentary launch. I expected that there would only be 
me at this parliamentary launch, as literally no one else had said that we should 
leave. Anyway, as it turned out 10 MPs turned up. I can't even remember who 
they all were. Eric Forth was there. Chris Chope, Nicholas and Anne 
Winterton, Phillip Hollobone, Douglas Carswell. I can't remember who else 
was there. Much to my astonishment. But that was great, because I thought that 
I was a lone wolf. So that is where we really got a bit of momentum in 
parliament for it. 
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This marked the point when Conservative MPs, who either supported the UK leaving the EU, 
wanted an in/out referendum, or powers repatriated from EU, began to become more 
organized and determined to see party policy move in their ideological direction. In general, 
however, this was still at an embryonic stage in the 2005-2010 parliament and there was little 
desire from Eurosceptics to ‘rock the boat’ in significant numbers before an election many 
saw as winnable. For example, in November 2007, only six Conservative MPs supported a 
Liberal Democrat parliamentary motion expressing regret that the government had not 
introduced a bill to hold an in/out referendum on UK membership of the EU (Cowley and 
Stuart, 2010). 
7.2.2 Shadow Cabinet, 2005-2010 
 
Cameron formed his first Shadow Cabinet on December 8th, 2005. As the proportion of the 
parliamentary identifying, or being classified, as Eurosceptic rose to a new high of 91.4% 
following the 2005 general election, the Shadow Cabinet followed the same trend. Of the 
twenty-three people in Cameron’s first Shadow Cabinet (excluding those shadow minsters 
with the right to ‘attend’) 100% were ‘Eurosceptic’ on the European ideological divide 
(Heppell and Hill, 2009). This proportion remained the same after Shadow Cabinet reshuffles 
on July 2nd, 2007 and June 18th, 2008. The only non-Eurosceptic MPs to join the Shadow 
Cabinet during the 2005-2010 parliament were Clarke (‘Europhile’) and Young (‘Agnostic’) 
in Cameron’s last reshuffle before the 2010 general election on January 19th, 2009. 
Cameron managed to surpass Duncan Smith and Howard in having no declared pro-European 
Shadow Cabinet member until Clarke joined in January 20095. However greater scrutiny 
reveals that Cameron appointed a number of moderates who leaned towards the ‘Soft’ 
Eurosceptic end of the European ideological spectrum. Shadow Cabinet members such as 
Lansley, Spelman, Willets, Lidington, Hunt, Grieve, and Clark, all fitted into this category, 
and represented the majority moderate Eurosceptic position. Cameron did have Shadow 
Cabinet members that leaned towards the ‘Hard’ Eurosceptic position, such as Fox, Villiers, 
and Davis, but they were a minority. Also gone were the veteran Eurosceptics who had 
periods in the Shadow Cabinet between 2001-2005, such as Jenkin, Cash, Forth, 
Whittingdale, and Ancram. Therefore, while it is accurate that Cameron maintained a 
consistently Eurosceptic Shadow Cabinet during his period as opposition leader, the Shadow 
                                                 
5 Clarke was offered a Shadow Cabinet position at the beginning of the Cameron leadership, but declined. 
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Cabinet was dominated by moderate ‘soft’ Eurosceptics, with the veteran Eurosceptic 
campaigners of previous Shadow Cabinets largely absent. 
7.2.3 Party Members, 2005-2010 
There is more data available on the views of Conservative Party members towards Europe 
during the 2005-2010 parliament than during the 2001-2005 parliament. This includes a 
YouGov survey of party members conducted in June 2009 for Webb and Childs (2011), in 
addition to a series of surveys carried out by the blog and activist website ConservativeHome 
founded in March 2005 by the former Conservative Party staffer Tim Montgomerie. 
Shortly after its foundation, ConservativeHome started regular surveys of party members. 
The surveys were accessible to all readers of the ConservativeHome website, but those 
completing the surveys were asked to identify whether they were a party member or non-
member. The data subsequently published would be collated from those self-identifying as 
party members. As with internal party surveys of members reported in newspapers, though 
these surveys should be treated with caution, they can provide some information on the 
position of party members on European policy during specific periods, in the absence of 
surveys from established polling agencies. 
An early example of this concerned party policy towards the EU Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP). In April 2006 ConservativeHome (2006b) conducted a survey of their ‘Members 
Panel’ on statements that should be included in the next Conservative general election 
manifesto. In this survey 68% of Conservative party members agreed that the statement ‘the 
European Union should return responsibility for fishing and aid policies to member states’ 
should ‘definitely’ be in the next manifesto. As ConservativeHome (2006b) stated this 
showed a ‘big appetite within the Tory grassroots for practical measures to address the 
continuing loss of British sovereignty to the EU’. Both repatriation commitments had been 
party policy under Howard. However, in June 2006, a party spokesperson confirmed that it 
would no longer be policy to negotiate a withdrawal from the CFP and that if elected the 
party would attempt to reform the CFP instead. There was no similar clarification on EU 
foreign aid contributions, in the manifesto or separately. This is an example of the new 
leadership changing European policy, despite evidence that suggests that the party 
membership preferred a renewed commitment to the existing, more Eurosceptic policy. This 
is likely because although the issue was important to party members, it possessed low 
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salience to the general public, and was a commitment that would have been extremely 
difficult to deliver successfully.  
 
In July 2006, the ConservativeHome (2006c) Members Panel survey asked party members 
whether they supported the aims of the recently launched Better Off Out campaign. Thirty 
percent of respondents replied that they ‘support this campaign and hope that Britain will 
eventually leave the EU’; 33% that they had ‘sympathy for this campaign’ but were 
concerned that political rivals would use the issue ‘to portray the Conservative Party as 
divided on Europe’, and therefore did not support the campaign; while 33% stated they 
opposed the campaign and wanted to see ‘Conservative Party fighting for British interests 
within the EU’. In total, therefore, 66% of self-declaring Conservative members in July 2006 
either supported or had sympathy with the idea of the UK leaving the EU. This is in contrast 
with the survey of members conducted by the Conservative Party in 1996 discussed in 
Chapter 5, which showed that though resistant to further integration with the EU, most party 
members supported the UK remaining inside the EU (Deans, 1996). In the 
ConservativeHome members’ survey, only a third opted for the pro-EU membership option. 
It is important to note that while we are not comparing like-with-like, this does provide some 
evidence for the view that during the 10-year period between the two surveys, Conservative 
Party members’ attitude to Europe was moving in a ‘Hard’ Eurosceptic direction. 
This development in the attitude of party members to Europe in the decade since 1996 is also 
reflected in the attitude of members to UKIP. In a further ConservativeHome (2006d) 
members survey in December 2006, 42% party members identified UKIP as the ‘other 
political party closest to the views of Conservative Party members’. Although there is no 
comparative data for earlier in this period, it is reasonable to surmise that this figure would 
have been smaller during the 1997-2001 parliament. This would likely have been due to the 
much lower profile of UKIP during this period, but also a difference in the ideological 
position on Europe at this time. As an internal survey of the party membership indicated in 
1996, though most wanted powers returned and the veto protected, most also supported the 
UK staying members of the EU (Deans, 1996). It is, though, additional evidence to suggest 
the drift of a sizable proportion of the party membership to a more ‘hard’ Eurosceptic stance 
on Europe. 
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In addition to this, we also have data for the attitudes of party members to the Lisbon Treaty. 
The survey was conducted by ConservativeHome (2007) in October 2007, and asked 
members for their response to a number of questions on the Conservative’s position on the 
Lisbon Treaty, as well as wider European policy. On the subject of the new EU treaty itself, 
77% of party members agreed that the Lisbon Treaty ‘amounts to a significant surrender of 
British powers and should be opposed’. With regard to EU powers, 67% of members 
supported the idea of repatriating powers, such as social and employment policy. On 
constitutional reform of the UK-EU relationship, 63% of respondents supported ‘a 
referendum that mandated an incoming Conservative government to negotiate back to the 
idea of a free trade area’. Finally, only 33% agreed that if the Lisbon Treaty had already been 
ratified ‘it will be very difficult to undo, and the Conservative Party would be unwise to 
promise to do so’.  
These surveys show that Conservative policy on Europe, as it developed over this parliament, 
varied in the extent that it went with the grain of grassroots’ opinion. Despite grassroots’ 
opinion being against the scrapping of the Howard pledge to repatriate control of UK fishing, 
the Conservative leadership took a different policy option, opting to commit to reform the 
current EU system. Additionally, while grassroots’ and leadership positions on opposition to 
the Lisbon Treaty were aligned, the evidence presented above suggests party members did 
not agree that a future Conservative government should drop the commitment to a 
referendum on Lisbon if it had already been ratified by all EU member states. In these cases, 
the key factor in this policy change is what the Conservative leadership perceived as being 
practically deliverable. They believed they had a good chance of forming the next 
government and did not want to be consumed by years of difficult negotiations with the EU. 
Further to this, it was also about managing the potential for conflict with the EU in the next 
parliament, in order to increase the chances of being successful in other areas. Cameron had 
already made a high-profile commitment to negotiate back control of social and employment 
policy, which would have been difficult to achieve on its own. Adding fishing, foreign aid, 
trade, or agriculture, would have amounted to a full renegotiation of UK membership terms, 
which would have gone against the leadership’s desire to keep European policy low-key in a 
future government. 
As well as the ConservativeHome surveys, we also have data from a YouGov survey of 1613 
Conservative members, carried out for Webb and Childs (2011). This data was collected in 
June 2009, towards the end of the parliament, in comparison with the ConservativeHome  
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surveys from the beginning and middle of the parliament. Table 7.2 shows the mean scores of 
party members responses when asked to place themselves on a 0-10 scale, 0 representing the 
position that the UK should integrate ‘fully’ with the EU, and 10 representing the position 
that the UK should ‘protect its independence from the EU’ (Webb and Childs, 2011). The 
responses are also separated into three clusters; Traditional Conservative Party (social 
Conservative Party, support well-established institutions, and moderate state economic 
intervention) Thatcherites (economically right-wing, suspicious of both social and economic 
state intervention), and Liberal Conservative Party (economically right-wing, but socially 
liberal) (Webb and Childs, 2011). 
As the ConservativeHome survey also shows, the data in Table 7.2 confirms that 
Conservative members, as of June 2009, are ‘firmly on the Eurosceptic wing’ (Webb and 
Childs, 2011). The majority, nearly 75%, are classified as traditional Conservative Party or 
Thatcherites. As Table 7.2 indicates, the mean score for both groups were around 9 on the 0-
10 scale, suggesting a ‘hard’ Eurosceptic attitude to Europe. 
The smaller liberal conservative grouping, representing around 25% of the party members, 
produces a mean score of 7.7. While obviously still placing this group on the Eurosceptic half 
of the spectrum, it does suggest that a minority group with the party membership held more 
‘soft’ Eurosceptic views at this point in time. Overall, a picture emerges from this survey of 
the Conservative membership leaning heavily towards a ‘hard’ Eurosceptic attitude towards 
the UK-EU relationship. 
The picture overall is of grassroots’ opinion moving in a harder Eurosceptic direction, with 
greater proportions of party members supporting both a radical restructuring of the UK-EU 
relationship or leaving the EU entirely. 
Table 7.2:  Conservative Members Attitude to European Integration, June 2009 
 
Group 
 
Mean Score on 0-10 Scale 
 
n= 
 
Liberal conservative 
 
7.7 
 
411 
 
Thatcherite 
 
9.1 
 
598 
 
Traditional conservative 
 
9.06 
 
605 
 
Total 
 
8.73 
 
1614 
Source: Webb and Childs (2011) 
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7.3 Rival Political Parties 
 
 
7.3.1 UKIP, 2005-2010 
 
If the 2001-2005 parliament was the period when political parties such as the Conservative 
Party had started to take notice of UKIP, the 2005-2010 parliament was the period when 
UKIP began to emerge as a serious political rival for the patronage of Conservative activists 
and voters. UKIP recovered quickly from their disappointing 2005 election result, where they 
achieved only 2.2% of the vote, stimulated by three main factors. The first was the election of 
Nigel Farage as party leader, a politician with considerably more national appeal than 
previous UKIP leaders, and someone with a determination to turn UKIP into a fully 
functioning political party that campaigned on a wide range of issues. Secondly, UKIP were 
successful in attracting some of the Conservative voters and activists alienated by the liberal, 
metropolitan Conservatism associated with Cameron (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Thirdly, 
UKIP also benefited from the rise in the salience of EU immigration, capitalizing on the 
discontent with policies for stricter border controls. 
At the 2009 European elections, although UKIP only increased their share of the vote by 
0.4%, gaining a single seat on their 2004 performance, the result was still significant. This 
was because, for the first time in their history, UKIP had come second in a national election, 
pushing the Labour Party into 3rd place. It had been helped by the MPs’ expenses scandal, 
with UKIP managing to exploit the anger generated towards established political parties 
(Ford and Goodwin, 2014a, 2014b; Ford, et al, 2012). However, while the expenses scandal 
and concern over immigration were certainly important, research suggests that 
Euroscepticism was still the main driver of support for UKIP at the 2009 European elections 
(Whitaker and Lynch, 2011). Further analysis showed UKIP were drawing their support from 
centre and centre -right voters, with support increasing regionally in the West Midlands, 
South West, North West, Yorkshire, and the North East (Whitaker and Lynch, 2011; Ford 
and Goodwin, 2014). These were exactly the voters and electoral regions the Conservative 
Party needed if they were to return to government at the next election. Even before the 2009 
European elections, an ICM poll had showed that 14% of Conservative voters could 
potentially switch to voting UKIP at the next election. 
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The extent to which the rise of UKIP influenced the policy thinking of Conservative 
parliamentarians and the party leadership, at this point, is limited. Davies (2016) argues that, 
in contrast to the divisions to come during the Coalition years, the Conservative Party was 
actually relatively united on Europe during the 2005-2010 parliament: 
After 2005, with Cameron as leader, in effect from that moment on, the 
Conservative Party was united on Europe. In the sense that aside from a dozen 
or so fanatics, your Clarkes, who are representative of very few Tory MPs now. 
Everyone agreed that we needed powers back from the EU. The whole 
parliamentary party was agreed. So, we were agreed on the direction of travel 
as a party. We were united as a party. With Major, you had some MPs that 
wanted to go more into the EU…Under Cameron we were all united because 
we all wanted to get powers back. The question was how many? I wanted to get 
them all back and he wanted to get some back, but on the direction of travel we 
were all the same. So, in that sense we were all happy. So, when the media kept 
banging on about splits in the Tory Party over the EU. That wasn't how we saw 
it. We were happy that at long last we all wanted to travel in the same direction. 
 
Andrew Mackay, Senior Political and Parliamentary Advisor to Cameron 2005-2009, doesn’t 
believe the rise of UKIP during the parliament had any direct influence over changing the 
content of European policy during this parliament. However, there was the fear that if UKIP 
replicated their success at the 2009 European elections at the next general election it could 
deny the Conservative Party a return to government by appealing to Eurosceptic 
Conservative voters (Mackay, 2016). Smith (2015:372) suggests that this was also 
concerning MPs, candidates, and party members, and directly links this to these groups being 
‘more vocal in their own Euroscepticism’ and for continued calls for a referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty. While there is undoubtedly some truth to this, it should also be considered that 
these groups within the Conservative Party were equally motivated by opposition to the 
integrationist ideas within the treaty itself and were merely reflecting long-standing 
opposition to these ideas since 1997. 
It does appear that, although UKIP had started to worry the leadership towards the end of the 
2005-2010 parliament, this was too late for it to have influenced the content of European 
policy in this period. In early 2007, for example, Lord Ashcroft, Deputy Chairman of the 
Conservative Party, briefed a meeting of Conservative MPs to ‘dispel the idea that UKIP 
presented a serious threat’ (Bale, 2016:305). UKIP’s electoral success would have delayed 
impact, manifesting itself following the 2010 election, when it could be more clearly 
demonstrated that UKIP’s appeal to voters could be significant in a ‘first order’ election. This 
will be examined in detail in the next chapter. 
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A growing body of academic literature makes the case that ‘extreme right’, or ‘radical right’, 
political parties in Europe, such as UKIP, have had success in influencing more mainstream 
parties to adopt their own policies, in order to prevent the seepage of ‘their’ voters to these 
parties at elections (Schain, 2006; Jean-Yves Camus, 2011). Others, such as Mudde (2013), 
are less convinced of the impact of so called ‘populist radical right parties’, arguing where 
they have made a difference it has been ‘limited’, and usually only on the question of 
immigration policy. Even in this area the impact is only to increase the salience of the 
immigration issue, not to cause mainstream parties to adopt firmer immigration policies, 
which are likely to have shifted for other reasons (Mudde, 2013). It is the conclusion of this 
thesis that where UKIP is concerned, during the 2005-2010 period, the impact on the content 
of Conservative European policy was also limited. It may have increased the salience of 
Europe leading up to and following certain events, such as the 2009 European elections, but 
its electoral impact had not yet reached the point at which the Conservative leadership needed 
to make concessions to it on Europe. Changes made up to this period, and during it, were the 
result of alternative causal factors. 
 
7.3.2 The Labour Party and European Policy, 2005-2010 
 
The main issues that dominated European policy for the Labour government during the 2005-
2010 parliament was the controversial resurrection of EU constitutional reform in the form of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the perceived breaking of Labour’s manifesto commitment to hold a 
referendum, and the unexpectedly large increases in Eastern European migration to the UK 
following the end of immigration restrictions on new EU members in 2007. 
In May and June 2005, referendums in France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitutional 
Treaty. After a short pause, many of the main features of the unratified treaty were 
repackaged as the Lisbon Treaty, with all member states agreeing to a final text of the treaty 
in December 2007. In its 2005 manifesto, Labour had promised a referendum on the 
Constitutional Treaty before parliamentary ratification. In April 2007, on the grounds that the 
new agreement was no longer a ‘constitutional’ treaty, Blair confirmed that there would not 
be a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.  
In August 2007, the Conservative Party launched the ‘Don’t Let Brown Let EU Down’ 
campaign to put pressure on the government, and new Labour leader Gordon Brown, to hold 
a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty before the next election (Cameron, 2007b; Hague, 2007). 
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In September 2007, Cameron made his famous ‘cast-iron guarantee’ to readers of The Sun 
that the Conservative Party would hold a referendum on Lisbon. As such, part of the 
motivation behind the Conservative Party making this policy decision at this point in time 
was in direct response to the Labour Party’s own decision not to hold a referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty. Christopher Howarth, Senior Researcher to the Shadow Europe Minister Mark 
Francois MP 2007-2010, agrees that this was an important motivation for the Conservative 
leadership: 
If this looked the same as the Constitution there was a domestic political point 
you could score which was that the Labour Party promised a referendum on the 
Constitution and they welched on the deal, because they stood for election on 
the basis that they would hold a referendum on the constitution. So as an 
opposition party holding the government to account...it was quite powerful, 
powerful because it was true. They stood for election on one basis and it looked 
like they were trying to sneak something through…Cameron wanted to be 
Prime Minister and he was on the sceptical side. Why not? You agree with it 
anyway, and all these things are coming together. So, it was a matter of 
trust…it is a logical thing for an opposition party that wants to take over to say 
that we will promise a referendum on this. 
 
The motivation behind the Lisbon Treaty pledge and referendum campaign in August-
September 2007, therefore, was at least partly stimulated by the desire to exploit a 
vulnerability of the Labour Party over a manifesto commitment which many observers felt 
the government was failing to adhere to for politically convenient reasons. 
The second aspect of Labour Party decision-making that influenced European policy was the 
gradual rise in the numbers of migrants moving to the UK from EU member states. In 2004 
ten nations, mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, had joined the EU. The UK 
government, along with Sweden and Ireland, were the only member states to not immediately 
impose transitional immigration controls on the citizens of the new member states. As a 
result, and in combination with the strong UK economy, 423,000 people moved to the UK 
between 2004-2012 from the new EU nations (Watt and Wintour, 2015). In May 2007, 
Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU, this time with some transitional restrictions on numbers 
and entitlements enforced until 2014. Caroline Spelman (2016), Shadow Cabinet member 
2005-2010, explained to me that in her view the unforeseen implications of this policy began 
to emerge during this parliament: 
Undoubtedly, the migration problem started. Rather naively Labour made a 
huge mistake in 2004 of not putting in place or requiring any transitional 
measures. Most other states had transitional measures, such as Germany and 
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France, liberal countries like the Netherlands. Their transition measures 
included the numbers coming from Eastern Europe as well as the access to their 
benefit system…So that had the knock-on effect of making the UK even more 
attractive to come to. It made it attractive to come to because there weren't 
quotas on the numbers, you automatically got an insurance number and pretty 
much automatic support for the same support a British citizen would have. 
Having said that very few migrants actually applied for JSA, they came here to 
work. Indeed, they got jobs, jobs that people weren't prepared to do. But that 
did cause a lot of resentment in communities that are predominantly white and 
poor. UKIP exploited that discontent. 
 
The decision on transitional controls for new EU member states made by the Labour 
government did contribute to growing discontent within UK public opinion on immigration 
policy. In the long term, this was exploited by UKIP. However, it is difficult to support the 
view that public discontent was growing in a significant way during the 2005-2010 
parliament. As survey data from the Ipsos Mori indicates (Figure 7.1), the percentage of the 
public ranking immigration as the most important issue facing the country was relatively 
stable, with the characteristic peaks when immigration policy was particularly prominent in 
the news cycle. Such as during mid-2005, when Bulgaria and Romania officially joined the 
EU. 
In addition, it is also difficult to entirely support the view that UKIP were making a 
significant impact on the domestic political environment during the 2005-2010 parliament. 
As voting intention data from Ipsos Mori shows (Figure 7.2), political support for UKIP 
remained flat for most of this parliament, increasing modestly in the period up to and 
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Figure 7.1: UK Public saying Immigration No1 Issue, 2004-2012
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following the 2009 European elections. If UKIP were exploiting public anger with 
immigration, especially from the EU, for political support during the 2005-2010 parliament, 
this did not strongly translate into increasing national support. Even when considering the 
2009 European elections, UKIP only increased their vote share by 0.4% on their 2004 
performance. This is hardly evidence of a dramatic rise in UKIP support during this period, 
though there is some indication it was beginning to alarm some Conservative MPs and 
candidates after 2009 (Smith, 2015). It is much more likely that public concern over EU 
immigration and UKIP started to put real political pressure on the Conservative position on 
European policy during the 2010-2015 parliament, and this pressure materialised gradually 
over a number of years. However, the political origins of these sources of future pressure on 
the Conservative Party in government were indirectly the result of decisions made by the 
Labour Party during the previous parliament over new EU member state transitional controls. 
 
 
 
7.4 Public Opinion 
 
 
7.4.1 Euroscepticism and UK Public Opinion 
 
Table 7.3 shows the changes in public attitude to the UK-EU relationship between 2005 and 
2013. As in previous chapters this data is taken from British Social Attitudes 33. As Table 7.3 
shows, data is missing from 2007, 2009, and 2010-2011, when the British Attitudes Survey  
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Figure 7.2: UK Voting Intention, 2005-2010 
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did not ask interviewees these questions on UK-EU integration. However, extending the table 
to include data from the 2012 and 2013 surveys enables us to encompass the entire 2005-
2010 parliament while also seeing the position of public opinion on European integration a 
few years later, in the early Coalition period suggests that support for the ‘status quo’ on the 
UK-EU relationship was falling, while at the same time ‘hard’ Eurosceptic attitudes, leaving 
the EU, were increasing. In 2005, those agreeing with the statement that the UK ‘should 
leave the EU’ were 16% of those surveyed. In 2012 this had increased to 30%. Those who 
agreed that we should ‘Leave things as they are’ decreased from 24% in 2005 to 16% in 
2012. Those agreeing that the UK should stay in the EU but reduce its powers, the ‘soft’ 
Eurosceptic position, remained relatively unchanged from 2005 to 2012. As such, the data 
suggests that during 2005-2010 public opinion was moving in a more ‘hard’ Eurosceptic 
direction, with support for the UK leaving the EU and the status quo increasing and 
decreasing, respectively. Support for the ‘soft’ Eurosceptic option, remain EU members but 
seek to reduce power it has in the UK, remained the most popular position. This was also, 
broadly speaking, still the European policy the Conservative Party had been advocating under 
each leadership since 1997, with Cameron being no exception during the 2005-2010 
parliament. 
 
 
 
Table 7.3: UK Public Attitudes towards the EU, 2005-2013 
 
% Agreeing 2005 2006 2008 2012 2013 
Leave the EU 16 15 20 30 26 
Stay in EU but reduce its power 36 36 35 37 39 
Leave things as are 24 27 24 16 19 
Stay in EU and increase its powers 10 9 9 9 6 
Work for single European government 4 4 3 2 3 
Source: British Social Attitudes 33 (2016). 
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During the same period that the British Social Attitudes Survey suggests that public opinion 
was becoming more Eurosceptic towards the UK-EU relationship, survey data also suggests 
that the public gave Europe a low priority. Figure 7.3 shows data from the British Social 
Attitudes Survey. During the 2005-2010 parliament this suggests that Europe decreased in 
significance for the general public. This is partly explained by the priority public opinion 
gave to economic and employment related policy in a parliament dominated by the 2007-
2008 financial crash. However, as Figure 7.4 indicates, public opinion gave a similar low 
priority to European policy in 2006, before the financial crash. Cameron’s desire to give 
European policy a low priority during the 2005-2010 parliament was therefore also matched 
by the priority given to Europe by the general public. 
On the question of the EU Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, the attitude 
of the general public broadly correlates with Conservative Party policy during this period. 
Conservative Party policy towards both EU treaties was firmly against the treaties themselves 
and for a referendum to decide whether Parliament should ratify them or not. Ipsos Mori data 
also shows public opinion was supportive of the party position on national referendums, but 
more ambivalent on rejecting the treaties themselves. In June 2005, 67% thought there should 
be a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, while 56% thought it should be rejected.  In 
September 2007, 81% agreed that the treaty should be put to a referendum. However, in the 
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same September 2007 survey, only 46% said they opposed the new treaty, with 44% 
supporting it. Interestingly, in March 2008 an Ipsos Mori survey also found that an in/out 
referendum (38%) was more popular than a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty alone (18%). It 
does need to be pointed out that 36% of people in the same survey either didn’t want a 
referendum at all or didn’t have an opinion either way. Public opinion was, therefore, in line 
with party policy on the need for national referendums on the EU reform treaties, but 
considerably less animated with the contents of the treaties themselves. 
Over the course of the 2005-2010 parliament, Conservative Party policy continued to go with 
the grain of popular attitudes towards the UK-EU relationship. This can be broadly summed 
up as increasingly soft Eurosceptic (in favour of EU membership but keen to see a reduction 
in EU powers) and supportive of referendums on new EU treaties. As the British Social 
Attitudes Survey suggests, there was also a growing trend in public opinion to support the 
UK leaving the EU. This does not appear to have coincided with any subsequent moves to 
more ‘hard’ Eurosceptic policies by the Conservative Party in the parliament currently under 
consideration and may be more relevant to the analysis on policy change in the following 
chapter. Nonetheless, it is important to note the increasing proportion of the public who 
favoured a ‘hard’ Eurosceptic policy during this parliament. There is no substantial evidence 
to suggest changes in public opinion during this parliament was a significant factor in 
changes to Conservative Party policy on Europe over the same period. As Spelman (2016) 
made clear when interviewed, her experience was that the general public had little knowledge 
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of or interest in the Lisbon Treaty process, which was much more likely to animate 
Eurosceptic parliamentarians. It remained a political condition of the structural environment 
that provided an incentive for policy to be broadly maintained, though it did not provide the 
motivation for specific alterations on the policy platform on Europe itself. 
 
 
7.5 Domestic Political Context 
 
The domestic political context for the Conservative Party in opposition during the 2005-2010 
parliament can be separated into two periods, divided in the middle between the September 
2007 collapse of Northern Rock and the subsequent 2008 financial and economic crisis. Pre-
September 2007 Cameron in opposition emphasised policy areas that were not traditionally 
associated with the Conservative Party, such as environmentalism, global inequality, and 
international development, in an attempt to improve the image of the Conservative Party in 
marginal constituencies that had remained loyal to the Labour Party between 1997 and 2005. 
Following the onset of the financial crisis in late 2007, the context shifted to economic policy 
and strategies to increase GDP growth, employment levels, and reduce the increasing public 
accounts deficit. In both these periods, therefore, different political priorities ensured 
European policy was not given a high profile by the leadership. This reflected public opinion 
during this parliament, which also shifted towards prioritising economic policy as the 
financial crisis increased unemployment and stagnated wages.  
In much the same way as the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks and the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq dominated the domestic political agenda during the 2001-2005 
parliament, the 2007-2008 financial crash meant the economy and the public finances 
dominated the 2005-2010 parliament. As Spelman (2016) notes, ‘I honestly don’t think that 
between 2005 and 2008 that the Europe issue featured heavily’. In the build-up to the 
expected general election in October 2007, Europe also didn’t feature much either, as the 
Conservative campaign was focused on ‘Brown’s economic competence’ (Spelman, 2016). 
This enabled Cameron to stick to his commitment to prevent the party ‘banging on’ about 
Europe in public and not re-open the subject until a change in the external political 
environment compelled him to address it. The eventual need to address substantive areas of 
European policy, the internal question of the EPP membership aside, would come when the 
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Lisbon Treaty ratification process was completed. It would not come, in the 2005-2010 
parliament, from the domestic political environment. 
As a result of the abandoned general election of autumn 2007, which damaged Brown’s 
political authority and abruptly ended his honeymoon period as Prime Minister, how the 
public viewed both the leaders themselves and the main parties also began to shift. As Figure 
7.5 shows, reporting data from Ipsos Mori during the 2005-2010 parliament, Cameron 
significantly improved his leadership satisfaction ratings. This was in contrast to Brown, who 
saw his dramatically fall over the same period, although these did recover slightly later on in 
the parliament as the 2010 general election grew closer. Similarly, support for the 
Conservative Party survey also increased steadily, as presented in Figure 7.3. This 
improvement was largely built on a successful strategy of questioning Labour and Brown’s 
economic competence following the financial crash. This enabled Cameron to avoid the fate 
of previous leaderships since 1997 by not feeling compelled to change course and re-focus on 
policy areas popular with core supporters, such as Europe and immigration, to help improve 
poor ratings. This, combined with clear lead on which party would have the strongest 
European policy (see Figure 7.6), enabled the leadership to approach the 2010 election 
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Figure 7.5: UK Leadership Satisfaction Rating, 2006-2010
Labour Conservatives Liberal Democrats
 192 
relatively free from domestic political pressure to make significant changes to European 
policy. 
 
7.6 International Political Context 
 
During the 2005-2010 parliament it was the international political context, and the politics of 
the EU institutions in Brussels, that contributed more to changes in Conservative European 
policy than the domestic political environment in the UK. Two main factors contributed to 
these changes in policy. Firstly, there was the political composition of the European 
Parliament and the difficulty of finding acceptable new Eurosceptic partners for the 
Conservative MEPs, which forced the Conservative Party to delay leaving the EPP-ED until 
after the 2009 European elections. Secondly, the completion of the Lisbon Treaty ratification 
process before the 2010 general election forced the party to change their commitment to hold 
a referendum. This in turn influenced Cameron into committing to future legislation such as 
the ‘referendum lock’ and the ‘UK sovereignty Bill’ that would prevent a future Conservative 
government from legally being able to refuse a referendum in similar circumstances. 
Cameron and the Conservative leadership had to react to these political developments in 
continental Europe and the EU to maintain coherence and credibility to their European 
policy, to satisfy opinion within their own parliamentary and grassroots’ ranks, and in the 
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case of the EPP-ED decision, to prevent damage to the party reputation. This section will 
now explore in detail each of these two cases. 
7.6.1 The European Peoples’ Party 
As mentioned previously in this chapter, Cameron was successful in securing the leadership 
of the Conservative Party in December 2005, partly though not entirely, on a commitment to 
withdraw Conservative MEPs from the EPP-ED grouping in the European Parliament. 
Publicly, no commitment was made on a timetable for this policy to be implemented. 
Privately, however, it is clear the commitment was for MEPs to leave the EPP-ED soon after 
Cameron was elected. The creation of the new Eurosceptic grouping would follow. Daniel 
Hannan MEP, a Eurosceptic campaigner for leaving the EPP-ED since his election in 1999, 
appears to have understood the commitment from Cameron was to withdraw ‘on day one’ of 
his leadership (Spicer, 2012:571). Spicer (2012:575) also states that the commitment was to 
withdraw ‘overnight’ following a Cameron victory. However, in July 2006, with the policy 
still not implemented, Cameron announced that the MEPs would remain in the EPP-ED until 
after the 2009 European elections. The time between would be used to organise the new 
group. 
The main reason for this change in policy, from a process that was expected to take weeks to 
one that they acknowledged would now take years, was that the leadership did not anticipate 
the difficulty they would face in finding acceptable Eurosceptic partners in the European 
Parliament. Howarth (2016), who worked closely with the Shadow Europe Minister on 
implementing this policy during the 2005-2010 parliament, explained to me the main 
problems they faced: 
…it had to look credible. Just giving a leadership order that the MEPs would 
leave the EPP immediately, which of course he could have done as soon as he 
became leader in 2005. If he had done that some of the MEPs would have 
probably mutinied. The MEPs were split between the very pro-EPP, almost 
federalist types, less of those exist now, and the diehard Eurosceptics, Dan 
Hannan and the like, who probably would have ended up leaving on his own 
account. The leadership of the MEPs had a very difficult job. The centre was 
telling them to leave and sit on their own, they were very vocal that this would 
lose them all their committee posts and then whatever influence they had. This 
was not what they wanted to do. 
 
It would seem, therefore, that the leadership were not prepared to force Conservative MEPs 
to leave the EPP-ED without a credible new group to move to first. Not doing so would have 
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led to their MEPs losing political influence in Brussels. The prospect of a high-profile row 
with both Eurosceptic and pro-integration MEPs is also likely to have acted to encourage the 
leadership to make adjustments to this policy. Howarth (2016) also explained to me the 
difficulty in finding partners for the new group: 
 
…to be credible you had to find a new group or one of the existing groups…they 
thought they would get a hammering in the media if they left the EPP and joined 
a group that a) had UKIP in it, or B) it had Lega Nord in it, for instance. So, this 
was the strategic problem. You had to find enough Eurosceptic, moderate 
parties…the sad fact is that in Europe there aren't many centre-right, Eurosceptic, 
free market, pro-Atlanticist parties. They don't really exist. You're trying to make 
bricks with no clay. 
 
The reputational damage that might follow from co-operating with political parties that might 
hold extreme or eccentric views, and the political ammunition this could give to domestic 
political opponents, also contributed to the decision to delay implementing the policy. More 
time was needed to find enough suitable centre-right parties to work with in order to form a 
new group. Waiting until after the 2009 elections provided more time to examine potential 
partners and left open the prospect of new moderate parties winning seats to the European 
Parliament at that election, with whom the party could potentially work with safely. 
This is an example of the international and the domestic political contexts contributing to 
policy change. New information gathered by the party with regard to the situation in the 
European Parliament and the position of Conservative MEPs, stimulated policy change by 
convincing the party leadership that forming a new grouping too soon could produce negative 
political consequences for the party in Westminster. This would be in the form of reputational 
damage and a high-profile display of internal division if the party leadership was to keep to 
the original policy of leaving the EPP-ED quickly by forming alliances with perceived 
extremist MEPs. Though the initial stimulus for change has its origins in the international 
political environment, consequences most feared by the leadership in Westminster appear to 
have been domestic in origin. 
 
7.6.2 The Lisbon Treaty, 2007-2009 
The second part of the international political context, which changed European policy for the 
Conservative Party as they reacted to political developments in the EU, was the negotiation 
and ratification process for the Lisbon Treaty. Negotiated during 2007, with formal 
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agreement in Lisbon on December 18th 2007, the Lisbon Treaty was an agreement between 
the member states to reform the existing treaties of the EU. Though the intention was to 
remove or play down those aspects of the Constitutional Treaty that had proved controversial 
in many member states (Bache, et al, 2013), in reality the ‘vast majority of its provisions 
were retained in the Lisbon Treaty’ (Bache, et al, 2013:177). Reforms such as an expansion 
of QMV into all EU policy areas apart from taxation and foreign affairs, a President of the 
European Council, and a de facto EU Foreign Minister, remained from the Constitutional 
Treaty. The Conservative Party had opposed the Constitutional Treaty in their 2005 
manifesto, as they had opposed the Nice and Amsterdam Treaties. As such, it was 
‘reasonably clear’ the Cameron leadership would oppose the new treaty (Howarth, 2016). 
Howarth (2016), who also worked on the response to the Lisbon Treaty process, suggests that 
while the opportunity to call for a referendum on Lisbon and exploit the Labour 
government’s resistance to holding one themselves was a motivation for the Conservative 
leadership, the ideas and principles contained in the treaty were also an important factor. As 
he explained when interviewed: 
When the final text came through of what the reform treaty would be we 
obviously had to find out pretty quickly what was in it and how much of it was 
the same. I remember on the night that we got the text, quite late in the evening, 
the key things were the President, QMV, the foreign minister…It was on that 
basis that Hague and Cameron decided, I think one of them was on holiday 
because it was a phone call, they decided that 'It's got a president in it, it has 
more going to QMV. On that basis, I'm going to call for a referendum.'…It 
wasn't just opportunistic...they already thought that European integration had 
gone too far. They would have opposed it. If it had been really trivial, which it 
wasn't, if the Lisbon Treaty had been what Blair said it was, just a tidying up 
exercise, a few things about how the Council worked...it might have looked 
over the top to promise a referendum on something that didn't really have any 
real meat in it. That would have been more difficult. If it had nothing in it, they 
may have opposed it on principle in Parliament but calling for a referendum I 
think they set the test that it had to have something substantial in it… 
 
This suggests that the while the opportunity to create a political divide between the 
Conservative Party and the Labour government over Europe was a motivation for the 
commitment to a referendum, the substantive ideas within the Lisbon Treaty itself 
surrounding the deepening of European integration was also an important reason for the 
Conservative leadership to oppose it. Not to do so would have been to reject the party 
position on integration, as set out in each Conservative manifesto since 1997, which was to 
oppose further UK-EU integration. As Howarth (2016) suggests, if the treaty had not 
 196 
contained major integrationist elements, it is plausible they would have still opposed it at 
Westminster to satisfy parliamentary and grassroots’ opinion, but not called for a referendum. 
The decision was therefore a reaction to both the substantive ideas agreed by EU member 
states in the treaty, in addition to the position of the Labour government. 
Cameron (2007b) and Hague’s (2007) commitment on the Lisbon Treaty in the summer of 
2007 was that a Conservative government, if the treaty had not already been ratified by all 
EU member states, would hold a referendum in the UK and campaign for a ‘No’ vote. 
Following the appointment of Brown as Prime Minister in June 2007, and the prospect of a 
general election in the autumn, the potential for the party being in a position to implement 
this commitment was real. The potential for a snap general election ended in October 2007, 
when Brown decided against it. If the parliament went to May 2010, the Lisbon ratification 
process was highly likely to have been completed and the Conservative Party would need a 
new policy position towards a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. 
The Conservative leadership managed to delay changing their position on the Lisbon Treaty 
while the ratification period concluded with a holding position which stated that they would 
‘not let matters rest there’ if the treaty was fully ratified before the next general election. The 
ratification was drawn out, as the new treaty was controversial in a number of EU member 
states, and by the end of 2008 Ireland, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Germany had still not 
ratified the treaty (Bache, et al, 2013). Ireland only adopted the treaty following a second 
referendum in October 2009. In the end, after pressure from the EU and other member states 
to complete the process, the Czech Republic became the final EU country to formally ratify 
the treaty in November 2009. 
This change in the international political context, that the Lisbon Treaty had now come into 
legal effect as of December 1st 2009, meant the Conservative leadership had to change their 
policy towards the treaty. It was no longer possible for an incoming Conservative 
government to hold a referendum on a reform treaty that had already been ratified. In a 
speech on Europe on November 4th 2009, Cameron confirmed the proposed referendum 
could now no longer take place. As Andrew Mitchell (2016), Shadow International 
Development Secretary 2005-2010, explained to me, the decision to drop this commitment 
was ‘not accepted by large parts of the Conservative Party’. Heathcoat-Amory (2012:149) 
supports this statement, describing the decision as causing a ‘great deal of unhappiness in the 
party, and allegations of bad faith’ towards the party leadership. 
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In response, Cameron announced a series of new policy commitments in the November 2009 
speech. These included a ‘referendum lock’ law to legally prevent future governments from 
agreeing to further European integration without conducting a national referendum first. A 
similar commitment had been included in the 2001 general election manifesto. Cameron also 
announced a UK Sovereignty Bill, a commitment to negotiate a full-opt out from the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, legal protections to prevent EU influence over UK crime and 
justice policy, in addition to the previously announced commitment to repatriate powers over 
social and employment policy. These policies would be negotiated with the EU following the 
election of a Conservative government and given legal authority when inserted into the next 
EU accession treaty. As there is no formal process in the EU for such actions, Cameron was 
committing the Conservative Party to a ‘renegotiation of our relationship with the EU’ 
(Heathcoat-Amory, 2012:149). These policies were ‘an important step in the right direction’ 
for many Eurosceptics (Heathcoat-Amory, 2012:152). 
These policy commitments, while having echoes in the European policy of previous 
Conservative leaderships, were introduced to fill the vacuum left behind by abandoning the 
Conservative policy towards the Lisbon Treaty. This had been caused directly by the change 
in the international political context; the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 before the 
election of a Conservative government was possible. It is an example of how a change in 
political circumstances in an international environment, external to the party itself, resulted in 
changes to European policy being forced on the party leadership. 
 
7.7 Individual Actors 
 
7.7.1 Cameron and Euroscepticism 
To put into context the decisions Cameron made on European policy during his period as 
Leader of the Opposition, and also later as Prime Minister, it is important to consider what 
ideological stance Cameron himself took towards Europe. Considering his background on 
this issue, and previous policy positions on the UK-EU relationship, will provide for a clearer 
understanding of the motivations behind the decisions made on Europe by the Conservative 
Party during the 2005-2010 parliament. 
The term ascribed to Cameron’s position on Europe before he was elected party leader was 
that he was believer in ‘moderate’ Euroscepticism (Denham and O’Hara, 2007). As a 
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candidate in Stafford during the 1997 general election, Cameron had, like many Conservative 
candidates during this election, focused a significant amount of his campaign on European 
policy. Cameron mostly took the official party position at this time, that European integration 
was approaching its limits and that the party supported continued membership of the EU. He 
went against the position set out by Major on the single currency by opposing it in principle 
(Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2016). This was, however, a common position among Conservative 
candidates, with around 200 making the same commitment. It would be the consensus 
position for most of the party following the 1997 election, even if the official position up to 
2001 was to only rule it out for 10 years. Bale (2016) points out that Cameron would have 
been incentivised to take this position to protect himself from having a Referendum Party 
candidate stand in his seat.6 
This is an interesting insight in two respects. Firstly, Cameron did take a largely ‘moderate’ 
Eurosceptic position during this period. His views aligned with the position of the party 
leadership, and he took a view on the single currency which would have been common 
among fellow candidates and grassroots activists. Secondly, it could also have influenced 
Cameron into believing, as many candidates and MPs did after the election, that a smaller 
party could not be allowed to ‘outbid’ the Conservative Party with a more Eurosceptic 
position, without damaging consequences to the Conservative vote share. There is, however, 
no corroborating evidence to suggest that this was Cameron’s perception at the time. This 
was, as evidenced in Chapter 5, a common belief among Conservative candidates at the 1997 
election. 
During the 2001-2005 parliament, Cameron’s stance on Europe again corresponded with the 
position of the party leaderships. As Cameron stated in an email to an academic who had 
questioned his Euroscepticism before the 2001 election, he was opposed to the single 
currency, opposed to any further transfer of power to Brussels, and supportive of the 
renegotiation of EU authority over UK fishing rights, in addition to undefined areas in which 
EU policy had been a ‘disaster’ for the UK. (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2016). Again, these 
were not unusual views for a Conservative candidate at the time. This provides further 
evidence to the view that Cameron was at least as motivated by opposition to the 
integrationist ideas in the Lisbon Treaty, as he was by short-term political advantage over the 
Labour Party. Those who knew Cameron during this period also maintain that however 
                                                 
6 Despite this, the Referendum Party stood a candidate in Stafford. 
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strong his criticism of the EU was, he always maintained the pragmatic position that the UK 
was still better off remaining in the EU (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2016). 
Cameron’s Euroscepticism before 2005, therefore, generally moved with the grain of the 
majority of his parliamentary colleagues, sticking predominately to the ‘official’ party 
position when there was a clear one to stick to. A further example of Cameron ‘moving with 
the times’ was on repatriation of EU social and employment policy. This had been party 
policy since October 2004, when it was announced by Howard, and included in the 2005 
election manifesto. Cameron was appointed by Howard to write the manifesto, under his 
guidance. This same policy commitment would remain, alongside his pledge to withdraw 
from the EPP-ED, as the two main elements of his European policy when he entered the 2005 
leadership contest. Cameron’s Eurosceptic background was therefore remarkably consistent, 
suggesting many of his policy decisions on Europe during the 2005-2010 parliament are at 
least partly shaped by his own historical positions on European integration, in addition to an 
unwillingness to stray too far away from the mainstream attitude of his party colleagues. 
 
7.7.2 Leaving the EPP – The Role of Individual Actors 
Previously in this chapter, the competition between the Eurosceptic candidates in the 2005 
leadership election had been presented as the main factor in producing Cameron’s policy 
commitment to withdraw Conservative MEPs from the EPP grouping in the European 
Parliament, which was fulfilled in 2009. The role of individual actors, and the influence they 
had on the decision-making process, also contributed to this policy change. Cameron’s 
individual views on the integrationist ideas and principles of the EPP-ED family of political 
parties also added to this decision. This was explained to me by Andrew Mackay (2016), who 
was appointed as special advisor to Cameron shortly after his election to the party leadership: 
…when he asked me to do the job for him straight afterwards and I turned up I 
assumed that this [the EPP pledge] was something he had just thrown in. To 
my surprise he found the whole EPP Christian Democrat thing, rather 
collectivist Christian based, not to his liking, and genuinely wanted out. I 
assumed he was just doing the American primary stuff. So, there was a lot of 
soul searching because IDS went to the Marbella conference of the EPP, with 
all talk of pulling out, but then decided he couldn't pull out as leader. IDS chose 
to stay. He probably had too much on his plate. But Cameron actually didn't 
like them and the whole idea and wanted out. 
 
As explained above, Cameron’s views on Europe were at least as Eurosceptic as the average 
Conservative MP in 2005. Therefore, it is entirely plausible that he shared the hostile attitude 
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towards the EPP-ED that many of his more prominent Eurosceptic colleagues did, which 
fitted with his need to appeal to Eurosceptic colleagues in the 2005 leadership election. This 
is a different interpretation to Ganesh (2014), who argues this decision was part of wider 
strategy announcements on ‘traditional’ Conservative policy areas, in the late summer of 
2005, designed by George Osborne to draw more support from traditionalist and Thatcherite 
MPs. This could have been suggested with the full knowledge that Cameron himself was not 
ideologically against such a move himself. Howarth (2016) also credits the influence of 
Heathcote-Amory in leading a group of Eurosceptic MPs who met with Cameron during the 
leadership contest. It is not clear, however, whether the group made any specific policy 
requests related to Europe at this time. Nonetheless, the role of individual actors was key to 
this process, with Cameron and Osborne the main protagonists. 
 
7.7.3 Lord Ashcroft and Modernisation 
In the wake of the 2005 general election defeat, former Conservative Party Treasurer 1998-
2001 and party donor, Lord Ashcroft, published Smell the Coffee: A Wake-Up Call to the 
Conservative Party (2005). In this pamphlet, based on extensive polling, Ashcroft argued that 
unless the Conservative Party modernised the image of the party, so that it better reflected 
modern society, and started to talk about and develop policies in areas the public prioritised, 
the Conservative Party would continue to lose elections like they had done since 1997. 
Among a number of other policy areas, Ashcroft was influential in convincing many in the 
parliamentary party, as well as the leadership and Shadow Cabinet, that making Europe a 
high-profile policy area would be to the continued detriment of their shared goal of finally 
returning the Conservative Party to government. Mackay (2016) believes Ashcroft’s polling 
and research played an important role in this endeavour during the 2005-2010 parliament: 
It was Ashcroft who used to go to the 1922 Committee and really upset them as 
they would all be there to talk about Europe and he would show that every time 
the Conservative Party banged on about Europe, and the public saw them on 
the TV news in the evenings, the poll reading went down. He would say that it 
doesn't mean that the people listening are Europhiles, very pro the EU and can't 
vote for that party - they looked at these Tories talking about this and thought 
‘This isn't my world. Why aren't they talking about crime on my street, my 
child’s school, my granny in hospital who was left on a stretcher - and all the 
other things - and therefore they think 'these people aren't for us, they are on a 
different planet'. Ashcroft tried again and again and again to explain to some of 
these people whose ears were not open at all. 
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Although not all Conservative parliamentarians were persuaded by Ashcroft’s position on 
Europe, it did convince many others (Mackay, 2016). As Bale (2016:250) observes, Ashcroft’s 
interventions, such as this, helped strengthen Cameron and the party leaderships position that 
European policy should be kept as a low-profile issue, and with as much stability to its content, 
as possible. 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
The Cameron years in opposition saw a number of policy changes related to Europe which 
this chapter has aimed to explain. As this chapter has set out, the origin of the policy on 
Conservative Party membership of the EPP echoes the circumstances of Hague and the ‘two 
parliaments’ position on the single currency. Each has its origins in the competitive dynamics 
of a leadership election, Cameron in 2005 and Hague in 1997, where each candidate signalled 
an important change to European policy from a perception that this would help them win the 
leadership. Both are also examples of individual agency making decisions that would change 
policy on Europe. As with the ‘two parliaments’ position, the EPP pledge developed path 
dependent power in which the costs of Cameron changing his position once he was leader 
would have been considerable. What was possible was to delay the implementation until after 
European elections in 2009. The primary cause of change after 2006 was the international 
political context and situation in the European Parliament, in which it would take 
considerably longer than the leadership had anticipated to find suitable partners. Again, this 
also echoes the experience of the party leadership during the 2001-2005 parliament. 
The changing stance on reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, from withdrawal to ‘reform 
from within’, very likely pragmatic, in which the Conservative leadership did want to commit 
to any further difficult negotiations with the EU if they returned to government at the next 
election. On the question of the changes in position on the Lisbon Treaty in November 2009 - 
and the subsequent commitments to introduce legislation on a ‘referendum lock’ and a ‘UK 
sovereignty bill’ after the 2010 election, in addition to getting a full UK opt-out from the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the return EU powers of crime and justice policy to ‘pre-
Lisbon levels’ – this was a further example of the Conservative leadership reacting to the 
changing international political context in the EU and changing policy to reflect the new 
circumstances. If the Conservative Party had returned to power before the treaty had been 
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ratified, due to the path dependent nature of European policy, is it likely a Cameron 
government would have held a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. 
The tools, mechanisms, and concepts of the new institutionalist framework set out in Chapter 
3 have guided and structured the analysis in this chapter. These have included the historical 
legacy of past events and decisions, path dependency, individual agency, the influence of 
internal and external institutions, the impact of ideas, and contribution of the structural 
environment. These have been, as the above text shows, embedded in the analysis and as a 
result has produced a more theoretically focused explanation of European policy change in 
the Conservative Party during this period. 
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Chapter 8: Cameron in Government – Policy Change and Europe, 2010-
2016 
 
This chapter seeks to explain the development of European policy within the Conservative 
Party between the May 6th, 2010 general election and February 19th 2016, when Cameron 
announced the conclusion to UK-EU renegotiation deal talks and confirmed he would be 
supporting the UK remaining inside the EU. This means that, unlike the previous empirical 
chapters, this chapter covers two parliaments, the entirety of the 2010-2015 parliament and 
the first nine months of the 2015-2017 parliament. This enables this chapter to consider the 
development of European policy during Cameron’s premiership.  
This period showed considerable change in both the Conservative Party’s own domestic 
political circumstances and the content of their European policy. The party was in 
government with the power to implement policy, firstly in coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats and, secondly, as a Conservative majority government following the May 2015 
general election. European policy experienced dramatic change, with policy moving rapidly 
in a hard-Eurosceptic direction with commitments to legislate for a referendum on UK 
membership of the EU and further pledges to restrict the welfare entitlements and free 
movement rights of EU citizens coming to the UK. There was also policy continuity, with the 
European Union Act 2011 and the limited renegotiation of UK-EU membership terms 2015-
2016, reflective of similar pledges made by each party leader, from Hague to Cameron, while 
in opposition. 
The changes this chapter will explain include the differences between the European policy 
commitments in the Conservative Party 2010 manifesto and Coalition Programme for 
Government; the change in position, from opposition to government, on the EU criminal and 
justice powers; the acceptance of  a referendum on UK membership of the EU by the end of 
2017, the change from opposition to support for legislating in the 2010-2015 parliament on 
an EU referendum,  in addition to explaining the development of the Conservative Party 
‘renegotiation’ of UK-EU membership terms policy between the May 2015 election and the 
June 2016 EU referendum. 
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This chapter will begin by summing up the period in opposition, 1997-2010, and considering 
the impact this had on European policy during 2010-2016, before moving to reflect on the 
influence of the May 2010 general election and the formation of the Coalition government. 
 
8.1: Historical Legacies, 1997-2010 
 
 
8.1.1 ‘Renegotiation and Referendum', 1997-2010 
 
As developed in the theoretical framework, this thesis emphasises the part historical context 
and legacy plays in party change and understanding why political actors make the decisions 
they do, in this case on the direction of policy. As such, the decisions made by the 
Conservative leadership in government between 2010-2016 need to be understood in the 
historical context of thirteen years of opposition, and that many of these policy decisions over 
time became path dependent, meaning that a future Conservative leadership would face 
substantial political costs from internal and external stakeholders if they attempted to resist 
their implementation while in government. 
On the question of the January 2013 EU renegotiation and referendum commitment, the 
Conservative Party had been legitimising the idea that a renegotiation of UK membership 
terms, followed by a referendum to endorse or reject the new deal, could be an appropriate 
mechanism for resolving European policy disputes. Major had committed to a referendum 
before he would agree to join the single currency. Hague and Duncan Smith had supported 
referendums on the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, with Howard and Cameron both launching 
campaigns for referendums to block ratification of the EU Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties 
in 2004 and 2007 respectively. Each leader, from Hague to Cameron, had also set out in 
opposition how they would renegotiate how EU law and directives applied to the UK, 
ranging from specific policy areas to a comprehensive all-areas approach. This long series of 
commitments legitimised the idea of renegotiating UK membership terms and holding a 
referendum on the EU when the Conservative Party returned to government. This idea 
developed a path dependent power, which contributed to the campaign for an EU referendum 
that emerged following the 2010 election, both within and outside of Conservative Party 
institutions. 
Cameron’s ‘cast-iron guarantee’ to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty while in 
opposition in September 2007, and the perception that this commitment had been broken, 
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made a significant contribution to creating the political space for the EU referendum 
campaign to grow after 2010. Many of those interviewed for this thesis commented that this 
was a significant event in the years preceding the Bloomberg speech. Widdecombe (2016) 
states that the perception that Cameron had gone back on his Lisbon commitment ‘opened the 
opportunity’ for the referendum commitment to be made in 2013. Additionally, Chope (2016) 
believes that the failure to keep to his promise on Lisbon was a ‘major factor’ in 
Conservative MPs agitating for an EU referendum in the early years of the Coalition 
government. This was because it communicated to the public that the Conservative Party 
could not be trusted to keep to their commitments on Europe, legitimising the political 
message of UKIP. It also developed feelings of betrayal and bitterness towards the leadership 
by many Conservative MPs, who felt Cameron was too keen to drop an issue which was 
important to them (Dorey and Garnett, 2016). 
Many Conservative MPs saw the European Union Act 2011, which would have triggered a 
referendum in the event of further powers being transferred to the EU, as poor compensation 
for dropping the Lisbon pledge (D’Ancona, 2013). Mackay (2016) supports this perspective, 
suggesting that the seeds of the January 2013 referendum pledge were sown in the Cameron 
opposition period: 
I think so, yes. I really do. It made it respectable to have a referendum. If you 
think about it, it would be difficult if you were Cameron and I was saying ‘Just 
a minute, you’ve accepted the principle – you were going to have one on 
Lisbon, but events overtook you and the treaty was signed and gone before you 
had got to office. Surely you can have an in/out one? 
 
Cameron, as well as others in the Conservative leadership, understood that abandoning the 
Lisbon commitment was deeply resented by those on the Eurosceptic wing of the 
parliamentary party, and that his alternative of a ‘referendum lock’ would only placate them 
for a limited amount of time (D’Ancona, 2015).  
By accepting the principle of holding an EU referendum in opposition, through a high profile 
public commitment, Cameron gave the path dependent nature of the EU referendum idea 
within the Conservative Party additional strength. This, combined with an equally high-
profile perceived U-turn on the pledge, made resisting the campaign for an EU referendum 
additionally difficult in his early years as Prime Minister, as the issue now had a new sense of 
‘legitimacy’ in the Conservative Party and the wider public (Carswell, as quoted in Shipman, 
2016:7). The principle of a referendum was therefore well established in the Conservative 
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Party during the opposition years after 1997, giving the idea of an EU referendum greater 
path dependent power that could be acted upon once the party was in government after 2010. 
The political costs of Cameron and the leadership attempting to resist the path dependency of 
these long-established ideas between 2010 and 2013 will be detailed later in this chapter. 
 
8.1.2 European Peoples’ Party, 2005-2009 
 
The decision by Cameron to remove Conservative MEPs from the EPP-ED which was not 
fully implemented until 2009, had long-term implications for the development of European 
policy during this period. Douglas Carswell (2017), Conservative (2005-2004) and UKIP 
(2014-2017) MP for Clacton, believes this was a ‘key’ moment in ‘shifting the trajectory on 
Europe’ within the Conservative Party in the period between leaving the EPP and the 
referendum commitment in 2013. Coordinated by Daniel Hannan, a group of between 15-20 
Conservative MPs from the 2005 intake pledged to publicly support Cameron in the 2005 
party leadership election if he publicly committed the party to leaving the EPP-ED. Although 
unconvinced that Cameron and Osborne had any real understanding of why this mattered so 
much to some Eurosceptic Conservative MPs, Carswell (2017) argues that this was 
significant, psychologically and physically, in gradually separating the Conservative Party 
leadership away from its association with pro-integrationist political parties in continental 
Europe, and closer towards those that shared the Eurosceptic views of Conservative MPs, 
MEPs, and members. As Carswell (2017) explained further to me when discussing the 
significance of the EPP withdrawal post-2010: 
 
As long as we were in the EPP, it would create a long-term tendency to shift 
the default setting within the Tory Party towards the pro-European side. If we 
left the EPP that ratchet would go into reverse…If British MEPs, and a large 
chunk of the Tory Party, saw their natural allies as German Christian 
Democrats, it would frame the debate about Europe in a certain way. Once that 
link is broken it frames the debate in a wholly different way and goes way 
beyond the influence of MEPs, which is at best marginal. I don’t think 
Cameron saw the importance of that point, which was why he conceded it. 
 
The significance of this, therefore, was to further weaken the institutional association 
between the Conservative Party and the pro-European, centre-right parties in Europe, who 
had traditionally been their natural allies. This view is supported by advisors to Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, who believe the decoupling of the UK from the EU can be traced back to the 
‘isolation’ Cameron created for himself and the Conservative Party following their 
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withdrawal from the EPP-ED in 2009 (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015). This moved the party 
further in a hard-Eurosceptic direction and made the likelihood that a future Conservative 
leadership would go one step further and commit to a referendum that could see the UK leave 
the EU, more likely than not. 
This episode also signalled to Eurosceptic Conservative MPs and MEPs that, if the political 
circumstances were right and he could be persuaded that the decision was in the best interests 
of the party, Cameron could be induced to make concessions on European policy, if they 
applied enough pressure (Shipman, 2016).  This instinct proved to be accurate, as Cameron 
reversed his position on an EU referendum in January 2013, following a parliamentary and 
external campaign by Eurosceptic Conservative MPs, having previously expressed his 
opposition to the idea in November 2009 and October 2011. 
Lastly, withdrawal from the EPP-ED can also be argued to have had some impact on the 
ability of Cameron to successfully negotiate with the EU following the 2015 general election 
victory. Howarth (2016) argues that Cameron, and the Conservative Party more widely, 
fundamentally misjudged how seriously many EU member states, especially Germany and 
France, regarded formal pan-European political institutions such as the EPP-ED. 
Consequently, when Cameron became Prime Minister in 2010, he had ‘few friends’ in other 
EU governments, with Angela Merkel still unhappy with Cameron for ignoring her advice 
that leaving the EPP-ED was a mistake.7 This breakdown of the relationship between the 
Conservative Party and the rest of centre-right political opinion in the EU would prove a 
hindrance to Cameron in forming the necessary coalitions that could deliver his goals for the 
new UK-EU relationship (Shipman, 2016). The building of alliances among member states 
has long been the key to individual countries advancing their national interest in the EU. 
These previous alliances and associations between the Conservative Party and their sister 
parties in Europe had deteriorated considerably by the time Coalition government was 
formed in 2010. The Conservative Party withdrawal from the EPP was considered a ‘disaster’ 
for European policy during the Coalition government by some of those who worked in the 
Foreign Office during the Coalition government (Private information). As one such 
individual explained to me: 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that in addition to Angela Merkel and her party, the CDU, the leaders of both France 
(Nicole Sarkozy, Les Republicans) and Spain (Mariano Rajoy, Peoples’ Party)  at the time were also members of 
the EPP-ED. 
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This [the Conservative decision to leave the EPP] meant that whereas there 
were quite a lot of Conservative MPs who went off to Washington on a regular 
basis, and met Republican think-tanks, they didn't have any comparable links to 
the German Christian Democrats. That is a real loss. It meant that the intake 
that came in in 2010 arrived without any sense of politics on the continent or 
who our natural allies are. 
 
As a result of this, when the Conservative Party needed to speak informally to individuals in 
European governments on matters of policy during the Coalition years, they would often 
have to rely on the Liberal Democrats’ contacts, as they had no substantial networks of their 
own (Private information). The corrosion of these formal and informal political relationships, 
between Conservative politicians and their counterparts in other member states, damaged the 
prospect of Cameron achieving his policy goals during the UK-EU renegotiation. 
The separation from the EPP-ED during the 2005-2010 parliament therefore had long-term 
ramifications for the relationship between the Conservative Party and the EU, the political 
strategy of Conservative Eurosceptic factions in the 2010-2015 parliament, in addition to 
Cameron’s negotiation of the UK-EU relationship after the 2015 general election. It is a 
further example, in addition to the many other examples in the previous chapters, of how 
historical events and decisions by past political actors, influence future policy decisions and 
outcomes. 
8.2 The 2010 General Election and the Coalition Government 
 
 
The outcome of the 2010 general election, a hung parliament, was not the result the 
Conservative Party had been expecting. This is signified by the fact the party leadership had 
done little preparatory work on this eventuality occurring (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). The 
Conservative electoral performance, despite coming first in terms of votes and seats, was also 
underwhelming. The 37% of the national vote achieved by the Conservative Party in 2010 
was the lowest achieved by the party in elections since the 1992 election (Curtice, et al, 
2010). Though the party increased their share of the vote by only 3.7%, they gained an 
impressive 108 seats in 2010. An achievement, in terms of seats gained by Conservative 
leaders at general elections, bettered only by Stanley Baldwin in 1924 and 1931 (See Table 
3.1 in Clarke, 2015:37). That being said, it was insufficient to form a majority government. 
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In order to establish a stable government, a coalition was formed with the Liberal Democrats 
on May 11th, 2010. The organisation and decision-making processes of the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat government created tensions within the Conservative Party. This, in turn, 
created incentives for Eurosceptic individuals and groups within the parliamentary party to 
put pressure on the government and Conservative leadership to change policy on Europe as 
will be shown below. Firstly, however, it will be shown how the negotiations towards the 
Coalition Agreement established this tension between the leadership and Conservative 
Eurosceptics, principally by removing many of the European policy commitments in the 2010 
Conservative manifesto from the Coalition’s programme for government. 
8.2.1 The 2010 Conservative Manifesto and the Coalition Agreement 
 
The coalition negotiations between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats 
themselves caused significant change to European policy. Although the Conservative Party 
secured commitments to prevent further powers being transferred to the EU, the introduction 
of an EU referendum lock, opposition to the single currency, limiting the scope of the 
Working Time Directive, in addition to supporting a single seat for the European Parliament 
and further EU enlargement (Coalition, 2010:19), a number of omissions are also notable. 
These included the absence of the repatriation of EU social and employment powers or 
gaining a full-opt out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Other policy commitments 
made in opposition, such as a UK Sovereignty Bill or opting out from EU crime and justice 
policy, were downgraded to ‘reviews’ and ‘proposals’ (Coalition, 2010:19). 
These changes to policy positions on Europe were the result of concessions made to the 
Liberal Democrats during the coalition negotiations. The Liberal Democrats, though 
advocating an in/out referendum on EU membership, overall took a considerably more 
positive and pro-integration position on the EU in their 2010 manifesto (Liberal Democrats, 
2010). The ‘referendum lock’ was viewed as a compromise between the Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat manifestos, as the Conservative Party had not advocated an EU 
membership referendum while in opposition or in the 2010 manifesto (Conservative Party, 
2010) with the hope that it would prevent Europe becoming a major area of policy conflict 
for the two sides of the government (Hazell and Young, 2010; Clegg, 2016; Laws, 2016). On 
the question of the ‘UK Sovereignty Bill’, Nick Clegg did not see the need for such 
legislation, and as result, Hague agreed that instead the Coalition would only commit to 
review the idea (Wilson, 2010). 
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The Liberal Democrat leadership maintained they could only support a government which 
took a positive attitude towards relations with the EU, insisting that the words ‘positive 
participant with the EU’ were included in the Coalition Agreement section on European 
policy, to make it a less ‘negative’ section and more acceptable to the Liberal Democrats in 
parliament who need to approve the agreement (Laws, 2010:185). This meant that from the 
beginning of the negotiations the Conservative leadership were under pressure to make 
concessions on the content of European policy they had established over years in opposition 
since 1997. Though the Conservative Party achieved many of their headline European 
policies, many others were downgraded or dropped to reach an agreement with the Liberal 
Democrats. 
A combination of a contingent event (the unexpected hung parliament) and the institutional 
requirements of forming a coalition government (the need to compromise on policy opposed 
by the second party) resulted in the necessity for the Conservative leadership to change 
European policy, in both tone and content, to one which many Eurosceptic Conservative MPs 
found difficult to accept. 
 
8.2.2 The Conservative Parliamentary Party and the 2010 General Election 
 
The circumstances of the Conservative Party entry into coalition government caused deep 
resentment and many Eurosceptic Conservative MPs began to put the party leadership and 
government under intense pressure over Europe, both inside and outside parliament. This was 
the consequence of a number of circumstances; the failure to win a majority in the 2010 
election; the eagerness of the leadership to form a coalition government with the pro-
integration Liberal Democrats, rather than form a minority government; the perception that 
too much of the 2010 Conservative manifesto’s policies on Europe had been dropped from 
the Coalition Agreement; and, finally, the view that Liberal Democrats had undue influence 
over the European policy of the government. Andrew Cooper (2016), Director of Strategy at 
No 10 Downing Street (2011-2013) during the Coalition government summarised this 
perception of the government by many Conservative MPs: 
A lot of MPs never forgave him [Cameron] for the fact that when he did the 
famous rose garden thing with Clegg.  They all felt he looked much too pleased 
about it. He was asked a question about forming a minority Conservative Party 
government and he basically sniffed at it and said it would be a very unedifying 
idea. A lot of them really resented this. Then for the first few months there was 
lots of euphoria, with people talking about Liberal Conservative Party and 
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shared agendas. That made a lot of Conservative Party really uncomfortable. 
Throughout the parliament a lot of Tory MPs felt that the tail was wagging the 
dog. That Cameron either sort of let himself be rolled over, or used the Lib 
Dem influence as an excuse, for not having a more robust policy on Europe. 
 
This perception, that Conservative leadership preferred being in coalition than having a 
narrow Conservative majority, combined with a frustration that EU reform was now being 
blocked for at least another five years by the Liberal Democrats. This was despite the gradual 
layering of more, and increasingly Eurosceptic, EU reform policies into the party policy 
platform during 13 years of opposition. Additionally, some suspected that Cameron was 
using the cover of the Liberal Democrats to conduct a more positive European policy than 
would have been tolerated by many of his backbench MPs had the Conservative Party won a 
majority in 2010 (Boulton and Jones, 2010). Graham Brady (2016), Chairman of the 1922 
Committee (2010-Present) explained how difficult this was for many Conservative MPs to 
see this policy agenda abandoned: 
If we had had a majority Conservative government in 2010 I think that it is 
inevitable there would have been some serious attempts at reform. Obviously, 
we can't predict what powers would have been brought back but I think it 
would have been inevitable that there would have been serious efforts to be 
able to demonstrate that the ratchet had been put in reverse and some powers 
were going back to UK control. I think it is quite likely that would have 
defused the tension in the UK-EU relationship. Instead of that we had an 
absolute lock for five years on which nothing could be done to redress the 
balance in the relationship, which meant that we had a greater demand for a 
referendum. We had a pent-up aspiration for change… I think the problem was 
that it was simply dropped as an issue. 
 
The decision-making process within the Coalition also contributed to this frustration. Major 
government policy decisions during the 2010-2015 parliament were taken by an informal 
institution known as the ‘Quad’, comprising of Cameron, Osborne, Clegg, and Alexander, 
with occasional participation by other senior members of the government such as Hague, 
Letwin, and Laws. This informal institution did not deal with the details of policy but set the 
general direction of the government and attempted to resolve any disputes between Coalition 
ministers in Whitehall. As a result of this arrangement many Conservative MPs felt 
disconnected and isolated from their party leadership, as they knew no initiatives on EU 
reform would make it past the Liberal Democrat side of the ‘Quad’. As Christopher Chope 
(2016), explained to me: 
There was a failure in the Conservative leadership in the coalition which was a 
consequence of the coalition governance. The coalition governance as you will 
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know was that nothing could be agreed or done by anybody if it hadn't been 
approved by the Quad. Unless those four agreed something, nothing could 
happen. That created an atmosphere where MPs had no engagement with the 
government because there was nothing they could do to influence anything, 
because anything that they wanted was vetoed by the Liberal Democrats. So 
that added to the frustration. It also meant that there was a vacuum as people 
with their energies couldn't direct them to change government policy. So, they 
had to use parliamentary procedure to create the atmosphere in which a 
fundamental issue of giving the people the choice would be pursued. 
 
The perception that pro-integration Liberal Democrats had a de facto veto on the 
government’s European policy added to the resentment many Conservative Party MPs felt. 
As the parliamentary party had not been asked to formally approve the Coalition agreement, 
some Conservative MPs did not feel obliged to support it in Parliament, as many had been 
elected by their constituents on openly hard-Eurosceptic platforms (Reckless, 2017). Many 
Eurosceptic Conservative MPs used these local mandates as justification to oppose Coalition 
policy, especially on Europe. 
These circumstances encouraged a significant minority of Eurosceptic Conservative MPs to 
work towards changing government policy on Europe by tabling motions and amendments in 
the House of Commons, to express their dissent and force changes in either government or 
Conservative Party policy. These circumstances created some of the institutional conditions 
within the parliamentary party and the House of Commons necessary for the campaign of 
dissent by Conservative MPs to attract support and momentum, that would contribute to 
Cameron changing party policy on an EU referendum in January 2013. Without these 
circumstances creating this resentment within the parliamentary party from the beginning of 
the Coalition, it is unlikely the Conservative leadership would have faced the necessary 
pressure required to convince them to change their minds on the EU referendum question. 
8.2.3 UKIP and the 2010 General Election 
 
The performance of UKIP at the 2010 general election was an improvement for the party on 
their 2005 general election result, but the breakthrough some in the party expected failed to 
materialise, and the overall results were disappointing (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). UKIP 
increased their share of the vote by 0.9%, to 3.1%. UKIP candidates averaged 3.5% of the 
vote in the seats in which they stood candidates, in comparison to 2.8% in 2005 (Kavanagh 
and Cowley, 2010). UKIP increased the number candidates standing in 2010, in comparison 
with the previous general election, by 64 (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). Once again, UKIP 
did not challenge many incumbents whom they deemed sufficiently Eurosceptic. 
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The relevance of UKIP’s electoral performance at the 2010 general election is the perceived 
contribution of this result to the Conservative Party failure to win a majority, despite the 
favourable circumstances following 2007-2008 financial crash. Philip Davies, Conservative 
MP for Shipley (2005-Present), explained that he and many of his colleagues believed that 
the UKIP vote had deprived them of a working majority at the 2010 election: 
We had lost too many voters to UKIP. We had to get these people back. Unless 
we can get these people, who used to vote Conservative, who have now 
stopped voting Conservative, back, we were never going to win a majority. 
We've got to get these people back… Lots of people had only just crawled in...  
they feared that UKIP would stop them being re-elected. We had clearly lost 
votes because of the UKIP vote in certain areas. I think of David Heathcoat 
Amory, in Wells, where we lost a safe Tory seat. One of reasons we had lost 
was because UKIP had got such as big vote. Or sufficient enough of a vote, 
anyway, to beat us. There were a few other seats like that. So, if you had added 
these seats up together you would have got an overall majority. That was partly 
it. Clearly UKIP were gaining ground…we needed to do something about the 
UKIP issue. 
 
The impact of UKIP at the 2010 general election was, therefore, perceived by the 2010 cohort 
of Conservative MPs in a similar way to the belief that the Referendum Party had 
exacerbated the scale of defeat in 1997. As was the case after the 1997 election, the solution 
to this problem proposed by many Conservative Party MPs after 2010 was to move to a 
harder Eurosceptic position, by committing the party to hold a referendum on UK 
membership of the EU after the next general election (Davies, 2016). In 1997 it had been 
ruling out UK membership of the single currency. 
As was the case following the 1997 election, academic analysis is divided on whether the 
performance of UKIP at the 2010 election contributed to the failure to win a majority. 
Johnston and Pattie (2010) conclude that as there were 21 constituencies where the 
Conservative Party finished second by a smaller margin than the total UKIP vote, there might 
have been a Conservative majority if UKIP had not contested these seats. Denver (2010:14) 
is more definitive, concluding that ‘simplistic assertions’ about UKIP denying the 
Conservative Party a majority at the 2010 election are undermined by the fact there was ‘no 
significant relationship’ between changes in the Conservative vote share and the UKIP 
electoral performance. If anything, the presence of a UKIP candidate was more likely to have 
damaged Labour’s electoral performance in 2010 (Denver, 2010:14). This being said, the 
regional performance of UKIP in areas of the UK where the Conservative Party have a 
concentration of seats (South East England, South West England, and Eastern England) was 
 214 
between 4.3 and 4.5% on average, in comparison to the national average of 3.5% (Ford and 
Goodwin, 2014:87). This could explain why some Conservative MPs believed the impact of 
UKIP was greater on the 2010 election result, than it was when considering the national 
picture. 
The perception that UKIP was a significant reason for many Conservative candidates failing 
to win their seats, or only winning them by the narrowest of margins, was clearly in the 
minds of many Conservative MPs during the early stages of the 2010-2015 parliament. The 
fear was that if the party did not offer a policy on the EU that was competitive with UKIP, 
such as the promise of a future EU referendum, the party would again fail to win a majority. 
It can therefore be argued that UKIP’s impact at the 2010 general election created further 
incentives for Conservative MPs to pressurise the Coalition, and the party leadership, into 
taking harder Eurosceptic positions on Europe. This then contributed to the decision by 
Cameron to commit the Conservative Party to an EU referendum, in addition to encouraging 
them to attempt to legislate for it in the 2010-2015 parliament in order for the policy to be 
included in the 2015 election manifesto. 
 
 
8.3 Ideological Composition of the Conservative Party 
 
 
8.3.1 Coalition Cabinet, 2010-2015 
 
David Cameron formed his first Cabinet, as Prime Minister of the Coalition government, on 
May 12th, 2010. As had been agreed during the coalition negotiations, the Liberal Democrats 
would have five full members of the Cabinet, including the Deputy Prime Minister Nick 
Clegg. If any of these members departed the Cabinet, they would be replaced by another 
Liberal Democrat. Cameron therefore only had direct control over the appointment of the 
remaining eighteen members of the Cabinet. As a result of this, the ideological composition 
of the Cabinet was proportionally higher, in terms those classified as ‘Europhile’ using the 
Heppell (2013) attitudinal mapping approach, than would have been expected under a 
Conservative majority government. This meant that the Cabinet, including both Conservative 
and Liberal Democrat members, was 74% ‘Soft Eurosceptic’ and 26% ‘Europhile’8 when 
first assembled. Of the eighteen Conservative Cabinet members whom Cameron had directly 
                                                 
8 This includes all five Liberal Democrat Cabinet members, in addition to Ken Clarke. 
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appointed, 94% were ‘Soft Eurosceptics’, with the only ‘Europhile’ member being Ken 
Clarke. No ‘Hard’ Eurosceptics were appointed, as Cameron had stated during the 2005-2010 
parliament that no Conservative MP that advocated the UK leaving the EU could serve as a 
minister in a Conservative government under his leadership (Heppell, 2013). This ideological 
composition remained stable throughout the 2010-2015 government. It was also consistent 
with the pre-2010 ideological composition of the Conservative parliamentary party, with 91% 
of Conservative MPs identified as ‘Eurosceptic’ (Heppell and Hill, 2009). 
As a result of this ideological and party divide in the Cabinet during the Coalition, in addition 
to the constraints placed upon government policy by the Coalition Agreement, this institution 
was not an influential factor in shaping the development of Conservative European policy 
during this period. As the MPs of both sides of the government had divergent views on 
Europe, there was a determination to keep tightly to what had been agreed on Europe in the 
Coalition Agreement, in order to limit the chance of major quarrels on the subject between 
Coalition ministers (Hazell and Young, 2012). The European policy section of the Coalition 
Agreement had been the final section to be discussed, as it was the most sensitive, between 
Cameron and Clegg personally. The commitments and language were precisely chosen, 
leaving little room for flexibility, in an attempt to put Europe on a ‘deep freeze’ (Laws, 
2016:238). Discussions around European policy which exceeded those already stated in the 
Coalition Agreement were therefore conducted outside of the Cabinet, usually between 
Cameron, Osborne, and Hague (Smith, 2015). 
The routine business of European policy was also handled formally between the two parties 
during monthly meetings of the European Affairs Cabinet sub-committee, in which a Liberal 
Democrat was the Deputy Chair (Hazell and Young, 2012). This ensured that collective 
agreement on government European policy was maintained and prevented more Eurosceptic 
policies from being approved without the Liberal Democrats’ permission. Items of business 
deemed sufficiently controversial were handled by the Quad, by-passing the main Cabinet 
(Hazel and Young, 2012). 
The Cabinet during the Coalition government, due to the political divide between the two 
coalition parties and their commitment to respect the terms of the Coalition Agreement on 
such a sensitive issue, was therefore not an institution which influenced change on European 
policy during this period, but one which displaced its discussion into other institutional 
arenas. It constrained government policy on the EU, but not the changing of Conservative 
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policy on the EU, as can be seen in the case of the January 2013 EU referendum 
commitment. Changes to Conservative European policy were thus made in the context of an 
imagined future where the party had a parliamentary majority, not in the present where the 
Liberal Democrats could veto proposals, in much the same way as policy was conceived 
during the years of opposition post-1997. 
Influence was exerted, on the side-lines of the formal Cabinet, by individual Conservative 
Cabinet ministers. These individual political actors within the Cabinet made important 
contributions to changing Conservative policy towards an EU referendum. Hague, Foreign 
Secretary 2010-2014, was the Conservative minister who was most closely involved with 
Cameron making the decision to change policy on the EU referendum question, insisting that 
it could no longer be avoided (Shipman, 2016). As a former party leader, who had been 
recruited to the Shadow Cabinet in 2005 for his leadership experience, and who had managed 
internal party conflict over European policy himself, it is likely his advice carried significant 
weight with Cameron. Duncan Smith (2016) also had private conservations with Cameron 
during this period, setting out his case why an EU referendum was the right policy response 
for the party. Again, like Hague, Duncan Smith was a former party leader with experience of 
managing backbench MPs. 
However, what counteracts the lobbying of both Hague and Duncan Smith, is that those who 
were in Cameron’s inner circle, Osborne and Gove, both agreed that changing policy to 
support an EU referendum was a potentially disastrous mistake to make for both the 
Conservative Party and the country (D’Ancona, 2012; Shipman, 2016). If Cameron were to 
be influenced by anyone’s private advice, the probability would that it would be his two 
closest political allies. However, he rejected the advice of Osborne and Gove, suggesting the 
decision was likely one made by Cameron individually assessing the many internal and 
external pressures he and the government were under, with the potential benefits and costs. In 
the end, therefore, the key individual from the Conservative Cabinet ministers associated 
with the EU referendum policy change decision, was Cameron himself. 
8.3.2 Conservative Cabinet, 2015-2016 
 
On May 11th, 2015, Cameron appointed the first Cabinet of a majority Conservative 
government since 1992. Given the absence of the Liberal Democrats, the Cabinet naturally 
became more Eurosceptic. All but one member of the post-2015 Conservative Cabinet was 
‘Soft Eurosceptic’, with the remaining member John Whittingdale, identified as ‘Hard’ 
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Eurosceptic (Heppell, 2013). Cameron had therefore abandoned his previous commitment in 
opposition to not appoint government ministers that had publicly supported the UK leaving 
the EU, as a conciliatory gesture to those in the parliamentary party that also took a ‘Hard’ 
Eurosceptic position. However, in this case, we have additional information on the EU 
attitudes of Cabinet members later in this parliament, based on whether they supported the 
Remain or Leave positions prior to the EU referendum in June 2016. In total five Cabinet 
members supported the Leave campaign: Grayling, Villiers, Duncan Smith, Patel, and 
Whittingdale. Others, including Javid and May, only supported the Remain campaign 
reluctantly. 
The main area in which Conservative Cabinet ministers influenced European policy, between 
May 2015 and June 2016, was over the detail and policy areas included in the government’s 
renegotiation of EU membership terms. As this concerned government policy in many areas, 
in which ministers and their departments had expertise and authority over implementation, it 
was possible for Conservative Cabinet ministers to exert influence over the process. 
From inside the Cabinet, Theresa May was influential in making immigration and welfare a 
key part of the UK-EU renegotiation talks and shaping the discussion on these areas from the 
UK side of the negotiations (Oliver, 2016; Shipman, 2016). Other Cabinet ministers, such as 
Osborne, Hammond, and Gove, took a more liberal attitude to rising levels of immigration 
from EU member states, but May was adamant that numbers needed to be reduced (Laws, 
2016). During the negotiations, pressure was put on Cameron and the negotiating team to get 
further concessions from the EU that would close loopholes in immigration rules, or May 
would refuse to publicly support the deal (Oliver, 2016). An additional section in Cameron’s 
letter to European Council President Tusk in November 2015 at the beginning of the formal 
renegotiation period, which called for a ‘crackdown on the abuse of free movement’, was 
inserted on the insistence of May (Shipman, 2016). May was thus the most influential 
Cabinet minister, outside the intimate inner circle around Cameron, during the EU 
renegotiation between May 2015 and February 2016, when the process concluded. 
 
8.3.3 Parliamentary Party, 2010-2016 
 
The new intake of Conservative MPs following the 2010 general election may not have 
secured a working majority for Cameron, but it was significant for the party in other ways. 
Firstly, the 150 new Conservative MPs who entered parliament in 2010 was one of the largest 
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intakes of new MPs in recent history. Secondly, those who interacted with this new intake 
considered them to be the most Eurosceptic group in Conservative Party history, influenced 
by the turn to Euroscepticism by Thatcher in the late 1980s (Stourton, 2011; Wright, 2011). 
Thirdly, many were more ‘independent-minded’ than previous generations of MPs and were 
determined that their voices would be heard during the Coalition government (Seldon and 
Snowdon, 2016:167). These elements, combined with tensions created in the transition from 
opposition into the Coalition and the perceived side-lining of the Conservative European 
policy agenda, created the necessary conditions within the parliamentary party for dissent 
over Europe. 
Attitudinal mapping analysis of the post-2010 election parliamentary party, however, 
suggests that proportionally Conservative MPs were less Eurosceptic overall, in comparison 
to the post-2005 election (Heppell, 2013). Overall, 76.8% of Conservative MPs following the 
2010 election were classified as ‘Eurosceptic’, a substantial drop compared with the 91.4% 
figure for the 2005-2010 parliament (Heppell, 2013). In terms of the Soft-Hard Eurosceptic 
binary, 50.3% of the Eurosceptic MPs were classified as ‘Soft’ Eurosceptic, with 26.5% as 
‘Hard’ Eurosceptic (Heppell, 2013). As this binary categorisation was not used in previous 
studies, it is difficult to make a direct comparison with previous cohorts. However, the data 
does indicate a significant group of Conservative MPs (81) took a directly contradictory 
position to Cameron on the question of UK membership of the EU. 
The proportion of ‘Europhile’ MPs also decreased, continuing the historical trend since 1997, 
from 3.5% to 2.3%. Interestingly, the proportion of MPs identified as ‘agnostic’ on the 
European question increased from 5% in 2005, to 20.9% in 2010. The increase in those 
identified as ‘agnostic’ on Europe, as Heppell (2013) notes, could be a combination of the 
number of new Conservative MPs elected in 2010 and the tendency for the attitudinal 
mapping method to categorise these MPs as agnostic due to an understandable lack of public 
comment on the issue. In total 36% (54) of newly elected Conservative MPs were classified 
as ‘agnostic’ (Heppell, 2013). New MPs could also be less likely to want to comment 
publicly early on in their parliamentary careers on a subject considered divisive within the 
party and one which the leadership wants to be given a low profile. 
The period between the May 2015 and the June 2016 EU referendum also provides data on 
how attitudes towards the EU developed from the early years of the Coalition to the 2015-
2017 parliament. In total 52.1% (172) of the parliamentary party supported the Remain 
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campaign and 43.6% (144) supported the Leave campaign, with 4.2% (14) not declaring for 
either side (Heppell, et al, 2017). Comparing the proportion of Conservative MPs who 
supported the Leave campaign, with those identified as ‘Hard’ Eurosceptic after the 2010 
election, Heppell et al (2017) claim that this shows ‘Hard’ Euroscepticism had evidently 
increased during these two periods. This may be the case. It is also equally plausible that 
many of those classified as ‘Soft’ Eurosceptic in previous parliaments may well have 
privately had ‘Hard’ Eurosceptic positions that they decided not to reveal in public, perhaps 
because of fears this might damage their careers and alienate them from the party leadership. 
These new MPs included Stephen Baker, Mark Reckless, Andrew Bridgen, Gordon 
Henderson, Jacob Rees-Mogg, and David Nuttall. These individuals combined with a similar 
group elected at the 2005 general election, who shared their ideological position and 
determination, to form a core that would resist the attempt by the Coalition government to 
relegate European policy to a minor issue. This new generation of Hard Eurosceptic MPs 
from the 2005 and 2010 cohorts, in addition to others from previous generations, would form 
an assortment of Eurosceptic factions and tendencies that would conduct a campaign to 
pressurise the Conservative leadership into committing to an EU referendum. This campaign 
will be examined in detail later in this chapter. 
8.3.4 Party Members, 2010-2016 
 
This section examines the available data sources on the attitude of Conservative Party 
members to European policy during this period, and to what extent this institution within the 
party influenced policy change. As with the previous chapter, the data sources come from 
academic studies, professional pollsters, and the grassroots activists’ website 
ConservativeHome.  The caveats that come with using ConservativeHome survey data have 
been previously discussed and do not need to be repeated other than to say they should be 
considered with appropriate caution.  
Before discussing party members views on the EU referendum question, it is important to 
reflect on how party members viewed Cameron and his commitment to the 2010 manifesto’s 
European policies. This enables the relationship between party members and the leadership 
on this issue to be placed in context. In the early period of the Coalition government, the 
majority of party members did not believe Cameron remained committed to repatriating 
powers from the EU back to the UK, which had been a prominent element of party policy on 
Europe during the 2005-2010 parliament. ConservativeHome (2011b) asked 1,125 party 
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members their view on how committed Cameron was to repatriating powers from the EU. 
Overall 64% of party members agreed that Cameron was ‘not very committed’ to this policy, 
as of October 2011, with 17% agreeing Cameron was committed to repatriating ‘a few’ 
powers from the EU and 18% stating that Cameron wanted to repatriate ‘significant’ powers. 
This indicates a lack of trust between the membership and the leader over how committed the 
Conservative Party actually was to the 2010 manifesto, and a realisation from party members 
that Cameron’s government agenda on Europe was in reality very different from that of the 
grassroots. 
Further evidence of this divergence in views between Cameron and the party membership 
was on the subject of an EU referendum. In October 2011, the same month in which 81 
Conservative Party MPs voted in support of a motion supporting an EU referendum, 
ConservativeHome surveyed their online members panel asking the question ‘Do you believe 
there should be a referendum on Britain’s continuing membership of the European Union?’. 
In total 77% of the 1,971 party members who responded to the survey answered ‘Yes’ with 
21% saying ‘No’ (ConservativeHome, 2011b). A similar survey in May 2012 saw 75% of 
panel members agree that a bill to provide for a referendum on EU membership should be 
included in the forthcoming Queen’s Speech. Unsurprisingly, this policy was considerably 
more popular with Conservative Party members than with the general public. In the same 
month, YouGov (2012) found 55% of voters supported the introduction of an EU referendum 
bill (ConservativeHome, 2012). Prior to the Bloomberg speech in January 2013, it is clear 
that idea of holding an in/out referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU was popular 
with Conservative Party members, who were much more enthusiastic for this option than 
ordinary voters. 
What this data establishes is that the idea of an EU referendum was popular with a majority 
of the public and a larger majority of party members. There is, nonetheless, no evidence to 
suggest that this was a significant internal factor that convinced Cameron, between October 
2011 and May 2012, to change his position on the EU referendum question. It is more likely 
that Cameron, as a Conservative MP since 2001, was aware that such a policy change would 
be popular with most party members and he would encounter little opposition. Cameron had 
long regarded the ‘collective opinion’ of the Conservative Party on the European question as 
‘non-negotiable’, with any attempt to ‘moderate’ it doomed to failure, which suggests he was 
well aware of how Eurosceptic the party membership was (D’Ancona, 2013:241). The 
conditions within this institution of the party were therefore conducive to such a policy, the 
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party membership would not seek to act as veto player and block it, but it was not these 
conditions themselves that were the stimulus for Cameron to make the policy change itself. 
In terms of party members views on UK-EU integration, before the Bloomberg speech, 
ConservativeHome (2011a) did a survey of party members in September 2011 asking their 
views on the ‘future for Britain and Europe’. In total 4% agreed that UK should remain in the 
EU and ‘participate in further EU integration’; 7% that the UK should remain members but 
‘reject further integration’ with the EU; 29% agreed that the UK should achieve a ‘substantial 
renegotiation’ of its position in the EU and then remain as members; 60% believed the UK 
should leave the EU and then complete a free trade agreement with the EU as a non-member 
(ConservativeHome, 2011a). Overall 89% of party members either wanted a ‘substantial 
renegotiation’ of the UK-EU relationship, or to leave the organisation entirely. From another 
perspective, 60% wanted to leave the EU and 40% wanted to remain, under certain 
conditions. Post-Bloomberg, however, Conservative Party members appeared to adopt a more 
pragmatic assessment. In May 2015, a YouGov/ESRC survey of Conservative Party members 
found only 15.3% of respondents agreeing that they would vote to leave the EU in a future 
referendum, regardless of the outcome of Cameron’s renegotiation of EU membership terms 
(Bale, et al, 2016). In total 63.3% of members agreed that their vote in the referendum ‘would 
depend on the terms of any renegotiation’ (Bale, et al, 2016), suggesting that a majority of 
party members would be prepared to support remaining in the EU if substantial change could 
be achieved in the renegotiation. 
Later in this period, a YouGov (2015) survey in September 2015 asked 1,003 party members 
whether the UK should remain in or leave the EU and found 56% supported Leave and 34% 
Remain. Though it is difficult to make a direct comparison as the questions were different, 
this suggests the proportion of the party membership taking the hard-Eurosceptic position 
increased by only 4% between September 2011 and September 2015. This, however, was 
before Cameron had completed his renegotiation of certain elements of UK-EU membership, 
so some party members at this time might have been waiting to see the results of the 
renegotiation before committing to voting leave in the referendum. The May 2015 survey by 
Bale et al (2016) suggests this is likely to have been the case. 
In what could be interpreted as a damning assessment by the party membership of Cameron’s 
EU renegotiation efforts between May 2015 and February 2016, in the end 69% of 
Conservative Party members voted Leave in June 2016 during the EU referendum vote 
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(Poletti, 2017). The proportion of party members voting Leave was therefore 13% higher 
than YouGov (2015) had found in September 2015, crucially before the outcome of the 
renegotiation process had been determined. This suggests many party members did not feel 
that the outcome of the renegotiation process went far enough and could not follow 
Cameron’s recommendation to vote to remain in the EU. 
 
8.4 Public Opinion 
 
8.4.1 Euroscepticism and UK Public Opinion 
 
Using data from British Social Attitudes 34, Table 8.1 shows the changes in public attitudes 
towards the UK-EU relationship during the 2008-2016. Table 8.1 shows that public opinion 
remained staunchly Eurosceptic. The proportion of the public who either wanted to ‘Leave 
the EU’ or ‘Stay in the EU but reduce its powers’ reached a record high in 2012, with 67% of 
survey respondents agreeing with the two sceptical positions (NatCen, 2016). This was 11% 
higher than in 2008 for the same two questions, and 15% higher than in 2005. Between 2012 
and 2015, those agreeing with the two Eurosceptic survey options was maintained at between 
62% and 65%. Post-referendum in 2016 this had increased to 76%, largely influenced by the 
referendum campaign and result, with a majority now saying the UK should leave the EU 
(NatCen, 2016). It is interesting to note that the proportion of respondents agreeing with the 
‘hard’ Eurosceptic position decreased by 8% between 2012 and 2015, with the ‘soft’ 
Eurosceptic option increasing by 6% during the same period. This could be a fluctuation 
within the Eurosceptic side of public opinion following the Bloomberg speech, which 
contained a commitment to fundamentally renegotiate the UK-EU relationship before holding 
a referendum.  
Figure 8.1 combines the two Eurosceptic and pro-European options in the British Social 
Attitudes survey question on public attitudes towards the EU, 1992-2016, to show the overall 
historical movement in UK public attitude towards the EU. Figure 8.1 shows that for the 
period in question, 2010-2016, Eurosceptic attitudes continued their historic trend by 
increasing to record-high levels in 2016. European policy during this period was therefore 
being developed in a political environment in which Eurosceptic attitudes towards the EU 
were increasing to unprecedented levels in the UK. 
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Figures 8.2 and 8.3 below show data from the Ipsos Mori Issues Index on the importance of 
European and immigration policy to UK voters, 2010-2016. Both figures show European and 
immigration policy was gradually increasing in importance for UK voters during this period. 
The data also shows that while both were growing in importance for voters, immigration 
policy was given a much higher priority. As few as 1% of voters surveyed in August 2010 
considered Europe to be the most important issue, reaching a high of 20% only in February 
2016 during the media attention around Cameron’s EU renegotiation. On the question of 
immigration, voters ranked this issue as either the 1st or 2nd most important policy issue for 
Table 8.1: UK Attitudes towards the EU, 2008-2016 
% Agreeing 2008 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Leave the EU 20 30 26 24 22 41 
Stay in EU but reduce its power 35 37 39 38 43 35 
Leave things as are 24 16 19 18 19 16 
Stay in EU and increase its powers 9 9 6 10 8 4 
Work for single European government 3 2 3 4 3 2 
Source: British Social Attitudes 34 (2017). 
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Figure 8.1: UK Public Attitudes towards the EU, 1992-2016
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UK for the entire period, from a 17% low in April 2011 to a 56% high point in September 
2015. In reality, and as discussed in the previous chapters, the line between Europe and 
immigration as separate political issues during this period is fuzzy, as the rise in concern over 
immigration was at least partly the result of increased migration to the UK from EU citizens 
from Eastern Europe and other member states. These two policy issues, and their rising 
importance in the minds of the public during this period, are therefore deeply connected and 
need to be considered as interacting with each other to produce a political environment in 
which the government came under intense pressure to reform the UK-EU relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ipsos Mori 
 
 
In terms of what internal and external factors contributed to Cameron changing policy on an 
EU referendum in the 2010-2015 parliament, Andrew Cooper, Director of Strategy at 10 
Downing Street 2011-2013, suggests public opinion on ‘Europe’ specifically was not a 
motivating factor. As he explained to me: 
 
‘It never came up as a particularly salient issue in that sense. It never ranked particularly 
highly in peoples’ lists of issues they were concerned about. Every week we used to ask a 
single question - 'If you could raise one issue with the Prime Minister, what issue would you 
want to talk to him about?' - It never, ever, ever featured. We did that for nearly two and a 
half years, every weekend, and for every weekend but one immigration was the number one 
issue and Europe didn't figure.’  
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Figure 8.2: UK Public saying Europe No 1 Issue, 2010-2016 
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In combination with his role as Director of Strategy, Cooper’s market research company, 
Populus, was also commissioned by the Conservative Party during the Coalition to undertake 
research into public opinion. This research suggested that Europe was not a highly salient 
issue for the public, and the Conservative leadership took note of this. This corroborates the 
Ipsos Mori data which indicated that though the proportion of the public who thought Europe 
was an important policy issue was rising during this period, in comparison to other issues it 
was still a minority concern. This largely discredits public opinion on Europe during this 
period as being a significant contributory factor in the EU referendum policy decision. 
The issue which did influence policy thinking in the Conservative leadership was the 
connected area of immigration, which grew in saliency particularly from late-2012/early-
2013. As Cooper explained to me, this had a much more dramatic impact on policy thinking 
in the Conservative Party during this time: 
The more that the Home Office addressed non-EU immigration the more it 
became clear that EU immigration was the real problem. Certainly in terms of 
the vote perception of it as an issue - most people when they talked about 
immigration, what they had in mind was people from Poland, Romania, 
Lithuania coming here - not people from other parts of the world…So I think 
that the more that became a political pressure and the more they faced up to the 
fact that free movement is a problem…I think what did grow internally was a 
feeling that we needed to find a way to make the EU open up a proper 
discussion with us about how we could control that and a realisation that if we 
didn't we basically didn't really have an immigration policy anymore. So, if 
there was a policy driver of it up the agenda it was immigration rather than the 
EU itself. 
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Public opinion on immigration, specifically from the EU, was therefore an important external 
factor which influenced the Conservative leadership to introduce proposals to change 
regulations relating to EU migrants and their welfare entitlements in the UK. These are 
evident in Cameron’s November 2014 speech on immigration policy, and his letter to Donald 
Tusk in November 2015 outlining the EU immigration and welfare policies the UK was 
seeking to renegotiate with the EU. The growing importance of this issue in public opinion 
does not correlate with the EU referendum policy change, as the January 2013 Bloomberg 
speech does not include any mention of EU immigration rules. This is supported by the data 
from the Ipsos Mori Issues Index, which shows immigration policy beginning to become a 
major concern for the public in late 2012/early 2013, after the decision to change policy had 
been taken. Public opinion therefore was an important external contributory factor to policy 
change during this period, with the rising salience of immigration more influential in shaping 
Cameron’s policy decisions on Europe post-Bloomberg than it was in the first three years of 
the parliament. 
 
 
8.5 Rival Political Parties 
 
8.5.1 UKIP:2010-2015 
 
After another poor general election campaign in 2010, the 2010-2015 parliament would 
finally see UKIP achieve the electoral success, mainstream recognition, and indirectly, policy 
goals they had been seeking since their formation in 1993. This included unprecedented gains 
in UK local elections, 2013 (+140), 2014 (+163), and 2015 (+202), after gaining no extra 
seats in the local elections in 2010, 2011, and 2012. In terms of Westminster elections, from 
2013, UKIP regularly attained double digit ratings in voting intention surveys and won two 
by-elections in October and November 2014 after Conservative MPs Douglas Carswell and 
Mark Reckless joined the party and triggered by-elections. The most significant electoral 
breakthrough came at the June 2014 European Parliament elections, where UKIP came first 
in terms of vote share (26.6%) and seats (24), the first time a third party had achieved this in 
a national election since the Liberal Party in the 19th century. At the 2015 general election 
UKIP increased their vote share by 9.5%, more than any other party, though they would win 
only a single seat. This section aims to evaluate to what extent the rise of UKIP during this 
period influenced the development of Conservative European policy. 
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Firstly, to what extent did the rise of UKIP in the 2010-2015 parliament contribute to 
Conservative leadership’s decision to change policy and commit to holding an in/out EU 
referendum? Many academic studies and journalistic accounts credit the electoral threat of 
UKIP in convincing the Conservative leadership to change their policy on a referendum. 
Additionally, a number of individuals interviewed for this thesis also credited the rise of 
UKIP in bringing about this policy change. It certainly made a contribution, but this should 
not be exaggerated. Sequencing the stages in UKIP’s rise suggest that their electoral impact, 
in voting intention surveys and election results, largely took place after the referendum 
decision was made. 
Figure 8.4 below shows data from the Ipsos Mori voting intention survey for the 2010-2016 
period. As can be seen, the rise of UKIP in the national election polls does not start to occur 
until late 2012 and early 2013. This, therefore, is after May/June 2012 when Cameron is 
known to have taken the decision to change party policy on an EU referendum (D’Ancona, 
2013; Shipman, 2016). UKIP’s electoral success in the local, European, and Westminster by-
elections, all occurred from 2013 onwards and not before the decision to change policy was 
made. As stated above, this is not to deny the rise of UKIP made some impact on Cameron’s  
decision. It was a rival political institution which put the Conservative Party under pressure to 
take a more Eurosceptic position on Europe. Craig Oliver, the No. 10 Director of 
Communications 2011-2016, attributes the influence of UKIP as the third most important 
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factor in producing the Bloomberg speech, behind the parliamentary party and the ‘right-
wing’ newspapers. The Conservative leadership had been concerned at the vote share UKIP 
candidates had achieved in Westminster by-elections since the start of the Coalition 
(D’Ancona, 2013). These included by-elections in Barnsley (March 2011, 12.2%) and Corby 
(November 2011, 14.3%), although it is unlikely Cameron was convinced to make such a 
significant change in policy on the basis of two by-election results, with only one in a 
marginal constituency. UKIP achieved more impressive results at by-elections in 
Middlesbrough (November 2012, 11.8%), Rotherham (November 2012, 21.7%), Eastleigh 
(February 2013, 27.8%) and South Shields (May 2013, 24.2%), importantly after the policy 
change was made in May/June 2012. 
It appears that it was an anticipated, future threat of a more electorally successful UKIP, and 
the internal and external problems this would cause, that was the main contribution of UKIP 
to the EU referendum commitment in January 2013. As Cooper (2016) explained when 
interviewed on the thinking behind this: 
We looked forward and thought you can basically predict with a high degree of confidence 
that when we get to the European elections in 2014, less than a year from the general 
election, UKIP are going to win. At which point we will be under a massive amount of 
pressure externally and internally, and because the PM's mind was already that this isn't a 
tenable position and we will have to have a referendum, the view was that it is very likely 
we will end up being pushed into committing to a referendum in the summer of 2014 
coming off terrible European election results. If the political reality is that we are going to 
have to have a referendum anyway, why don't we try to approach it in a more orderly way? 
Set out a proper argument, think about a process for it, how to frame it and find a way to 
make it both more credible and coherent policy idea. 
 
However, when sequencing the rise of UKIP before the Bloomberg speech, the argument that 
it was the political pressure from UKIP, at this early stage in the parliament, that was the 
main factor which led to this decision is unlikely. As Cooper (2016) suggests in the above 
quote, Cameron was already of a mind that the current Conservative Party position on an EU 
referendum was ‘untenable’ and would have to change at some point in the future. UKIP 
aggravated the tension in the Conservative Party over the direction of European policy, 
especially from 2013 onwards, but, as detailed at the beginning of this chapter, they were not 
the source of these tensions. 
The impact of the rise of UKIP was a much more central factor in shaping European policy 
when combined with the growing salience of immigration in UK public opinion from 2013. 
Research by Dennison and Goodwin (2015) shows clearly the strong ownership over the 
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issue of immigration UKIP had from 2013 onwards. This contributed to Cameron introducing 
immigration and welfare policy to his EU membership renegotiation plans. The Conservative 
Party had conducted private research which indicated that UKIP voters were drawn to the 
party more because of their approach to immigration policy, than concerns over the 
relationship between the UK and the EU (Cooper, 2016). As stated previously, in the 
Bloomberg speech Cameron made no mention of immigration policy. It was not until 
November 2013, 10 months after the Bloomberg speech, that Cameron (2013a) set out new 
policies for reducing the number of migrants moving to the UK from EU member states, in 
an article for the Financial Times. The sequencing of these events suggests a new external or 
internal factor which encouraged the Conservative leadership, in the intervening period, to 
include migration and welfare policy as part of the EU renegotiation plan. This change in 
policy correlates with the notable rise in the salience of immigration among the general 
public, and the rise in the number of voters saying they would support UKIP at a future 
general election, both of which occurred during 2013. This means that it is likely that a 
combination of these two factors, and the concern in the Conservative leadership that 
growing concern over EU migration was driving more voters to support UKIP, was the 
external structural factor which stimulated this policy change. 
Overall, as an external rival institution in the same domestic political environment, the rise of 
UKIP during the 2010-2015 parliament did make an important contribution to European 
policy change in the Conservative Party. However, when subjected to closer analysis, it 
appears this influence was less significant in bringing about the EU referendum commitment, 
than it was in encouraging the Conservative Party to change their EU renegotiation plan to 
include immigration and welfare policy. UKIP’s influence was also amplified from 2013 
onwards with the rise in saliency of immigration policy as a concern to voters, and the 
concern the leadership and parliamentary party had that UKIP’s hard-line approach to 
reducing EU migration levels would reduce electoral support for the Conservative Party. 
 
8.5.2 The Labour Party and European Policy, 2010-2015 
 
Under Ed Miliband’s leadership, Labour maintained the pro-Europeanism of the Blair/Brown 
governments (Hertner and Keith, 2017). European policy was not a high priority issue for 
Labour, with Miliband choosing to focus on more salient policy areas like health and the 
economy, making vague references to EU reform in his speeches (Hertner and Keith, 2017.) 
Those that were more specific, such as introducing a warning system for national parliaments 
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to express concern over EU legislative and regulatory proposals and cutting the EU budget, 
appeared to closely shadow the soft Eurosceptic positions of the Conservative Party. In 
policy terms, Labour reacted to Conservative policy changes when it was necessary to do so, 
rather than coming forward with new policies that would put the Conservative Party under 
pressure to adapt or change their own positions. For example, the Labour leadership acted 
reactively to the Bloomberg speech, embracing the idea but only through a beefed up 
‘referendum lock’ legislation, which required an in/out EU referendum if further powers were 
transferred from the UK to the EU. As such, Labour did not create much political pressure for 
the Conservative Party to change their European policy during the 2010-2015 parliament, as 
they were, up to a point, mirroring the soft Eurosceptic policy positions of the Conservative 
Party. 
In Parliament, however, Labour did play a role in exacerbating tensions in the Conservative 
Party and put the leadership under parliamentary pressure to take a more Eurosceptic line on 
Europe. In a similar way to which Conservative MPs had worked with the Labour opposition 
to put pressure on the government on key votes during the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty, members of the Labour leadership also forged relationships with Eurosceptic 
campaigners on the Conservative backbenchers for the same ends. This took place on a series 
motions tabled in the House of Commons during this parliament, some only tangentially 
connected with the EU, such as vote on IMF contributions in July 2011 in which 31 
Conservative Party voted against the government. The most substantial vote was a motion in 
October 2012 which supported a real term cut in the EU budget, which both the Labour Party 
and many Eurosceptic Conservative MPs supported. Mark Reckless (2017), a leading 
Eurosceptic Conservative MP, co-operated with Labour frontbenchers Chris Leslie and Ed 
Balls on the language in his EU budget motion to ensure that rebel Conservative MPs and 
opposition Labour MPs could combine to defeat the government.  
This co-operation between Labour and backbench Conservative MPs produced a defeat for 
the government by 307 votes to 294, the first defeat on a government motion of the 
parliament, which forced Cameron to change position and take a harder line with his EU 
counterparts, calling for a rise in the budget only in line with inflation (Watt, 2012). Many 
other Conservative MPs, who did vote for the motion, made it clear they would support 
future amendments if Cameron did not take a more Eurosceptic position later (Watt, 2012). 
Reckless (2017) explains that this was significant as it showed the Conservative leadership 
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that Labour, and backbench Conservative MPs, could work together and dictate the political 
agenda: 
I think that the impression that the government is in charge and in control, that 
the Prime Minister is showing leadership, was heavily undermined by the 
prospect of parliamentary defeats…they hadn't seen that level of co-operation 
between Tory Eurosceptics and Labour, and the fact that I was able to agree a 
motion and get Labour support for it, and deliver a majority in the House of 
Commons, could mean that it could happen again at unpredictable points in the 
future on EU or EU-related issues. Which is what we tried to explain when the 
Coalition was set up in 2010, that in the same way they needed to agree certain 
things to keep the Lib Dems on board to get their programme through, they 
also needed to agree on an in/out referendum if they were to be a sustainable 
government that could get their business through the Commons. 
 
This parliamentary co-operation between the Labour opposition frontbench, and Eurosceptic 
Conservative MPs, presented a real threat to Cameron and the Coalition government’s ability 
get their legislative agenda through Parliament. The unpredictability of this co-operation 
meant the Conservative leadership had to consider closely the views of Eurosceptic MPs 
when developing policy. As such, and as was the case following the 2012 EU budget defeat, 
Cameron was incentivised to take European policy in a harder Eurosceptic direction to avoid 
further embarrassing defeats.  
 
8.6 Domestic Political Context 
 
This section considers how the domestic political context of the 2010-2016 period influenced 
changes in Conservative European policy over the same period. For much of the Coalition 
government’s time in office, if not the entire period, the state of the economy and public 
finances dominated the political agenda (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015). The Coalition 
implemented a controversial programme of spending cuts and tax rises to reduce the deficit 
created by the 2007-2008 financial crash. The Coalition also implemented unpopular 
programmes of reform to the NHS and university funding, both of which increased tensions 
in government. Legislation to reform the House of Lords, led by the Deputy Prime Minister 
Nick Clegg, generated strong opposition from Conservative MPs, with 91 voting against the 
proposals in July 2012. 
The Labour Party, with new leader Ed Miliband, developed noteworthy leads in voting 
intention surveys from 2012 onwards, before falling behind the Conservative Party in early 
2015. Despite struggling to hold sustained leads over Miliband in the leadership satisfaction 
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ratings, the Conservative Party did maintain a lead over Labour in terms of economic 
competence and the best potential Prime Minister (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015). The 
Coalition’s domestic policy programme, and the opposition this generated, created a domestic 
political context for the Conservative Party in which many were pessimistic about the party 
winning a majority at the next election and unhappy about the Liberal Democrat influence 
over the government agenda. 
With this political context in mind, two events added to this tension and created incentives 
for Eurosceptic Conservative MPs to put parliamentary pressure on the Conservative 
leadership over Europe; the proposed changing of constituency boundaries and the 
introduction of same-sex marriage legislation. 
The re-organisation of parliamentary constituency boundaries, instigated by the 
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011 but introduced in July 2010, was 
a Conservative-led initiative to cut the cost of politics by reducing the number of MPs by 50 
and ensure that nearly all MPs represented roughly 70,000 constituents, with some exceptions 
for geographical reasons. The reduction in the number of MPs would mean many 
Conservative MPs would have to compete with each other for the new constituencies if their 
current seat were abolished. David Nuttall, Conservative MP for Bury North 2010-2017, 
believes this incentivised many Conservative MPs to support the backbench business motion 
on an EU referendum in October 2011, which the leadership strongly opposed. As he 
explained to me: 
So, knowing what we know about the Eurosceptic nature of Conservative Party 
members, the question you have to ask yourself is how many MPs were 
thinking, 'if I'm in a selection battle before members of the local Conservative 
association, I want to be able to say that I have voted for having a referendum. 
If the guy or lady next to me didn't it might give me on one up on them. 
 
A member of the Liberal Democrats (Private interview), who worked closely with many 
Conservative MPs during the Coalition, recalls a Conservative MP expressing a similar view 
on the connection between the willingness of his colleagues to defy the party leadership on 
Europe, and anxiety over the constituency boundary review: 
 
[A Conservative MP] once said to me when discussing this that, 'Well you have 
to understand that what holds us all back. We are expecting...’, this was before 
we sabotaged the redistricting, ‘…the redistricting of constituency boundaries 
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and we will all have to compete with each other for the new seats. When we go 
before these retired Telegraph readers, who are the constituency’s executive, 
they will say to us if there was one law you could repeal…if we don't say the 
1972 European Communities Act, they won't select us. That's why we are all so 
hesitant about it. 
 
This underlines how the apprehension surrounding the review of constituency boundaries 
amongst Conservative MPs contributed to the domestic political pressure on the Conservative 
leadership to take more hard-Eurosceptic positions, and to change party policy on an EU 
referendum, evidenced dramatically in October 20119 when 81 Conservative Party MPs 
supported an EU referendum motion. This reflects how an external structural factor, the 
domestic political context, can contribute to producing the institutional conditions in which 
policy change is more likely to take place. 
The announcement in December 2012 that the Coalition government, with the strong support 
of Cameron, would introduce a bill in 2013 to legalise same-sex marriage in England and 
Wales, caused widespread concern and opposition from grassroots Conservative members, in 
addition to many parliamentarians. The difficulty this created between Conservative MPs and 
their constituency members also created incentives for Eurosceptic Conservative MPs to be 
seen to stand up to the government on issues of high concern to activists. One of these 
important issues, of course, was hostility to the EU. As Desmond Swayne (2017), 
Parliamentary Private Secretary to Cameron 2005-2012, described when interviewed: 
There was another factor added to that which spooked many Tory MPs - the 
huge protest in terms of correspondence over gay marriage…the number of 
people who didn't renew their membership and the huge correspondence that 
members received from Conservative supporters about that issue. I found that 
very difficult to deal with myself, being a libertarian… Nevertheless, that was a 
factor. That added a significant ingredient to the mix. Making Tory MPs feel 
jittery. Making them want to be seen standing up to the coalition, polishing 
their credentials as Eurosceptics, in line with the true believer. 
 
Others interviewed for this thesis suggest the same-sex marriage controversy in the 
Conservative Party, and the boost this gave to UKIP who opposed the legislation, contributed 
to the EU referendum policy change. However, the sequence of events does not fit this 
explanation, as the decision to change policy on the EU referendum position was made in 
early summer 2012 and the government announcement on same-sex marriage was not made 
                                                 
9 If not for significant levels of pressure on backbench Conservative MPs by government whips not to 
support the motion, the number could have been as high as 150 (Shipman, 2016). 
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until December 2012. While it is difficult to connect the opposition to same-sex marriage in 
the Conservative Party with any one policy change, it appears clear that some Conservative 
MPs felt incentivised to push for a more Eurosceptic agenda towards the EU, in order to 
placate anger at the grassroots level over same-sex marriage. 
The domestic political context, therefore, was one in which initiatives such as constituency 
boundary reforms, same-sex marriage legislation, and House of Lords reform, created 
incentives for Eurosceptic Conservative MPs to stand up to the Coalition and Conservative 
leadership, providing a policy area in which they could assert their views. It also created 
incentives for the Conservative leadership to placate them by moving to a more Eurosceptic 
agenda, in order to maintain a semblance of unity between the leadership, parliamentary, and 
grassroots institutions of the party. 
8.7 International Political Context 
 
 
When forming the Coalition in 2010, Cameron had on a number of occasions expressed a 
hope that Europe would be a low-key area of government policy (Seldon and Snowdon, 
2016). This hope, however, did not last long. From 2009 to early 2010, fears started to spread 
that a number of Eurozone countries had unsustainable levels of sovereign and bank system 
debt. Those most strongly implicated were Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. The crisis 
became a political issue during the 2010 election campaign, when protests and 
demonstrations took place in Greece after government austerity measures were announced on 
May 1st, 2010. This highlighted the issue of UK national debt, which had been made a central 
part of the Conservative election campaign. The Eurozone crisis dominated EU affairs 
between 2010 and 2014, with Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus, all needing a variety of 
financial relief and bailouts from EU and international organisations. This propelled the EU 
affairs, and how the UK government should respond as a non-Eurozone EU member, up the 
political agenda in Parliament. However, as the Ipsos Mori Issue Index suggests, it was low 
among the political concerns of the public. 
In raising the salience of EU related issues in Parliament, the Eurozone crisis provided a 
window of opportunity for Conservative MPs to argue that the institutional architecture of the 
EU and Eurozone was a drag on the UK economy and finances and that the UK would be 
better to have a more separate relationship (Nathaniel and Copsey, 2014). More importantly, 
however, it provided a window of opportunity for Conservative MPs to raise EU-related 
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issues on the floor of the House of Commons and organise to put parliamentary pressure on 
the government and party leadership over Europe. For example, there were Conservative 
rebellions on EU economic governance (November 2010), UK participation in financial 
assistance to Eurozone countries (February, March, May, and October 2011), and the 
increase in contributions to the IMF10 (July 2011). 
The international context of the Eurozone crisis also interacted with the domestic context of 
UK politics, and the Coalition programme of financial austerity. Conservative MPs used the 
unpopularity of reductions in government spending at home as an argument in favour of 
opposing both further UK financial assistance to the Eurozone and closer economic/financial 
integration with the EU. As Reckless (2011) stated when speaking in support of an 
amendment opposing potential liability for UK tax-payers in further Eurozone bailouts in 
May 2011: 
If they believe that we need to put a stop to these bail-outs and say, “Enough is 
enough, it is our money, we did not join your currency, and we want our money 
back”, then vote no to the amendment. 
 
The EU’s response to the sovereign and banking debt crisis is therefore an example of an 
external institution, this time in the international political environment, interacting with the 
domestic political context in the UK, to provide the conditions that would encourage policy 
change on Europe in the Conservative Party. It is an important structural factor that provided 
Conservative MPs with a window of opportunity in which to vote against the government and 
put more pressure on the Conservative leadership to move policy in a more ‘hard’ 
Eurosceptic direction. 
8.8 Factions and Tendencies 
 
 
During the 2010-2015 parliament, a collection of factions and more informal groups of 
individuals, which Rose (1964) describes as tendencies, worked within parliament from the 
Conservative backbenches to change party and government policy in a more Eurosceptic 
direction. This type of highly organised, formal parliamentary insurgency had not been 
experienced inside the Conservative Party since the 1990s, when a faction of Conservative 
MPs worked within parliament to try to delay and defeat the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty. The Pro-European/Pro-Euro tendency in the parliamentary party after 1997 was 
                                                 
10 That could potentially be used by the IMF in financial bailouts for Eurozone countries. 
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disorganised and docile and did not make a notable contribution inside or outside parliament. 
With the transition from opposition to government, Conservative MPs now had the window 
of opportunity they had been waiting for to pressurise and gain access to colleagues in 
positions of power in government. They did this through a number of actions, organising in 
parliament to defeat and oppose the Coalition on EU related issues, utilising the influence of 
outside pressure groups, organising letter writing campaigns, and the direct lobbying of 
government ministers and leadership figures. The leaders of these groups worked cross-party, 
much like in the 1990s, with colleagues in the Democratic Unionist Party and the Labour 
Party (Nuttall, 2016). This sustained pressure on the party leadership, in combination with the 
other factors discussed in this chapter, is the foremost internal factor which explains the 
policy changes seen on Europe during this parliament. This section firstly explains in detail 
how these Eurosceptic factions and tendencies organised and co-operated with each other. 
8.8.1 Organisation and Co-operation 
The collection of Conservative MPs, who organised to change party and government policy 
on Europe from within parliament, did so through a network of Eurosceptic factions and 
more loosely constituted tendencies of like-minded individuals. These groups co-operated 
with each other, but had their own identities and leaders, and conducted their own separate 
initiatives without necessarily consulting the other groups. The general principle was to 
pressurise the government into taking policy in a more Eurosceptic direction, but as Mark 
Reckless (2017) explained to me, the main goal of his more formal group was to extract a 
commitment to hold a referendum on EU membership: 
 
I formed with Douglas Carswell, we called it the Tuesday Breakfast Club, a 
group of several Eurosceptics including myself, Douglas, Steve Baker, Phillip 
Hollobone, Christopher Chope, who were there pretty reliably, and a few others 
who at least came some of the time. We were looking, really from the 
beginning of the 2010-2015 parliament, to put pressure on the government, 
with a view to ensuring we got an in/out referendum on our EU membership. 
That was our objective. From the beginning, we campaigned for that and chose 
a series of differing but related issues to gradually increase our strength and get 
influence on the government. 
 
This was a conscious change of tactics, following the transition from opposition to 
government, that aimed to ‘radicalise the parliamentary party’ by creating opportunities to 
debate and vote on the issue in Parliament (Carswell, 2017). If the Conservative leadership 
were constantly protected from losing votes on Europe by Liberal Democrat MPs, this would 
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further radicalise the parliamentary and membership sections of the party, putting additional 
pressure on Cameron not to be seen to always take the pro-EU position (Carswell, 2017). 
This faction, led primarily by Carswell and Reckless, had a clear objective of extracting a 
commitment to an EU referendum, or forcing the circumstances in which Cameron would 
find it difficult to deny one. 
Three other more established groups, representing the Thatcherite-Eurosceptic wing of the 
parliamentary party, also participated in organising against the Coalition and Cameron’s low-
key position on Europe. No Turning Back, Cornerstone, and the 92 group all began meeting 
on Wednesday nights together to discuss ‘strategy, debates, motions, amendments’ (Private 
interview). They also co-operated to help ensure Eurosceptics were elected to select 
committees and the 1922 Committee, by producing ‘sound slates’ of candidates supported by 
the main groups (Private interview). Each group essentially had the same outlook on Europe 
but were essentially different ‘brands’ for the various senior MPs (Edward Leigh, John 
Redwood, and Gerald Howarth) to discuss Eurosceptic activities. 
During key votes, such as the October 2011 EU referendum motion and the October 2012 EU 
budget amendment, the operation to encourage colleagues to vote against the Coalition was 
as organised as it had been during the Maastricht Treaty ratification. As one member of this 
group (Private interview) explained to me when discussing this: 
They would mobilise their own shadow whipping operation, so they would 
choose two people, or three people, to mobilise the vote, send out emails 
saying, 'Vote against the government on this amendment because it is really 
important because of X, Y, and Z’. On the day they provided unofficial whips, 
shadow whips, basically their own people to get people through the right lobby. 
 
This was key to ensure a sufficient number of MPs would support these groups on important 
votes, as the greater the number they could mobilise, the more pressure it would put on 
Cameron to not ignore their position. In the 2010 to 2012 parliamentary session, for example, 
93 Conservative MPs, 30% of the total parliamentary party, voted against the government on 
29 separate pieces of EU related business (Lynch and Whittaker, 2013). It is important to 
recognise the role of attrition in this campaign, with Eurosceptic factions attempting to force 
concessions from Cameron via constant pressure on Europe in parliament (Private interview). 
To this extent, the policy change seen in this parliament is a combination of all these 
incidents. However, the following section will look at a series of key parliamentary events 
that more directly contributed to policy change. 
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8.8.2 The 81 Rebellion – October 2011 
 
The circumstances surrounding the backbench rebellion in October 2011, when 81 
Conservative MPs defied a three-line whip to vote in favour of an EU referendum, was the 
direct result of a series initiatives by the Eurosceptic factions identified above. Following the 
2010 election a new committee was formed, the Backbench Business Committee, which had 
the power to allocate debates in the House of Commons on issues of interest to backbenchers. 
There were low levels of awareness about the powers this new committee had, and few MPs 
had shown interest in applying to be members (Davies, 2016). This was identified by a group 
of Conservative MPs as being a powerful tool in getting time on the floor of the House to 
debate the EU without the government having the power to block them (Nuttall, 2016). Peter 
Bone, Philip Davies, and Phil Hollobone were elected to the committee of seven, meaning 
they needed only one member to support them to get a debate scheduled. David Nuttall, a 
fellow Eurosceptic colleague, applied to have a debate on the question of EU referendum, 
which was granted by the committee (Nuttall, 2016). 
Both sides of the Coalition publicly rejected the idea as the debate grew closer and the 
government realised there was substantial support for the motion amongst Conservative MPs. 
Cameron took a firm line and ordered an ‘industrial-scale operation’ to reduce the number of 
Conservative MPs willing to vote for the motion (Shipman, 2016). Cameron and Hague 
personally saw MPs in their parliamentary offices to convince them to support the 
government or abstain (Nuttall, 2016). The supporters of the motion responded with their 
own ‘military operation’ behind the scenes to counter this (Private interview). The scale of 
the rebellion, 81 Conservative MPs voted for the motion, was the biggest in post-1945 
Conservative Party history. 
The evidence suggests that it was this event, and the scale upon which so many of his own 
MPs had defied his authority so early on in the parliament, that was the key internal factor in 
convincing Cameron to change policy on an EU referendum between May and June 2012 
(Clegg, 2016; Laws, 2016; Shipman, 2016). A separate follow-up campaign, organised by 
Conservative MP John Baron, which delivered a letter personally to Cameron from the 
parliamentary party from over 100 backbenchers on June 30th 2012, calling for an EU 
referendum in the current parliament, is also likely to have contributed (Baron, 2016). 
However, an advisor to Cameron credits the October 2011 rebellion as the critical juncture, 
as it was clear the parliamentary party would not accept anything other than a commitment on 
 239 
an EU referendum before the 2015 election (Shipman, 2016). There were also genuine fears 
of a leadership challenge, by a more Eurosceptic MP who would be willing to commit the 
Conservative Party to a referendum, if Cameron had not changed his mind (Oliver, 2016). 
The parliamentary campaign, by a collection of Eurosceptic factions and individual actors, 
directly resulted in the most significant European policy change of the parliament. Though 
other factors contributed, as detailed elsewhere in this chapter, the October 2011 rebellion 
was the critical juncture which produced this policy change. 
8.8.3 The EU Budget – October 2012 
 
In October 2012, as part of the campaign to put the Coalition under pressure over Europe, 
Conservative MPs attempted to amend a government motion on UK contributions to the EU 
Multiannual Financial Framework, the EU budget framework for the next seven years. The 
government’s position was to negotiate with the EU for a rise in the budget in line with 
inflation. An amendment, introduced by Reckless, called for a real term cut in the budget. 
Carswell had used the same issue to initiate a backbench rebellion in October 2010. In total 
35 Conservative Party had supported the Carswell amendment. This had been ‘a huge shock 
for the whips and the government’ and was the first indication to the party leadership of the 
strength of backbench opinion on the issue (Reckless, 2017). In October 2012, after two of 
years of austerity, the Labour Party supported the Reckless EU budget amendment and the 
government was defeated 307 to 294, with 51 Conservative MPs voting against the Coalition. 
This was an even bigger shock for Cameron, as it indicated that Conservative MPs could and 
would work with Labour to defeat the government when their political interests aligned. This 
directly influenced a change in policy, as Cameron subsequently negotiated for a cut in the 
seven-year EU budget after October 2012, achieving this in February 2013 (Waterfield and 
Kirkup, 2013). Conservative MPs had indicated there would be further parliamentary defeats 
if Cameron did not change policy on the EU budget (Watt, 2012). 
As with the October 2011 EU referendum, the organisation of Conservative MPs in 
parliament, in this case by Reckless, was the primary influence on Cameron changing his 
policy position and moving to the harder Eurosceptic position popular with Eurosceptic 
backbenchers. The rebellions in question relied upon a strict policy of not discussing plans 
with those outside a small trusted circle until the last possible moment (Carswell, 2017; 
Reckless, 2017). This ensured that government whips had less time to organise against 
amendments, and potential converts on the backbenches would not be put off by seeing 
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rebellions bragged about in the newspapers before they had been discussed with colleagues 
privately (Carswell, 2017; Reckless, 2017). This had been the case in previous parliaments 
and was counter-productive (Carswell, 2017; Reckless, 2017). This change in tactics, at least 
by one influential group, was an internal factor that helped to produce these policy changes 
on Europe. 
 
8.8.4 The Queen’s Speech Amendment – May 2013 
 
The final key example of the activity of Eurosceptic factions producing direct policy change 
came in May 2013, before and after the Queen’s speech. This initiative was led by John 
Baron. The objective on this occasion, as Baron explained to me, was to put pressure on 
Cameron to support a private members’ bill for an EU referendum in the 2010-2015 
parliament (Baron, 2016). He and other like-minded colleagues did not accept that the 
Bloomberg speech was enough, as Cameron had not committed to bringing forward 
legislation to make it law (Baron, 2016). As discussed previously, Conservative MPs were 
deeply suspicious of Cameron’s promises on Europe and did not trust him to deliver on them. 
In the Spring 2013, Baron had asked a Cabinet member at a 1922 Committee meeting 
whether it was likely they would support a private members’ bill, if they could not get Liberal 
Democrat approval. They said they could not support it (Baron, 2016). Eurosceptic 
Conservative MPs did not accept this, and Baron decided to try and amend the Queen’s 
Speech to express ‘regret’ that it had not included legislation on an EU referendum. 
Despite attempts to avoid a ‘rebellion’ by announcing that Conservative MPs would not be 
whipped to vote against the amendment, and avoiding the heavy-handed tactics administered 
to deter rebels in October 2011, 114 Conservative MPs voted in favour of the Baron 
amendment (Watt and Wintour, 2013). Again, as in the other examples, organisation among a 
faction of Conservative MPs in parliament had directly changed party policy on Europe. On 
July 4th 2013, with leadership encouragement, James Wharton MP introduced a private 
members’ bill to legislative for an EU referendum in the 2010-2015 parliament. 
 
 
 
8.9 Individual Actors 
 
 
8.9.1 David Cameron 
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Although they are not the only individual actors that shape policy, the party leader in the 
Conservative Party policy-making structure certainly has the final say. This gives them a 
critical role in the explanation of why party policy changes, when, and under what 
circumstances. Cameron as an individual actor must be factored into any analysis of 
European policy change during his period as Prime Minister. As this section will set out, 
certain characteristics of Cameron’s personality arguably made him more susceptible to be 
influenced by the internal and external pressures discussed previously in this chapter. 
Most, if not all, political leaders have complex characters that defy one-dimensional 
assessments of their personality. Cameron is no different in this regard, and therefore, many 
aspects of his character contributed to his willingness to change position on European policy 
during this period. A number of those interviewed for this thesis, who themselves had many 
interactions with Cameron over Europe, suggests that it was a contradictory mix of hubris, an 
overconfidence in his own ability to win a political argument, but also complacency and an 
acute sensitivity to criticism and political pressure (Private interview). 
One Conservative MP (Private interview) explained to me how he saw the contribution that 
Cameron’s character made to policy change on Europe during this period: 
I think his personality goes to the core of this. A more cautious person, a less 
confident person would not have made the undertakings that he did. A more 
ideological person, someone who was more committed to the EU, I suspect that 
they would have been more reluctant to essentially gamble with British 
membership of the EU on a referendum. So, he lacked ideology and he had a 
huge self-confidence to deliver the verdict that he needed...Cameron, I'm 
afraid, was the unwitting aider and abettor of this. Contrary to what he wanted. 
Without him this wouldn't have happened. That is almost a truism, but you 
know a more diffident person would not have made the commitments that he 
made and would not have blundered into the referendum that he did and 
probably wouldn't have lost it. A lot of it had to do with his complacency, his 
self-belief, his sense of historic mission, maybe. 
 
Cameron’s natural tendency to be confident that he can change the political weather and win 
the argument, as arguably in he did in making the Conservative Party electable again during 
the 2005-2010 parliament, contributed to his decision to change position on an EU 
referendum in 2012 and commit his party to a ‘fundamental’ renegotiation of the UK-EU 
membership terms (Cameron, 2013a). 
These characteristics, complacency and overconfidence, may also have contributed to the 
perceived lack of success Cameron achieved in his EU renegotiation strategy. One individual 
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(Private interview), a Conservative MEP during this period, argues that it was self-
confidence, bordering on arrogance, during the renegotiation that contributed to its ultimate 
failure. Cameron was not willing to invest the required time to get the outcome he needed and 
rushed the process to get it finished quickly (Private interview). Conservative MEPs did try 
and contribute ideas, but no one directly involved in the process at Westminster was 
interested in engaging constructively with them (Private interview). Furthermore, Cameron 
had a limited understanding of how EU institutions worked and relied naively on his 
relationships with EU leaders such as Mark Rutte, the Dutch Prime Minister, who did not 
share many of his views on EU reform (Private interview). This approach decreased the 
chances of Cameron securing the renegotiation deal that he had set out to achieve. 
Another Conservative MP (Private interview) suggests that, alternatively, it was Cameron’s 
private insecurities about his own position during his premiership and his sensitivity to 
conflict, rather than hubris, which encouraged Cameron to make changes to European policy: 
He was actually thin-skinned, lacking confidence…It was a bravado of 
confidence that hid this lack of confidence. I remember once when he was 
going to Brussels, it was a very weak moment in his premiership, and he is 
suggesting a policy which I can't recall, but I leaked something to one of the 
political blogs about certain names being put in, certain names asking for him 
to go…I leaked an exaggerated number of names to this blog, knowing full 
well that he checked these blogs on his Blackberry constantly, all the time. 
Like Major used to read the newspapers. Behold, within 12 hours the policy 
had changed because he was at a particularly weak moment, reading the blogs, 
and responded to the blogs. You don't do that if you're confident.... I know of 
MPs that were being sacked, or didn't get a job, that would throw a tantrum or 
burst into tears and he would buckle. 
 
This suggests that it was a mixture of overconfidence in public, but also insecurity about his 
own position in private, which combined during this period to incline Cameron to move to a 
more Eurosceptic position on Europe, including conceding the internal party demand for an 
in/out EU referendum. 
 
8.9.2 Angela Merkel 
 
An important part of Cameron’s approach to European policy during this period was the 
belief that winning the support of German Chancellor Angela Merkel was the key to success 
during negotiations with the EU. As one advisor to Cameron put it, ‘The strategy was always: 
schmooze the pants off Merkel, get that locked down and then everyone else will fall in 
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behind’ (Shipman, 2016:11). Merkel was therefore the EU leader Cameron most consulted on 
EU relations during the Coalition and following the 2015 election, to the detriment of his 
relationship with other EU leaders. This meant Merkel was a critical individual actor on the 
development of Conservative European policy as her view on whether a reform proposal was 
workable could shape policy before it had even been formally introduced to other EU 
member states. This role was enhanced, in comparison to other EU leaders, due to the weight 
Cameron and his aides themselves placed on her opinion and influence in the EU. 
As a result, Merkel was a critical individual actor in the development of the Conservative 
Party EU renegotiation policy, her influence directly changing policy. In November 2014 
Cameron gave a speech on Europe, specifically around EU freedom of movement and 
welfare entitlements. When developing the policy proposals to be included in the speech, 
Cameron had wanted to propose a quota mechanism to limit the number of EU migrants 
coming to the UK in the future (Shipman, 2016). This idea was subsequently leaked to the 
Sunday Times, and privately and publicly rejected by Merkel as non-negotiable (Shipman, 
2016). Cameron dropped the proposal as a direct result of Merkel’s veto, suggesting an 
‘emergency break’ mechanism as an alternative, also later dropped from the speech on the 
understanding Merkel would not support this either (Shipman, 2016). 
 
8.10 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to explain a series of policy changes experienced by the 
Conservative Party during the 2010-2016 period. Firstly, the difference between the 
European policy of the 2010 Conservative manifesto and the Coalition Agreement was the 
combination of influence from the pro-EU Liberal Democrats and a willingness from the 
Conservative Party leadership to drop commitments made in opposition to repatriate or 
radically renegotiate areas of EU competence, such as social and employment policy. As 
such, a contingent event, like the 2010 general election hung parliament, had an important 
impact on policy change at this point. Secondly, on the question of the change in position on 
participation in EU justice and criminal policy, this has been difficult to find direct evidence 
for. However, this was likely the result of a combination of political pragmatism (opting in to 
the most important and opting out of the less beneficial measures to save face) and the 
influence of Theresa May in Cabinet. 
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The decision to change policy on an EU referendum, and the commitment to legislating in the 
current parliament, was the result of a series of endogenous factors and the sequence in which 
they occurred. 1) The failure to win the 2010 general election and the abandoning of much of 
the Conservative European policy commitments in Coalition Agreement caused deep 
resentment among Eurosceptic Conservative MPs towards Cameron; 2) This helped 
stimulate, and sustain, a parliamentary campaign from a network of Conservative MP 
Eurosceptic factions which aimed to win concessions from the party leadership on Europe; 3) 
A critical juncture took place in October 2011 when 81 Conservative MPs voted against the 
government to support a referendum, which ultimately convinced Cameron that policy had to 
change, or he risked losing control of the government agenda.  
This thesis has argued that UKIP played a less significant role in this than usually credited, as 
the sequence of events suggests Cameron made his decision to change policy in early 2012 
before UKIP’s political and electoral rise. The contribution they did make was more the 
anticipation of their electoral significance later in the parliament, at the 2014 European 
elections and at the next general election. UKIP were more successful at influencing the 
Conservative Party to introduce EU immigration and welfare reform as part of the 
renegotiation and referendum, which took place in November 2014 following the UKIP 
victory at the European elections in May 2014 in EU migration had been their main campaign 
issue. The rise of immigration as the most important issue to UK voters also contributed to 
this change in policy during the 2010-2015 parliament. However, during the negotiations 
themselves after the 2015 election, the role of a powerful individual political actor – German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel - was the most important exogenous factor in causing Cameron to 
adjust his proposals for a new UK-EU relationship.  
The new institutionalist framework, as set out in Chapter 3, has made a central contribution to 
the analysis in this chapter and has guided the discussion. It has shown how the role of 
individual actors, the influence of historical legacy (actions, events, and ideas), the impact of 
internal/external institutions and groups, the structural environment, path dependency and the 
sequencing of events has contributed to the development of European policy during this 
period in the history of the Conservative Party. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis has been to explain the development of European policy in the 
Conservative Party, 1997-2016. The intention has been to explain how European policy has 
changed during this period, and what causal factors have most contributed to these changes. 
The objective of this conclusion is to provide a summary of the preceding chapters main 
findings and contributions, in addition to emphasising throughout the original contribution 
this thesis makes. It is structured in the following manner. In the first section, the exogenous 
and endogenous causes of European policy change in the Conservative Party are considered 
in context. This section also considers the contribution these findings make to literature on 
policy change in political parties. The second section considers the thesis findings in the 
context of the new institutionalist theoretical approach. The third section looks at other 
examples in which this approach could be applied. Lastly, this conclusion looks at how the 
development of policy during this period contributed to Brexit, and what the implications of 
this thesis means for future research into the development of European policy in the 
Conservative Party following the Brexit referendum. 
 
9.1 Endogenous and Exogenous Causes of Policy Change in Context 
This thesis has drawn extensively on the quantitative and qualitative literatures that reflect on 
policy change, as well as general change, in political parties. The development of these 
literatures, as examined in Chapter 2, has made an important contribution to our 
understanding of how and why political parties change. However, there has been a tendency 
within this literature to consider different exogenous and endogenous factors in isolation of 
each other, and to downplay the significance of some factors such as political leadership and 
intra-party pressure groups. As such, the literature on the Conservative Party and European 
policy has also tended to limit the explanation of policy change to an isolated range of 
factors, most notably somewhat vague references to the rise of ‘Euroscepticism’, which has 
limited our understanding of other possible explanations and provided insufficient analysis. 
In applying an approach that systematically considers the contribution of both exogenous and 
endogenous factors, and the interactions between them, this thesis provides a blueprint for a 
more detailed, flexible, and wide-ranging analysis of policy change in a political party. 
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It has drawn a number of broader conclusions which are relevant to the future consideration 
of policy change in political parties. Firstly, as the previous chapters have established, the 
role of the party leaders and political leadership has been an influential in contributing to 
party change. This therefore supports the conclusions of Bale (2012), in his general study of 
policy change in the Conservative Party, that party leaders were central to changes in the 
direction of policy. This thesis however would expand upon this, in context of European 
policy 1997-2016, to also include political ‘leaders’ in the party such as Shadow Foreign 
Secretaries 1997-2005 (Howard, Maude, and Ancram) and Foreign Secretary William Hague 
(2005-2010, 2010-2014). Each individual, in their own capacities and to different extents, 
were influential in both instigating and influencing policy change during this period. This 
was especially the case during the opposition years, as Shadow Secretaries were given 
considerable autonomy over the technical details of new policy. This finding points to the 
need to not narrow ‘political leadership’ to only concern the role of the party ‘leader’, but to 
expand it to consider the influence other individual political ‘leaders’ have over policy 
change in political parties. 
Secondly, the findings of this thesis have broader considerations for the role that factions play 
in contributing to policy change in political parties. As examined in Chapter 2, the literature 
tends to down play the role party factionalism has on policy change in political parties. This 
thesis has concluded that party factionalism can contribute to policy change, as evidenced in 
Chapters 5 and 8, with the impact more acute in periods where the party is in government 
rather than opposition. As suggested in some of the elite interviews, this is likely to be the 
result of a strategic consideration on the part of individuals and groups as to the right moment 
to apply pressure on the party leadership to change policy. In opposition, the potential costs 
of being seen to undermine the party leadership and damage the chances of returning to 
government are not counter-balanced with the opportunity to directly change government 
policy. This acts to decrease potential for active party factionalism. However, once in 
government, the opportunity to change party, and therefore government policy, potentially 
exceeds the costs. Following the 2010 general election and the formation of the Coalition 
with the pro-EU Liberal Democrats, and after 13 years of Eurosceptic opposition, the 
necessary internal and external conditions were there for factions to have the political space 
to have an influence on policy. 
 
 247 
Thirdly, this thesis highlights the role of leadership elections on policy change during this 
period. This, as with the role of party factionalism, has in general not been previously 
considered in the literature on policy change in political parties as being particularly 
influential. This thesis has shown that in the competitive environment of leadership elections 
policy positions can be established by candidates with long-term ramifications for policy 
change. The 1997 leadership election produced the ‘two-parliaments’ policy on the single 
currency, a triangulated position between the anti and pro-single currency wings of the 
parliamentary developed by Hague and his campaign team to attract the support of moderate 
Conservative MPs. The 2005 leadership election would prove fundamental in seeing the idea 
that Conservative MEPs should withdraw from the EPP grouping, a policy which had long 
been a goal of many Eurosceptic MPs and MEPs, became established party policy when 
Cameron committed to it under the perception that this would give him a competitive edge 
over Davis. This commitment, as developed in Chapter 8, would have long-term implications 
for European policy when the party returned to government and needed to work with 
continental European allies which they previously have been seen to reject. As such, a 
conclusion of this thesis is that more consideration needs to be made for the potential that 
leadership elections have to be arenas in which the origins of future policy change can be 
established. 
Finally, a conclusion of this thesis is that while the empirical chapters of this thesis have 
highlighted a number of prominent factors which have been the causes of policy change at 
different times, a consideration also needs to be made of how change has been produced 
through a continuous interaction between the institutional, structural, and agential elements of 
the exogenous/endogenous causal factors of policy change. As was developed in Chapter 2, 
this is a dialectical relationship in which individual agents, institutions, and structural factors 
interact and react to each other to produce policy change over time.  
This interaction has been evident when considering the Conservative Party, policy change, 
and Europe during the 1997-2016 period. The rise in Euroscepticism in institutions of the 
Conservative Party since 1997 has interacted with the growth in Eurosceptic attitudes within 
the general public opinion to produce a structural political environment which has 
incentivised individual actors to change policy in a Eurosceptic direction. The rise of 
Euroscepticism in the UK from the 1990’s onwards also created an environment in which 
there was political space for rival ‘Eurosceptic’ political parties to emerge and put the 
Conservative Party under pressure to move European policy further in a Eurosceptic 
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direction. It was the perceived success of these rival political parties at elections by individual 
actors within the party, most notably the Referendum Party in 1997 and UKIP from 2013 
onwards, which additionally contributed to both external and internal pressure on the party 
leadership to incorporate some of their positions on European policy in order to neutralise 
them as electoral competitors, most prominently with regards to referenda and EU 
immigration. Providing wider structural context has been what this thesis has called the 
domestic and international political contexts, events in the UK or abroad which indirectly or 
directly have contributed to the stability or instability of European policy at different times. 
These have been additional layers of the structural environment which have shaped the 
direction of European policy by requiring individual actors to react to developing events and 
adjust their actions accordingly. Prominent examples have been the EU reform treaties 1997-
2009 and the Eurozone crisis 2010-2014. 
Following the transition from opposition party to government in 2010 a network of connected 
but independent groups used the mechanisms of Parliament and parliamentary procedure to 
defeat the government on the floor of the House of Commons and persuade Cameron that the 
inclusion of a promise to hold a future in/out referendum on UK membership of the EU could 
no longer to be resisted. These structural and institutional factors contextualised the policy 
options open to the party leadership during this period, both constraining and enabling them 
to act on policy change depending on the circumstances. This thesis has shown that the 
interpretation of these structural and institutional circumstances by the party leaders has been 
fundamental to the content and direction of policy change on Europe in the Conservative 
Party during this period. Therefore, this thesis considers that the agency and actions of the 
party leaders, leadership, and other prominent individuals must not be neglected in future 
research into policy change in political parties. 
 
9.2 Contribution of the New Institutionalist Approach 
To answer the research questions this thesis has used a number of different academic 
literatures. As the above section indicates, the literature on change in political parties, and the 
specific literature on policy change in political parties, has made a considerable contribution. 
In addition, this thesis has also used the new institutional theory literature to develop a more 
sophisticated explanation of European policy change in the Conservative Party that adds 
additional factors and mechanisms that are missing or underemphasised in the party change 
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literature. This has enabled the explanation to better understand policy change as a complex 
process that develops overtime, with institutions, the structural environment, and individual 
agency interacting with contingent events and critical junctures to produce change. 
This period, 1997-2016, started with a critical juncture which established a new Eurosceptic 
path dependent dynamic to European policy in the Conservative Party. In 1997, with the 
election of a majority Eurosceptic parliamentary party and party leadership, European policy 
in the Conservative Party established itself as hostile to further European integration for the 
UK and in favour of a greater independent role for national governments in the EU. This 
created positive feedback for the party leadership. This meant that after each step the party 
leadership took European policy in more a Eurosceptic direction, however abrupt or 
incremental, they gained positive feedback from the internal institutions of the party and 
elements the external structural environment. This both made each further step in this 
direction more likely and the costs of attempting to challenge this path more severe.   
With the internal institutions of the party and the public opinion in the UK seeing Eurosceptic 
attitudes incrementally increase, this created incentives for policy to move in a gradually 
harder Eurosceptic direction. It also created constraints to changing the direction of policy, as 
positions became entrenched and the political costs to reversing the trend increased. As a 
result, when Cameron formed the coalition in 2010 with the Liberal Democrats and attempted 
to put the European policy developed by the party of the previous 13 years in ‘deep freeze’, 
the political costs included a parliamentary campaign of pressure by MPs that eventually led 
to the January 2013 EU referendum pledge. European policy had developed incrementally in 
which Eurosceptic policies were built up over each parliament and leadership. Over the 
course of the period existing policies were adjusted, and new policies added. The overall 
Eurosceptic trend continued, with European policy expanding into new areas such as welfare 
entitlement and immigration. These developed in a sequence over time, with each 
development and contingent event along the path influencing the next, for example the 
unexpected failure to win the 2010 general election storing resentment among Eurosceptics 
that would at least partly be released during the parliamentary campaign for an in/out EU 
referendum. Critical junctures such as the 1997 general election and the October 2011 
parliamentary rebellion by 81 Conservative MPs made significant contributions, but as this 
thesis has shown, policy change was influenced at least as much by a linked sequence of 
smaller contingent events and individual actions. 
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The historical legacies of previous policy decisions and events influenced the actions of 
future individual agents, most importantly the party leaders. For example, the historical 
legacy of the Referendum Party, and the impact it made at the 1997 general election, made 
the parliamentary party and leadership particularly sensitive to the rise of UKIP during the 
2010-2015 parliament and the question of referendums on future European integration. This 
impact was ‘huge’ (Finkelstein, 2018). As Daniel Finkelstein (2018), political advisor to 
William Hague 1997-2001, has recently stated on the 2001 general election and the legacy 
for the Referendum Party: 
The threat of a Referendum candidate polling a big vote pushed Tory 
candidates towards a harder line against the euro and shifted the whole of the 
right towards support for a referendum. 
The persistence of historical legacies, such as the Referendum Party, to influence the thought 
process of individual agents shows the power history has to shape future policy change in 
political parties many years after the event. 
The historical legacy of ideas, not only events and actions, has also played a role in the 
development of European policy. The persistence of historical ideas has been important to 
policy change, as party leaderships have often resurrected ideas from previous periods and 
introduced them as if they were new ideas. For example, the question of whether the 
Conservative Party should withdraw its MEPs from the EPP grouping in the European 
Parliament, or at least fundamentally change the relationship, was a persistent idea 
throughout the period. History has therefore been used by the policy-making elites within the 
Conservative Party as fertile ground for the rediscovery and redeployment of historic ideas 
around Europe, as means of addressing a present political or policy dilemma. 
The new institutionalist theoretical framework, as set out in Chapter 3 and applied throughout 
the rest of thesis, has aimed to establish an integrated approach to the analysis of policy 
change in political parties. This integrated approach has aimed to introduce a theoretical 
toolkit of mechanisms and concepts which are missing or underplayed in current literature on 
policy change in political parties that can be applied to other examples in future research.  
9.3 Applying the Approach to other Examples 
During the course of this research it has become apparent that this approach could be applied 
to a number of other cases related to the development of European policy in UK political 
parties, that would benefit from an in-depth analysis of the causes of policy change. There are 
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many opportunities here for further research that are both historical and contemporary in 
perspective, but also comparative. This includes the political party that has been the focus of 
this thesis, the Conservative Party, but also the Labour Party. This section briefly sets out two 
of these examples. 
• Conservative Party and Labour Party: European Policy Post-Brexit, 2016-Present 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the result of the June 2016 referendum that saw the UK 
electorate vote to leave the EU but not on what terms, has meant European policy for the 
Conservative Party has entered a new phase. The question has now changed from how to 
modify the UK-EU relationship and reform the EU institutions (pre-Brexit), to how to 
negotiate the UK leaving the EU and the degree of association that should remain once 
the UK has left (post-Brexit). The latter, if not the former, also applies to the Labour 
Party in the post-Brexit era. The post-Brexit European policy of the Conservative Party 
and Labour Party are in a state of limbo. The manifestos presented at the 2017 general 
election providing only vague details and the inconclusive election result adding to the 
confusion in each party of what direction to take. Each party, at present, is still 
developing their positions on what the future UK relationship should be with the EU with 
regards to trade and economic co-operation, immigration and citizens’ rights, security and 
defence, in addition to the status of Northern Ireland. This provides an excellent 
opportunity in which to apply the approach of this thesis to studying policy change on 
Europe comparatively, during a new phase in the history of the UK-EU relationship. 
• Conservative Party and Labour Party: Policy Change and Europe, 1945-1997 
Both the Conservative Party and Labour have had evolving policy positions on European 
integration since the beginning of the ‘European project’ in the post-World War Two era. 
The approach of this thesis could be applied to this to provide an in-depth, comparative 
analysis of the drivers of policy change on Europe during this period. This is currently 
lacking in the literature on British political parties and European integration, which tend 
to focus on narrative accounts of the period. This historical approach would also benefit 
from the potential availability of archive material, which is more difficult to access in 
studies which focus on contemporary periods. In addition, it would also be interesting to 
see whether the Conservative backbench 1922 Committee exerted more collective 
influence as an intuition during this period on policy change and Europe. As opposed to 
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the contemporary period, in which this thesis found little evidence to suggest it acted as 
an institution to change policy. 
These examples would provide helpful comparisons with the analysis of policy change and 
Europe contained in the 1997-2016 period that this thesis has studied. It would be interesting 
to compare and contrast whether or not the same, or different, endogenous and exogenous 
causal factors contributed to policy change during the separate historical periods. In addition, 
they would also provide additional tests of whether the new institutionalist theory insights 
could be applied to enhance the explanation, or whether the approach would need to be 
adjusted to compensate for the different historical and political circumstances. 
9.5 Conservative European Policy 1997-2016 and Brexit 
Since the June 2016 EU referendum a number of studies have attempted to provide an 
analysis of why a majority of those who participated voted to leave the EU and how the UK 
had found itself at this historical crossroads to begin with. Most of these studies have focused 
on a combination of the EU referendum campaign itself, political and demographic trends in 
public opinion leading up to the vote, the rise of UKIP, and short histories of the UK and EU 
(Ashcroft, 2016; Mosbacher and Wiseman, 2016; Clarke, et al, 2017; Evans and Menon, 
2017; Taylor, 2017). 
This thesis makes its own contribution to our collective understanding of the UK path 
towards Brexit. This is because how the UK has reached this point is as much about the 
politics of the Conservative Party with regards to European policy over the last twenty years, 
as it has been about long-term changing economic and social trends, though these are of 
course connected. This thesis has set out how Conservative policy on European integration 
moved in an incrementally more Eurosceptic direction between 1997-2016 and provided a 
theoretically and empirically informed interpretation of why policy changed the way that it 
did. In this concluding chapter, therefore, it is necessary to consider briefly to what extent the 
analysis in the proceeding chapters helps to explain the present situation the UK finds itself in 
regarding Brexit. 
In the years following the 1997 general election, and sustained under each preceding 
leadership and parliamentary cohort, the Conservative Party position became more hostile to 
the question of UK-European integration and more supportive of referendums as a policy 
mechanism to oppose it. The party strongly opposed all three EU reform treaties 
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(Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon) between 1997-2009 and proposed national referendums to 
prevent their ratification in Parliament by the Labour government. During this, as set out in 
Chapter 4, the European policy increasingly included areas of EU policy competence which 
the Conservative Party wanted to see reduced and returned to UK control, or at least 
fundamentally renegotiate.  
This put the party position at odds with the majority of centre-right parties in continental 
Europe and the general direction of the EU member states with regards the future of 
European integration, while being popular policies with a majority of Conservative MPs, 
MEPs, and party members. While in opposition, the party leadership were in a position to 
obfuscate when the question of how these positions on Europe were compatible with 
continued UK membership of the EU, as the other member states, EU institutions, and 
treaties presently understood it. This reality would be much harder to avoid when in 
government. The formation of the Coalition government in May 2010, and argument that the 
Liberal Democrats would prevent any of the more radical policies on Europe being 
implemented, did not satisfy many in the parliamentary and grassroots sections of the party 
who expected more extensive action to be taken after 13 years in opposition. 
The reaction to this response, especially from the campaign by Eurosceptics in Parliament to 
destabilise the government but also from the build-up of Eurosceptic attitudes and policy in 
the party during the previous 13 years, was the January 2013 in/out EU referendum pledge by 
Cameron. From this point, and with the path dependent nature of European policy as set out 
in this thesis, it can be argued that it was a question of when, not if, a future majority 
Conservative government would be compelled to legislate for a referendum on UK-EU 
membership.  
The methods of managing dissent in the party on this issue (candidate selection, patronage, 
discipline, allowing low-cost dissent, compromise and delayed decisions, treaty referendum 
pledges, and issue suppression), as identified by Lynch and Whitaker (2013a), produced 
increasingly diminished returns over the 1997-2016 period as more determined, Harder 
Eurosceptic, more independent, and more organised Conservative MPs resistant to 
compromise on this issue were elected to Parliament believing that the only way to remove 
the UK from the EU was through a referendum. Cameron, understanding that previous 
methods of suppressing dissent on the European question were no longer effective, saw the 
2013 in/out EU referendum pledge as the only hope to contain, and perhaps resolve, the issue 
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for a generation. As with the other methods of managing the ideological divisions over 
Europe in the Conservative Party adopted by previous leaderships, this ultimately also failed. 
 
9.6 Implications for Future Research 
 
This thesis has made an important contribution to the academic literature on the Conservative 
Party and European policy, British politics and European integration, in addition to literature 
on political parties and policy change. It has used a significant amount of original qualitative 
data from 36 interviews with party elites, many of whom had key roles in the policy making 
process, in combination with an in-depth analysis of multiple secondary qualitative and 
quantitative data sources. It has also shown that insights from a new institutionalist 
theoretical approach can be used to help enhance the explanation of policy change as a 
process over time. However, there are number of limitations to this research that could be 
improved upon, in addition to implications for future research in the post-Brexit era. 
Firstly, and has been commented previously in the empirical chapters, there remains limited 
academic sources on the views of contemporary Conservative Party members on European 
integration, and what impact this might have had on the selection of Eurosceptic 
parliamentary candidates. Academic survey data on the attitudes of party members would 
have been helpful in determining to what extent party members were in sync with the 
attitudes of the parliamentary party and current policy. The thesis concluded that party 
members were a limited influence on policy change, but more robust quantitative data would 
have helped to draw more firm conclusions. This will be important to any future research on 
the Conservative Party and Europe in the post-Brexit era. 
Secondly, the result of the June 2016 EU referendum brings into question to what extent the 
categorisation of ‘soft Eurosceptic-hard Eurosceptic’ or ‘pro-EU’ any longer has any 
application to future research into the Conservative Party and European policy in the UK, as 
it is currently understood in the party-based Euroscepticism literature. It is difficult to see 
how, logically, members of the parliamentary party could be classified as ‘pro-EU’ if they 
still support the UK leaving the EU, however close the relationship afterwards. Or, for that 
matter, a party currently in government being categorised as ‘soft Eurosceptic’ as they 
negotiate a UK withdrawal. It will be necessary to construct a new categorisation approach, 
on a spectrum between ‘Soft Brexit’ and ‘Hard Brexit’ during the negotiation and transition 
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phase. Beyond this will depend on what future political and economic relationship evolves 
between the UK and the EU, and how the present and future Conservative Party reacts to 
these continually changing circumstances. 
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Appendix: List of Interviewees 
 
 
1. Ancram, Michael. Marquess of Lothian. Conservative MP for Devizes, 1992-2010. 
Deputy Leader, 2001-2005. Interview 11/05/2016. 
 
2. Baron, John. Conservative MP for Basildon and Billericay, 2001-Present. Interview 
25/10/2016. 
 
3. Brady, Sir Graham. Conservative MP for Altrincham and Sale West. Shadow 
Minister for Europe, 2004-2007. Chair, 1922 Committee, 2010-Present. Interview 
11/05/2016. 
 
4. Cash, William. Conservative MP for Stone, 1997-Present. Shadow Cabinet 2001-
2003. Chair, European Scrutiny Committee, 2010-Present. Interview 27/10/2016. 
 
5. Carswell, Douglas. MP for Clacton, Conservative 2005-2014, UKIP 2014-2017. 
Interview 22/11/2017. 
 
6. Chope, Sir Christopher. Conservative MP for Southampton Itchen, 1983-1992, and 
Christchurch, 1997-Present. Interview 22/09/2016. 
 
7. Collins, Tim. Conservative MP for Westmorland and Lonsdale, 1997-2005. Shadow 
Cabinet 2001-2005. Interview 14/03/2016. 
 
8. Cooper, Andrew. Lord Cooper of Windrush. Conservative Party Director of Strategy, 
1997-1999, 2011-2013. Interview 02/03/2016. 
 
9. Davies, Phillip. Conservative MP for Shipley, 2005-Present. Interview 17/10/2016. 
 
10. Duncan-Smith, Iain. Conservative MP for Chingford, 1992-Present. Shadow Cabinet 
1997-2001. Leader, 2001-2003. Cabinet, 2010-2016. Interview 25/10/2016. 
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11. Goodman, Paul. Conservative MP for Wycombe, 2001-2010. Editor, 
ConservativeHome, 2010-Present. Interview 02/11/2016. 
 
12. Grieve, Rt Hon Dominic. Conservative MP for Beaconsfield, 1997-Present. Shadow 
Cabinet 2008-2010. Cabinet 2010-2014. Interview 28/10/2016. 
 
13. Hollobone, Phillip. Conservative MP for Kettering, 2005-Present. Interview 
09/09/2016. 
 
14. Howard, Michael. Lord Howard of Lympne. Conservative MP for Folkstone, 1983-
2010. Shadow Cabinet 1997-1999, 2001-2003. Leader, 2003-2005. Interview 
01/03/2016. 
 
15. Howarth, Christopher. Special Advisor to Shadow Minister for Europe, 2007-2010. 
Interview 03/03/2016. 
 
16. Howarth, Sir Gerald. Conservative MP for Aldershot, 1997-2017. Interview 
27/10/2016. 
 
17. Kwarteng, Kwasi. Conservative MP for Spelthorne, 2010-Present. Interview 
19/10/2016. 
 
18. MacGregor, Mark. CEO, Conservative Central Headquarters, 2002-2003. Interview 
17/03/2016. 
 
19. Mackay, Andrew. Conservative MP for East Berkshire and Bracknell, 1983-2010. 
Shadow Cabinet 1997-2001. Parliamentary/Political Advisor to David Cameron, 
2005-2009. Interview 01/03/2016. 
 
20. Maclean, David. Rt Hon Baron Blencathara of Penrith. Conservative MP for Penrith 
and The Borders, 1983-2010. Shadow Cabinet 2001-2005. Interview 26/10/2016. 
 
21. McMillan-Scott, Edward. Conservative MEP, 1984-2009, for Yorkshire and the 
Humber. Leader Conservative MEPs, 1997-2001. Interview 14/04/2016. 
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22. Mitchell, Andrew. Conservative MP for Sutton Coldfield, 2001-Present. Shadow 
Cabinet 2005-2010. Cabinet 2010-2012. Interview 15/3/2016. 
 
23. Nuttall, David. Conservative MP for Bury North, 2010-2017. Interview 22/10/2016. 
 
24. Private interview, 24/10/2016. 
 
25. Private interview, 19/10/2016. 
 
26. Private interview, 18/10/2017. 
 
27. Reckless, Mark. MP for Rochester and Strood. Conservative 2010-2014, UKIP 2014-
2015. Interview 13/11/2017. 
 
28. Rifkind, Rt Hon Sir Malcom. Conservative MP for Edinburgh Pentlands, 1974-1997, 
and Kensington, 2005-2015. Defence Secretary, 1992-1995. Foreign Secretary. 1995-
1997. Interview 25/02/2016. 
 
29. Sherbourne, Stephen. Lord Sherbourne of Risby. Chief of Staff to Michael Howard, 
2003-2005. Interview 27/04/2016. 
 
30. Spelman, Dame Caroline. Conservative MP for Meriden, 1997-Present. Shadow 
Cabinet 2001-2010. Cabinet 2010-2012. Interview 16/03/2016. 
 
31. Spicer, Michael. Rt Hon Lord Spicer or Cropthorne. Conservative MP for South 
Worcestershire, 1974-1997, West Worcestershire 1997-2010. Chairman, 1922 
Committee, 2001-2010. Interview 14/09/2017. 
 
32. Spring, Richard. Rt Hon Baron Risby of Haverhill. Conservative MP for Bury St 
Edmunds, 1992-1997, and West Suffolk, 1997-2010. Opposition Spokesperson for 
Foreign Affairs, 2000-2004. Interview 16/04/2016. 
 
 259 
33. Swayne, Sir Desmond. Conservative MP for New Forest East, 1997-Present. PPS to 
David Cameron, 2004-2012. Interview 18/10/2016. 
 
34. Van Orden, Geoffrey. Conservative MEP for East England, 1999-Present. Interview 
12/10/2016. 
 
35. Wharton, James. Conservative MP for Stockton South, 2010-2017. Interview 
18/10/2016. 
 
36. Widdecombe, Rt Hon Anne. Conservative MP for Maidstone, 1987-2010. Shadow 
Cabinet 1998-2001. Interview 29/02/2016. 
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